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the post-‘war on drugs’ era has begun. prohibitionist policies must now take a 
back seat to the new, comprehensive, people-centred set of universal goals and 
targets that we know as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
Nation states and the global drug regulatory system must shift to principles of sustainable development that 
include: public health, harm reduction of consumption and supply, access to essential medicines, and scientific 
experimentation with strict legal regulation. 
To enable this transformation, nation states should drastically deprioritise the prohibitionist goals of the past. They 
must implement new comprehensive development policies dealing with the root causes of problems associated with 
illicit drugs.
The ‘war on drugs’ caused the international community to prioritise prohibitionist policies over sustainable 
development at a terrible socioeconomic cost. As the United Nations Development Programme highlights in the 
discussion paper excerpted in this report, ‘evidence indicates that drug control policies often leave an indelible 
footprint on sustainable human development processes and outcomes… [and] have fuelled the marginalisation of 
people linked with illicit drug use or markets.’
This report recognises that key reforms within the global regulatory system will come from changes at the national 
and local levels. It highlights that the UN drug control treaties recommend an approach grounded in the ‘health and 
welfare’ of mankind. Further, it emphasises that human rights obligations have absolute supremacy over drug control 
goals and as such there is sufficient interpretive scope within the treaties to experiment with social scientific policies 
that can further global health and welfare.
The world can shift away from counterproductive and ineffective drug policies. The UN General Assembly Special 
Session in 2016 is a key platform for driving debate. However, the ultimate impetus lies with countries to reform their 
policies based on evidence and local realities. This report provides a framework for achieving this shift.
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Executive Summary 
John Collins
The ‘war on drugs’ has been largely discredited on the international stage. Former and sitting presidents, Nobel Prize winners, heads of UN agencies and other world leaders have all in some way rubbished the idea of the international community waging war against already marginalised groups of people as a way to prevent substance use or misuse. It is for 
this reason that the UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) in April 2016, whatever the explicit consensus outcomes, 
represents the global end point in a failed and counterproductive strategy. The question now is what comes after the drug wars. 
 
This report suggests a new set of guiding policy principles for both the national and international levels. First, replace prohibitionist 
drug policy goals with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Second, drastically expand public health approaches, including harm 
reduction services. Third, apply the principles of harm reduction to supply-side policies and management of illicit markets. Fourth, utilise 
inherent flexibilities within the conventions to engage in rigorously monitored social scientific policy experimentation, conforming to 
strict public health and human rights principles. 
The Role foR MulTilaTeRalisM
 
In the first two chapters John Collins and Francisco Thoumi discuss 
the UN drug conventions and the role of multilateralism after the 
drug wars. Both argue for a more nuanced implementation of the 
international drug control treaties with much closer regard to local 
development, welfare, public health and human rights. They also 
highlight innate flexibilities within the treaties. 
John Collins demonstrates that a ‘development first’ approach to 
drug policy reigned prior to the declaration of the ‘war on drugs’ in 
the 1970s, and he calls for a return to this principle. He highlights that 
the UN drug conventions were not written as a ‘prohibition regime,’ 
and instead their core ‘intent’ and ‘purpose’ was ‘an international trade 
regulatory framework’ with broad national scope for interpretation 
and implementation. Collins highlights that extreme prioritisations 
of prohibitionist policies produced the modern ‘war on drugs,’ but 
this can be rolled back through prioritising development and welfare 
policies, outlined in the SDGs.
 
Francisco Thoumi explores the logical consistency of the 
conventions. He highlights that, despite limiting drug uses to ‘medical 
and scientific purposes,’ these key terms are not defined in the 
conventions and current interpretations exclude any contribution of 
the social sciences. Consequently, because these ‘key determinants 
of the allowed drug uses are not defined, it is logically impossible 
to know if any specific policy complies with the conventions, 
and it is not possible to rule out any policy as ‘unscientific’,’ 
including those based on ‘social scientific’ experimentation. 
RegulaTing DRug ConsuMpTion anD supply
 
There is a clear policy consensus in favour of decriminalising 
drug consumption to reduce the harms of drug prohibition and 
support public health. Catalina Pérez Correa, Rodrigo Uprimny 
and Sergio Chaparro highlight that, despite the overt reformist 
discourse, ‘Latin American governments maintain a predominantly 
punitive and repressive approach to illegal drugs and their use.’ 
Their paper seeks to explain why, and analyses some of the 
moral and theoretical problems implied by criminalisation. They 
argue that ‘with little in its defence, regulation of possession must be 
revised’ in order ‘to protect users from the application of unjust and 
disproportionate laws and practices.’
Jonathan Caulkins examines the legalisation of cannabis and, 
potentially, other currently illicit substances. Leaving aside the 
question of whether legalisation is a good idea, he focuses on 
principles for how best to implement it. He highlights that, 
(1) Heavy users are prone to abuse dependence-inducing intoxicants; 
(2) Industry prioritises profit over protecting customers, recognising 
that most sales and profits flow from the minority of heavy 
consumers; (3) Regulatory bodies are prone to industry capture. 
As such, the regulatory architecture should be stacked in favor of 
protecting public health, most notably the welfare of the heavy users 
who lose control over their consumption.
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TowaRD ‘haRM ReDuCTion’ 
foR The supply-siDe
 
Given the continued existence of an 
enormous illicit drugs market, whatever 
the outcome of small scale regulatory 
experimentation, the following five papers 
examine the role of supply-side policies 
within the SDGs. Three focus explicitly on 
applying the concept of ‘harm reduction’ 
to supply-side policies, while two examine 
case studies.
Peter Reuter, Harold Pollack and Bryce 
Pardo examine the ‘classic and critical 
assumption of the ‘war on drugs’,’ namely ‘that 
more stringent enforcement would raise 
price.’ They highlight that ‘there is minimal 
evidence’ in favour of that assumption, 
although warning that the research base 
is so weak as to make a firmer statement 
‘unwarranted.’  They suggest explanations for 
why enforcement fails at the margins to raise 
prices. Further, they elaborate a set of metrics 
for policing as well as concluding that ‘harm 
reduction’ ‘is most helpful in identifying a set 
of guiding questions which ought to inform 
drug policy and drug law enforcement.’
Michael Shiner points to ‘a central paradox 
of drug policing - what is politically 
acceptable cannot be achieved, but what is 
achievable is not politically acceptable.’ He 
highlights that prevalence of drug use varies 
sharply between countries, but is not causally 
related to the severity of the local drug 
policy regime. He warns that inappropriate 
policing increases market violence, health 
harms and damages police legitimacy. He 
suggests harm reduction policing can tackle 
underlying problems rather than simply 
responding to specific incidents. 
Even in the case of specific market shifts, 
the causes are unclear and rarely causally 
attributable to supply interventions. 
Beau Kilmer examines the US cocaine market, 
which appeared to shrink by roughly 50% from 
2006 to 2010. He explores twelve hypotheses 
for the market reduction and concludes that it 
is too early to determine the cause. However, if 
further research points to supply-side polices, 
‘this does not mean that supply reduction is 
the optimal approach for reducing problem 
consumption; much depends on the particular 
drug, stage of the epidemic, characteristics 
of the country and the perspective of the 
decision maker. It would, however, challenge 
the conventional wisdom that supply-side 
interventions can do little to influence mature 
consumption markets.’
 
Vanda Felbab-Brown examines the security 
situation in Mexico. She highlights that 
major human rights violations and drug 
violence persist. Security policy remains 
focused on the military and Federal Police, 
with a lack of planning and operational 
design. Criminalisation has fuelled low-level 
incarceration.  Meanwhile, the Supreme Court 
is moving towards marijuana legalisation. 
She highlights that decriminalisation and 
legalisation will need to be coupled with 
comprehensive law enforcement (beyond 
high-value targeting), extending state 
presence, developing socioeconomic 
anti-crime efforts and strengthening citizen-
state bonds. 
Mark Shaw warns the emerging public 
health consensus towards consumption 
comes at a risk if it allows a return to 
established law enforcement practices 
further down the supply chain. He reiterates 
that the harms from criminal networks are 
frequently only exacerbated by hard-line 
criminal justice and militarised approaches. 
He examines  ‘widening the scope of the 
harm reduction concept to the drugs supply 
chain in its entirety, and to organised crime 
itself.’ Shaw highlights that UNGASS and 
the SDGs can help make a linkage between 
security and development issues and thereby 
help protect development interventions 
from criminal exploitation – and to deliver 
services where they are needed most.  That, 
he points out, is the route to undercutting 
criminalised violence. 
TowaRDs susTainable 
DRug poliCies & The sDgs
 
The final four chapters examine how key 
development issues intersect with drugs, 
peace and security policies.
Drawing on the UNDP discussion paper 
on the development dimensions of drug 
policy, Javier Segredo, Rebecca Schleifer 
and Tenu Avafia highlight that repressive 
and prohibitionist drug policies have 
frequently been implemented irrespective 
of development goals. Further, these 
policies have had little effect in eradicating 
production or problematic drug use, while 
exacerbating poverty, impeding sustainable 
development and threatening the health 
and human rights of the most marginalised 
people. Further drug control agencies and 
development institutions have tended to 
 
 
operate in isolation or at cross-purposes. 
They argue that to succeed in meeting the 
SDGs and drug control goals, UN entities and 
Member States must commit to a sustainable 
development approach to drugs. 
Kasia Malinowska-Sempruch and Olga 
Rychkova examine the impact of repressive 
drug policies on women and ‘the children 
for whom women are often the principal 
caregivers.’ They highlight that incarceration 
of women for drug offences is increasing 
rapidly in many parts of the world, including 
Latin America, with broader societal impacts. 
Further, punitive drug laws result in children 
being taken from mothers, reduce access to 
essential health and treatment services and 
stigmatise vulnerable populations placing 
them at much higher risk of HIV, HCV and 
other health-related issues. They highlight 
that less punitive laws for minor and non-
violent drug infractions are the best single 
means of reducing incarceration of women 
and thus incarceration-related abuse. They 
suggest new policies, targets, metrics and 
indicators to reverse or at least mitigate 
these impacts.
Joanne Csete examines a sustainable and 
effective public health approach to drugs. 
She highlights that aggressive policing and 
incarceration results in higher HIV, hepatitis 
C and tuberculosis risks. She then looks 
‘beyond the impact of drug policy on the 
health of the individual,’ to examine the 
ways a focus on repressive drug policies 
has distorted and limited public health 
science, research and practice as tools to 
address drug problems. Further, she shows 
the need for greater scepticism about the 
supposed effectiveness of drug courts and 
highlights that UN agencies and treaty 
bodies, ‘which should promote evidence-
based best practices in research and 
programmes, have too often been silent 
or complicit with questionable research 
(and programme) directions.’
David Mansfield examines rural 
development and drug control. He 
highlights that illicit crop production often 
represents ‘a dual edged sword,’ generating 
both benefits and costs for producer 
countries, while ‘Alternative Development’ 
achieves very limited results and fails on pro-
poor development outcomes. As a result, 
development organisations are often ill at 
ease when engaging with the challenges of 
illicit drug production in the global south and 
tend to ignore the illicit economy altogether. 
He subsequently highlights that many drug 
control statistics are methodologically weak 
and ignore the wider socioeconomic, political 
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and environmental context. This reinforces 
the tendency towards simplistic models 
of rural development where development 
assistance is a means to leverage reductions 
in drug crop cultivation from rural elites and 
power brokers while development outcomes 
go largely unnoticed.
on MeTRiCs anD inDiCaToRs
Each chapter includes a discussion on 
metrics and indicators. John Collins 
writes that to ‘walk into a discussion on the 
direction of drug policy in any meeting is to 
walk in on a discussion of the need for new 
metrics, indicators, or in some circles, for 
new data. The assertion is rarely followed by 
any tangible elaboration of actual metrics 
and indicators.’ In this report most authors 
offer a critique, furtherance of or greater 
level of specificity to the metrics debate in 
a purposely informal and discursive manner. 
ConClusion
The international community’s great mistake 
over the past few decades has been to treat 
drugs as a singular issue, independent of 
broader socioeconomic determinants. The 
result has been policies fixating on greater 
repression on the demand or supply side 
as a means to eradicate the problem, 
with occasional funding for ineffectual 
‘alternative development’ programmes as a 
‘softer’ approach. UNGASS is an opportunity 
to correct this strategic imbalance. It is 
an opportunity to move beyond short-
termist approaches  that target symptoms 
rather than  causes. Going forward, drug 
policy  should not be seen as a  supply 
reduction, demand reduction or alternative 
development issue. It is, first and foremost, a 
sustainable development issue. 
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Development First:  
Multilateralism in the  
Post-'War on Drugs' Era
John Collins1
The failures of the ‘war on drugs’ have been well documented elsewhere.2 Former and sitting presidents throughout Latin America to the sitting President of the United States, his former Attorney General, and now the Prime Minister of Canada 
all openly reject the ‘war on drugs’ in favour of new approaches grounded in public health 
and policy alternatives including legal regulation of cannabis. The Director of the US 
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), Michael Botticelli, recently described the 
war on drugs as ‘all wrong.’3
SUMMARY 
 ■ UNGASS 2016 will mark the beginning 
of the post-war on drugs era. 
 ■ The international system has moved 
toward a new cooperative structure 
based on the tenets of ‘policy 
pluralism,’ which is the most fortuitous 
route toward developing the social 
scientific base.
 ■ The rigidity and obligations of the 
drug treaties are often drastically 
overstated, and the obligation to 
pursue policies which we equate with 
the ‘war on drugs’ are virtually  
non-existent.
 ■ From the very beginning, the UN  
drug conventions were read in  
terms of local socioeconomic and 
political realities.
 ■ A ‘development first’ approach had 
frequently been the case before the 
declaration of the ‘war on drugs’ in  
the 1970s.
 ■ ‘Medical and scientific’ use was a 
constantly shifting parameter based 
on reigning cultural norms. The UN 
was generally a reflection of this, not  
a determinant.
 ■ Portrayals of the UN drug conventions 
as ‘prohibitionist’ are historically 
inaccurate, and the treaties’  
‘intent’ and ‘purpose’ was for a 
relatively loose international trade 
regulatory framework. 
 ■ An extreme focus on specific 
prohibitionist policies produced the 
modern ‘war on drugs.’ However, this 
can be rolled back through local and 
national policy choices.
 ■ Multilateral reforms, although 
occurring, will inevitably lag behind 
local and national reforms.
Regardless of the official outcomes of the 
UNGASS 2016, it represents the end point 
of the global ‘war on drugs’ era.4 The key 
questions remain; how to reform national 
and international approaches to drugs, 
where to direct scarce resources, how to 
translate evidence into policy, and what 
policies to replace the ‘war on drugs’ strategy 
with. While a wholesale change in national 
regulatory structures, let alone international 
ones, seems far off, incremental shifts have 
begun and look likely to pick up steam. In 
this new era, the post-‘war on drugs’ era, as 
this paper argues, national and local spheres 
increasingly hold greater relevance than 
international ones in determining policy 
choices and outcomes. 
At the international level this is reflected 
in greater reliance on treaty ‘flexibilities’ to 
sustain international cooperation, even if 
that cooperation occurs on an entirely new 
implementation framework.5 Some reject 
flexibilities as a ‘cop out’ to avoid rewriting the 
treaties or  claim flexibilities on drug treaties 
represent a threat to international law.6 
This paper rejects both of these arguments, 
highlighting that the history of UN drug 
control is poorly understood, the domestic 
obligations of the treaties overstated, and 
the obligation to pursue policies which 
we equate with the ‘war on drugs’ largely 
non-existent. This chapter argues that 
selective enforcement, policy prioritisation, 
wide national regulatory variations, and 
purposefully undefined criteria for ‘medical 
and scientific’ use7 all represent ingrained 
interpretive room within the conventions, 
reinforced with an absence of any tangible 
treaty enforcement mechanisms.
This chapter highlights that the treaties 
themselves do not constitute a ‘prohibition 
regime’ mandating a ‘war on drugs.’ It shows 
that the treaties represent a relatively loose 
international trade regulatory framework. 
Like all regulatory frameworks they suggest 
permitted and non-permitted (or prohibited) 
practices. An extreme focus on tackling 
certain types of prohibited behaviours from 
the 1970s onwards produced the modern 
‘war on drugs’ – but it is far from a direct by-
product of the UN drug conventions.8
Moreover, the chapter demonstrates 
that throughout the twentieth century, 
drug control imperatives were repeatedly 
subsumed to security, development, political 
stability and population welfare imperatives 
or  what we might now refer to under the 
umbrella of  ‘development issues.’ It was 
only during the ‘war on drugs’ era, 1971-
2016, that drug policies became increasingly 
untethered from other policy realities. By 
highlighting that drug policies can once 
again be subsumed to development policies, 
i.e. the current Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) framework, it suggests a return 
to a ‘development first’ approach to drugs 
and drug policy.
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Finally, this paper highlights new interpretive 
frameworks for the post-war on drugs era that build 
on convention ‘flexibilities’ to enable a new round 
of social scientific policy experimentation. It argues 
that the forthcoming role for multilateralism is to 
provide a functional cooperative framework to 
help member states (the executors of the treaties) 
to manage this issue, mitigate cross-border spill-
overs, forward evidence-based drug policies, 
and openly challenge practices unjustified by 
evidence and banned by human rights law. 
eXplaining The enD of The 
‘waR on DRugs’ eRa
The changed international paradigm has been 
precipitated by four main factors: 
1. Recognition of broad failures of supply 
reduction policies;9
2. A massive normative shift away from 
repressive demand reduction policies toward 
public health oriented policies based on 
voluntary treatment provision and harm 
reduction;10
3. Interpretive widening around UN drug 
control treaties, and a recognition that 
these treaties sit within a wider plethora of 
development and human rights needs and 
obligations (see below); 
4. A small number of ground-breaking shifts 
in national regulatory regimes, particularly 
cannabis legalisation.
Many international forums, once bastions of the 
prohibitionist mentality of market eradication and 
zero tolerance to drug use, now openly discuss 
compassion and public health approaches. The 
interventions (if not the language) of ‘harm 
reduction’ are increasingly recognised for their 
efficacy. The clear failures of ‘demand reduction’ 
and ‘supply reduction’ policies militate against 
cheerleading for a continuation of a police-led and 
militarised strategy.11 Few still seriously speak of a 
‘drug free world.’ Meanwhile, emerging regulatory 
experimentation with recreational drug markets is 
widely viewed as either inevitable12 or a positive 
empirical social scientific experiment.13
unDeRsTanDing The ‘puRpose’ 
anD iMpleMenTaTion of 
The ConVenTions14
The conventions are frequently described in 
terms of mandates toward prohibition. It is, as is 
often repeated, a ‘prohibition regime’ advocating 
a clear set of prohibitionist principles.15 The 
treaties are, as some have put it: ‘fundamentally 
about prohibition.’16 These principles, it is inferred, 
mandate unconstrained and symmetrical 
enforcement around preventing the non-medical 
and non-scientific use of certain substances.17 
This interpretation usually begins with the current 
policy framework as the logical outcome of the 
treaties and thereby reads the history backwards 
from the current approach. The treaties preceded 
the war on drugs and therefore must have 
mandated it. Further, in the absence of textual 
clarity within the documents their ‘prohibitionist’ 
intent is often used to infer an obligation to 
repressive policies in legal analyses.18 
Those which deviate from this ‘prohibitionist’ 
approach, the Swiss, the Dutch, Uruguay, the US, 
Bolivia (and others which avoid the flashlight 
of international attention19) are regarded as 
aberrations or ‘defections’ from the clear intent of 
the conventions.20 This establishes a dichotomy 
between strict treaty adherents and those 
defecting from or  ‘breaching’ the treaties. This 
dichotomy is then used to argue for the necessity 
of treaty rewriting.
The following examples, far from exhaustive, intend 
to highlight that instead of a clear dichotomy 
between adherence and ‘breach,’ implementation 
has always ranged on a broad spectrum. This 
implementation was determined by resource 
constraints, local economic development, security 
policy, political stability and geopolitics. As one 
UK diplomatic brief in 1951 highlighted, parts of 
the drug conventions had frequently ‘been more 
honoured in the breach than in the observance.’21 
Nevertheless, the conventions have traditionally 
been viewed as a useful coalescing mechanism for 
international cooperation and therefore deserving 
public declamations of respect and adherence. 
Legal accommodations (what we today might 
call ‘flexibilities’) have been a common part of the 
international discourse, and generally accepted 
provided they sustained a sense of coherent 
international management of the issue.22
’
‘ The treaties represent a relatively 
loose international 
trade regulatory 
framework. Like 
all regulatory 
frameworks they 
suggest permitted 
and non-permitted 
(or prohibited) 
practices. An 
extreme focus on 
tackling certain 
types of prohibited 
behaviours from 
the 1970s onwards 
produced the 
modern ‘war on 
drugs’ – but it is far 
from a direct by-
product of the UN 
drug conventions.
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Regulations oveR PRohibitions:
Far from a system focused on ‘prohibition,’ prior to the ‘war on drugs’ 
era, prohibitions represented one (relatively minor) aspect of a 
broader international regulatory and trading arrangement. The vast 
majority of diplomatic fuel from 1924-1971, when the modern treaty 
system evolved, was burned on developing international production 
regulations – i.e. establishing how many states could grow opium 
and other substances and in what quantities. The US favoured a 
strict oligopoly of producers based on quotas, while other powerful 
drug manufacturing states preferred a relatively free market to keep 
opium prices low.
Prohibitionist aspects of international treaties, for example against 
state sanctioned opium smoking or problematic cultivation, were 
of secondary interest. Many, the UK for example, thought the latter 
unsolvable and held much ‘sympathy for the raw [opium] producing 
countries.’23 They merely sought to enshrine market protections 
for their pharmaceutical firms in treaty law. Further, when the 
conventions were formulated, European countries had extremely 
low levels of domestic consumption. They viewed a well-regulated 
international trade as the best mechanism to keep consumption 
low and undermine the illicit market. Under this trajectory of 
supply management, international provisions around managing 
consumption were generally sidestepped24 or kept as relatively 
unobtrusive as possible. Again, as one UK diplomat wrote, British 
public opinion ‘little excited by a drugs menace, would not favour 
extravagant local penalties to meet a world problem.’25 
PRioRitising Policies: DeveloPment, secuRity anD 
WelfaRe fiRst:
When international obligations pushed against the continuation of 
preferred regulatory policies, the latter were generally continued 
regardless of the treaties by referring to mitigating factors. The 1912 
and 1925 conventions suggested prohibitions on opium smoking 
and accompanying production in Asia. However, the imperial powers 
in pre- and post-World War II Asia largely refused to implement them 
because state structures were too weak to do so, medical systems 
- let alone treatment services - were non-existent, and because it 
would simply fuel an already large regional illicit market. 
Instead, their focus was to regulate existing consumption via 
monopolies and maintenance. They could then aim toward 
a time when prohibitions would be feasible and not produce 
more harm than good.26 For example, many of the monopolies 
enacted registration and rationing systems and in many areas 
the core focus of opium policy was merely to make government 
opium more competitive than illicit opium. The goal was, first and 
foremost, do no policy harm and second to lessen the harms of the 
regional illicit markets.27 Blind adherence to international policy 
agendas forwarded by, what one British medical official called 
‘statistics-bound opiophobes’ and ‘anti-opium propagandists,’ 
‘would be foolish as well as wrong’ if it didn’t take account of 
local realities.28
The Dutch and British, in particular, focused their diplomatic efforts 
on creating a fully regulated global licit market (see below) to 
undermine the illicit one. If this could be shown to demonstrably 
suppress the illicit market and make prohibitions more sensible 
they would be countenanced. Even then, however, they insisted on 
‘a reasonable transitional period’ to shift away from certain types 
of consumption.29  Prohibitions on certain types of use could be 
viewed as end goals but only if a whole array of development and 
governance outcomes were secured first.30
Quiet bilateral pressure from the US eventually pushed the UK to 
officially end government supplies of smoking opium to registered 
users in most colonies at the end of World War II.31 However, in many 
cases, local policies remained unchanged or the form of government 
‘maintenance’ changed. For example, the Colonial Office merely 
switched to providing opium in pill form, as this was seen as more 
in line with conceptions of ‘medical and scientific’ use of the day.32 
Yet, as political unrest continued in Malaya through the late-1940s, 
they consciously avoided enforcing pointless prohibitions on 
smoking opium and deflected attention by once again highlighting 
illicit trafficking in the region as a mitigating factor.33 The UK also 
steadfastly refused to implement immediate prohibitions in Burma 
after World War II, despite intense US pressure.34
The US itself was extremely selective on enforcement. It was happy 
to pressure states to implement prohibitions, but would ignore 
them the moment broader geopolitical interests intervened. For 
example, although the US was ostensibly pushing Iran to limit opium 
production after World War II, embassy officials in Tehran, bucking 
against congressional pressure, cited ‘patent instability’ and refused 
to lobby for measures against opium production until stability 
returned.35 In the 1940s and 1950s the US ignored high levels of 
opium smuggling from Kuomintang insurgents in Burma, continued 
opium smoking in French Indochina36 and Mexican domestic opium 
production.37
What these and numerous other examples show is that drug issues 
were almost never read in isolation of broader health, welfare, 
development and security targets, and rarely as absolute obligations 
to institute un-sequenced and self-defeating policies. 
Therefore, the history of the international system highlights that:
 
 
1. The term ‘Medical and scientific’ use was the treaty 
delineator between licit and illicit practices. However, 
it was a consistently shifting parameter determined 
by reigning cultural norms. The international control 
system was a reflection of these norms, not a 
determinant. In the Single Convention the definition 
of ‘medical and scientific’ use was consciously left to 
member states38 to decide alongside broad scopes to 
implement national regulations. 
2. Bilateral political pressure was often the key driver of 
shifts toward prohibitive models of regulation, not any 
overweening fidelity to a prohibitionist reading of the 
drug conventions. Recourse to bilateral pressure was, 
in-turn, generally determined by, and subservient to, 
broader geopolitical interests.
3. The conventions, from the very beginning, were 
read and implemented with close regard to local 
socioeconomic and political realities. This has since 
been extended to include UN human rights regimes 
which mitigate against repressive policies. 
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the un as a noRmative actoR:
The UN is frequently referred to as the 
‘policemen’ of global prohibition. This is 
something not mandated by any treaty. 
Moreover, the UN CND is effectively a 
democratic forum populated by member 
states. The International Narcotics Control 
Board (INCB) is not a UN body - it has a 
role in assisting member states in treaty 
implementation and highlighting concerns 
to CND, but has little room for autonomous 
action, let alone enforcement. The drug 
secretariat (currently UNODC) exists to 
facilitate CND and member state policies. The 
Secretariat has played a role in advocating 
repressive policies and setting national 
policy trajectories toward the ‘war on drugs.’ 
However, this arose through agenda setting, 
policy dissemination and nudging toward 
repressive policies by suggesting they were 
based in best-practice evidence. 
For example, the UN drug secretariat was 
instrumental in shaping the international 
narrative around managing consumption. 
This normative framework was established 
by a questionnaire circulated to member 
states in March 1947. Independent of any 
treaty obligations, questions were designed 
to suggest repressive and strict measures as 
the natural response, such as asking whether 
provision had been made to isolate drug 
‘addicts’ from the rest of the population.39 
States began vying to outdo each other at 
CND in highlighting the severity of control 
and punishment. Soon the arrest of ‘addicts,’ 
overprescribing doctors, illicit traffickers and 
other narcotics laws violators were viewed as 
metrics of success in international control.40 
The implication is that these were policy 
trajectories and choices, to which treaty 
debates have little relevance. Member states 
can, just as they rolled toward these policies, 
roll back from them. UNODC, just as its 
predecessors painted repression as the policy 
du-jour, can now highlight more effective 
policies in its place.
the single convention:
The obligations, architecture and authorship 
of the Single Convention are widely 
misunderstood. It was a consolidation 
of existing treaties with some minor 
advances, such as defining the parameters 
of supply regulation and suggesting further 
prohibitions on types of non-medical and 
non-scientific use (while leaving these terms 
purposely undefined).
Far from being the author of the document, 
the US rejected the Single Convention 
because it was seen as too permissive. The 
US failed to secure key goals and, due to an 
inept delegation,41 the diplomatic heavy 
lifting was taken over by the UK who drove 
the compromise Single Convention through. 
For example, the US strongly advocated 
wording suggesting states consider a 
‘closed institutional’ method of dealing 
with addiction (a euphemism for confined 
compulsory treatment or  incarceration) if 
resources permitted. Even this watered down 
version could not make it into the draft.42
Most importantly, the Single Convention 
allowed for the regulation of international 
supplies of drugs, but provided no 
mechanism for shrinking them, other than 
mild dissuasion – for example, self-reporting 
exports to the INCB. The US instead pushed 
for the stalled and wildly unpopular 1953 
Opium Protocol which would have limited the 
production and export of opiates to a global 
oligopoly of countries. The US delegation 
pointed out that the Single Convention was 
based on ‘an entirely different concept’ of 
production limitation than the 1953 Protocol. 
The Single Convention, they wrote, contained: 
‘a compromise provision resulting from the 
insistence of the Soviet Bloc, countries in the 
British Commonwealth, and some African 
countries that the new countries be permitted 
to produce and export opium if they so 
desire.’43 As a result, one major US press source 
described the Single Convention as a ‘Soviet 
plot’ to flood the world with opium.44
It was not until 1967 that the State 
Department shifted policy and drove its 
ratification through the Senate.45 Eventually 
the White House unilaterally declared the 
‘war on drugs’ in 1971. It thereafter focused 
on aggressive bilateral diplomacy, funding 
efforts and ensuring regulatory capture of 
international bodies such as INCB, the UN 
drug secretariats, and exerting significant 
political capital at CND. 
‘Later conventions were additions to the 
regulatory framework but provided little 
that was new. The 1971 Convention was 
an even looser regulatory framework than 
the Single Convention and was written 
with a burgeoning drug industry in mind, 
while the 1988 Convention was written in 
terms of the 1961 Convention’s regulatory 
framework.46 These conventions and 
relevant international bodies provided a 
useful enabling mechanism to coalesce 
member states around, while growing drug 
consumption in traditionally recalcitrant 
regions like Europe facilitated the US global 
‘war on drugs’ pincer movement. A global 
regulatory framework matured alongside 
and was co-opted by the ‘war on drugs,’ but 
it was not a determining factor.
summaRy
From 1909-1967 a global regulatory system 
was created at the international level to 
manage the flows of ‘dangerous drugs.’ It was 
a system of trade regulation – not a system 
of global prohibition. Like all regulatory 
systems it created a distinction between ‘licit’ 
activities and ‘illicit’ activities. The former 
centred on undefined ‘medical and scientific’ 
use of ‘scheduled’ substances, while the 
latter centred on undefined forms of non-
medical and non-scientific use and diversion. 
The overall goal was to create a ‘planned’ 
international market,47 with demand being 
predicted by industry and governments, 
and supply being determined by a central 
bureaucratic group of number crunchers 
– what became INCB – while transactions 
would be left to the market.
The assumption of its architects was that 
a functioning regulatory system would 
absorb most licit production, lessen the illicit 
market and thereby help lessen non-medical 
and non-scientific consumption. What 
would remain would be a minimal role for 
enforcement activities.48 These assumptions 
proved misplaced as drug consumption 
grew rapidly in the 1960s onwards and 
with it the global illicit market. Further, an 
overly westernised conception of ‘medical 
and scientific’ consumption consigned 
large swathes of traditional medical use 
to the illicit market and with it the regions 
where it was present. Simultaneously, 
those advocating a police oriented and 
repressive and militarised approach gained 
prominence and eventually instigated the 
‘war on drugs’ of the 1970s – 2000s. However, 
by 2008 it was clear that this approach was 
not working and member states began to 
openly question the consensus. It is toward 
this period we now turn.
Medical and scientific’ use was 
the treaty delineator between 
licit and illicit practices.  
However, it was a consistently 
shifting parameter determined 
by reigning cultural norms.  
The international control 
system was a reflection of 
these norms, not  
a determinant.
‘
’
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Meanwhile, governmental views on drug 
treaty issues were summed up by one senior 
Latin American political leader in 2014: ‘we 
examined the treaties closely and concluded 
there is nothing in them which requires a ‘war 
on drugs.’52 While many observers continued 
to argue normative, legal and moral 
imperatives for treaty rewriting, pragmatism 
seemed increasingly absent. Latin American 
governments, while leading the debate, 
appear to have done so for a variety of reasons 
including: geopolitics, national self-interest, 
diplomatic manoeuvring, pragmatism, a 
desire to pursue effective and evidence-
based policies and other idiosyncrasies. 
When some of these factors began to shift or 
results were unclear, their willingness to bear 
the resource and time burdens of endless 
diplomatic processes waned. 
The US, on the other hand, simply shifted 
their interpretation of the international 
treaties after several states moved toward 
cannabis legalisation. Further, in moments 
of bluntness, State Department officials 
have openly asserted national sovereignty 
tempered by a need to defuse international 
criticisms.53 Conservative actors within 
the control system, most notably the 
diplomatically inept President of INCB (a 
treaty body with an abysmal human rights 
record),54 Raymond Yans, sparked ire by 
publicly castigating Uruguay for legalising 
cannabis while seeming to avoid direct 
confrontation with the US.55
Simultaneously, a number of other 
‘flexibility frameworks’ emerged to deflate 
the conventions as an obstacle to reform. 
Europe, while expressing discomfort with 
overtly highlighting international legal 
instruments as ‘flexible,’ preferred to speak 
of interpretive ‘scope,’ downplay the debate 
and keep it off their already packed policy 
agenda. Asia, meanwhile, sought a path of 
‘steady as she goes’ on the ‘war on drugs,’ 
with ASEAN nations continuing the ‘drug free 
world’ pursuit.56 Russia, pursuing the maxim 
of ‘offence is the best defence,’ grappled with 
building repressive coalitions around anti-
public health policies – for example an anti-
methadone coalition57 – and pushing a hard-
line on opium production in Afghanistan. 
The likelihood of creating a new ‘consensus’ 
across these diverse blocs on this divisive 
issue hardly needs elaborating.
The UN stepped in to take clearer control 
of the negotiating reins. Soon the UNGASS 
process became bogged down in consensus 
building and the reform impetus appeared 
to stall. By mid-late 2015, expectations for 
the UNGASS meeting reached rock bottom. 
Some looked to 2019 as the ‘next big step’ 
where true UN reforms could be enacted. 
Others looked outside the system. As one 
senior Latin American official stated in a private 
roundtable: ‘the current system does not work 
for us and we cannot wait for it to change.’58
In the years 2008-16 the UN served as a useful 
forum for driving a change in the normative 
underpinnings of global drug policies. By 
exposing the contradictions between the 
UN’s approach to drug policy and broader 
approaches to human rights, development 
and public health (most notably in the 
field of HIV), significant rhetorical and 
policy shifts occurred. These changes have 
been internalised by CND, UNODC and its 
corresponding bodies. This percolated down 
to member states, many of whom more 
openly laud human rights and public health 
policies. However, while governments have 
absorbed the language of reform, they have 
generally avoided major shifts in budgets 
and policies. To tackle this latter issue now 
requires a shift beyond international forums 
and a greater focus on changing national 
and regional funding and policy goals.
poliCy eXpeRiMenTaTion in 
a ChangeD inTeRnaTional 
enViRonMenT
 
As US Assistant Secretary of State for the 
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs, Ambassador William 
Brownfield stated: ‘Things have changed 
since 1961. We must have enough flexibility 
to allow us to incorporate those changes 
into our policies … to tolerate different 
national drug policies, to accept the fact that 
some countries will have very strict drug 
approaches; other countries will legalise 
entire categories of drugs.’59
There is no single mechanism to define the 
boundaries of the treaties. Member states 
must instead decide whether the national 
regulatory systems they enact remain ‘in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning’ of the treaties, as mandated by the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.60 
Meanwhile, as Mark Kleiman and Jeremy 
Ziskind note: ‘The places that legalise 
cannabis first will provide – at some risk to 
their own populations – an external benefit to 
the rest of the world in the form of knowledge, 
however the experiments turn out…[t]he 
guardians of the international treaty regimes 
would be well advised to keep their hands off 
as long as the pioneering jurisdictions take 
adequate measures to prevent ‘exports.’61 
The ReCenT hisToRy of 
ungass, 2008-2016:49
 
In 2008, amidst carnage in Mexico and a 
recognition of the mass incarceration crisis in 
the US, a shift in global drug policies became 
apparent. For the first time in decades, 
new approaches outside the ‘war on drugs’ 
strategy were countenanced. Tentative 
discussions gave way to open debate. By 
October 2012 President Juan Manuel Santos 
of Colombia called for a systematic rethink of 
global drug policies arguing that:
‘The time has come to think outside the 
box. Our invitation is to dutifully study 
new formulas and approaches screened 
through an academic, scientific and 
non-politicised lens, because this war 
has proven to be extremely challenging 
and oftentimes, highly frustrating.’50 
By June 2013, a coherent reform bloc 
had emerged in the Americas under 
the leadership of Mexico, Colombia and 
Guatemala. At the height of global reform 
rhetoric, even the UN Secretary General 
called for ‘a wide-ranging and open debate 
that considers all options.’51 
Reform-minded civil society was encouraged 
and hoped for a full ranging debate which 
would break open the holy grain of global drug 
policy: rewriting the UN drug conventions.
Some member states appeared willing to 
push a hard-line reform agenda and the 
idea of written treaty reforms was quietly 
countenanced. However, member states 
soon faced a choice: shift policies by (1) 
circumventing the conventions or (2) 
engaging in a monumental diplomatic 
process that risked rupturing the global 
control system and other issues, linked 
via byzantine international institutional 
structures and politics. 
The tendency toward option (1) was only 
reinforced when one or more of the following 
factors seemed present: 
1. If the system could be reformed by de 
facto rather than de jure means; 
2. If the system could serve as a 
mechanism to readjust regional 
institutional alignments for a variety 
of issues by exploiting drugs as a 
geopolitical wedge issue; 
3. If wavering adherence to the control 
system could add new pressure for 
additional resources from interested 
states such as the US to tackle issues 
seen as important to producer and 
transit countries.
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fRaMewoRKs foR fleXibiliTy 
on RegulaTeD MaRKeTs:62
 
1.  ResouRce/caPacity limitations: 
selective enfoRcement moDel:
This framework derives from legal complications 
around enforcing the treaties in a federal political 
system. The US remains the test case. The federal 
government is the signatory to the UN drug control 
treaties and is their executor. Individual US states are 
not. The federal government has no constitutional 
authority to force states to implement the treaties. The 
federal government only has the authority to directly 
enforce the treaties in states via federal resources. 
The US State Department has argued this would 
place an excessive burden on federal resources 
and is therefore not consonant with a realistic 
interpretation of the drug control treaties. Further, 
the drug control treaties make repeated and specific 
mention of ‘constitutional limitations’ as a mitigating 
factor around implementing a number of their 
clauses. For example, Article 35 of the 1961 Single 
Convention includes the preface: ‘Having due regard 
to their constitutional, legal and administrative 
systems the Parties shall…’63
The US State Department has gone further and 
suggested a four-point framework for continuing 
international cooperation around drug policy, whilst 
allowing increasing variation in national policies:64
1) Defend the integrity of the core65 of  
the conventions.
2) Allow flexible interpretation of treaties.
3) Allow different national/regional strategies.
4) Tackle organised crime.
Other federalist jurisdictions have faced similar 
issues. In the case of Spain, a 2013 report by RAND 
highlights that: 66
‘Following several Supreme Court rulings, the 
possession and consumption of cannabis is no 
longer considered a criminal offence, and the 
jurisprudence in the field has tended to interpret 
the existing legislation in a way that permits 
‘shared consumption’ and cultivation for personal 
use when grown in a private place. While there is 
no additional legislation or regulation defining 
the scale or particulars under which cultivation 
could be permitted, the Cannabis Social Club 
(CSC) movement has sought to explore this 
legal space, reasoning that if one is allowed to 
cultivate cannabis for personal use and if ‘shared 
consumption’ is allowed, then one should also 
be able to do this in a collective manner. In this 
context, hundreds of CSCs have been established 
over the past 15 years, but legal uncertainty 
around the issue of production continues.’
2.  suPRemacy of human Rights 
tReaties oveR DRug contRol tReaties:
Human rights obligations are a part of the UN 
Charter. Obligations derived from the drug 
control treaties are subordinate to human rights 
obligations. As the UN Charter explicitly states, 
‘in the event of a conflict between the obligations 
of the Members of the United Nations under the 
present Charter and their obligations under any 
other international agreement, their obligations 
under the present Charter shall prevail.’67
Uruguay has provided a systematic elaboration of 
this argument. The Uruguayan Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs wrote to the INCB in February 2014:68
 
‘The Uruguayan State is an absolute 
defender of international law. In that sense, 
it has a comprehensive view of the law and 
obligations assumed by the country not 
only in the sphere of the Drug Conventions 
of 1961, 1971 and 1988, but also in the field 
of the protection of human rights…
It is important for Uruguay to remark the 
following: 
i. The object and purpose of the 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 
especially the 1988 Convention, should 
be combating illicit trafficking and, 
in particular, combating the harmful 
effects of drug trafficking…
ii. All the measures adopted to put this 
combat into practice must neither 
contradict the Uruguayan Constitution 
nor ignore or leave fundamental rights 
unprotected. 
iii. The obligations that our State, as well 
as other State parties, have assumed 
under other Conventions, must be 
taken into account, in particular those 
related to the protection of human 
rights, since they constitute jus cogens 
[“compelling law”] and cannot be 
ignored. 
iv. …given two possible interpretations of 
the provisions of the Convention, the 
choice should be for the one that best 
protects the human right in question, 
as stated in Article 29 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights…In 
this context and on the basis of the 
above interpretation, we believe that 
production and sale in the manner 
prescribed in the new law may be the 
best way, on the one hand, to combat 
drug trafficking, and on the other, to 
defend the constitutionally protected 
right to freedom of our fellow citizens.’
 
‘Alternative 
development’ 
represents a 
particularly 
problematic 
framework as it 
segregates entire 
communities from 
regular development 
processes and 
implements 
retrograde and 
discredited 
development policies 
with the same end-
points as eradication 
strategies: ineffective, 
crop displacing 
and innately short-
termist, while 
favouring the landed 
over the landless.
‘
’
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Increasing segments 
of the commodity 
chain, beginning with 
marginalised coca 
and opium producer 
communities, should 
be decriminalised. 
Particularly when 
that decriminalisation 
works with the 
implementation of 
the SDGs and has no 
demonstrable impact 
on consumer  
country prices.
‘
’
3.  exPanDeD Definition of ‘meDical 
anD scientific’ via social scientific 
Policy exPeRimentation:
As the commentary on the 1961 Single 
Convention states, ‘The object of the international 
narcotics system is to limit exclusively to medical 
and scientific purposes the trade in and use of 
controlled drugs.’69
The Commentary on the Single Convention 
states that ‘the term ‘medical purposes’ does 
not necessarily have exactly the same meaning 
at all times and under all circumstances.’70 
Prior to 1961, an array of states counted state 
regulated opium eating and smoking as ‘quasi-
medical’ use.71 Although this has ceased, it 
highlights the continued evolutionary process 
of convention interpretation. By redefining 
national understandings of ‘medical and 
scientific’ with greater regard to national needs, 
indigenous rights and human rights, states 
can expand the scope of licit consumption 
practices under the conventions. This provides 
significant and innate flexibility of interpretation 
around implementation of the conventions.72 
In particular when understood in terms of the 
clear ‘regulatory’ ‘intent’ and ‘purpose’ of the 
conventions.
a long TeRM DRugs/DRug 
poliCy MiTigaTion sTRaTegy – 
susTainable DeVelopMenT
As member states increasingly reject the war 
on drugs strategy, this chapter suggests a 
mechanism for replacement: the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). This is not to suggest 
that the SDGs address drug policies in any 
great depth. They do not. However, the SDGs 
provide the most comprehensive international 
framework to substitute prohibitionist policies 
and instead prioritise sustainable development 
for member states and the broader international 
community. 
For example, in the case of peace building in 
Colombia, the government faces the continued 
existence of illicit crop economies, which 
sustain poor, marginalised and conflict ravaged 
communities with virtually no viable alternative. 
In this context, issues of supply reduction must 
take a back seat to the SDGs. Further, it should not 
be considered an ‘alternative development’ issue: 
it is a sustainable development issue. ‘Alternative 
development’ represents a particularly 
problematic framework as it segregates entire 
communities from regular development 
processes and implements retrograde and 
discredited development policies with the same 
end-points as eradication strategies: ineffective, 
crop displacing and innately short-termist, while 
favouring the landed over the landless.73 
By tackling the causes of poverty, insecurity and 
inequality, governments can lessen the causes 
of illicit drug economies and thereby eventually 
work to reduce supply. However, the policy 
process must be properly sequenced and supply 
reduction viewed as the long-term outcome of 
successful development policies. 
 
        Key Policy Points:
 ■ Support development and political 
integration first.
 ■ Accept a need to accommodate 
local realities and prioritise 
policy goals: development over 
eradication. 
 ■ View problem-crop reduction as a 
positive externality (outcome) of 
successful sustainable development 
policies, rather than a prerequisite 
for government assistance. 
 ■ Recognise that ‘properly sequenced 
forced eradication’ is incongruent 
with economic and political 
integration as the looming 
threat of military intervention 
undermines trust and establishes 
the government as an external and 
threatening force.74 
 
In this context, the government’s role is to treat 
illicit production as an issue, but a relatively 
low priority one that requires overarching 
development issues to be addressed before it 
can be tackled.
In tackling these issues in coca or opium growing 
regions, governments must grapple with the 
traditional issues of development: fostering 
economic integration, sustainable and diverse 
livelihoods, security, rule of law, etc. None of 
these can progress if the government sets an 
end commodity as its key target: i.e. whether 
farmers are growing the only crop that sustains 
them in the immediate term. Meanwhile, the 
impacts on consumer countries are minimal and 
thereby render the policy choices additionally 
unjustifiable. Most of the price inflation that 
is credited with dissuading consumption in 
consumer countries75 comes from the parts of 
the commodity chain which require the greatest 
financial and political capital to maintain – 
transhipping and crossing borders. Farm gate 
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prices of coca and opium represent an 
almost negligible proportion of end market 
prices. Marginal shifts in production, unless 
a massive and sustained macro shift,76 have 
no impact. Therefore, policies geared toward 
impacting on production induce major 
hardship on vulnerable populations with no 
discernible outcomes.
Meanwhile, there is broad academic 
recognition that decriminalisation is a policy 
imperative for demand-side policies.77 
This is now extending to the supply side. 
Beyond UNGASS, increasing segments 
of the commodity chain, beginning with 
marginalised coca and opium producer 
communities, should be decriminalised. 
Particularly when that decriminalisation 
works with the implementation of 
the SDGs and has no demonstrable 
impact on consumer country prices. 
ConClusion
 
A myriad of political, diplomatic, economic, 
realpolitik, irrational, moral and legion other 
forces have brought international drug 
policy to where it is today. An inflection point 
occurred over the last decade, which drove 
global drug policies more quickly toward a 
new normative international framework. The 
complex political and economic forces which 
buttress the system have begun to shift. 
However, UNGASS demonstrates that change 
will be evolutionary, not transformative; ad 
hoc, messy and legally ambiguous, not clear, 
coherent and legalistic. This is as one would 
expect with any issue within the realm of 
international relations. 
Overall, the SDGs offer a clear pathway to 
a ‘development first’ approach to drugs. 
They allow for positive action on the key 
issues that mitigate or worsen issues of drug 
policy: violence, poverty, corruption and 
so on. Further, history highlights that the 
current global strategy rests on an extremely 
selective prioritisation of specific aspects 
that could potentially be implied by the 
treaties. It further rests on its prioritisation 
above all other development, welfare and 
health-based policies or any real reference 
to human rights. Under such a reading, the 
system is not a ‘straightjacket:’ it is simply 
being implemented in a particularly bizarre, 
ineffective and unjustifiable manner. 
That the treaties suggest member states 
work to suppress illicit (undefined) 
‘non-medical and non-scientific’ use by 
(undefined) mechanisms, does not therefore 
equate to forced eradication, militarisation, 
widespread criminalisation or any of the 
other ‘pigheaded’78 implementations of 
international drug policy. The ‘war on drugs’ 
has always been about interpretation, 
implementation and resource allocation. 
The escape from the ‘war on drugs’ will 
similarly rest on interpretation (flexibilities), 
implementation (evidence or ideology) 
and resource allocation (public health and 
human security over incarceration and 
policing).
MeTRiCs anD inDiCaToRs
To walk into a discussion on the direction 
of drug policy in any meeting is to walk in 
on a discussion of the need for new metrics, 
indicators or  in some circles, for new data. 
The assertion is rarely followed by any 
tangible elaboration of actual metrics and 
indicators. Further, the role of metrics and 
indicators in a broader reform strategy, 
itself usually lacking, is never addressed. The 
assumption appears that: fundamentally 
irrational policies can be made more rational 
through more effective monitoring and 
implementation.  
Undoubtedly there are marginal changes 
that can be made. But the idea that new 
metrics and indicators are the way to reform 
global drug policies in a less prohibitionist 
direction seems to be untethered to any 
clear strategic reality. Instead, it seems it 
is a debate which fixates on symptoms of 
policy inadequacy rather than causes. Again, 
one could think of the SDGs: the goals and 
targets came first. The metrics and indicators 
second. It seems in drug reform the notion is 
to reverse engineer policy goals by tinkering 
with policy evaluation tools.
Others suggest new metrics and indicators 
will be a useful mechanism to engage the 
broader development community. This 
seems a reasonable goal, however, some 
caution is needed. Alternative development 
emerged in a similar manner - as a softer form 
of supply side policies. Its origins trace back 
to the 1930s and 40s, and since then it has 
always been seen as the ‘new wave’ of liberal 
drug policy that just requires commitment 
and funding. 
Alternative development has in fact become 
one of the most ineffective and unjustified 
policy interventions in the field and is subject 
to the same displacement ‘balloon effect’ as 
eradication policies. Further, it becomes a 
mechanism to sustain prohibitionist policies 
by appearing to do ‘something’ about 
supply reduction regardless of whether it is 
ineffective or harmful. It thereby results in 
policy makers viewing it as a soft fall-back 
from repressive policies. Frequently, policy 
makers have oscillated between damaging 
and ineffective eradication policies and 
ineffectual and wasteful alternative 
development policies: meaning that 
genuinely development-oriented policies 
never achieve a foothold. Similar worries 
should be held about the emerging fixation 
on the metrics debate. 
Other contributions to this report offer 
attempts to elaborate some clear metrics 
that policy makers should incorporate. This 
discussion is meant merely to highlight 
the dangers of metrics becoming a non-
discussion about a non-solution to the 
problems of bad drug policies.
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Re-examining the ‘Medical and Scientific’  
Basis for Interpreting the Drug Treaties: 
Does the ‘Regime’ Have Any Clothes?
Francisco E. Thoumi1
The 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs has been ratified by 185 countries and the 1971 and 1988 Conventions have received similar support. This essay explores the logical consistency of the conventions because, 
despite the strong support to the limitation of drug uses to ‘medical and scientific 
purposes,’ they are not defined in the conventions and exclude any contribution of 
the social sciences.
The International Drug Control System 
arose from the concern with the 
growth of opium addiction during the 
Nineteenth Century, mainly in China 
and particularly after the Opium Wars. 
At the Shanghai Opium Commission 
of 19092 the US delegation, supported 
by China, proposed to limit the use of 
opium and other psychoactive drugs to 
‘medical and scientific purposes.’ Other 
countries opposed efforts to restrict their 
burgeoning pharmaceutical industries 
via international regulation. Meanwhile, 
colonial powers which produced and 
exported opium or  allowed domestic 
consumption, argued that some 
traditional or ‘quasi-medical’ uses were 
legitimate and that use regulation was a 
better policy than complete prohibitions 
on non-medical and scientific uses.3 
The Commission produced a series of 
non-binding recommendations and did 
not go along with the American and 
Chinese proposal.
The US pursued that use restriction in 
the conferences in which The Hague 
Convention of 1912 and the 1925, 1931 
and 1936 drug conventions of the League 
of Nations were negotiated. However, the 
US did not achieve its desired result and it 
actually left the 1925 conference because 
of that issue. In the League of Nations, the 
US only signed the 1931 Convention that 
made some advances in the direction of 
limiting controlled drug use. 
 
By the end of the Second World War, 
the politics of international drug control 
had changed drastically and the drug 
control system developed by the League 
of Nations shifted to the Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC) of the UN. 
During the 1940s and 50s, disorder and 
illegality of the world opium market 
resulted in efforts led by the US to create 
a new ‘single convention’ to consolidate 
all existing treaties and international 
norms, as well as to establish a regulatory 
system for global production in order 
to forcibly limit supply to ‘medical 
and scientific’ needs.4  Interim efforts 
to restrict global supply, alongside 
stalled negotiations around the ‘single 
convention,’ resulted in the 1953 Opium 
Protocol wherein article 2 asserts that 
‘The Parties shall limit the use of opium 
exclusively to medical and scientific 
needs.’ However, the Protocol was viewed 
as a product of diplomatic bullying and 
many member states rejected the explicit 
limiting of the number of ‘recognised’ 
producers of opium and other medicines 
internationally. As a result, it did not come 
into force in the 1950s, despite US efforts. 
Meanwhile, under British leadership the 
‘single convention’ became viewed as a 
compromise document which could roll 
back the excesses of the 1953 Protocol 
and it was agreed at a Plenipotentiary 
Conference in 1961. The US initially 
rejected the document as too weak, but 
it found overwhelming support among 
member states, coming into force in 1964 
SUMMARY 
 ■ The 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs has been ratified by 185 countries, 
with the 1971 and 1988 Conventions having 
received similar support. 
 ■ This essay explores the logical consistency of 
the conventions since, despite strong support 
to limiting drug use to ‘medical and scientific 
purposes,’ these terms are not defined in the 
Conventions: excluding any contribution of 
the social sciences.
 ■ By ignoring other sciences, the international 
control system has failed to account for the 
fact that policy success depends on the 
policy implementing mechanisms that are 
available in a society. Failure to cooperate 
with the social sciences is equivalent to the 
INCB telling countries that policy goals in 
global drug control should be complied with 
independent of any social costs  
or consequences.
 ■ Interpretation of the term ‘science’ has 
left drug policy mainly in the hands of 
physicians, health and law enforcement 
experts, in an effort to de-politicise drug 
policies under the assumption that the 
drug policy makers’ decisions can be made 
using only ‘hard’ sciences and medicine. 
This omits any consideration of the social 
factors of drug dependence, illegal drug 
production and trafficking. Anti-drug policies 
based on ‘medicine and science’ may attack 
contributing factors, but not their underlining 
social causes.
 ■ It may be logically possible to accept 
that non-medicinal and research uses of 
marijuana, such as in Uruguay, comply with 
the conventions if those policies are based on 
scientific evidence from both medicine and 
the social sciences. The same may be argued 
about safe injection rooms.
 ■ Whereas the slogan of the last UNGASS was 
‘A drug free world. We can do it!’, the author 
hopes that the slogan of UNGASS 2016 will be 
‘a drug free world, no we can’t, but let’s accept 
the complexity of drug issues and work 
together to minimise the costs of addiction 
and all other related social harms.’
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The first article of the three drug conventions 
defines the important terms and concepts 
used.8 Other definitions concern the UN 
drug agencies and their staff positions. This 
list confirms that when negotiating the 
conventions, it was important to clarify what 
each term meant to avoid ambiguities and 
confusion. Unfortunately, the interpretation 
of the conventions depends in a fundamental 
way on the definitions of medicine and 
science used, as they are not defined in the 
conventions. Meanwhile, the fact that article 
4 Paragraph ‘c’ treats medicine and science as 
separate raises doubts whether medicine is 
considered a science, because if medicine is 
a science there would not have been a need 
to mention it separately. 
 
However, the Commentary on the Single 
Convention sheds some light: 
‘The term ‘medical purposes’ has 
not been uniformly interpreted by 
Governments when applying the 
provisions of the narcotics treaties 
containing it. Some have prohibited 
the consumption of narcotic drugs 
by all addicts excepting only when 
necessary to alleviate suffering 
during withdrawal treatment; 
a number of other countries 
have permitted consumption by 
persons whose addictions proves 
to be incurable to the minimum 
quantities required to life. There 
have also been a few cases in which 
all consumption of narcotic drugs 
by addicts was prohibited, even in 
the course of withdrawal treatment. 
The term ‘medical purposes’ does 
not necessarily have the same 
meaning at all times and under all 
circumstances. Its interpretation 
must depend on the stage of 
medical science in the particular 
time in question; and not only 
modern medicine, sometimes 
referred to as ‘western medicine,’ 
but also systems of indigenous 
medicine such as those which 
exist in China, India and Pakistan, 
may be taken into account in this 
connection.
The term ‘medical purposes’ 
includes veterinary and dental 
purposes.’9
and eventually being ratified by the US in 
1967. This convention was also based on 
the goal of limiting all controlled drug use 
to ‘medical and scientific purposes.’ Article 4, 
paragraph c reads:
‘Article 4. General obligations 
The parties shall take such legislative 
and administrative measures as may 
be necessary: 
[....]   (c) Subject to the provisions of 
this Convention, to limit exclusively 
to medical and scientific purposes 
the production, manufacture, export, 
import, distribution of, trade in, use 
and possession of drugs’ (highlights by 
the author).
Achieving this goal was the main purpose of 
the Convention as stated in the preamble:
‘Desiring to conclude a generally 
acceptable international convention 
replacing existing treaties on narcotic 
drugs, limiting such drugs to medical 
and scientific use and providing for 
continuous international co-operation 
and control for the achievement 
of such aims and objectives.’5 
The Commentary on the 1961 Single 
Convention concurs: ‘The object of the 
international narcotics system is to limit 
exclusively to medical and scientific 
purposes the trade in and use of controlled 
drugs.’ From the beginning this has been a 
basic principle of the multilateral narcotics 
system, although all the treaties providing 
for it authorise some exceptions. The 1912 
and 1925 Conventions and the 1953 Protocol 
contained provisions incorporating this 
principle. The gradual scope of its application 
is a characteristic feature of progress in this 
Despite the 
expressed goal of 
limiting drug uses 
to ‘medical and 
scientific purposes,’ 
they are not defined 
in the Conventions 
and current 
interpretations 
exclude any 
contribution of  
the social sciences.’
‘
branch of treaty law. It is one of the most 
important achievements of the Single 
Convention that it ended the exceptions 
permitted in earlier treaties, subject only 
to transitional provisions of limited local 
application and duration.’6 
This essay explores the logical consistency 
of the conventions because, despite the 
expressed goal of limiting drug uses to 
‘medical and scientific purposes,’ they are 
not defined in the conventions and current 
interpretations exclude any contribution of 
the social sciences. Further, the motivations 
expressed in the preamble are confusing 
because they differ in the various official 
languages of the United Nations. These 
issues are analysed in sections II and III.
Section IV explores the commonly used 
concepts of science. These include medicine, 
‘basic’ or ‘hard,’ and social sciences. Section V 
and VI look at the etiology and epidemiology 
of illegal drug production trafficking and 
consumption and the impossibility to 
formulate and implement successful drug 
policies solely based on medicine and ‘hard’ 
sciences. The last two sections present a 
few conclusions and challenges facing the 
International Drug Control System (IDCS).
aRe TheRe logiCal flaws 
in The ConVenTions anD in 
TheiR inTeRpReTaTion? 
The drug conventions implicitly assert that 
limiting the use of controlled substances 
to ‘medical and scientific purposes’ is the 
right way to achieve and protect the ‘health 
and welfare of mankind.’7 This formula was 
first proposed in 1909 and based on the 
prevailing belief that scientific advances in 
medicine and other sciences would enable 
societies to manage and reduce the social 
harms from drug use. 
There is no question that conventions 
should be complied with, but there is also 
no question that the conventions should 
be clear and logically consistent because 
otherwise they would lead to contradictions 
and confusion. To avoid these problems, 
conventions generally define their most 
important terms carefully and in this respect 
the drug conventions are flawed because 
they fail to define their two most important 
concepts: ‘medical and scientific purposes.’ 
In legal parlance, they have a ‘legal void’ or 
‘legal gap.’
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These commentaries note that countries 
have interpreted the term ‘medical purposes’ 
in various ways, using criteria from modern 
medicine but also accepting some other 
traditional medical practices and ways to 
treat addicts including some addiction 
maintenance, that ‘may be taken into 
account in this connection,’10 a statement 
that is vague enough to require further 
interpretation. 
In any case, neither the conventions nor the 
commentaries make any effort to define 
medicine and science. One may speculate 
about the reasons why:
 ■ Perhaps it was assumed that 
everybody clearly knows what 
medicine and science are and there 
is no need to define them.
 ■ Perhaps because those are very 
complex concepts that could have 
not been discussed or defined 
adequately in a political document 
of a multicultural and diverse 
organisation.
 ■ Perhaps because the adequate 
interpretation of the conventions did 
not require such definitions.
 ■ Perhaps because drug policies 
should be decided only by 
consensuses emanating from 
medicine, but accepting the use of 
psychoactive substances in ‘hard 
sciences’ research programmes.
I am sure that there could be other 
hypotheses, but in my experience with those 
who have participated in the interpretation 
and implementation of the conventions I 
have found the last hypothesis is likely to 
have prevailed as many of them implicitly 
assume social and other ‘soft’ sciences are not 
sciences and should not be taken seriously 
because they are simple speculations.11 
Thus, drug policies should be formulated by 
‘hard’ scientists and physicians. The logic of 
this position is simple: medicine knows how 
psychoactive drugs negatively affect the 
brain and the central nervous system and 
this knowledge gives toxicologists and other 
doctors, supported by other ‘hard’ sciences, 
the power to formulate drug policies for the 
whole of humankind.  It is as if physicians, 
who are used to decide which drugs their 
patients should and should not take, should 
also decide for all of society.
Whatever the reasons may be, the real issue 
is that the agencies of the UN have not 
defined ‘medical and scientific purposes’ and 
have interpreted the drug conventions from 
a perspective that rejects the legitimacy of 
the social sciences and give a monopoly to 
the medical establishment to decide what 
are the only legitimate uses of psychoactive 
drugs. This however presents a logical 
dilemma since the terms ‘medicine’ and 
‘science,’ that are the key determinants of the 
allowed drug uses, are not defined. Thus, it 
is logically impossible to know if any specific 
policy complies with the conventions and 
it is not possible to rule out any policy as 
‘unscientific.’ ‘For example, if social sciences 
are sciences, syringe and needle exchange 
and drug injecting rooms, that are based on 
empirical evidence (that social sciences can 
provide) about their social costs and benefits, 
might well comply with the conventions.’ 
But if the social sciences are not scientific, 
such policies could be rejected.
is The pReaMble CleaR 
enough abouT The 
MoTiVaTions foR The 
ConVenTions?
The preamble of any convention informs 
about the reasons and motivations 
that promoted its creation. Then, when 
conventions formulate policies, they 
are expected to be consistent with their 
motivations, but the 1961 Single Convention 
is confusing in this regard. The preamble 
starts: ‘The Parties, concerned with the 
health and welfare of mankind.’ However, the 
Spanish and French versions are different: 
‘Las Partes, preocupadas por la salud física 
y moral de la humanidad’ and ‘Les parties, 
soucieuses de la santé physique et morale de 
l’humanité’ which translates as ‘The parties 
concerned with the physical and moral 
health of mankind.’ Revising the Russian, 
Chinese and Arabic versions, it is found that 
the prefaces refer to wellbeing and caring 
for human health and welfare. Article 40, 
paragraph 1 of the Convention asserts that 
‘This Convention, of which the Chinese, 
English, French, Russian and Spanish texts 
are equally authentic.’13 The 1971 Convention 
on Psychotropic Substances in English, 
French and Spanish have replicated those 
assertions about their motivations.
The preambles of both conventions present 
an apparent contradiction between the 
motivations expressed on the one hand in 
Arabic, English, Russian and Chinese, and 
on the other in French and Spanish: the 
main motivation expressed in the former 
group was the welfare of mankind and in 
the latter two languages was the moral 
health of mankind.  It may have been that 
in 1961 the term ‘welfare’ in English had 
a moralistic connotation, in which case 
there would not have been a contradiction. 
However, after reviewing several dictionaries 
and encyclopaedias, in their definitions of 
welfare there were no references to morals.14 
The fact is that ‘welfare’ and ‘moral’ are 
not synonymous and their meanings vary 
drastically across societies. That is why to 
clarify the conventions the same term should 
be used in English, the language in which the 
conventions were negotiated and in other 
UN official languages. Furthermore, that term 
should also be defined. Besides, if a definition 
of morals is used, the Convention is arguing 
that there is a concept of morality that can 
be applied globally, which is impossible 
to agree on. If the common definition of 
welfare is used, drug policies would be a lot 
more flexible than if the purpose was moral 
The denial of scientific status to the social 
and other non-basic sciences is not particular 
to the interpretation of the conventions. 
For example, Keith Humphreys and Peter 
Piot argue that factors beyond ‘scientific 
evidence’ should be taken into account in 
drug policy formulation and implementation 
and that ‘economics research helps policy 
makers determine the efficacy of policy 
interventions.’12 The implication of their 
argument is simple, drug policies should 
consider economics and other social factors, 
but economics is not a science. However, 
they do not specify why economics is not 
a science or how economics’ contributions 
should be taken into consideration. 
This would allow policy makers to pay 
lip service to economic factors without 
having to explain how they take them into 
consideration. Since economics is perhaps 
the social science that has advanced the 
most in the application of modern scientific 
methods, one may conclude that the other 
social sciences are not sciences either.
Conventions 
generally define 
their most important 
terms carefully and 
in this respect the 
drug conventions 
are flawed because 
they fail to define 
their two most 
important concepts: 
‘medical and 
scientific purposes.’ ’
‘
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as it would allow the use of rigorous social 
and economic cost-benefit analyses wherein 
results cannot be predicted a priori, to 
determine whether a drug policy improves 
or harms welfare. 
whaT is sCienCe? aRe TheRe 
any soCial sCienCes?
Since the conventions do not define science, 
Table 1 presents the definitions in the 
dictionaries of Cambridge University and the 
Royal Academy of the Spanish Language.15
These definitions show that the attempts 
to define science, besides trying to answer 
the question of what science is, have also 
developed systems to classify sciences and 
scientific knowledge. The contrast between 
the definitions of the two dictionaries is 
striking. The Cambridge University Dictionary 
limits science to what could be considered 
as modern sciences emanating from the 
Enlightenment, while the definition of the 
Royal Academy of the Spanish Language 
covers also pre-modern fields such as infuse 
and occult sciences, which fall into the 
category of ‘epistemological obstacles’ to 
the development of modern sciences and 
scientific knowledge.16
The attempts to classify sciences are 
innumerable and result in a great variety 
of groupings. The following is presented to 
illustrate this point: 
 ■ Natural sciences: physics, chemistry, 
ecology, oceanography, geology, 
meteorology, human biology and 
botany.
 ■ Social sciences: anthropology, 
archaeology, business 
administration, communication, 
criminology, education, government 
(political science), linguistics, 
international relations, psychology, 
sociology, economics, law, history 
and geography.
 ■ Formal sciences: decision theory, 
logic, mathematics, statistics, 
systems and computer theories. 
 ■ Applied sciences: all engineering 
fields, applied mathematics, applied 
physics, medicine and applied 
computing.
 
TABLE 1. DEFINITION OF SCIENCE
Dictionary of the Royal Academy of 
the Spanish Language (23rd. edition, 
author’s translation)
 Cambridge University Dictionary 
(online)
1. Body of knowledge obtained 
by systematic and structured 
observations and reasoning from 
which it is possible to deduce 
general principles and laws.
2. Erudition.
3. Skills, mastery, knowledge about 
something.
4. Body of knowledge relative to exact, 
physics, chemistry and natural 
sciences.
Science-fiction: Literary or 
cinematographic genre whit a content 
based on hypothetical future technical 
and scientific achievements.
Infused science: 1. Knowledge received 
directly from God. 2. Knowledge that is 
not acquired through study.
Pure sciences: The study of natural 
phenomena and other aspects of 
knowledge studied without regard of 
their applications.
Exact sciences: mathematics.
Human sciences: sciences like history, 
philosophy and philology that study 
diverse aspects of human thought and 
activity.
Natural sciences: those whose object 
is the study of nature such as geology, 
botany, zoology, etc. Sometimes physic 
and chemistry are included.
Occult sciences: Mysterious knowledges 
and practices such as magic, alchemy, 
astrology, etc., that since antiquity have 
pretended scrutinise and dominate the 
secrets of nature.
Social sciences: those like economics, 
sociology and anthropology that deal 
with social human activity. 
The art of Poetry (‘ciencia Gaya’ in 
Spanish)
 
1. The systematic study of the 
structure and behaviour of the 
natural and physical world or  
knowledge obtained about the 
world by watching it carefully and 
experimenting. 
2. Sciences are also particular areas of 
science, such as biology, chemistry, 
and physics.
3. Science also refers to subjects which 
are studied like political science, 
computer science.
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The definitions and classifications of science show 
that there are many possible definitions of science 
and also that the term ‘science’ does not apply only 
to the fourth definition of the Royal Academy of 
the Spanish Language: ‘Body of knowledge relative 
to exact, physics, chemistry and natural sciences,’ 
which is perhaps close to what some scientists would 
refer to as ‘basic’ sciences. This is why without clearly 
defining the terms ‘medical’ and ‘scientific’ in the 
conventions, it is logically impossible to claim that 
there is a unique way to interpret them. Furthermore, 
to be logically consistent, any interpretation of the 
conventions should spell out which definition of 
science is used.
I propose that in order to decide if an academic 
discipline is a science and whether it should be 
considered in the conventions on the same footing 
as modern medicine, two questions should be 
answered positively: first, is the knowledge in that 
discipline obtained through modern scientific 
methods? That is through methodical and structured 
observation, reasoning and empirical testing 
techniques. And second, is that knowledge relevant 
for drug policies?
Drug policy issues involve many academic 
disciplines: medicine, public health, law, 
criminology, law enforcement, chemistry, 
economics, finance, sociology, political science 
(government), international relations, statistics, 
agronomy, anthropology, environmental sciences, 
history, among others. The issue is whether these 
disciplines were developed following modern 
scientific methods. 
In 1909 many of these disciplines were weak and 
undeveloped compared to physics and chemistry, 
which were also grossly undeveloped compared 
to their current state. Since then the development 
and complexity of universities and research centres 
across the world has grown exponentially and the 
fields of knowledge became increasingly specialised. 
Concurrently scientific research methods advanced 
in virtually all fields. Social sciences have made 
great strides. They have applied analytical research 
methods and developed new models and empirical 
testing techniques. In some cases, like experimental 
economics and psychology, the use of research 
methods previously used only in the so called ‘hard’ 
or ‘basic’ sciences, has become the norm. In medicine 
itself, neuroscience virtually did not exist in 1961 
and its findings are not reflected in the Convention.
Not surprisingly, both supporters and critics of the 
IDCS insist that their positions are based on science 
and that they want drug policies based on ‘science 
and evidence.’
Current policy supporters implicitly assume:
1. That current policies have been formulated 
based on science. 
2. That science provides the models and 
instruments to fully understand drug 
phenomena. 
3. That there is a consensus about the 
interpretation of the evidence. 
4. That science also provides the knowledge 
necessary to go from the scientific models to 
socially adequate policies.
Critics concur with the last three assumptions and 
differ only on the first one: from their point of view, 
current policies have disregarded many scientific 
advances and significant evidence. They also 
point out:
1. The weakness of some of the medical studies 
used to support some of the measures taken 
in the Single Convention. For example, the 
report of the Commission of Inquiry on the 
Coca Leaf17  would not meet today’s scientific 
criteria and was a highly politically motivated 
document.18 Besides, a summary of the 
Commission’s report  asserts that ‘It does not 
at present appear that the chewing of the 
coca leaf can be regarded as a drug addiction 
in the medical sense.’ But despite finding that 
coca chewing has deep social reasons rooted 
in Peru and Bolivia’s social structures and 
history, still recommended that coca chewing 
should be banned:  ‘since chewing coca is not 
an isolated fact, but the consequence of a 
number of unfavorable social and economic 
factors, the solution of the problem involves 
two fundamental and parallel aspects: firstly, 
the need for improving the living conditions 
of the population amongst which chewing 
is a general habit and secondly, the need for 
initiating simultaneously a governmental 
policy to limit the production of coca leaf, 
to control its distribution and eradicate the 
practice of chewing it.’19 
2. That the efforts to repress drug consumption 
and eliminate its supply do not consider 
the evidence on their social, economic 
and environmental consequences, which 
frequently are dismissed as unintended and 
attributed to the drug production, trafficking 
and consumption that the anti-drug policies 
are combating.
  
Without clearly 
defining the terms 
‘medical’ and 
‘scientific’ in the 
conventions, it is 
logically impossible 
to claim that there 
is a unique way to 
interpret them. ’
‘
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Interestingly, both policy supporters and policy 
critics are convinced that they are objective and 
can formulate drug policies rationally without 
interference from their emotions and intuitions, that 
is, from their political beliefs and inclinations.
The eTiology anD epiDeMiology 
of illegal DRug pRoDuCTion, 
TRaffiCKing anD ConsuMpTion
In most instances, cause and effects relationships 
are clearly established in the ‘hard’ sciences like 
chemistry and physics, but when psychoactive drug 
production, trafficking and consumption are tested 
empirically no such relationships are encountered. 
Medical epidemiology studies show that drug 
addiction vary substantially among societies.20 In 
some cases, genetics plays an important role, like in 
alcohol addiction among some native communities 
in North America, but in all cases the importance of 
social factors is very substantial. In the cases of drug 
production and trafficking of illegal substances it is 
not possible to argue that genetics has played a role 
in the development of the illegal drug industries. In 
all these cases there are no direct cause and effect 
relationships.
All epidemiological studies have identified 
contributing and protective factors, but no direct 
causal factors. There are many social factors that 
contribute to drug consumption: broken homes 
and single female parents, school failure, poverty, 
social exclusion, pressures to succeed in business 
and professions, having received extensive medical 
treatment with addictive drugs, etc. Many others are 
protective like good loving families, strong religious 
participation and factors that are the inverse of the 
contributing ones. These factors are used to develop 
risk profiles of vulnerable people, but most people 
that fit those profiles do not become addicts or drug 
users. Risk factors simply increase the probability 
that a particular phenomenon occurs like the 
probability that a person will become a drug user or 
an addict. However, they are not functional causes 
in the sense of mathematics and basic science such 
that drugs (D) are a function of X, Y and Z such that it 
could be argued that D=f(X, Y, Z).
Epidemiological social studies reach similar results; 
they identify contributing and protective social 
factors for and against engaging with illegal drugs 
and other criminal activities. The great difference in 
the prevalence of drug production, trafficking and 
consumption across countries shows that there are 
some societies that have a higher risk of developing 
criminal activities and drug consumption than 
others. That is, as with individuals, every society 
has a degree of vulnerability determined by 
its social structures and formal and informal 
norms (institutions).21
The iMpossibiliTy To foRMulaTe 
anD iMpleMenT suCCessful 
DRug poliCies solely baseD 
on MeDiCine anD sCienCe 
The drug conventions assume that successful 
international drug policies can be formulated and 
implemented solely based on medicine and science. 
This assumption implies that medical doctors, 
supported by scientists, mainly chemists, biologists 
and other professionals from the ‘hard’ sciences, 
should have monopoly power to decide what uses 
the controlled drugs may have across humankind. 
That is, that humans may not ingest controlled 
psychoactive drugs under any circumstances, 
except for purposes approved by doctors. Thus, 
recreational, experimental, religious, social and 
similar uses are absolutely prohibited and UN 
documents refer to them as abuses. This implies 
that the international control system has had the 
goal of a world without drugs, except when they 
are used to cure illnesses and do research. Because 
of this, those in the professions of medicine, the 
police services and the justice system have ended 
up acting as public policy experts formulating and 
implementing policies with a very narrow view that 
disregards the social etiology of drug production, 
trafficking and consumption.  
By ignoring the social and other sciences, the 
international control system has failed to take into 
account a fundamental public policy fact: policy 
success depends on the policy implementing 
mechanisms that are available in a society. Medicine 
can determine the effects of drug use on the human 
body but it cannot prevent addiction and prohibiting 
social uses of addictive drugs is not medicine, it is 
an act that falls in the realm of social sciences.  The 
failure to cooperate with the social sciences in the 
formulation of drug policies is equivalent to have 
the INCB tell countries: ‘this is the policy goal that 
you accepted when you signed the conventions, it is 
your problem to comply with it, independent of any 
costs, benefits or social consequences and it is our 
job to induce you to comply.’22
Drug production, marketing and consumption 
present multidimensional complex problems that 
may not be solved with solutions coming from 
one discipline. Any solution to the social problems 
of addiction cannot be formulated by a group 
solely consisting of, physicians or  economists 
or  sociologists or  policemen, etc., no matter how 
scientifically rigorous their methods. Yet, despite a 
consensus about the complexity of psychoactive 
drug-related phenomena, the great majority of 
policy makers and analysts involved do so from 
a partial perspective influenced by their narrow 
academic and professional training. 
I propose that in 
order to decide if an 
academic discipline 
is a science and 
whether it should 
be considered in 
the Conventions on 
the same footing as 
modern medicine, 
two questions 
should be answered 
positively: first, is 
the knowledge 
in that discipline 
obtained through 
modern scientific 
methods? That is 
through methodical 
and structured 
observation, 
reasoning and 
empirical testing 
techniques. And 
second, is that 
knowledge relevant 
for drug policies?
’
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Every academic discipline has a subject of study, 
tackles some specific problems and develops a 
paradigm used to solve them.23  In the physical 
(‘hard’) sciences, consensus is relatively easy to 
obtain and there is little controversy: most scholars 
agree how things should be done. In the ‘soft’ social 
sciences it is more difficult to build consensus, but it 
is possible. However, when consensus is achieved, 
its acceptance is limited within the paradigm of 
each discipline and it does not necessarily extend 
to other fields of knowledge.24
Within all academic fields there might be an 
agreement on the need to use modern scientific 
methods, but they disagree about the relative 
importance of each one of them, e.g. inductive vs. 
deductive, quantitative vs. qualitative methods. 
They also have great differences among their goals, 
that may conflict with those of other fields because 
they tend to reflect the particular world view 
(Weltanschauung) of each discipline. Physicians 
may support the limit of drug use to ‘medical and 
scientific purposes’ but economists or sociologists 
may argue that the implementation of that policy, 
through strong law enforcement actions, would 
destabilise the economy and social structures of 
a country and lead to violence. Each group would 
argue that they are arriving at their conclusion 
applying scientific methods and analysing the 
same evidence as the others. These divergences 
result from differences among academic fields in 
what is considered evidence and the way to analyse 
it, indicating that a purely ‘scientific’ evaluation of 
any policy is always questionable by those outside 
the paradigm from which it was formulated.
A deeper problem arises from the fact that most 
humans find it difficult to make decisions based 
solely on scientific evidence and reason, even 
though they all claim to be rational. For example, 
late nineteen and twenty century Marxist and 
Neoclassical economics were developed under the 
assumption of the ‘homo economicus,’ who has the 
capacity to always make rational decisions. Over 
time it became clear that they failed to explain 
many real life economic behaviours. Today’s 
behavioural sciences have made great evidence 
based strides that show the influence of sentiments 
and the individuals’ life experiences on personal 
decisions, factors that the ‘homo economicus’ of 
the traditional economic models would consider 
irrational.
Medicine provides another good example: 
‘although understanding the causes of a 
phenomenon, which successful basic research 
does, is helpful in formulating policy, often a large 
amount of other information that is structured in a 
different manner best serves policy makers. Policy 
makers draw on a large amount of information 
that has no particular analytical base or theoretical 
background (of the kind that basic research 
provides). In this sense medical science that deals 
with changing bodies and minds, is a prototypical 
policy science. It is estimated that about half the 
information physicians employ has no basis in 
biology, chemistry or  any other science, but rather 
it is based on an accumulation of experience. This 
knowledge is passed on from one medical cohort 
to another, as ‘this is the way things are done’ and 
‘they work.’25
Furthermore, in many cases a purely rational 
approach to decision-making is not practical. 
Everybody has to make innumerable decisions 
every day. Just going to the supermarket requires 
people to decide among many items to buy and 
a rational choice among 30 cereals would require 
to gather information about daily or weekly 
consumption, the size of the weight and volume of 
the cereal in each box, the type of each cereal, its 
fat and sugar content, its price per ounce, etc. Then 
you’d also need a mathematical model, feed all the 
information to a computer and arrive at a ‘rational 
decision.’ This is clearly impractical and that is 
why everybody learns to simplify those decision-
making processes. Modern psychology shows 
empirically, that people learn to use heuristic short 
cuts, that use sentiments, like brand and store 
loyalties, to bypass reason. These work reasonably 
well most of the time.26  
The pretention to formulate policies based only 
on ‘medicine and science’ is an attempt to de-
politicise policy making which is an oxymoron.27 
Policy making is fundamentally a political process 
in which policy proponents present a list of reasons 
to justify a particular policy.28
Another interesting issue is whether a 
consensus ‘based on medicine and science’ is 
sufficient to produce successful drug policies. 
There is no question that medicine should 
inform policymakers, but consensuses among 
professionals are just educated opinions and are 
akin to elections and elections never prove that 
the best candidate was chosen, they only prove 
that a particular candidate received the most 
votes, e.g. a consensus within WHO and PAHO 
may prove that most physicians in those agencies 
think that non-medical drug uses should be 
prohibited and a consensus among free-market 
economists proves that most of these economists 
believe that the marijuana market should be 
quite free. But a consensus does not demonstrate 
that the consented policy may be implemented 
successfully without rigorously considering the 
financial, political, cultural, religious and other like 
constraints that every society may have. 
The international 
control system has 
had the goal of a 
world without drugs, 
except when they 
are used to cure 
illnesses and do 
research. Because 
of this, those in 
the professions of 
medicine, the police 
services and the 
justice system have 
ended up acting 
as public policy 
experts formulating 
and implementing 
policies with a 
very narrow view 
that disregards the 
social etiology of 
drug production, 
trafficking and 
consumption... 
the international 
control system 
has failed to take 
into account a 
fundamental public 
policy fact: policy 
success depends 
on the policy 
implementing 
mechanisms that  
are available in  
a society. ’
‘
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Once the limit of drug uses to ‘medical and 
scientific purposes’ was enshrined in the 1961 
Single Convention, it was interpreted as a 
prohibition for all non-medicinal and research 
uses which was based on the belief that medical 
doctors had the power to decide drug uses for 
all of humankind. This measure implicitly seeks 
an ideal world without drugs, which could be 
a worthy goal according to some moral codes. 
The prohibition of all non-medical and research 
uses has been a fascinating experiment in social 
engineering that pretended to de-politicise drug 
policies but that to succeed required every Party 
to the Conventions to commit very large amounts 
of resources to prevent people from using drugs 
and if they already use them to prevent them from 
becoming addicts, and if they are addicts to treat, 
rehabilitate and resocialise them.29 It would also 
commit Parties to devote large amounts of money 
to control their territories, to fund development 
programmes to prevent the development of illicit 
drug producing and trafficking organisations, to 
assign more resources to the justice system and 
to building jails, etc. The government programmes 
required to comply with a commitment to 
eliminate all drug uses different from those with 
‘medical and scientific purposes’ would crowd 
out government expenditures in many other 
important health, food and nutrition, education, 
infrastructure, housing, other police and health 
programmes, etc. 
In reality, the goal of a ‘world without drugs’ 
is impossible to  achieve given the resource 
constraints faced by all governments which 
frequently result in a ‘beggar thy neighbour’ 
reaction to demand from other foreign countries 
what they cannot achieve domestically. For 
instance, Colombians complain that the United 
States does not control domestic illegal drug 
markets and Americans that Colombia does not 
control its territory, crops and drug cartels. The 
institutional and financial constraints required to 
achieve a world in which psychoactive drugs are 
used only for ‘medical and scientific purposes’ 
are so great that such a goal should be only 
‘aspirational’ to be achieved in an ideal society, 
but not for a real one. Confronting this reality 
in official international meetings has been very 
difficult because once an international treaty 
is ratified, there are many obstacles to make 
substantial changes in the policies that it has 
ingrained in a society. It is then not surprising 
that the political declarations of the drug control 
agencies periodically reassert their ideal goals 
and promise that ‘ten years from now we will have 
reduced significantly drug production, trafficking 
and consumption.’30 This is just kicking the can to 
the future and dodges the need to confront the 
complexity of the drug phenomena.
soMe ConClusions
The international drug control system is based on the 
premise that addictive psychoactive drugs must be 
used only for ‘medical and scientific purposes.’  This 
premise was formulated first at the 1909 Shanghai 
Opium Commission. The Conventions of 1912, 
1925, 1931 and 1936 accepted this use restriction 
with different exceptions, and by that time the 
1961 Single Convention generalised its application 
to all controlled drugs. The consensus was almost 
universal and the terms ‘medical’ and ‘scientific’ were 
not defined in the Convention, despite it having a 
long list of defined terms. This presents a problem 
when trying to interpret the Convention because 
its two most important concepts are left as if their 
meaning is so clear that they do not have to be 
defined. 
The preambles and commentaries to the drug 
conventions could contribute to clarify those 
meanings, but they do not. Besides, the statement 
of purposes in the preambles in English, Russian, 
Chinese and Arabic on one hand, and in French 
and Spanish on the other, are different. In the 
former group the purpose is to improve the ‘health 
and welfare of humankind,’ but in the other two 
languages it is the ‘physical and moral health of 
humankind.’ As argued above the decision about 
which policies would meet the ‘medical and 
scientific’ requirement vary depending of which 
purpose is applied. The commentaries mention 
that some countries have interpreted ‘medicine’ as 
including traditional medical practices and not only 
modern (‘Western’) medicine.
The definitions of science provided by the most 
recognised dictionaries are extremely diverse. 
However, the way conventions have interpreted the 
term ‘science’ has left world drug policy mainly in the 
hands of physicians, health and law enforcement 
experts. This has been an effort to de-politicise 
drug policies under the assumption that the drug 
policy makers’ decisions can be made using only 
‘hard’ sciences and medicine, without taking into 
consideration the social etiology of drug addiction 
and illegal drug production and trafficking. Policy 
makers are human, not just unfeeling scientists 
in love with the beauty found in truth and their 
policy recommendations are always influenced by 
their own sentiments, life experiences and cultures. 
The failure to define and clarify the term ‘science’ 
implies that there is no unique way to interpret the 
conventions. For instance, it may be logically possible 
to accept that the policies of Uruguay and the States 
of Colorado and Washington that have allowed non-
medicinal and research uses of marijuana comply 
with the conventions if those policies are based on 
It may be logically 
possible to accept 
that the policies of 
Uruguay, and the 
States of Colorado 
and Washington 
that have allowed 
non-medicinal and 
research uses of 
marijuana comply 
with the conventions 
if those policies are 
based on scientific 
evidence from both 
medicine and the 
social sciences. The 
same may be argued 
about injection 
rooms in some 
European countries. ’
‘
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scientific evidence from both medicine and the 
social sciences. The same may be argued about 
injection rooms in some European countries.
Epidemiological studies show that there are 
some factors that contribute to or protect against 
drug addiction and illegal drug production 
and trafficking. These factors only change the 
probability that those activities would develop. 
Anti-drug policies based on ‘medicine and science’ 
may attack contributing factors, but not their 
underlining social causes. This is why they might 
achieve some improvements, mainly in the short 
term, but they will not solve the drug addiction, 
production and trafficking problems. 
Critics of current policies highlight the illegality 
of drug markets as the cause of many terrible 
social harms. But illegal drug markets are just a 
contributing factor of those harms, not causes in 
the scientific sense.  For example, if ‘drugs generate’ 
violence, why does the homicide rates in drug 
producing and trafficking countries vary so much 
in time and space? In these cases, the epidemiology 
of crime shows clearly that there are some societies 
that are more vulnerable than others and that 
legalising drug markets does not take care of the 
underlining social reasons that contribute to make 
a society vulnerable to the development of illegal 
drug production, trafficking and markets or  of 
many other criminal activities.
 
MeTRiCs, inDiCaToRs anD The iDCs
 
The international drug conventions were 
formulated with a particular purpose in mind: 
‘Desiring to conclude a generally acceptable 
international convention replacing existing treaties 
on narcotic drugs, limiting such drugs to medical and 
scientific use.’ The interpretation of this restriction 
is today being challenged by some American 
countries that are clamouring for a need to change 
anti-drug policy strategies and from some States 
in the United States which are sovereign and 
are not Parties to the drug conventions. As drug 
trafficking organisations increase their power and 
control of some territories in Africa and parts of 
Asia, those countries are likely to join the clamour 
for change.
Contemporarily, the IDCS confronts 
many challenges:
1. The need to acknowledge fundamental 
contributions of sciences other than medicine 
to the understanding of psychoactive drug 
issues. The IDCS is a child of modernity that 
implicitly assumes that every government is 
sovereign and has the monopoly of territorial 
control, power, violence and justice in its 
country. This implicitly requires that in each 
country there is social cohesion and core of 
shared values which identify a nation. This 
is why the society of all these countries is 
called the United Nations rather than the 
United Countries. In today’s postmodern 
world there are many organisations such 
as large corporations (especially in the 
pharmaceutical and chemical sectors), NGOs, 
financial institutions, religions, citizen’s 
groups, criminal organisations, subversive 
groups, that are stakeholders in drug-related 
policy issues.31
2. Illicit drug production and trafficking are 
just some among many profitable illegal 
activities for criminal organisations. These 
organisations’ goals are to obtain profits 
and power and they simply use drugs as an 
instrument in achieving these objectives. 
They, like any modern business, are always 
seeking to grow and diversify. For instance, 
the Organization of American States32 
identified 23 broad criminal categories in 
which criminal organisations are actively 
making money.  Many of those activities may 
be as profitable as drugs and many are less 
risky.33
3. The world today confronts many social and 
economic ‘bads’ and harms: extreme poverty, 
social inequality and exclusion, greed and 
lack of social cohesion, corruption, trafficking 
in arms and humans, homicides, fraud, 
economic crisis, wars, etc. The conventional 
wisdom is that drugs are a cause of many of 
those social harms. For example, ‘drugs are 
the cause of the high number of homicides 
in Colombia.’ But the evidence points in a 
different direction: the relationship among 
many of those harms is circular and not 
causal. Every harm encourages other harms 
as it increases the probability that a society 
will develop them. This is why drug addiction, 
trafficking and production are symptomatic 
of the structural vulnerabilities of each society 
and why traditional law enforcement policies 
based on the police and justice systems 
cannot eliminate drugs except in extremely 
authoritarian regimes. But since uncontrolled 
power corrupts, even in those countries, their 
Some would argue 
that such a policy 
would lead to a 
‘slippery slope’ that 
will lead to the 
liberalisation of 
other drug markets, 
like cocaine and 
amphetamine. But 
the evidence shows 
that societies and 
their leaders on the 
whole are not stupid. 
When the evidence 
clearly shows that 
the balance between 
the benefits and the 
costs of any policy 
turns significantly 
negative, modern 
societies react 
on their own, 
without the need 
of a paternalistic 
international body 
telling them what is 
good for them ’
‘
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The slogan of the 
last UNGASS, which 
fortunately was not 
part of the political 
declaration, was ‘A 
drug free world. We 
can do it!’ It is my 
hope that the slogan 
of the next UNGASS 
will be ‘a drug free 
world, no we can’t, 
but let’s accept 
the complexity of 
drug issues and 
work together to 
minimise the costs 
of addiction and all 
other related  
social harms.’
’
‘
governments tend to become corrupt in the 
medium term and their drug policies are likely 
to subsequently fail.
4. The IDCS was inspired by two policy issues: 
how to take care of drug addiction and how 
to deal with the international drug trade 
(legal and illegal). The conventions focused 
more on addiction than drug trafficking, but 
today some countries and other stakeholders 
question that approach because of the high 
social and economic costs associated with 
some law enforcement efforts, particularly 
against marijuana consumption, crop 
eradication and trafficking organisations. It 
would be useful to have a debate about the 
conditions under which a sovereign country 
might decide to allow non-medical marijuana 
use. The circular relationship among social 
and economic ‘bads’ show that there may be 
cases in which efforts to eliminate one ‘bad’ 
may induce the growth of many other ‘bads’ 
that would result in worse social conditions.
5. The debate should also confront the fact that 
modern Public Policy has empirically found 
that when there are circular relationships, 
the policies should be holistic, consider all 
‘bads’ and attempt to maximise the difference 
between overall social and economic benefits 
minus costs, not to eliminate one ‘bad.’ From 
the international perspective, there is no 
question that illegal drug trafficking should 
not be allowed. But the argument to impose a 
prohibition on marijuana (or any other drug) 
use through an international treaty, even 
when a government considers that it will do 
more harm than good, is highly questionable 
and goes against the results obtained from 
the application of scientific methods in the 
social sciences. Of course this is valid only 
with a caveat about the need to insure that no 
social costs are transferred to other countries. 
6. Some would argue that such a policy would 
lead to a ‘slippery slope’ that will lead to the 
liberalisation of other drug markets, like 
cocaine and amphetamine. But the evidence 
shows that societies and their leaders on the 
whole are not stupid. When the evidence 
clearly shows that the balance between the 
benefits and the costs of any policy turns 
significantly negative, modern societies 
react on their own, without the need of a 
paternalistic international body telling them 
what is good for them. This is why alcohol 
prohibition failed in the United States but 
has succeeded in some Islamic countries. 
The evidence shows that throughout history 
psychoactive drug use has been controlled 
mainly by religion, family, clans and other civil 
society organisations. The State as we know it 
is a relatively new social development and it 
cannot succeed as the main drug controlling 
agent without the support from the civil 
social organisations. 
7. And to conclude, modern international drug 
policy should be part of the broad anti-crime 
policies of any country and should also take 
into account other concerns such as human 
rights and the environment. However, 
drug policies cannot succeed if they are 
independent of policies dealing with those 
issues because of the fact that these are all 
interrelated. When the restriction of drug 
uses to ‘medical and scientific purposes’ was 
first formulated, the world was a lot simpler 
than today and the simple solution adopted 
was a very powerful idea that was well 
received by almost everyone. At that time 
drugs were perhaps the main international 
criminal economic activity. Today there are 
many more, and both the world and criminal 
organisations are a lot more complex. 
The IDCS needs to reflect that complexity 
because otherwise it will become completely 
useless. After all, it is just ‘soft law’ and there is 
not much that can be done to keep a country 
from trying alternative strategies to confront 
its addiction and illegal market problems. The 
slogan of the last UNGASS, which fortunately 
was not part of the political declaration, was 
‘A drug free world. We can do it!’  It is my 
hope that the slogan of the next UNGASS 
will be ‘a drug free world, no we can’t, but 
let’s accept the complexity of drug issues 
and work together to minimise the costs of 
addiction and all other related social harms.’ 
Let’s acknowledge the need to coordinated 
drug policies against corruption, organised 
crime, greed and other social ‘bads’ and 
work together with all the stakeholders, to 
ultimately develop better policies to cope 
with drug and other harms and build a more 
complex and strong IDCS.
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Regulation of Possession and 
the Criminalisation of Drug Users 
in Latin America1
Catalina Pérez Correa, Rodrigo Uprimny and Sergio Chaparro
Latin America has, over the last few years, emerged at the vanguard of international efforts to reform drug policy. In 2009, the former presidents of Brazil, Mexico and Colombia co-chaired the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy. 
The report issued by the Commission urged countries to treat drug use as 
a health issue and not a criminal one.2 In 2012, the presidents of Colombia, 
Guatemala and Mexico called for the UN to host an international conference 
on drug policy reforms, which led to convene the special session of the General 
Assembly on the world drug problem (UNGASS) in early 2016.3 That same year, 
the Organization of American States (OAS), led by Chilean José Miguel Insulza, 
published the Scenarios for the Drug Problem in the Americas (2013-2015), in 
an effort to ‘open up the path to a new hemispheric dialogue on how to act.’4 
Yet despite the reformist discourse, 
Latin American governments maintain a 
predominantly punitive and repressive 
approach to illegal drugs and their use. The 
criminal justice system is still preferred over 
the health system as a tool for government 
intervention in drug policy. It is primarily 
through the police, and sometimes the 
military, prosecutors and criminal courts, 
that states interact with users of controlled 
substances in these countries.
For example, according to the information 
obtained by the Research Consortium on 
Drugs and the Law (CEDD), in Argentina, 
9,414 investigations were recorded for 
drug possession for personal consumption 
in 2012 by federal prosecutors around the 
country.5 In addition, in 2008, the province 
of Buenos Aires recorded 7,484 criminal 
investigations for possession for personal 
use pursued by local prosecutors.6  This 
means that both national and provincial 
authorities are engaged in the persecution 
of drug use through the criminal system. 
In the case of Mexico, between 2009 
and May 2014, 140,860 individuals were 
arrested and 52,074 investigations were 
opened for drug use (which is not formally 
a crime) by the federal government. 
In addition, during this time 87,746 
criminal investigations were initiated for 
possession of drugs at the federal level.7 
Moreover, in Ecuador, between 2007 and 
2014 the Public Defender’s Office aided 
15,532 people detained for possession.8
This paper seeks to explain how, despite 
growing consensus against it, drug users 
remain criminalised. The paper analyses 
the legal mechanisms in place across the 
region that facilitate the criminalisation of 
users. Using the national studies on drug 
users and state responses published by 
CEDD,9 this text explores the existing legal 
norms and penal reasoning that explain 
the constant criminalisation of drug users 
across the region, in countries where the 
use of drugs is actually not considered a 
crime. It also analyses some of the moral 
and theoretical problems implied in 
the current legislation of possession of 
illicit drugs. The paper ends with some 
notes regarding the current metrics and 
indicators used to evaluate drug policy. 
 
SUMMARY 
 ■ Despite the reformist discourse,  
Latin American governments maintain a 
predominantly punitive and repressive 
approach to illegal drugs and their 
consumption.
 ■ This paper seeks to explain why, despite 
the growing consensus that governments 
should not seek to criminalise consumption, 
drug users remain criminalised.
 ■ The principle of proportionality establishes 
that criminal law should only be used as a 
last resort. The principle states that a policy 
must:
•	 First prove a conduct is harmful to 
others, to such degree that it must be 
determined as a crime.
•	 Second, it establishes that before using 
criminal law, all other available options 
(whether formal or informal) must be 
evaluated.
•	 Third, if something can only be prevented 
through punishment, then the least 
intrusive punishment available should  
be used. 
•	 If we take this principle seriously, as we 
should to guarantee just and reasonable 
laws, then any deviation from this 
standard will qualify as an unlawful use of 
criminal law.
 ■ Possession, in different ways and through 
different mechanisms, remains a crime, 
because the use of illicit substances remains 
regulated through criminal law even though 
it is not considered a crime.
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In most countries, possession is normatively 
distinguished between: i) possession with intent to 
distribute (which can be with or without a commercial 
purpose)13 and,  ii) possession without intent to distribute. 
This last type can also be distinguished between 
possession tolerated for personal use and possession 
that, without having any intention of distribution, is 
not tolerated by the law. We will henceforth refer to the 
latter as possession without intent, (in Spanish: posesión 
simple, or tenencia simple  (as opposed to possession 
with intent).
Possession of illicit substances in any of these instances can 
have three possible regulations:
 ■       the conduct is considered a crime     
      and is punished
 ■       the conduct is considered a crime  
      but is not punished.
 ■       the conduct is neither considered  
      a crime nor is it punished.
In the countries studied by CEDD, the use of illicit 
drugs is usually neither a crime nor punished while 
the different types of possession usually fall within 
the first two regulatory regimes mentioned above. 
In addition, imprisonment is often the preferred form 
of punishment.    
Table 1 shows the legal regulation  of use and possession 
in the countries studied. Although the table does not 
account for all the complexities of each legal framework, 
it shows that use and possession are always handled 
within the criminal sphere even if they are  not punished.
As the table shows, while no state considers the 
use of illegal substances to be a criminal offence, 
possession is prohibited in all countries to some 
extent or in certain circumstances. In some cases, 
like Mexico, Peru or Ecuador, possession for use 
is a crime but not criminally sanctioned under 
certain circumstances (such as when the amount 
does not surpass the allowed threshold). In 
Brazil, possession for use is a crime and criminally 
sanctioned, although not through imprisonment. 
In Argentina, all possession is a crime, although 
the Supreme Court declared the punishment of 
possession for use to be unconstitutional, as long 
as it does not ‘result in a specific hazard or harm to 
the rights or goods of third parties.’ In Ecuador (see 
Table 4 and 5) recent reforms (in September 2015) 
set thresholds to distinguish levels of involvement 
in trafficking at such low levels that any quantity of 
certain substances can be processed as a trafficking 
offence. In that country, small scale trafficking of 
heroin, base cocaine, cocaine and marijuana is 
verified above zero grams. Uruguay, on the other 
hand, sets several objective criteria to determine 
possession for use in the case of cannabis, but 
maintains an open (discretionary) system for 
other substances.
Since every consumer must possess the substance 
in order to use it, she must therefore commit the 
crime of possession in order to use. Thus, even in 
the cases where possession for use is not criminally 
sanctioned (but remains a crime), it is through the 
police, prosecutors and criminal judges that the state 
deals with consumers. Additionally, authorities from 
the criminal justice system are the ones to decide 
if the person will be charged as a user or a dealer. 
This implies that consumers are at constant risk of 
being detained, become the victims of extortion or 
even imprisonment.
In some countries possession without intent, 
above certain thresholds, is a punishable crime. 
This is extremely problematic because it punishes 
possession with no further requirement of proof of 
intent, beyond the actual act of possession. This, 
we argue, implies a violation of the presumption 
of innocence, the principle of ultima ratio (last 
resort) and the principle of proportionality. Under 
the legal definition of the crime of possession, 
consumers are often processed as small-scale 
dealers and punished accordingly. In some cases, 
such as in Ecuador, the user has to prove that it was 
not his or her intention to distribute (i.e. proving a 
negative), but to consume. In other countries, for 
example Mexico, mere possession of drugs in an 
amount above the established threshold is enough 
to warrant criminal prosecution, regardless of the 
circumstances or intent. Other countries only punish 
possession with intent to sell or distribute (even if 
distribution is without payment), but even in those 
cases, people who possess illicit substances for 
personal use must be arrested before the possession 
is declared lawful or without punishment.
In some countries, 
possession without 
intent, above certain 
thresholds is a 
punishable crime. 
This is extremely 
problematic 
because it punishes 
possession with no 
further requirement 
of proof of intent, 
beyond the actual 
act of possession. 
This, we argue, 
implies a violation 
of the presumption 
of innocence, the 
principle of ultima 
ratio (last resort) and 
the principle of 
proportionality. 
RegulaTion of possession 
anD of use    
 
Although drug use is not a crime in the countries 
that were studied, possession is always – although in 
different ways – considered a crime.10 This results in 
the criminalisation of consumers, for consumption 
always involves, at some point, the possession of the 
illegal substance. The only exception to this constant is 
found in Costa Rica, where there is a clear and explicit 
policy not to arrest consumers for possession, as will be 
explained further on.
In several of the countries studied, as is shown below, 
possession is tolerated under certain circumstances. 
Such is the case of possession for personal use where 
the finality – for personal use – can be either objectively 
or discretionally determined by prosecutors and/or 
judges. However, even in these cases it is the criminal, 
not health, authorities who determine if possession 
is for personal use or not. In other cases, for example 
Argentina and Colombia, possession is not tolerated 
under any circumstances. In these instances, the 
Supreme11  and Constitutional Courts,12 respectively, 
declared that punishing possession for personal use is 
unconstitutional, provided it does not imply a concrete 
danger or harm to the rights or property of a third party. 
’
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Table 1. Is consumption and/or possession of illicit substances a crime?14
  COUNTRY  CONSUMPTION  POSSESSION      REGULATION (SYNTHESIS)
 
Argentina
 
No
 
Yes
 
Drug possession for personal use is considered a crime (Article 14 of law   
23.737). However, in 2009, the Supreme Court declared that the part of the 
article that criminalised possession for use is unconstitutional.
 
Bolivia
 
No
 
Yes
 
Possession for use is a crime, punishable with forced treatment, according to 
article 49 of law 1008. However, in practice this law is  
not applied.
If a medical examination determines that a person carries more than is needed 
for his or her personal use, he or she is prosecuted for trafficking (Article 49 of 
Act 1008).
 
Brazil
 
No
 
Yes
 
Possession for personal use and possession without intent are considered 
crimes. Article 28 of law 11.343/06, states that the judge must determine if the 
substance is for personal use through taking into account, among other things, 
the nature of the substance, the amount carried and the criminal record of the 
person. Possession for personal use is criminally punished, although not with 
prison time.
 
Colombia
 
No
 
Yes
 
Consumption is constitutionally prohibited, but the Constitutional Court 
declared that the article from the criminal code that penalised possession for 
personal use is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has ruled that possession 
for personal consumption should not be criminalised even if it surpasses the 
established dose for personal use.15 Possession without intent is considered  
a crime.16
 
Costa Rica
 
No
 
No
 
Possession for personal consumption is not a crime. Possession is only a 
crime if it is determined that the person’s intent is to ‘distribute, trade, supply, 
manufacture, develop, refine, transform, extract, prepare, cultivate, produce, 
transport, store or sell drugs, substances or products referred to in this Act or  
to cultivate the plants from which such substances or products are obtained.’ 
(Article 58 of Act 8204)
Possession of seeds with the capacity to germinate or of other natural 
products that produced the referred drugs is a crime and is criminally 
sanctioned (Article 58 of Law 8204). However, in practice and as a result of the 
General Attorney’s guidelines, this law is not applied and consumers are rarely 
detained by police.
 
Ecuador
 
No
 
Yes
 
Possession without intent is illegal, but when it is for consumption it is 
not punished (Article 220 of the Organic Comprehensive Criminal Code). 
Possession without intent is established by threshold amounts.17
 
Mexico
 
No
 
Yes
 
Possession for personal consumption is illegal, but it is not criminally 
prosecuted if it is for consumption, provided it does not exceed the maximum 
thresholds established by the General Health Act, and as long as it is not done 
in places such as schools or prisons and is one of the substances covered by 
the General Health Law. Possession without intent above the established 
thresholds is a criminal offense.
 
Peru
 
No
 
Yes
 
Possession for use is not criminally sanctioned as long as it is below the 
established thresholds allowed and the person is not in possession of two or 
more substances.
 
Uruguay
 
No
 
Yes
 
Possession is a crime but it is exempt from punishment if the amount is 
‘intended for personal consumption.’ In the case of cannabis, the possession 
of up to 40 grams or 6 psychoactive cannabis plants is legal for personal 
consumption (Article 7, Law 19.172).
Moreover, possession is a crime if the person does not have the corresponding 
legal authorisation (Article 5, Law 19.172).
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ThResholDs anD CRiMe of 
possession wiThouT inTenT
 
Although some legislation considers 
possession to be a crime, certain amounts 
are permitted or tolerated under established 
thresholds deemed to represent personal 
use. However, some of these legal systems 
will sanction possession in excess of these 
thresholds without requiring proof of intent 
to sell or distribute, such as in Mexico, Peru 
(when more than one substance is involved) 
or Ecuador (under the new thresholds 
established in 2015). This crime is referred to 
as possession without intent.
Under this legal definition, any person 
caught carrying more than the allowed 
amount of a particular substance is regarded 
as a small-scale dealer and prosecuted for 
that crime. It is not necessary for prosecutors 
or judges to assess the circumstances or 
concrete evidence of the case. In some 
instances, even when there is evidence to 
suggest that possession was for personal 
use, judges must sentence for micro-
trafficking, regardless of the circumstances. 
A case in Mexico illustrates this point:
 
In 2014, a Judge in the State of 
Guanajuato declared the sanction of 
possession without intent (posesión 
simple) to be unconstitutional 
due to considering it being a 
disproportionate response. In this 
case, a state prison inmate was 
found with two pills of Clonazepam, 
a substance commonly used for 
panic disorders and anxiety attacks. 
The inmate had gone through a 
divorce while being imprisoned 
and also lost his father, both within 
a short timespan. After suffering 
severe panic attacks, he had begun 
to self-medicate Clonazepam to 
control them. Expert testimonies 
included in the file declared that 
the inmate had a nervous condition 
and that the substance lessened 
the attacks he suffered. Although 
the substance can be sold and 
bought in drug stores with medical 
prescription, the law establishes 
severe penalties for possession of 
certain medicines without a valid 
prescription. In addition, since the 
crime had been committed in a 
prison this allowed no space for 
exemption from the rule. In this 
case, the judge had no room to 
consider the specific conditions of 
the case in the ruling: which proved 
that there was no intention to sell 
or distribute.18 Although the judge 
affirmed that a crime had been 
committed, she did not apply the 
corresponding sanctions due to 
these being disproportionate.
The result of this use of thresholds, 
found in Mexico, Ecuador and Peru is the 
criminalisation of an unknown number of 
consumers who are processed as sellers or 
micro- traffickers, and who appear in official 
statistics as such.
In other countries, like Brazil, Colombia or 
Bolivia, legislation or high court judgements 
have required the evaluation of additional 
elements to prosecute and sentence a 
person for possession. However, even in 
this scenario, consumers remain under the 
sphere of criminal justice institutions, as laws 
require detention of users until quantities 
and/or intent are determined.
Unfortunately, thresholds in the region are 
usually very low, and the amounts often 
do not correspond to the use and buying 
practices of consumers. Table 2 shows the 
maximum carrying thresholds established in 
countries covered by CEDD.
In the case of Mexico and Peru, the 
thresholds for cannabis are 5 and 8 grams 
respectively. Taking the daily dosage of 
any average cannabis consumer into 
consideration, carrying 5 or 8 grams can 
be regarded as reasonable. However, if the 
consumer is buying enough for a longer 
period of time, the amount purchased will 
most likely exceed the tolerated threshold 
and, if apprehended, he or she will likely be 
processed as a dealer. In the case of cocaine, 
cocaine paste and cocaine hydrochloride, all 
countries have low thresholds, even for daily 
consumption. In the case of Peru, if the person 
is in possession of two or more substances, 
possession is criminally sanctioned.
In Ecuador, there are two coexistent 
thresholds.19 The first threshold, shown in 
table 2, seeks to protect consumers from 
the criminal law intervention. The second 
Table 2. Thresholds established for main substances20
  SUBSTANCE COLOMBIA   ECUADOR   MExICO   PERU    URUGUAY
Heroin - 0.1 g 50 mg - -
Cannabis 20 g
Hashish: 
 5 g
10 g 5 g 8 g 40 g
Cocaine, base cocaine  
or cocaine 
hydrochloride
1 g 2g  
cocaine
1g  
hydrochloride
500 mg 5g  
cocaine
 2 g 
hydrochloride
-
MDA - 0.15 g 40 mg - -
MDMA - 0.015 g 40 mg - -
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threshold, on the other hand  (see Table 3), seeks to 
distinguish levels of involvement within trafficking 
networks (divided in minimum, medium and high). 
However, the reform created an overlap of the two 
thresholds thus exposing rather than protecting 
users. The new threshold criminalises the possession 
of certain substances at the same level that the 
previous one tolerated (see Tables 3 and 4). Thus, for 
example, possession of 0 to 20 grams of marijuana 
today is considered minimum trafficking and is 
punishable from 1 to 3 years in prison. Moreover, 
possessing 0.1 to 0.2 grams of heroin is considered 
medium trafficking and is punishable from 3 to 5 
years. Large scale trafficking is punished with 10 to 
13 years in prison. This new system will probably 
lead to the criminalisation of users.
In terms of criminal law theory, possession without 
intent attributes objective culpability to the act of 
possession.26 This means that punishment of any 
person who possesses illegal substances above the 
tolerated thresholds is justified regardless of the 
intent to harm.27 Furthermore, it punishes a conduct 
without the existence of actual harm. According to 
Luigi Ferrajoli, the principle of responsibility (blame) 
implies that every crime can be attributable to a 
person because of their understanding of the facts 
and intent to commit a crime.28 Thus, the fact that a 
conduct is considered morally wrong is not enough 
to warrant punishment. As stated by Nils Jareborg,
 
 ‘The measure of blameworthiness of any 
kind of conduct depends partly on what 
values and interests have been infringed 
or threatened, and partly on whether the 
conduct involves actual infringement (harm) 
or  creates a danger of such infringement 
or  is related to such infringement in some 
more distant way (for instance, a breach of a 
safety rule). But it also depends on the guilt or 
culpability exhibited by the actor in  
her conduct.’29  
In other words, harm and culpability are necessary 
aspects to determine and justify criminalisation and 
punishment and pose limits to state intervention 
through criminal law.30 According to Ashworth, ‘the 
harmfulness of a conduct must be judged in terms of 
its effect on valued interests, which may be individual 
interest or some form of collective interest.’31 In other 
words, the criteria for determining harm are set by 
the actual consequences of an action. A necessary 
question then, when analysing the criminalisation 
of possession of certain substances over a certain 
quantity is: what is the harm caused by this particular 
conduct? Is criminal punishment justifiable when no 
clear harm exists?
The other element of criminal law highlighted by 
Ferrajoli is culpability or intent. Intent is a central 
part of criminal law and in justifying punishment. As 
stated by Andrew Ashworth:
‘The centrality of the culpability requirement 
is surely part of the essence of the criminal 
law: if a person is to be censured publicly 
by being labeled a criminal and made liable 
to the sentence, then the court should be 
satisfied not merely that that person caused 
consequence but also that he or she did so 
culpably. Anyone can cause injury, death 
or damage by misfortune or coincidence, 
but that should not be enough for criminal 
liability, however great the harm. The 
criminal law should require proof of fault as 
a condition of imposing censure, let alone 
punishment that involves restriction or 
depravation of liberty.’32
 
Table 3. New thresholds for Ecuador, narcotic drugs23
   NARCOTIC DRUGS  (SEPTEMBER 2015)
SCALE 
HEROIN BASE COCAINE COCAINE 
HYDROCHLORIDE
MARIJUANA
Net weight (grams)
Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum
Minimum 0 0.1 0 2 0 50 0 20
Medium 0.1 0.2 2 50 1 50 20 300
High 0.2 20 50 2,000 50 5.000 300 10.000
Higher scale 20 onwards 2.000 onwards 5.000 onwards 10.000 onwards
In terms of 
criminal law 
theory, possession 
without intent 
attributes objective 
culpability to the 
act of possession. 
This means that 
punishment of 
any person who 
possesses illegal 
substances above the 
tolerated thresholds 
is justified regardless 
of the intent to harm. 
Furthermore, it 
punishes a conduct 
without the existence 
of actual harm.’
‘
      |   AFTER THE DRUG WARS LSE EXPERT GROUP ON THE ECONOMICS OF DRUG POLICY  |34 35
 
Table 4. New thresholds for psychoactive drugs in Ecuador25
   PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES    (SEPTEMBER 2015)
 
SCALE 
AMPHETAMINES METHYLENE 
DIOxYPHENETHYLAMINE  (MDA) 
ECSTASY  
(MDMA)
Net weight (grams)
Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum
Minimum 0 0.090 0 0.090 0 0.090
Medium 0.090 2.5 0.090 2.5 0 2.5
High 2.5 12.5 2.5 12.5 2,5 12.5
Higher scale 12.5 onwards 12.5 onwards 12.5 onwards
Blame, however, is a subjective condition that 
involves the capacity to foresee consequences. 
Thus, most countries criminalise certain 
harms caused unintentionally but that 
could be prevented, such as involuntary 
manslaughter.33 Also, most countries criminally 
punish actions where there is an intent to cause 
harm but no actual harm.34 In these latter cases, 
criminalisation and punishment is justified since 
if the conduct had been carried out, a concrete 
harm would have been caused. However, the 
crime of ‘possession without intent’ criminalises 
and punishes a conduct with neither intent nor 
harm.35  
The difference between subjective and objective 
culpability can show the difficulty for justifying 
the criminalisation of possession without 
intent. Consider a case of first-degree murder. 
Premeditation and the act of taking a life are 
justifications for punishment. Punishment is 
justified because a person had an intent to harm, 
so even if the conduct had not been carried 
out the intent is condemnable. This is a case of 
subjective criminality. Now consider a case where 
a patient dies during an operation. The medic 
could be responsible under criminal and civil 
law, independently of intention. If negligence 
is proven, punishment is justified because the 
medic had a duty of care toward the patient that 
was not fulfilled. In this case, there would be 
objective criminality, which means the conduct is 
reprehensible independently of the intent.
The crime of possession without intent implies 
objective criminality, thus blame becomes 
irrelevant in the justification of these cases. The 
conduct is reprehensible independently of the 
intention to cause harm. Even more, the crime 
presupposes the existence of harm, and thus 
requires no need to prove harm. Sodomy laws 
represented a similar situation where certain 
sexual acts were deemed as immoral and 
therefore punishable. In the case of possession 
without intent neither blame nor harm are 
relevant to justify criminalisation. Possession 
proves the crime and specific circumstances 
are irrelevant, even when they show that 
possession was for personal use and no harm 
can be determined. The result can be viewed as 
a violation of the right to be presumed innocent 
until proven guilty.
A worrisome consequence, especially for 
problematic and inefficient judicial systems, is 
criminalisation and imprisonment of an uncertain 
number of individuals that derive from possession 
crimes. In 2014, the Argentinean Attorney’s 
Office (PROCUNAR) reported 9,414 cases of 
drug possession for personal use by federal 
prosecutors around the country in addition to the 
cases investigated at the local level.36  In Mexico, 
between 2006 and 2014, 175,993 investigations 
were initiated for possession (possession without 
and with intent).37 In Ecuador, between 2007 and 
2014, the public defenders office aided 15,532 
people detained for possession.38
Even in countries like Uruguay or Bolivia, 
where legislation includes the assessment of 
circumstances (not just thresholds), consumers 
are criminalised and sometimes punished. In 
those countries, the intent to distribute or sell 
is evaluated by judges that are often insensitive 
to consumers’ practices. In the case of Uruguay, 
although possession of up to 40 grams of 
cannabis is tolerated for personal use, other 
substances are subject to the judge’s criteria to 
determine whether possession is for personal use 
or not.39
A necessary question 
then, when analysing 
the criminalisation of 
possession of certain 
substances over a 
certain quantity is: what 
is the harm caused by 
this particular conduct? 
Is criminal punishment 
justifiable when no 
clear harm exists? ’
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With vague parameters like ‘reasonable quantity,’ it 
is up to each judge to decide.40 In Bolivia, maximum 
possession thresholds are not legally established but 
are instead established in practice and depending 
on the medical reports prosecutors request from 
experts or health authorities. If the medical report 
states that the consumer was carrying a few grams 
more than the amount that he or she should carry 
for personal use, the consumer is prosecuted for the 
crime of drug trafficking, since micro-trafficking is 
not codified in law in Bolivia.
In Colombia, the Supreme Court has developed 
the doctrine of the provisioning dose to protect 
consumers (in Spanish, dosis de aprovisionamiento). 
According to this doctrine, if someone is caught 
with an amount slightly higher than the threshold 
and it is only for personal use, he/she should not 
be punished. However, continued criminalisation 
motivated the Supreme Court to intervene, 
encouraging the Prosecutor General’s Office and the 
police to focus their action against traffickers who 
threaten legally protected goods.41
In all, thresholds can be said to have a dual effect. 
One the one hand, they serve to limit arbitrary 
decision-making by prosecutors or judges.42 This 
can be positive for judicial systems undermined by 
corruption. However, when the maximum thresholds 
are low they drive perverse practices that lead to the 
criminalisation of users. It becomes easier for police 
and prosecutors to charge a user with possession 
than to investigate (and prove) micro-trafficking.  In 
terms of prosecution indicators, possession cases 
will usually result in easily obtained guilty verdicts, 
which implies an incentive to prosecute these cases 
over more complex (and important) ones.
Perhaps the exception to the analysis presented 
here is Costa Rica, where there are no thresholds 
for personal use, but rather a discretionary model 
based on evidence and mitigating factors found in 
the commission of a crime. Further, the Attorney 
General’s Office has disseminated guidelines 
pushing for arrests made for consumption to be 
dismissed.43  This has prevented the arrest of users by 
the police meaning that neither use nor possession 
is criminalised.44
According to Von Hirsh, several considerations 
are necessary when evaluating the decision to 
use criminal law as a response to a conduct, 
such as whether or not; ‘the system has explicitly 
rated the seriousness of the crimes? In grading 
offenses, has the rulemaking agency made its 
own conscientious judgment on the merits as to 
their seriousness? Lastly, has the rule maker given 
explicit reasons for this seriousness rating?’45 The 
problem with the crime of possession without 
intent is the impossibility to adequately respond 
to these questions as the evaluation of harm is not 
possible. From a theoretical and moral point of 
view, criminalisation of possession without intent 
becomes unjustifiable.
In Latin-American societies, the use of criminal law 
is practically tantamount to punishment through 
imprisonment; a highly intrusive, violent and costly 
state measure. Because of this, criminalisation should 
only be used as a last resort (principle of ultima ratio), 
when other – less harmful – means have failed, and 
for conduct that truly merits the intervention. In this 
sense, regulation of possession must be revised in 
order to protect users of illicit substances from the 
application of unfair, unwarranted and inappropriate 
laws, and the proportionality of the response should 
also be evaluated.
ConClusions
 
Despite the regional ‘decriminalisation’ discourse 
consumers continue to be detained, prosecuted 
and even incarcerated in Latin America. This occurs 
because possession, in different ways, remains a 
crime, and because the use of illicit substances 
remains regulated through criminal law even 
though it is not considered a crime. So while Latin 
America’s discourse is one of decriminalisation of 
drug use, legal practices and norms rely on the use 
of penal institutions for addressing the consumption 
of illicit substances.
Understanding the regulation of possession of 
illicit substances is fundamental for understanding 
the constant criminalisation of consumers across 
Latin America. In this text, we analysed different 
regulations of possession that help understand 
why users are caught within the penal sphere 
of the law. Particularly, we analyse the case of 
‘possession without intent’ as an example of a legal 
mechanism that criminalises users without any moral 
or theoretical justification.
In Latin America, where police and other penal 
institutions are known for often pervasive abusive 
practices, placing the regulation of use and 
possession within the purview of criminal law 
exposes drug consumers to violations of their 
basic rights, corruption, extortion, physical abuse 
and arbitrary detentions. According to Burgh, 
‘Punishment involves our doing to people what we 
ordinarily think is wrong to do. It seems that, insofar 
as this intuition is disconnected from justice, we 
have a compelling reason to cease acting on it.’46 As 
seen in this text, there are few (or no reasons) to 
prohibit the possession of illicit drugs or worse, to do 
so via criminal law. This is especially true in the case 
of possession without the intent to sell or distribute. 
Today, the regulation of these conducts violates the 
principles of proportionality and produces an unjust 
approach to a widespread social reality. With little in 
its defence, regulation of possession must be revised 
in order to match discourse with reality and as a way 
to protect users from the application of unjust and 
disproportionate laws and practices.
Thresholds can be  
said to have a dual 
effect. On the one 
hand, they serve 
to limit arbitrary 
decision-making by 
prosecutors or judges. 
This can be positive 
for judicial systems 
undermined by 
corruption. However, 
when the maximum 
thresholds are low 
they drive perverse 
practices that lead to 
the criminalisation 
of users. It becomes 
easier for police and 
prosecutors to charge 
a user with possession 
than to investigate 
(and prove)  
micro-trafficking.
‘
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With little in its defence, 
regulation of possession 
must be revised in order 
to match discourse with 
reality and as a way to 
protect users from the 
application of unjust and 
disproportionate laws 
 and practices.
on MeTRiCs anD inDiCaToRs
Metrics and indicators are a structural problem of contemporary drug policies, which often 
promote the criminalisation of drug users and hinder progress toward a better response to 
drug use. We find five main problems with these indicators:
1. The first lies in the objectives set by current drug policies: reduction of supply or 
demand. These objectives inform a set of metrics that solely focus on analysing 
supply and demand reduction, without addressing the root causes that contribute 
to such supply and demand, such as poverty, underdevelopment, health, education  
and insecurity.
2. The data used to assess the success or failure of drug policies is extremely 
narrow. Indicators based merely on procedural aspects of drug control (budget 
invested, the number of people arrested, convicted and incarcerated) to reduce 
supply and demand reveal very little about the impact of drug policies on  
peoples’ lives.
3. Traditional metrics of supply and demand reduction can signal success without 
revealing the damaging impact of drug policy on human rights, health or  
social inclusion.
4. The indicators currently used have created perverse incentives, such as the tendency 
to inflate results with illegal or harmful strategies.
5. Finally, the current metrics do not give room for differential approaches for different 
populations. As we show, the existing indicators create incentives to process 
consumers over micro traffickers as they are often registered as successful captures 
to reduce supply. As a consequence, the policy hides realities that should be taken 
into account, such as class, gender and race biases in criminal prosecution of  
drug offenses.
Better indicators to assess drug policies could lead to better drug policies. These could be, for 
example;
•	 The decrease in the number of deaths caused by overdose,
•	 The evolution of the infection rates from HIV, hepatitis B and C and other 
communicable diseases among people who use drugs,
•	 And, the coverage of treatment and harm reduction programmes for people who 
need them (within prisons or for the general population).
On the supply side, rather than evaluating the number of people arrested and incarcerated 
for drug law violations, indicators such as; the reduction in the number of victims from 
drug-related violence, the decrease in the number of families whose incomes depend on 
the participation in drug markets, and the reduction of recidivism, could lead to a more 
just approach. This is an approach that protects human rights rather than pose an obstacle 
to them. 
‘
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Legalising Drugs Prudently:  
The Importance of Incentives and Values
Jonathan P. Caulkins 
This is yet another paper about legalising drugs.  But it’s different. The usual slant is debating the pros and cons of legalisation, with academics who chose to write on the topic almost always coming out in favor; defending the status quo 
may not be innovative enough to satisfy academics’ contrarian urges or tenure 
committees’ expectations.
 
SUMMARY
 ■ For the first time in the modern era, 
jurisdictions are legalising not just 
cannabis use but also its production, 
distribution and sale.
 ■ Legalisation could make cannabis 
use relatively safer – if it increases 
occasional users who experience no 
problems. However, it could just as 
easily go the other way, with lower 
prices, higher potency, and greater 
advertising, facilitating escalation of 
problematic cannabis use.
 ■ The notions developed herein have 
a potential relevance for a number of 
other illicit drugs.
 ■ Regulatory architectures should be 
based on acknowledging that: 
(1)  Heavy users are prone to 
abuse dependence-inducing 
intoxicants.
(2)  Industry prioritises profit 
over protecting customers, 
recognising that most sales and 
profits flow from the minority 
of people who consume very 
heavily (e.g., the ‘whales’ in the 
gambling industry).
(3)  Regulatory bodies are prone 
to industry capture, and their 
political overlords are more 
responsive to large numbers 
of affluent voters than to small 
numbers of poor ones.
 ■ As such, the regulatory architecture 
should be stacked in favor of 
protecting public health, most 
notably the welfare of the heavy 
users who lose control over their 
consumption.  
 ■ At least two basic strategies (not 
mutually exclusive) are available:
(1) To place regulatory control in 
the hands of a public-health 
minded agency.
(2)  To keep for-profit industry out 
of the picture altogether.
A newer genre takes legalisation – of 
cannabis at least – as a fait accompli, but 
recognises that legalisation is not a simple 
yes/no choice.1  There are a myriad ways 
of implementing legalisation, and those 
choices matter.  A bad legalisation could 
underperform a good prohibition just as 
a bad prohibition could underperform an 
idealised legalisation.  Publications in this 
vein evaluate the pros and cons of including 
this or that regulation or  setting taxes at this 
rate vs. another rate.2
This paper has a similar goal – informing 
how to best implement legalisation – but 
takes one step back.  Instead of asking, in 
effect, what regulatory regime should a 
benevolent dictator impose by fiat?  It asks 
what supply and regulatory architectures 
are appropriate, given the realities of 
political processes and economic incentives 
in a modern democracy.  
The moment of legalisation presents two 
special opportunities and one special 
challenge relative to the ensuing decades 
of grubby regulatory rule-making.  First, it 
is only at the moment of legalisation that 
voters and lawmakers can act free of the 
constraints created by an extant legal 
industry with all of its parochial interests. 
There is a one-time opportunity to work 
with a relatively clean slate.  
Second, legalisation is a high-stakes act that 
can focus the attention of busy lawmakers 
and voters, increasing the diversity of 
viewpoints and stakeholder interests that are 
represented.  Once the watershed moment 
passes, the day in and day out drudgery 
of deciding whether production licenses 
should be denominated in plants, square 
feet or  kilograms, and whether wattage rules 
should be adjusted for growers using LED 
rather than incandescent lights, will concern 
only industry insiders and (hopefully) a 
handful of unusually attentive do-gooders. 
The big choices, such as what kinds of 
organisations get to participate in the 
market, will be made all at once in a rush and 
then rapidly become ossified.  
The catch is that this one-time-only 
opportunity for getting the regulatory 
architecture right comes before we 
actually have much experience with or 
evidence concerning legalisation in a 
modern industrial society.  At the moment 
of legalisation, society will be debating 
passionately but largely in ignorance.  
This suggests that the most important 
decisions to be made on legalisation day or 
very soon thereafter are: (1) What kinds of 
organisations get to supply cannabis legally? 
And (2) What are the powers and motives 
of the regulatory agencies who oversee 
those suppliers? Rather than debating 
whether the ideal excise tax is $1.00 or $1.50 
per gram when no one has the empirical 
evidence necessary to support objective 
analysis, we might instead think about 
who gets to decide how those tax rates will 
be adjusted over time.3 And rather than 
deciding whether billboards advertising 
cannabis sales must be 200 meters or 400 
meters away from the nearest school, maybe 
we should be thinking more about what 
types of organisations are allowed to make 
those sales.  
The goal of this paper is to spur thinking 
along these lines.  I begin by laying out three 
foundational observations, and then identify 
key recommendations that flow from those 
observations.  I couch the discussion in terms 
of cannabis legalisation, since only cannabis 
legalisation is a live policy topic today, but 
close with some thoughts about how the 
analysis might or might not carry over to 
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other substances. The data concerning 
use patterns are drawn mostly from the US 
household survey, because that survey is 
well-run, large, and makes its data available 
to the public via a convenient online tool that 
permits easy replication of the calculations 
underpinning the figures given below.4 
I suspect that the general patterns – including 
the concentration of use among the minority 
of heavy users – may have parallels in some 
other countries.  
founDaTional pReMise #1: 
heaVy useRs aRe pRone 
To abuse Cannabis
 
Most people who try cannabis do not 
become dependent, but a distressing 
proportion of those who use on an ongoing 
basis do become dependent.
A commonly cited source for estimates of 
the lifetime risk of developing cannabis 
dependence is Anthony et al.’s study6 that 
used 1990 – 1992 data from the National 
Comorbidity Study.  They found that 4.2% of 
respondents reported having had enough 
problems with their cannabis use to meet the 
criteria for dependence at some point and 
46.3% reported ever trying cannabis even 
once.  Dividing 4.2% by 46.3% suggests that 
9.1% of those who ever tried cannabis had 
developed dependence.6  The corresponding 
proportion among younger users was 15.3% 
- presumably higher because back in 1990–
1992 many older users never had a chance 
to try cannabis until they had aged past their 
most vulnerable years.
Similar rates are found in other Western 
countries.  E.g., Fergusson and Horwood7 
report that 69% of 1,265 children in the 
Christchurch cohort study had tried cannabis 
by age 21 and 9% had already developed 
cannabis dependence, for a 9 / 69 = 13% 
risk of dependence by age 21.  By age 25, 
that proportion had grown to 16% -- with 
12.5% dependent out of 76.7% who had 
tried.8  In an Australian sample (mean age 
21), 12% were dependent at the time of 
data collection; lifetime rates of dependence 
would be higher to the extent that some 
who had been dependent no longer were 
so and others may not yet have progressed 
to dependence.9
For various reasons the proportions may be 
different now, notably the sharp increase in 
cannabis potency,10 and the future could be 
different even from today.  Anyhow, let us 
suppose for the moment that it will also be 
true in the future that 9 – 15% of those who 
try cannabis will become dependent on it.
That still would not mean using marijuana 
creates little risk of dependency because 
most people who try marijuana only ever 
use it occasionally. As such, all of that 
dependence risk loads up on the smaller 
number of people who use it more often.
according to the 2013 US household survey). 
Hence, the lifetime risk that heavy marijuana 
use will lead to abuse or dependence is quite 
high, perhaps considerably greater than 
27 – 45%.
Logic and the limited empirical evidence 
available suggests that liberalising cannabis 
policies will increase the prevalence of use 
and, to an even greater extent, increase the 
intensity of use.  For example, the number 
of daily and near-daily cannabis users in the 
US has increased sevenfold from its nadir in 
1992.12  Not all of that increase can be pinned 
on policy changes.  And precisely estimating 
the effects of any given policy change is 
difficult for many reasons.  For one, changes 
in cannabis laws tend to follow – not trigger 
–changes in law enforcement practice, 
rendering before and after comparisons 
treacherous.  Cannabis flows freely across 
state lines, so states meant to serve as 
‘controls’ in statistical evaluations often get 
‘treated.’  In addition, much of the empirical 
work has erroneously lumped together 
disparate policy changes by modeling all 
types of decriminalisation with a single 
binary indicator variable or  using as an 
independent variable the existence of a 
medical marijuana law not its constituent 
parts or the number of dispensaries or number 
of patients as the predictor variables.13
Nevertheless, the most sensible prediction is 
that legalisation will increase cannabis abuse 
and dependence to at least some extent, and 
the question is really how large the increase 
will be, not whether there will be one.14
suppoRTing pReMise: 
Cannabis abuse anD 
DepenDenCe is unhealThy
 
Systematic reviews identify a variety of 
health-harms associated with heavy and 
prolonged cannabis use,15 so for many 
people it is obvious that cannabis abuse 
and dependence are public health concerns. 
Readers in that camp can skip this section, 
which merely presents statistics showing that 
a significant proportion of marijuana users 
self-report suffering problems stemming 
from their use.
Rather, this section is written for those 
who question whether society should care 
whether legalisation increases cannabis 
abuse and dependence.  Some skepticism is 
not unreasonable.  After all, caffeine induces 
tolerance, withdrawal and other hallmarks 
The most important  
decisions to be made on  
legalisation day or  
very soon thereafter are:  
(1) What kinds of organisations 
get to supply cannabis legally? 
And (2) What are the powers 
and motives of the regulatory 
agencies who oversee  
those suppliers?  
‘
’
The tobacco literature often counts people 
as ever having smoked only if they have 
done so on at least 100 occasions.  Those 
who never cross that threshold are seen as 
not being relevant for understanding health 
harms (or industry revenue).  The same 
principle can be applied to marijuana.  Few 
whose lifetime consumption totals less than 
100 occasions are ever seriously harmed by 
that use.  Conversely, most frequent users do 
cross that threshold, since it amounts to less 
than six months of daily or near-daily use or 
a year of using on weekend days.  
US household surveys no longer ask about 
the number of occasions used cumulatively, 
from initiation to date, but older surveys 
did.  They show that only about one-third 
of those who admit trying cannabis report 
having used it as many as 100 times in their 
lives.  Since almost no one who uses less 
often develops dependence, we should 
triple the 9 – 15% figures to 27 – 45% to find 
the lifetime risk of developing dependence 
for someone who uses marijuana 100 or 
more times in their life.11  
Furthermore, ‘dependence’ was the more 
severe of two levels of substance use 
disorder (SUD) distinguished before the 
newer Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM) merged them into 
the broader category of SUD.  The other 
form was labeled ‘abuse.’  About 1.5 times 
as many people meet the criteria for ‘abuse 
or dependence’ as meet the stricter criteria 
for dependence (4.1 million vs. 2.8 million 
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of substance abuse, and the DSM labels 
caffeine-use disorder as a condition meriting 
further study.16  Yet few view the tribulations 
of those who over-indulge their caffeine 
habit as rising to the level of a societal 
problem.  Even though the Drug Abuse 
Warning Network recorded about 21,000 
emergency department episodes involving 
energy drinks and there are occasional 
reports of associated deaths,17 some argue 
that caffeine and energy drinks do not pose 
a significant public health problem, aside 
from adverse effects on sleep.18  Perhaps 
cannabis abuse and dependence is likewise 
a reality but not a concern.  Indeed, Room 
et al.19 argue that cannabis not only has a 
lower risk of addiction than other common 
drugs, including tobacco, alcohol, cocaine, 
stimulants, and heroin, but also that the 
degree of dependence is less.
Still, less harmful does not mean not harmful, 
as a comparison with the familiar case of 
alcohol makes clear.  Alcohol is obviously 
much more harmful than cannabis in several 
very important respects, including the risk 
of death from acute intoxication and the 
tendency to induce violence. On those 
dimensions, marijuana looks exceedingly safe. 
However, self-reports to the US household 
survey suggest that marijuana produces 
challenges to life functioning and self-
control.20  In 2013, twenty million Americans 
self-reported past-month marijuana use 
and 4.1 million self-reported enough 
problems with that use to meet DSM-IV 
clinical definitions for marijuana abuse or 
dependence.  Based on parallel questions in 
the same survey, the corresponding figures 
for alcohol were 136 million past-month 
users and 18.9 million suffering alcohol 
abuse or dependence.  
All of those figures are presumably under-
estimates because they are based on 
survey self-report and denial is a hallmark 
of addiction.  But the ratio of ratios is 
instructive.  The ratio of marijuana abuse and 
dependence to current use (4.1 / 20 = 0.21) is 
about 60% higher than is the corresponding 
ratio for alcohol (18.9 / 136 = 0.13).  So 
under current patterns of use in the United 
States, marijuana appears to generate more 
abuse and dependence per user than does 
alcohol.  If one focuses on the more serious 
diagnosis of dependence, then marijuana 
produces 140% as many victims per user, 
since the ratios are 0.14 for marijuana vs. 0.06 
for alcohol. 
SAMHSA imputes abuse and dependence 
from answers to about a dozen questions 
concerning specific problems that 
respondents might indicate they believe are 
being caused by their substance use.  There 
is a discernible pattern to the responses. 
Cannabis looks the worst, relative to alcohol, 
on questions about life functioning.21 
Cannabis also generates greater rates of 
people saying they tried to limit or cut down 
their use, but failed.  The only commonly 
answered question for which alcohol’s 
ratio was larger than marijuana’s was ‘Did 
you regularly drink alcohol and then do 
something where being drunk might have 
put you in physical danger?’ (0.08 for alcohol 
vs. only 0.07 for cannabis.)  
So  not  only is cannabis abuse and depen-
dence fairly common now among those 
who use cannabis regularly for a half-year or 
more, that abuse and dependence interferes 
with life functioning at rates per past-month 
user that are greater than those for alcohol 
(albeit still nowhere near alcohol’s effects on 
death or violence).  Conceivably, legalisation 
could make cannabis use look relatively safer 
– if it leads to a flood of occasional users who 
experience no problems, but it could just as 
easily go the other way, with lower prices, 
higher potency, and greater advertising, 
facilitating escalation.  
founDaTional pReMise #2: 
The MaRijuana inDusTRy is 
pRone To abuse heaVy useRs
 
Problem marijuana use may be a public 
health concern, but it is a profit opportunity 
for those selling marijuana.  Indeed, it is 
not just a profit opportunity, it is the only 
important profit opportunity. Simple 
arithmetic reveals that controlled, occasional 
use by adults does not generate enough 
sales to fulfill Jamen Shively’s forecast 
that the cannabis industry will mint more 
millionaires than Microsoft.
For the moment, let us define non-problem 
use as weekend consumption by adults 
who do not suffer from substance abuse 
or dependence (of any intoxicant, not just 
marijuana, so marijuana use by alcoholics is 
counted as problem use).22
The US household survey does not ask 
respondents how much cannabis they 
used; people have a hard time answering 
questions in terms of grams of cannabis, let 
alone milligrams of THC.  The best measure 
for these purposes is the number of days 
of use.23  
Altogether respondents to the 2013 survey 
report 287 million days of cannabis use in the 
past month.24  Of that total, 229 million (80%) 
come from respondents who are 21 or older 
(the usual definition of adult for purposes of 
using legal cannabis or alcohol in the United 
States).  137 million (60%) of those days come 
from people who do not self-report enough 
problems to merit a diagnosis of substance 
abuse or dependence.  Less than half of 
use-days (80% * 60% = 48%) are by adults 
who are not identified as having abuse or 
dependence problems.25  
The survey does not ask on which days of 
the week respondents used.  As a proxy for 
‘only on weekends,’ consider those who 
report using on fewer than 10 days in the 
past month  (if someone used both weekend 
days on all four weekends, they would have 
used on 8 days).  Adults who suffer from no 
abuse or dependence problems and who 
consume on fewer than 10 days per month 
report 13 million past-month days of use or 
4.7% of the 287 million total.  Since frequent 
users also tend to use a greater amount per 
day of use, this market segment’s share of 
consumption is probably more like 3% of 
marijuana consumption.  
Some might think the definition of non-
problem use above was drawn too narrowly. 
Figure 1 shows how this proportion varies 
with the cut-off frequency above which use 
is defined to be problematic.  Unless one 
expands the definition of non-problematic 
to encompass daily or near-daily use, 
unproblematic use by adults is less than 10% 
of the market in terms of days of use, and 
even less in terms of amount consumed.
Two things reconcile this with the fact that 
most cannabis users suffer no adverse 
consequences.  First, even daily use does 
not always harm every user of cannabis or, 
for that matter, even more deadly drugs. 
The proportion of pack-a-day smokers who 
get lung cancer is ‘only’ 5 – 20%, depending 
on how old they were when they started 
smoking.  But obviously lung cancer 
associated with daily smoking is nonetheless 
a health concern at the population level.  
Most people who  
try cannabis do not  
become dependent, but  
a distressing proportion 
of those who use on an  
ongoing basis do 
become dependent. 
‘
’
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Second, one heavy user consumes more – a 
lot more – than does one occasional user.26 
So the person involved in the typical episode 
of use is very different from the typical user. 
Again, a little arithmetic makes the point. 
(this time we include the 13 million people 
who report use in the past-year but not the 
past-month).
In the 2013 survey, 53.4% of past-year users 
reported using on 52 or fewer occasions in 
the past year.  So if we created a sorted table 
with a row for each frequency of use, wrote 
in the number of respondents belonging in 
each row, and marched down that ordered 
table until we got to the median user – 
meaning the user such that half of all users 
consume less often and half consume more 
often – then that typical user would report 
having used 52 times in the past year.  It is 
fair to say that the typical cannabis user 
consumes about once a week, on average.
We can do the same exercise with days of 
use.  The row for the 2 million people who 
report using twice in the last 12 months now 
contains the number 4 million, since those 
2 million people produced 4 million days of 
use.  Likewise, the row for the 700,000 who 
report using 10 times in the last 12 months 
contains the number 7 million, and so on. 
The survey respondents collectively report 
3.9 billion days of use in the last year, so we 
can march down the ordered table until we 
reach the 3.9 / 2 = 1.95 billionth day of use. 
That might be viewed as the typical day of 
use.  We can then ask how frequently the 
Figure 1.  Proportion of Cannabis Use Reported in Household Surveys that is by Adults with 
No Identified Substance Use Disorder and Who Use No More Often than the Number of Days 
per Month Specified on the Horizontal Axis
person contributing that typical day used 
over the last 12 months.  The answer is 
312 days – or 26 days per month, not just 
once a week.  That striking difference arises 
because the minority of daily and near daily 
users account for a disproportionate share of 
the days of use.  The 50% of past-year users 
who consume weekly or less often account 
for just 7% of the days-of-use.
Finally, we can do a similar exercise with 
grams consumed.  Although the US 
household survey does not ask about grams 
used, RAND conducted web-surveys in seven 
European countries and again in the state of 
Washington that showed users pictures of 
piles of cannabis alongside everyday objects 
like coins, paper clips, and credit cards.27 
These prompts helped respondents answer 
what otherwise would be difficult questions 
about the weight of marijuana consumed. 
The key finding from Washington is that 
people who report using daily or near-daily 
average about 1.6 grams per day of use, and 
that is about two to three times as much per 
use-day as for the occasional users.  Light 
et al.28 obtained similar results from parallel 
data collection in Colorado.
Folding that information in with the survey 
data on number of days used produces the 
following estimate.  The 13% of past-year 
users who report using on each and every 
day in the last month account for 45% of 
the days-of-use reported in the last month 
and more than 50% of the grams consumed. 
Hence, the typical gram of marijuana is used 
by someone who reports using literally every 
single day in the past month.  Indeed, since 
their average consumption of 1.6 grams 
per day is enough for roughly 3-4 joints, 
and each joint produces intoxication that 
lasts several hours, the following striking 
statement is probably literally true: The 
majority of cannabis in the US is consumed 
by people who spend the majority of their 
waking hours intoxicated.29 
In sum, we have three contrasting descrip-
tions of typical use,  all simultaneously true.
 ■ The typical marijuana user consumes 
weekly or less often.
 ■ The typical day of marijuana use 
involves someone who uses nearly 
daily (26 times per month)
 ■ The typical gram of marijuana is 
used by someone who spends 
the majority of their waking hours 
intoxicated.
So marijuana companies cannot expand 
sales significantly by selling to occasional 
users.  They must push additional people 
into a state of more or less perpetual 
intoxication or intensify the intoxication of 
those who are already in that state.  Neither 
is healthy.  In short, marijuana producers’ 
profit interests are at odds with the 
welfare of their customer base, and of society 
more generally.
The next question is whose side regulators 
will take.
Marijuana producers’  
profit interests are  
at odds with the welfare  
of their customer base, and of 
society more generally. 
‘
’
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founDaTional pReMise #3: 
RegulaToRs aRe pRone To negleCT 
The publiC healTh inTeResT
 
After legalisation, the regulatory agency responsible 
for overseeing the new industry could focus on any 
of three interests:
 ■ The regulated companies
 ■ Typical consumers
 ■ The public health interest
The first two have political clout; the third does not. 
In an ideal world public agencies would be defenders 
of the weak; in the real world, clout often wins out.
The idea that regulated industries generally have 
clout and exercise it to bend rules to their benefit 
needs no explanation,30 and there is no reason to 
expect the cannabis industry to be any different. 
In Mark Kleiman’s words, the marijuana advocacy 
movement is already morphing into the cannabis 
lobby,31 with the National Cannabis Industry 
Association front and centre.  This is natural and not 
a problem per se – unless one is naïve enough to be 
surprised by it.  
Still, the brazenness of the cannabis industry’s 
ambitions are breathtaking.  Oregon’s Cannabis Tax 
Act proposition of 2012 (which almost passed) would 
have charged a newly constituted Oregon Cannabis 
Commission with responsibility for overseeing the 
industry.  The proposition stipulated that five of the 
seven commissioners ‘shall be elected at large by the 
[licensed] growers and processors.’  In other words, 
regulatory-capture was built in.  
That plan did not pass, but reality under the 2014 
proposition which did pass is also troubling.  One-
third of the Oregon Liquor Control Commission’s 
cannabis rules advisory committee hail from industry 
(four entrepreneurs on the production side and the 
founder of a cannabis testing company, as well as 
the chief petitioner for the proposition).  Needless 
to say, the FDA does not allow pharmaceutical 
representatives to play a similar role.
The most dramatic example to date, though, is 
Sensible Ohio, which pushed for an amendment 
to the State Constitution that would have created 
a legally-protected oligopoly, with production 
limited to sites owned by ten people who each 
contributed $2 million to the campaign to get this 
proposition passed.32  
Likewise, it would be surprising if a regulatory 
bureaucracy did not pay attention to the interests 
of typical consumers in a democracy.  Median 
voters hold the power in elections, and we would 
expect median users to be on the minds of 
cannabis regulators. As noted above, the median 
user consumes only weekly. Most such people are 
fully in command of their consumption and so can 
reasonably be treated the way government agencies 
treat any other consumer – as competent adults 
who can look after their own interests.  They are not 
suffering appreciable harms and whatever harms 
they suffer are likely more than offset by the benefits 
they derive from their consumption.
The interests of such controlled users lie in having 
many conveniently-located stores offering a wide 
variety of products, clear and accurate labeling, 
and low prices – which implies both low taxes and 
a minimum of burdensome regulations that drive 
up production costs.  That list of desiderata overlaps 
considerably with the industry’s wish-list.  
Indeed, the cannabis industry can, like the alcohol 
and gun industries but unlike the tobacco industry, 
call on a cadre of happy customers whenever 
its interests are threatened by the prospect of 
unfavorable laws or regulations.  
By contrast, the public health interest lies in 
dependent and abusive patterns of consumption, 
but there are relatively few such people.  The 4.1 
million people who report enough problems on 
surveys to meet DSM criteria for marijuana abuse or 
dependence are outnumbered three to one by the 
11.7 million adults who use 50 or fewer times per 
year and do not suffer from abuse or dependence.
They are also less educated and poorer, which matters 
inasmuch as political and bureaucratic institutions 
respond to money, not just headcounts.   Only 10% 
of those who abuse or are dependent on marijuana 
have college degrees.  The corresponding figure is 
40% among controlled, adult users.  So the number 
of college graduates who use marijuana in ways 
that align their interests with industry outnumbers 
eleven-to-one the number of college graduates 
suffering from marijuana abuse or dependence.
It is perhaps obvious that the interests of industry 
and these problem users differ.  Industry wants them 
to consume more; their doctors generally want them 
to consume less.  But what is less widely appreciated 
is that the heavy users’ accountants also ought to 
weigh in on the side of moderation.  At present this 
group spends about 4.5% of its household income 
on marijuana, a vastly greater proportion than the 
0.25% share among controlled, adult users.33  
In sum, natural political processes will nudge 
regulators to serve the industry (which lobbies and 
makes campaign donations) and the modal users (who 
are numerous and relatively more affluent, so more 
likely to vote), not the circumstances surrounding the 
typical gram of use – which involves daily users who 
spend the majority of their waking hours under the 
influence of a performance-degrading drug.
Hence, if the public, and the law makers they elect, 
generally want legalisation to be conducted in a 
way that protects the public interest, the overall 
architecture within which producers and regulators 
operate will have to be slanted toward achieving 
that end. 
It is only  
at the moment  
of legalisation that  
voters and 
lawmakers  
can act free of the  
constraints created 
by an extant legal 
industry  
with all of its  
parochial interests. 
‘
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ConClusion: legalisaTion oughT 
To sTaCK The DeCK TowaRD 
pRoTeCTing heaVy useRs
 
From these three premises, it is possible to 
assert that:
1. Heavy users are prone to abuse marijuana 
(and they themselves say it harms them)
2. Industry is prone to abuse heavy users
3. Regulators are prone to neglect public 
health interests
It follows that at the moment of legalisation – 
when the topic has captured the attention of 
diverse people and industry interests have not 
yet become entrenched – the deck should be 
stacked in favor of protecting public health, most 
notably the welfare of the heavy users who lose 
control over their consumption.  At least two basic 
strategies are available for achieving this.
The first is to place regulatory control in the hands 
of a public-health minded agency that views its 
job as protecting those who abuse cannabis from 
being abused by industry.34 There are agencies 
that are willing to be tough on the industries 
they regulate, notably the FDA vis-à-vis the 
tobacco industry and the EPA vs. the coal industry. 
However, that is not the norm. Even leaving 
aside extreme instances of regulatory capture 
(the Interstate Commerce Commission being the 
textbook example), many agencies construe their 
role as being neutral toward the industry, insisting 
that companies follow the rules but not worrying 
whether the rules are protecting the public health. 
Alcohol beverage control agencies are thought to 
operate in this fashion, and some inherit regulatory 
oversight of marijuana (e.g., Washington State’s 
Liquor and Cannabis Board).  Other agencies are 
explicitly dual mission, such as the Federal Aviation 
Administration being responsible for both airline 
safety and promoting air travel.  Colorado placed 
regulatory control in its Department of Revenue, 
which presumably has a culture of viewing tax 
collection as a central function; taxes depend on 
revenue, which for cannabis in turn depends on 
sales to people who abuse the drug.
For those who believe good government 
is stronger than industry lobbying and the 
political pressures of the median user, simply 
choosing an appropriate regulatory body may 
be sufficient.  But others might want additional, 
structural protections.
One powerful way to accomplish that is keeping 
for-profit industry out of the picture altogether. 
Rolles and Murkin35 warn against the two extremes 
At least in theory  
an industry might 
make more money 
selling high-priced 
products to rich 
users, even if they use 
moderate quantities, 
than it does selling 
low-priced products 
to poor users who 
consume more in 
total.  If companies 
catering to the rich 
dominate the industry 
associations, they 
might lobby for 
regulations that favor 
lower-volume, higher-
quality and higher-
cost production 
patterns. 
‘
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of prohibition and free market supply. They argue 
that both are prone to dangerous excesses and 
that some middle ground, such as a government 
monopoly over production and distribution, is 
much safer for substances, like marijuana, that are 
prone to harmful use.  That is the path Uruguay has 
adopted, along with co-ops and home growing.36
The US has not heeded such warnings.  All four 
states that have legalised large-scale production 
as of this writing have embraced the private-
enterprise commercial model.37   The problem, 
of course, is that companies have no interest 
in protecting users’ health beyond keeping 
them alive so they can keep on buying the 
companies’ products. 
Moreover, a government monopoly also might 
not fit well with a free-market American culture, 
particularly at this time when hostility toward 
government is so high, and as a practical matter 
government monopoly at the state level may be 
problematic while marijuana remains prohibited 
by the federal Controlled Substances Act.  But 
as Caulkins et al.38 note, there are many ways to 
provide for legal supply besides government 
monopoly and commercial legalisation.
One alternative would maintain all of the industry 
structure and regulations that states like Colorado 
and Washington impose on licensed producers 
and retailers, but in addition limit licenses to non-
profits or public benefit-corporations.39 Public 
benefit corporations are for-profit, but they have 
pledged to manage their organisation in order 
to advance a triple bottom line of people, planet, 
and profits, rather than sacrificing all to maximise 
profits.  One could go further and require these 
organisations to have governing boards whose 
members come from – or are selected by – the 
public health and child welfare communities. 
Just as the charters of some universities set aside 
a certain number of board seats for alumni, and 
the charters of some religiously affiliated colleges 
set aside board seats for church representatives, 
the state could refuse to issue a license to any 
organisation that does not build in a voice on 
its governing board for those most likely to be 
harmed if the organisation embarked on a single-
minded pursuit of profits.
Eliminating or softening the mission-driven 
incentive for promoting sales to heavy users 
may be particularly valuable vis-à-vis control of 
advertising in the US, where First Amendment 
speech protections extend to commercial free 
speech, greatly limiting regulators’ options for 
constraining advertising.  If the suppliers do 
not want to promote sales to consumers who 
harm themselves via that consumption, then it 
does not matter whether regulators can block 
such promotion.
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DisCussion: Does The 
pRinCiple eXTenD To 
oTheR DRugs?
This essay was motivated by the trend toward 
cannabis legalisation.  That is the drug whose 
legalisation is a present possibility, and it is 
the one for which direct empirical evidence 
is beginning to develop.  However, even for 
cannabis that evidence is thin, because no 
modern jurisdiction had legalised large-scale 
production and sale for non-medical use 
until Colorado and Washington State did in 
2012, and even there, cannabis stores did not 
open until 2014.
Nevertheless, it is natural to wonder what 
portion of the logic would carry over to other 
substances.  Since the evidence base with 
respect to legalising other drugs is all but 
non-existent, this section moves into more 
or less pure speculation.  With that caveat 
firmly stated, here is one guess concerning 
generalisability to other substances.
In broad terms, the foundational premises 
hold for many other currently illegal drugs, 
so one might expect essential elements 
of the conclusion to pertain.  That is, if we 
restate the three premises in more general 
form, they seem uncontroversial:
1. Heavy users are prone to abuse 
dependence- inducing intoxicants.
2. Industry prioritises profit over 
protecting customers, and recognises 
that most sales and profits flow from 
the minority of people who consume 
very heavily (e.g., the ‘whales’ in the 
gambling industry).
3. Regulatory bodies are prone to 
industry capture, and their political 
overlords are more responsive to 
large numbers of affluent voters than 
to small numbers of poor ones.
Hence, there is a risk that the minority of 
consumers who use heavily will be (1) harmed 
by their abuse, (2) exploited by industry, and 
(3) neglected by regulators.  So if one wishes 
to minimise that risk, it is prudent to slant the 
design or ‘architecture’ of legalisation in ways 
that resist these tendencies.
If we want to probe for instances in which 
the risk is smaller, and so special precautions 
are less necessary, we might try thinking of 
substances for which the premises do not 
hold.  Some examples follow.
 ■ Some banned substances do not 
induce dependence and so are 
less likely to lead to compulsive 
or otherwise uncontrolled 
consumption.  Examples include 
steroids and some hallucinogens.
 ■ Most consumer goods – not just 
drugs – obey some form of ‘Pareto 
Rule’ in which consumption is 
concentrated among a minority of 
heavy users, but not all do.  To the 
extent that MDMA rapidly produces 
short-term tolerance to its desired 
effects, the average consumption 
rate among heavy MDMA users may 
be a smaller multiple of the average 
rate for typical consumers than is 
the case for alcohol, marijuana or  
cocaine.  
 ■ At least in theory, an industry might 
make more money selling high-
priced products to rich users, even if 
they use moderate quantities, than 
it does selling low-priced products 
to poor users who consume more 
in total.  If companies catering to 
the rich dominate the industry 
associations, they might lobby 
for regulations that favour lower-
volume, higher-quality and higher-
cost production patterns. 
 ■ If most of the drug-related harms 
fall on third parties, rather than 
on the user, then the political 
marginalisation of the heavy users 
matters less.  Politicians might 
care as much about helping those 
third-party victims as they do about 
catering to industry needs.  Banning 
indoor smoking to protect the 
public against second-hand tobacco 
smoke might be an example.  But 
the case of alcohol is troubling in 
this regard.  Alcohol generates a 
fairly high ratio of harm to third 
parties (drunk driving, violence, 
etc.) relative to harm to users 
(cirrhosis, heart disease), and yet 
only a handful of countries truly 
adopted a public health approach 
to alcohol regulation (the so-called 
‘Nordic model’)40; many take action 
against the externalities themselves 
(e.g., with tough penalties for drunk 
driving), but otherwise are fairly 
industry-friendly.  
More such examples could be cited.  But 
these suffice to suggest that the thesis 
developed above for cannabis probably has 
relevance for a number of other drugs, but as 
a general rule subject to exceptions, not as 
an iron-clad law of nature. 
Indeed, at some level this entire essay boils 
down to stating the obvious.  For goods and 
services over which consumers maintain 
full control of their consumption decisions, 
and make those decisions wisely, there is 
little need for a benevolent government 
to regulate in ways that favour consumers’ 
interests over producers’ interests.  The 
consumers can look after themselves very 
well, thank you.  
However, for goods and services that have a 
systematic tendency to defeat the heuristic 
decision-making capabilities of the average 
human, a paternalistic government may want 
to structure laws and regulatory processes to 
ensure that consumers are protected – not 
just from the drug but also from exploitation 
by the drug industry.  Cannabis is such a 
good.  Many, though not necessarily all, other 
dependence-inducing intoxicants are, too.  
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on MeTRiCs
With regards to recent discussions 
surrounding metrics and indicators, it 
seems as if some of the debates have been 
concerned with attacking a straw man: no 
thoughtful person has ever pretended that 
enforcement statistics are an adequate or a 
complete set of measures to be employed in 
the international drug control system.
The frequent use of enforcement statistics 
when assessing ‘success’ in drug control 
is in part due to the fact that they are 
available at near zero cost as by-products of 
administrative record systems. For example, 
the amount of drugs seized will typically be 
measured whether or not it is considered 
to be an indicator of drug control success. 
Keeping track of amounts seized is a basic 
administrative function that ensures that the 
right evidence gets associated with the right 
court case and reduces the risk that some of 
the seized drugs will be diverted for re-sale 
in later stages of the enforcement process 
(in particular in settings where corruption 
is rampant). Thus, from an economic 
perspective, when the cost of something is 
near zero, one should ‘consume,’ i.e. use, such 
statistics even if they are not highly useful in 
measuring drug control success.
It is also worthwhile touching upon the 
obsession with hectares of coca eradicated 
as a measure of either effort or success. 
Importantly, there can be a world of difference 
between a hectare of coca eradicated by 
aerial spraying and a hectare eradicated by 
manual removal.  The former may have little 
effect – if the peasants get to the field within 
a few hours, they can often still harvest 
the leaves that have been sprayed and the 
roots will not generally get infected with 
the herbicide. Thus, it has little effect except 
forcing the farmer to harvest at a suboptimal 
time. However, when eradicated by hand, the 
farmer would have to start over by planting 
anew.  As such, a fundamental error that 
has been committed for almost 20 years is 
the narrative that hectares eradicated by 
air + eradicated manually = total hectares 
eradicated. Although eradication in and of 
itself is a method with very limited success, 
if continuing the pursuit of this strategy 
drug enforcement officials at least need to 
provide a clear delineation between aerial 
and manual eradication 
For other indicators, it is true that these are 
poor: prevalence of use does not directly 
matter that much since total prevalence 
is usually dominated by users who use 
infrequently, and so have few or no 
problems.41 With cannabis use in the US, 
RAND has switched to mostly talking about 
and measuring the number of daily and 
near-daily users, in addition to past-month 
days of use: which is a much better proxy 
for both the quantity used and the amount 
of use-related harm than is total prevalence. 
These statistics are further broken down in 
various ways, such as days-of-use by people 
who have a substance use disorder versus 
those who do not.
Moreover, whereas public health officials 
tend to measure drug-related deaths, 
this is a poor measure of addiction since 
deaths per year of dependence tends to be 
much higher for opioids than stimulants or 
other substances: and some interventions 
are highly efficient at reducing overdose-
related fatality (notably Naloxone for opioid 
overdoses), but not very good at reducing 
dependence. Although some of the strong 
supporters of the public health approach 
may claim that drug-related deaths matter so 
much more than all other metrics that it is a 
sufficient statistic in itself, this author argues 
that it is incomplete. Drug dependence in 
and of itself wrecks a significant amount of 
lives: of the dependents and their families. 
This is not reflected in drug-related death 
statistics. Nor are amounts spent on black 
market transactions and crime and violence 
fuelled by that spending.  An intervention 
that cut black market spending by 50% while 
leaving the number of overdoses unchanged 
would be a substantial gain from a public 
health as well as social welfare perspective, 
and an exclusive focus on deaths of drug 
users would not give it due credit.  
Moreover, there is only limited sub-literature 
on drug-related Emergency Room (ER) 
mentions. Such data does get used, which 
it should. However, the key challenge is to 
work out the extent to which the drug was 
the primary cause of the ER mention or if it 
was just detected inside the ER and played 
some ancillary role in the health event 
precipitating the need for emergency care. By 
and large, the kind of data that ERs routinely 
collect does not answer that question very 
well, and we cannot ask ER doctors to take a 
break from saving their patients, in favour of 
filling out longer data instruments.
An important 
contribution 
on the metrics 
side would be to 
develop methods 
to support the 
monitoring of 
(purity-adjusted) 
price, and also 
have purity itself as 
an indicator.
‘
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This author has been arguing that an 
important contribution on the metrics side 
would be to develop methods to support 
the monitoring of (purity-adjusted) price, 
and also have purity itself as an indicator. 
If this is done correctly, it is possible to get 
high-frequency measures of price and purity, 
whereas many traditional demand side 
measures are only available on an annual or 
quarterly basis.
These are mostly not new ideas; the 
literature on these issues is long-standing. 
That said, there have been some important 
innovations, including developing methods 
of wastewater testing for drugs, and perhaps 
Siddharth Chandra’s use of price gradients 
to infer trafficking flows.42 Eric Sevigny’s 
recent work on drug harm measures may be 
consulted for something which this author 
think reflects the state of the art, at least in 
the US43
One area which needs further work 
is thinking about how these metrics 
and measures would be different post-
legalisation. The obvious point here is that 
we might get much better supply side data 
on quantities sold from tax records, just as 
today estimates of total amount of alcohol 
consumed comes from tax records – and 
not so much from self-report surveys. The 
limitation here is the inability to distinguish 
between people who are problem drinkers 
from those who are not. Generally speaking, 
we do know that most alcohol is consumed 
by people who have a drinking problem or 
at least drink rather alarming amounts.44 This 
is the Pareto Law in action. Figuring such 
things out tends to be a research project, 
and not something that is easily derived 
from administrative data. In contrast, for 
illicit drugs, the supply side estimates are 
almost all highly dubious and/or not very 
useful. For example, the UN makes a good 
faith effort at estimating Afghan opium 
production, but since Afghanistan supplies 
90% of the world’s illegal opioids, this is not 
terribly useful for any individual country 
since no one country consumes a dominant 
share of Afghan production. Contrast that 
with the situation with cocaine in the 1980s. 
At that time, the US dominated cocaine 
consumption – and thus estimating global 
production shed some light on the likely 
magnitude of US cocaine consumption.
Similarly, post-legalisation proponents will 
have to ask many finer-grained questions 
about outlet density and concentration of 
outlets in disadvantaged neighbourhoods, 
among other things – just like what is 
done for alcohol. Likewise, there should be 
monitoring of marketing efforts, both in 
traditional media and internet and social 
network based marketing.  Hopefully, in an 
era of legalisation we will have more useful 
data. Indeed, to some extent that may be 
inevitable if one impact of legalisation is 
simply to increase drug use enough that 
surveys will be more precise. Whereas 
the consumption of alcohol, tobacco and 
cannabis are so common that a random 
sample of 1,000 people produces a 
reasonable number of users, the same is not 
true for heroin or cocaine. For substances 
whose frequent use seriously disrupts lives, 
i.e. cocaine, crack, and meth (as opposed to 
cannabis and tobacco) we will still face the 
problem that the most frequent users may 
not be living in circumstances that render 
them easy to survey. 
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A classic and critical assumption of the war on drugs was that more stringent enforcement would raise price. Whether higher price was a desirable outcome was hotly debated.  Higher prices, under most reasonable assumptions about demand, 
meant higher revenues for dealers, more property crime and perhaps more violence. On 
the other hand, it meant fewer users and less drug consumption, and so perhaps less 
drug-related harm over the long-run.
If Tougher Enforcement  
Cannot Reliably Raise Drug Prices,  
What Are Appropriate Goals and Metrics?
Peter Reuter, Harold A. Pollack and Bryce Pardo
Though the drug war may have ended, 
drug enforcement is likely to still dominate 
budgets in most countries for the 
foreseeable future. Change occurs slowly 
and enforcement is generally much more 
expensive than prevention, treatment or 
harm reduction.  In a previous review of the 
empirical evidence on the effects of tougher 
supply side enforcement on prices,1 two of us 
found little support for the proposition that 
higher toughness produced higher prices. 
However, the research to date is sparse, 
heterogeneous in terms of methodology 
and of enforcement programmes assessed, 
marred by limited data sets and thus fragile 
methodologies.  The problems are inherent 
in the topic.  There is little likelihood of 
a major breakthrough in understanding 
the effects of the many forms of drug 
enforcement (from eradication of crops 
to longer sentences for street dealers) on 
purity-adjusted prices.  
Moreover, many theoretical arguments call 
into question prior models used to justify 
the assumption that tougher enforcement 
mechanically translates into corresponding 
price increases.  Though complications to 
the model, in particular dynamic aspects, 
have been discussed elsewhere,2 we believe 
that this paper offers some useful advances 
in understanding of why enforcement might 
fail, at the margin, to raise prices.
The question then is what are appropriate 
goals for drug enforcement if we can 
neither assume that such measures raise 
prices nor assume that raising prices would 
automatically reduce the social harms 
associated with drug use? How should 
progress be measured?  
This paper is an early exploration of that 
question, with no claim to a firm conclusion. 
We are sure that there is no unitary goal to 
drug enforcement policies. Rather, there are 
multiple proper goals. Goals and measures 
vary by agency, substance, and level of 
market targeted.  An imaginary drug czar, 
cannot ask her supply side office to identify a 
single indicator of success, as she might once 
have if she subscribed to what we will refer to 
as the standard model of drug markets.
For simplicity, we focus on policing (broadly 
defined as apprehending or otherwise 
altering the behaviour of drug dealers, 
traffickers and producers through police 
actions), rather than prosecution or 
regulation.3 We ignore demand side policing, 
since we think decriminalisation of simple 
possession might be most desirable. 
Section I briefly summaries the research 
evidence available on enforcement and 
prices, justifying our initial skepticism. 
Section II then provides a more detailed 
theoretical account of how the standard 
model might apply to some components of 
the distribution chain but is unlikely to apply 
to other components and the consequences 
in terms of the effect of higher stringency on 
prices.  Section III explores the consequences, 
both positive and negative, of more stringent 
enforcement: some of these are unintended 
effects and others are the result of strategic 
choices.  Section IV draws some policy 
implications from the analysis.  
SUMMARY
 ■ There is minimal evidence supporting 
the core proposition that drug 
enforcement raises the price on illicit 
drugs: which has been a classic and 
critical assumption of the global war 
on drugs.
 ■ Through a careful analysis of four 
levels of the cocaine industry; 
production, smuggling, high-level 
domestic distribution and low-level 
domestic distribution – this article 
highlights how illegal drug markets 
differ in important ways from the 
simplified models taught in  
Economics 101.
 ■ Rather than simply increasing 
price and limiting the supply, drug 
enforcement strategies prioritising 
market disruption have caused 
disorder and violence: as can be 
seen in Mexico where organisational 
decapitation has contributed to  
cartel fragmentation as increasing 
number of groups fight over fewer 
trafficking routes.
 ■ Whereas arrests and quantities seized 
have long been the two metrics used 
to evaluate operational success, the 
authors propose that an alternative set 
of metrics should be used. A coherent 
framework for assessing the goals of 
drug enforcement can be applied from 
the analysis of demand side policy, 
namely harm reduction; i.e. reducing 
the harms that drug users inflict on 
themselves, others, and also the 
harms caused by illicit markets in the 
production, trafficking and distribution 
of drugs.
 ■ Overall, the supposed efficacy of 
supply-side enforcement remains 
challenged as there is little evidence 
that marginal increases in enforcement 
raise equilibrium prices. This realisation 
should allow law enforcement to focus 
on those social harms most amenable 
to police interventions.
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i. whaT Do we Know 
abouT The effeCT of DRug 
enfoRCeMenT on pRiCe?4
 
Simply put, there is minimal evidence 
in support of the core proposition that 
drug enforcement raises price.  We word 
that cautiously not merely from scholarly 
prudence, but because the research base 
is so weak that any stronger statement 
is unwarranted.
We have identified only eight published 
studies, meeting minimal research 
standards, relating price at some point 
in the drug distribution system to drug 
enforcement efforts, varying from the source 
country level to retail sale.  There is limited 
additional literature on the price effects of 
tighter regulation of precursors, dominated 
by the contributions of Cunningham 
and collaborators;5 we do not include 
that because it involves use of regulatory 
rather than police authority, raising input 
costs directly.
The studies are primarily of cocaine 
markets, with just two involving heroin. 
The programmes covered include: 
eradication, interdiction, high-level domestic 
enforcement and retail enforcement.  The 
studies employ a variety of measures of 
enforcement (seizures, arrests, incarceration) 
and use prices at different levels of the 
distribution system.  Mejia, Restrepo and 
Rozo6 found that a variety of interventions 
in Colombia may have accounted for the 
rise in retail prices in the US in 2007.  One 
interdiction study found short-term retail 
price increases resulting from enforcement 
surges.7  Moreover, one of the retail studies 
found a 5-15% increase in retail cocaine 
prices from 1983-1996 as a consequence of 
enforcement intensification, which included 
a ten-fold increase in incarceration for 
cocaine offenses.8  The other studies have 
found no effect.
The challenges facing such studies 
are numerous and daunting.  Purity-
adjusted price is difficult to measure and 
rarely available.9  The proper measure of 
enforcement is a rate of penalty per unit flow. 
However, the numerator has many elements 
(arrest, incarceration, asset seizure, drug 
seizure), and there is no basis for determining 
the appropriate weights for each.  In 
addition, the denominator is impossible 
to measure, and very difficult to proxy. The 
problems are both conceptual and empirical. 
There may be natural experiments or quasi-
experiments, such as the restriction on the 
spraying of Colombian coca fields near the 
Venezuelan border (exploited by Mejia and 
Restrepo)10 that can help empirically but 
only in a limited way.
The evidence comes almost exclusively 
from the US.  The intensity of enforcement, 
certainly in terms of incarceration, may 
be so much higher in that country that 
the findings, which are about marginal 
changes in enforcement, have little claim to 
generalisability to other nations.   There is 
no consistency across the few studies of any 
one stage of the distribution system.  
Given the number and variety of these 
problems, it is hard to see that the literature 
is likely to be strengthened in the near 
future.  Policy decisions will have to be made 
with minimal research guidance about the 
impact of increasing the intensity of policing 
or penalties at any stage of the distribution 
system.
Note that we have considered only 
the incremental or marginal effects of 
enforcement in mature markets.  That reflects 
the difficulty of obtaining such measures for 
smaller and emergent markets with limited 
supply chains and small consumer bases of 
mostly new users. Enforcement, mounted 
early enough and targeted appropriately, 
may sufficiently raise prices or otherwise 
deter users and sellers so the market does 
not reach maturity.  Such successes would 
not be susceptible to this kind of evaluation. 
ii. whaT aRe The Values 
anD liMiTs of The 
eConoMiC MoDel of DRug 
enfoRCeMenT/MaRKeTs?
 
The previous section informs our sceptical 
take on the empirical evidence. But what 
about the theory?  
Here we set out the standard model 
that has been used to predict that more 
stringent enforcement will raise price, and 
then consider how applicable it might 
be to different segments of the market. 
Within the standard economic framework, 
competitive markets are characterised 
by free entry and exit by firms, no one of 
which is able to dictate prices. Within such 
markets, prices closely reflect marginal costs. 
Information (including pricing information) 
is transparent. Transaction costs are 
negligible. Firms structure themselves to 
most efficiently meet market demand at the 
prevailing price of what they produce.  These 
are the assumptions underlying the widely 
used Risks and Prices model.11
Assume for the moment that these notions 
characterised the drug markets.  Then the 
most basic enforcement strategies that aim 
to reduce drug consumption are readily 
illustrated in a standard supply-demand 
framework. Interdiction and other supply-
side enforcement efforts raise marginal 
production costs, shifting the supply 
curve up by this amount at whatever 
stage in the supply chain is affected by 
the particular enforcement action. The 
resulting equilibrium price will rise, and the 
quantity of drugs sold will decline, as the 
market equilibrium moves along the market 
demand curve. 
In fact, drug markets are not well-
functioning by the standards applied to the 
global markets for sneakers or breakfast 
cereal or  even by the standards applied 
to more concentrated markets such as 
word processing software or smartphones. 
Illegal drug markets differ in important 
ways from the simplified models taught in 
Economics 101.  They differ even more from 
the competitive ideal than do many legal 
markets that are characterised for example 
by monopoly or asymmetric information 
(i.e. where sellers know more than buyers 
or  vice-versa).  Illegal drug markets display 
many distinctive features such as imperfect 
information about product quality (sellers 
are often as ignorant as buyers about purity), 
about other prices (since transactions are 
clandestine) and self-selection into the trade 
on characteristics such as a willingness to 
take physical and legal risks. The addictive 
character of illegal drugs introduces other 
market failures, as well.
All of these characteristics have been 
discussed in earlier papers.12 None of them 
have considered, as we do in the following 
pages, how these characteristics might 
lead to different responses to enforcement 
interventions and how they might differ 
The current public debate 
over drug policy largely 
centres on adverse 
unintended consequences 
of drug policing, whether 
in American cities at the 
retail end or  the spraying 
of coca crops as part of 
eradication programmes. ’
‘
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across the many distinct elements of the 
drug trade, particularly the many levels of 
the cocaine and heroin trades. 
We consider here, for expositional purposes, 
four levels of the cocaine industry; 
production, smuggling, high-level domestic 
distribution and low-level distribution.  This 
should be seen as describing a mature mass 
market; there are other sources of deviation 
from the standard model when the drug is 
still emerging.
Producers: We start with the segment for 
which the difference between the standard 
competitive model and what is observed in 
drug markets is slightest.  Farmers growing 
coca in the Andes are many in number 
(according to the UN, in Colombia alone 
there are over 300,000 people living in 
65,000 households that cultivate coca), are 
price takers, perhaps facing a monopsonist 
(a single buyer of a good or service), 
and purchase all relevant inputs in 
competitive markets. 13
These producers operate under varying 
degrees of legal pressure that will affect their 
efficiency relative to a legal producer; for 
example, they cannot effectively invest in 
R&D and generate rents from developing a 
new strain of coca bush that might be more 
productive.  Yet the simple model ought to 
do well in predicting their response to such 
interventions as eradication or alternative 
development.  Because this stage accounts 
for such a small proportion of the value-
added between the original plants and final 
product markets, it is unclear how much 
increases in farmers’ marginal costs (and 
thus equilibrium prices of their output) raises 
actual drug prices paid by users.
The fully competitive model seems less 
applicable to the next two levels in the supply 
chain, though some aspects of these markets 
are familiar from industrial organisation 
accounts of oligopoly and monopolistic 
competition.
Smuggling: Relatively few smuggling 
organisations account for a large share of 
the market.  Following the break-up of the 
Cali and Medellin syndicates in the 1990s, a 
greater number of autonomous organisations 
smuggle multi-tonne shipments of cocaine 
out of Colombia. Simple arithmetic suggests 
that the largest ten organisations might 
account for about 50 % of the total.14  
The technology of smuggling is varying 
and non-standard; some use corrupt 
connections in Venezuela,15 others 
substitute relatively expensive technology 
for expensive corruption payments (e.g. 
sending submersibles from the Colombian 
to the Mexican coast)16 and yet others use 
higher risk methods that economise both 
on corruption and technology (e.g. sending 
shipments concealed in legitimate freight).17 
The smugglers’ costs are often determined 
in idiosyncratic bargaining.  What does a 
Honduran colonel charge for allowing a 
250 kg shipment to land safely at a remote 
airport?  How much market power does 
he have in this transaction: he might be 
constrained by awareness that an equally 
biddable colonel controls a neighbouring 
border zone that is almost as convenient 
for cocaine smuggling.  Do the pilots who 
fly these planes even have a rough estimate 
of the risk they face of apprehension and 
the expected penalty conditional on being 
apprehended?18  
elaborate undercover operations that 
increase uncertainty about the reliability of 
customers and colleagues.
For the retail and low-level wholesale 
markets we are back to very large numbers 
of supply side participants. Even for a single 
city retail market, Caulkins and Reuter,21 
using standard numbers, suggest that a 
metropolitan area with 1 million inhabitants 
(e.g. Birmingham, Alabama around 2005) 
might have had 3,300 cocaine sellers, the 
vast majority of them retailers.  Buyers shop 
around,22 both because drug dealers are 
unreliable (often sick, jailed or out of stock) 
and perhaps to learn about prevailing price 
and quality.  Sellers’ major costs include time, 
both their own and those of others that they 
employ: there may well be a standard wage 
for working as a look-out for a street cocaine 
dealer in Atlanta in 2005.  The standard 
model, on its face, looks more plausible 
for this segment of the market. The factor 
intensity within the production process 
of enforcement-vulnerable inputs, and 
producers’ ability to shield or to substitute 
away from these vulnerable inputs, would 
both influence the translation between 
enforcement and ultimate market prices.
In fact, though, it may be weak for many 
different reasons.  As noted above, Caulkins 
and various collaborators have already 
identified a long list of threats.  For example, 
assume that policing tends to weed out the 
most violent sellers first, this may not be a 
result of drug policing strategy but because 
homicidal drug dealers get picked up by 
the homicide squad.  Then, Caulkins, Reuter, 
and Taylor23 show that this might lead to 
reductions in price as the market becomes 
less violent and attracts more sellers with 
high aversion to physical risks; this is purely 
a theoretical result, though one that perhaps 
is more rooted in the realities of mature drug 
markets than are other models that generate 
perverse results.24
None of this reasoning and observation 
suggests that economics is irrelevant to 
understanding drug markets or  that such 
enforcement efforts are unwise or ineffective. 
It is just a reminder that the standard models 
of how increasing risks and certain other 
costs, the tool that policing/eradication/
interdiction brings to bear, may not have 
the consequences predicted by the simple 
economic model.  With neither theory nor 
evidence supporting the proposition, it is 
time to turn to the other consequences of 
drug enforcement.
One of the retail studies found 
a 5-15% increase in retail 
cocaine prices from 1983-
1996 as a consequence of 
enforcement intensification, 
which included a ten-fold 
increase in incarceration for 
cocaine offences.   The other 
studies have found no effect.
Standard economic models appear more 
strained for this sector of the industry: 
though competitive pressures are not wholly 
unfamiliar from other complex network 
models of industrial organisation. Because 
local opportunities and local knowledge are 
so important, efficient producers may not 
be able to expand or replicate their efforts in 
broader contexts.
The high-level domestic distribution sector 
within the US or any European country is 
less well understood.19 Corruption and 
violence certainly play a smaller role than 
in the smuggling market: cases involving 
high-level cocaine distributors paying US 
enforcement agencies are rare and pay-
offs to high-level Dutch or British police 
almost unheard of. DEA records a total of 
5 agents killed in the line of duty between 
2006 and 2010, underscoring the rarity of 
systematic violence directed at US drug 
enforcement personnel.20  Direct evidence is 
rare regarding the commercial calculations 
of high-level domestic distributors, though 
many investigative strategies aim to 
increase perceived risk, for example through 
’
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iii. oTheR effeCTs of 
DRug enfoRCeMenT
 
The current public debate over drug policy 
largely centres on adverse unintended 
consequences of drug policing, whether 
in American cities at the retail end or  the 
spraying of coca crops as part of eradication 
programmes. Legalisation proponents 
stress these harms as the principal reason 
to consider a dramatic alternative.25  Public 
health advocates, even if not pressing 
legalisation or depenalisation, emphasise 
the harms from current enforcement efforts 
as the basis for major policy reforms.26 Yet, 
as we describe below, drug policing can also 
have positive consequences, unrelated to 
any price effects.
Aggressive enforcement has been criticised 
for contributing to the alienation and further 
marginalisation of minority communities, for 
example in Seattle.27  The Wire grimly and 
persuasively documents the accompanying 
harms in extreme form for Baltimore. 
Such policing efforts have contributed 
substantially to the incarceration of low-
level retailers and drug couriers who are 
easily replaced.28  Prioritising drug law 
enforcement may contribute to increases in 
property crime as manpower and resources 
are directed away from such crimes.29  
‘You can’t regulate what you prohibit,’ 
dictates an old policy adage. By prioritising 
controlling drug markets, police ignore 
some of the negative consequences of their 
actions, and may lead police to overlook 
opportunities for more socially-useful 
enforcement practices. Efforts to suppress 
local drug markets may focus enforcement 
resources on dealers with the greatest 
market share or on those who can be most 
readily apprehended rather than those who 
impose the greatest social harms.
In some instances, prioritising market 
disruption may itself introduce disorder 
which can increase violence in the short-
term.30  For example, enforcement strategies 
in Mexico that focused on organisational 
decapitation have contributed to cartel 
fragmentation and a surge in violence as 
increasing numbers of groups fought over 
fewer trafficking routes.31
Interdiction efforts can shape smuggling 
routes, sometimes with mixed results. 
A shift away from maritime toward terrestrial 
trafficking routes for Colombian cocaine in 
the last decade has been devastating for 
many smaller nations in Central America 
and Mexico.32
Drug policing, even if aimed at sellers (many 
of whom are also users) can negatively 
impact the immediate health and wellbeing 
of drug users as it induces unsafe behaviours 
and displaces criminal activity.  For example, 
users begin to fear law enforcement 
involvement and adopt unhygienic practices 
such as the rental of drug paraphernalia to 
avoid detection.33  Drug law enforcement 
can displace drug use activity; arresting 
or citing users that possess paraphernalia, 
such as syringes, are associated with higher 
incidence and prevalence of HIV and HCV.34 
Some police departments, faced with 
increases in overdoses—particularly 
from heroin and prescription opioid use, 
are starting to depart from traditional 
enforcement goals that emphasise the 
market itself.  In these cases, police have 
been issued with Naloxone kits to reverse 
overdose. One study in Ohio found that 
training and equipping officers with 
Naloxone is associated with reduced opioid 
overdose deaths.39
One important, but poorly articulated, aspect 
of drug law enforcement is the manner in 
which agents of the state maintain the rule 
of law and state legitimacy.  Poorly governed 
or impoverished communities and territories 
are susceptible to drug production or selling 
activity.  This includes cities in consumer 
nations and sparsely populated hinterlands 
of producer nations.  Smartly applying drug 
law enforcement, by focusing on violent 
and disruptive actors, may improve the rule 
of law as well as community relations.  The 
Drug Market Initiative in High Point, North 
Carolina and the Colombian government’s 
shift toward security and state presence 
post-Plan Colombia are examples by which 
the state can reassert itself in communities 
and territories that are troubled by drug 
activity and violence.40
That said, as noted above, policing is 
probably most successful at preventing the 
establishment of new drug markets: such 
markets are vulnerable to the removal of a 
few key providers and to simple interruption 
where networks are not yet established and 
new users are most readily deterred or diverted 
into the use of other substances.  Enforcement 
is weaker at controlling mature markets. 
The elimination or substantial shrinkage 
of established markets may necessitate 
unsustainable levels of enforcement that do 
not conform to the democratic principles of a 
free and equal society. 
In sum, drug law enforcement, like any other 
state intervention in a market, has many 
consequences, intended and unintended. 
Well targeted, normatively sensitive and 
intelligently informed policing that takes 
into account the lifecycle of a drug market41 
will often improve social welfare. This is 
not always possible in the real world, with 
individuals and agencies that have their 
own interests and constraints.  A simplified 
version of our task then is to maximise the 
net benefit, taking into account both the 
positive and negative consequences.  The 
final section turns to goals and metrics. Given 
space limitations, we focus here on policing 
of markets in American cities.
Police also have the power to shape the 
supply of drugs in more socially positive 
ways.35 Drug policing can improve 
community safety by focusing on ‘hotspots’ 
such as open-air markets or areas known 
to retail drugs and which contribute to 
violence or public disorder.36 It turns out, 
against criminology theory expectations, 
that there is a diffusion of benefits rather 
than displacement of crime.  In some 
circumstances, domestic drug enforcement 
may reduce crime and violence through 
other mechanisms, improving community 
safety by policing criminogenic drug users 
or dismantling violent retail operations.37  
Local police can directly address supply-side 
threats to public health by implementing or 
supporting harm reduction interventions 
and through orienting investigation to 
reduction of harms.  Police can identify 
and warn the public about adulterated 
or exceedingly potent batches of drugs 
entering the market.38  Efforts can then be 
made to investigate and shut down the 
supply of these sources.  
Illegal drug markets 
display many distinctive 
features such as imperfect 
information about product 
quality (sellers are often 
as ignorant as buyers 
about purity), about other 
prices (since transactions 
are clandestine), self-
selection into the trade on 
characteristics such as a 
willingness to take physical 
and legal risks. The addictive 
character of illegal drugs 
introduces other market 
failures as well. ’
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iV. goals anD MeTRiCs foR 
DRug enfoRCeMenT
Drug markets present a particular challenge 
to police. Both buyer and seller are willing 
participants in a market transaction. The 
lack of any complainant or victim removes 
a central prop of policing against violent 
and property crimes, even white-collar 
crimes.  In contrast to robbery or assault, 
police often rely on undercover or intrusive 
means to infiltrate drug markets.  At the 
other end of the production system, coca 
farming, the task is similarly complicated 
by the fact that the police and/or military 
are being asked to deprive low-income 
rural households of a principal source 
of income. 
Drug market enforcement also defies simple 
outcome measures.  For modern police, with 
their increasingly sophisticated geographic 
databases, reports of crime incidents are 
the standard measure of success.  Flawed 
though reports may be, they have a face, 
validity and reality.  For drugs there is as yet 
no counterpart. Arrests (perhaps weighted 
by importance) and quantities seized have 
long been the two metrics used to evaluate 
operational success.  From this standpoint, 
a department police may look good at its 
job.  However, often the other consequences, 
discussed above, are more salient. 
We focus on established mass markets since 
these are almost certainly responsible for 
most of the harm associated with drugs. New 
markets may involve drugs that are more 
dangerous to users but it is precisely that 
danger which typically leads to the demise 
or at least sharp shrinking, of these markets.  
One way to provide a coherent framework 
for assessing the goals of drug enforcement 
is to apply the same framework that now is 
so widely used in the analysis of demand side 
policy, namely harm reduction.  Although 
the term ‘harm reduction’ is often used 
to denote specific interventions such as 
syringe exchanges, the term is most helpful 
in identifying a set of guiding questions 
which ought to inform drug policy and drug 
law enforcement. 
Useful as Caulkins and Reuter’s four 
categories above are, this list is incomplete 
because it fails to recognise the role that 
drug policing may play in crime control 
generally.  Drug sellers and producers 
are frequently involved in other criminal 
activities, both as part of the drug business 
(e.g. violence and corruption) and separately. 
To the extent that drug-market participation 
complements or promotes other crimes, 
drug policing can thus be a means of 
apprehending offenders who pose a risk 
apart from their provision of illegal drugs. Of 
course drug-market participation may also 
substitute for participation in other types of 
crimes. Street-level drug sellers earn wages 
and act under the managerial supervision 
of drug-selling organisations. It is at least 
theoretically possible that suppressing 
a particular drug market may lead some 
participants to commit other types of crime.
We briefly consider each of the goals in turn, 
identify the mechanisms by which policing 
can attain these goals, and then turn to the 
issue of metrics.  
Reducing drug use: Even without reliable 
price effects, policing of drug suppliers 
can reduce the quantity consumed. 
Making sellers discreet and markets less 
geographically concentrated can raise the 
time required and difficulty faced by drug 
buyers to find a willing seller.  That old insight 
of Moore43 has been only lightly explored 
in the research literature and is not part of 
the discussion of drug policing generally. 
Cell phones and internet connections may 
have transformed the ways in which buyers 
and sellers find each other, but the fact 
that traditional drug policing still turns up 
so many sellers and buyers on the street 
suggests that the transformation is far 
from complete.
Reducing the harm that drug users experience 
per unit drug consumed: These involve the 
classic harm reduction issues.  Having police 
distribute Naloxone, in addition to not 
making needle possession a target for arrest, 
exemplifies the positive approach, as does 
the spread of warnings about dangerous 
batches, discussed previously. Curbing 
enforcement practices that promote 
needle-sharing (e.g. aggressive enforcement 
of paraphernalia laws) reduces harms 
stemming from blood-borne infectious 
diseases.
Reducing the harms that drug users impose on 
others: The classic example of these harms 
is property crimes generated by the high 
cost of a drug habit.  Caulkins and Reuter44 
note that drug users are often irresponsible 
parents and partners, and that police can 
attempt to systematically ameliorate this by 
checking whether social services are needed 
in the households of those arrested for drug 
selling.  However, that goes beyond what 
might reasonably be assigned to supply 
side policing. Supply-side enforcement 
can sometimes be especially helpful when 
it is focused on substances associated with 
large user-induced externalities. 
Reducing the harms caused by production, 
trafficking and distribution of drugs: Many 
drug enforcement efforts aim to close down 
open-air retail markets or  at least to force 
these markets to be discreet. Such measures 
reduce the actual or perceived danger of 
specific neighbourhoods, even if these have 
negligible impact on the prices or quantities 
of drugs actually consumed. At the other 
end of the production system, that goal can 
lead to targeting strategies for eradication: 
to target producing areas where alternative 
development programmes give farmers 
more opportunity for obtaining a decent living 
without growing coca or opium poppies. 
Caulkins and Reuter,42 attempting to bring human rights to drug enforcement 
generally, suggested that drug enforcement could have four positive goals:
‘1.  Reducing the amount of drug use  
(which one might denote use reduction). 
 2.  Reducing the harm that drug users experience per unit of drugs used  
(which might be denoted as micro harm reduction). 
 3.  Reducing the harms that drug users impose on others  
(which might be denoted as use-externality reduction). 
 4. Reducing the harms caused by production, trafficking and distribution of drugs  
(which  might be denoted as market-externality disruption).’
We ignore demand side policing, 
since we think decriminalisation 
of simple possession might be 
most desirable.’
‘
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Policing is probably  
most successful 
at preventing the 
establishment of  
new drug markets;  
such markets are 
vulnerable to the 
removal of a few key 
providers and to simple 
interruption where 
networks are not 
yet established and 
new users are most 
readily deterred or 
diverted into the use 
of other substances.  
Enforcement is weaker 
at controlling  
mature markets.  
ConClusion
 
Drug policy discourse was once anchored 
in debates over whether supply-side 
enforcement could appreciably increase 
production costs, thus raising equilibrium 
prices, reducing use and ultimately reducing 
drug-related social harms. The supposed 
efficacy of supply-side enforcement is now 
contested across the supply chain in most 
markets for most substances. In mature 
markets, there is surprisingly little evidence 
that marginal increases in enforcement raise 
equilibrium prices. The overall market impact 
of more-intensive supply-side measures is 
generally limited.
 
At first blush, this is a chastening turn in the 
research and policy consensus. On reflection, 
though, this is neither good nor bad news. 
However disappointed police might be 
that their efforts rarely appreciably move 
equilibrium drug prices, this knowledge 
might also be liberating. Law enforcement 
might now enjoy greater leeway to focus on 
those social harms most amenable to police 
interventions. 
Police can also, in good conscience, do less 
if this reduces the harms associated with 
enforcement efforts which do not, at the 
margin, seriously disrupt drug markets. 
Police will have plenty to do in most large 
cities of Europe or North America. If their role 
in drug markets is now less central or urgent, 
they will hardly be standing idle. 
Reducing crime: One of the oldest insights 
about policing is that specialised units focus 
only on the offences for which they are 
responsible. In a world of non-specialised 
offenders, such units often ignore other 
crimes; the burglary squad was uninterested 
in the drug activities or the gun sales of 
burglars.45  Much of the harm caused by 
drug dealers arises from other offences. 
Drug enforcement should therefore target 
the most dangerous or the most violent 
drug-involved offenders within a particular 
drug market. 
Even if we have articulated the correct principles, to be useful we must turn these 
into metrics that can be used by managers to motivate their officers to take them 
seriously.  We offer just three suggestions here:
1.    Develop criteria for the existence and harmfulness of drug markets, 
drawing  on relatively easily obtained information.  One outcome criterion 
might be the number and severity of such markets, at least in areas where 
such markets are at a high risk of emerging. Criteria might include violent 
offenses, weapons charges or  serious property crimes committed by likely 
users and sellers in a particular location.
2.    Track the criminal histories of those arrested by the drug squad so that there 
is an incentive to target those who are involved in the most serious non-
drug crimes as well as major dealers. Particular emphasis might be placed 
on buyers and sellers involved in gun offences, since gun violence in drug 
markets is strongly associated with homicide.
3.    Track the flow and engagement of drug selling arrestees with the drug 
treatment system for some period after arrest.
The feasibility of such metrics must be established and requires greater 
management and implementation skills than we possess.  However, there is no 
doubt that a new set of metrics to align with a new set of goals is required.’
‘
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Drug Policing:  
What is it Good For?
Michael Shiner
Years ago I spoke at a drugs conference alongside a police chief from Canada. We were both fans of The Wire, which he described as ‘the most realistic’ depiction of drug policing he had ever seen. In the show’s ‘bravest and most radical storyline,’ 
Major ‘Bunny’ Colvin creates a series of ‘free-zones’ in Baltimore’s Western District, where 
drug enforcement is not a police priority and dealers are given immunity from arrest and 
prosecution.1 The aim is to push the street level drug trade into the free-zones where it will 
be ‘least harmful.’ The experiment is successful in clearing drug dealing off residential street 
corners, which show signs of coming back to life; public health workers and harm reduction 
experts move into the free-zones, distributing condoms and clean injecting equipment; and 
the crime rate drops by 14 per cent in five weeks. When Bunny informs his bosses about 
this policy of selective non-enforcement they accuse him of having ‘legalised drugs’ and of 
having ‘lost his fucking mind.’ He is effectively demoted and forced into premature retirement 
on a reduced pension. During the subsequent post-mortem, the Mayor, impressed by the 
reduction in crime, thinks about trying to salvage the initiative, musing: if only ‘we can call 
this shit something other than what it is.’ But he is quickly reminded of the political realities 
and the free-zones are shut-down. This apparently fanciful tale encapsulates the central 
paradox of drug policing - what is politically acceptable cannot be achieved, but what is 
achievable is not politically acceptable.
 
The oRigins of haRM 
ReDuCTion poliCing
The notion that policing cannot stamp 
out demand for drugs and should be 
reoriented to reduce the associated 
harm is not new and nor is the idea 
of free-zones entirely fictitious. Dorn 
and South made the case for harm 
reduction policing some 25 years ago 
on the basis that it ‘seems easier for the 
legal apparatuses to reshape patterns 
of crime, including drug markets, than 
to prevent them.’2In making their case, 
Dorn and South describe how policing 
is implicated in creating or exacerbating 
some of the harms associated with 
drug markets. Noting that suppliers 
and enforcement agencies interact 
with each other, they argue that the 
cultivation of informants and the 
escalation of penalties pushed the drug 
trade into being more security conscious 
and violent than it would otherwise 
have been. This increasing brutality, 
they claim, had been used to legitimise 
heavier law enforcement, reinforcing the 
spiral of violence. It was to reverse this 
spiral that Dorn and South raised the 
possibility of extending the principle of 
harm reduction to policing:
‘Given that crimes such as drug 
distribution may be occasioned in ways 
which are more or less socially harmful 
(e.g. with or without shootings), it follows 
that the policy of harm minimization 
can be invoked. This concept is now 
widely accepted as an aim in relation to 
drug consumers: minimizing the social, 
legal, and medical harms that may be 
associated with drug consumption, 
as well as trying to reduce drug 
consumption itself, are now accepted as 
the twin goals of prevention. It may now 
be time to discuss harm minimization 
in relation to drug distribution. The 
question is, given that we cannot totally 
prevent illegal drug markets (and 
there is reasonable consensus on that 
proposition), what sort of markets do we 
least dislike, and how can we adjust the 
control mix so as to push markets in the 
least undesired direction?’3
SUMMARY
 ■ The notion that policing cannot 
stamp out demand for drugs and 
should be reoriented to reduce 
associated harms is not new.
 ■ The difficulties of enforcement 
are reflected in the emergence of 
a global drug trade ‘of enormous 
proportions’ – 3% of world trade, 
making it the third largest sector 
behind oil and arms.
 ■ The prevalence of drug use varies 
sharply between countries, but not 
in a way directly related to drug 
policy: repressive regimes do not 
have lower rates of use than  
liberal regimes.
 ■ The claim that prohibition 
represents an effective price control 
mechanism is problematic, not 
least because there are other, more 
efficient, ways of achieving the same 
goal. Under legalisation, taxes could 
increase drug prices.
 ■ Established drug markets have 
proved highly resilient in the face of 
significant seizures.
 ■ Policing can cause or  
exacerbate drug-related harm 
through ineffectual market 
reduction strategies.
 ■ The alternatives are problem 
oriented strategies which reduce 
harm even if the size of the market 
remains unaltered.
 ■ Problem oriented strategies 
may also mitigate the police’s 
reputational damage associated 
with enforcement-led approaches. 
The practicalities of harm reduction policing 
were simultaneously being explored in Zurich, 
Switzerland, where something like a free-zone 
was created in Platzspitz park, with a view to 
containing the city’s growing heroin problem.4 
Police tolerated small-scale dealing and public 
injecting so long as it remained geographically 
contained, while clean needles were distributed 
to users to combat the spread of HIV.
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The Platzspitz attracted users and dealers 
from outside the city and the ‘needle-
park,’ as it came to be known, was closed 
down in 1992 amid complaints from local 
residents and concerns among politicians 
about the city’s international reputation. 
The social workers and doctors involved in 
the Platzspitz initiative insisted that it had its 
advantages, noting that the concentration 
of users in one place meant they could 
be given clean injecting equipment and 
be helped quickly in cases of overdose. 
Problems persisted despite the closure of 
the needle-park and were arguably more 
difficult to address because the addict 
population had dispersed. In time, various 
harm reduction initiatives, including needle 
exchanges, supervised injecting sites and, 
eventually, heroin assisted therapy were 
introduced across Switzerland, displacing 
the traditional reliance on law enforcement. 
These innovations have yielded significant 
benefits in the form of HIV prevention and 
crime reduction, convincing policy-makers 
and persuading a sceptical Swiss public.5
The Challenge of 
DRug poliCing
 
Drug offences pose a particular challenge 
to law enforcement because they represent 
a form of ‘victimless’ or ‘consensual’ crime. 
The crux of the problem here is that if ‘the 
victim’ is a willing participant then ‘there is 
no party to the act who has an interest in 
being the plaintiff.’6  This creates practical 
difficulties for policing, because crimes 
are typically investigated and convictions 
secured on the basis of information provided 
by victims and witnesses. In the absence of 
specific intelligence, police tend to rely on a 
more proactive and discretionary approach 
to drug offences than other forms of street 
crime.7  Such tactics can reshape local drug 
markets, but are resource intensive and their 
effects are difficult to sustain over the longer-
term: activities that may be displaced to 
other areas often return once the operation 
is over.8
The difficulties of enforcement are reflected 
in the emergence of a global drug trade ‘of 
enormous proportions.’9  A flurry of activity 
aimed at strengthening international 
drug control during the early 1970s was 
followed by an ‘explosive worldwide growth 
in production and trafficking of virtually 
all types of illicit drugs.’10  The scale of the 
problem can be gauged from estimates that 
illicit drugs account for 3% of world trade, 
making it the third largest sector behind oil 
and arms.11 The global prevalence of drug 
use is currently considered to be stable, 
with around 246 million people aged 15 
to 64 years or 5% of the population having 
engaged in such behaviour during the 
last year.12 Official estimates also point to 
187,100 drug-related deaths over the same 
period. The prevalence of drug use varies 
sharply between countries, but does not do 
so in a way that is straightforwardly related 
to drug policy: countries with stringent 
regimes do not have systematically lower 
rates of use than those with more liberal 
regimes.13  Despite massive investment in 
enforcement efforts, for example, the US 
and UK have been left with significant drug 
problems.14
It has, nonetheless, been suggested that 
the failure of prohibition may have been 
overstated. Caulkins argues this point, 
claiming that prohibition increases drug 
prices far beyond what they would be in 
a legalised market, thereby constraining 
availability and use.15 Elsewhere, with 
Reuter, Caulkins suggests that ‘enforcement 
acts almost like a tax’ and that ‘it is hard to 
identify any large costs of delivering drugs 
to final users other than those directly 
related to illegality and enforcement.’16 
There is broad agreement that prohibition 
does increase the price of illegal drugs, 
though the size of the increase is a matter 
of dispute,17 and there is reasonable 
evidence that demand for some drugs, at 
least,  is responsive to price.18  The claim that 
prohibition represents an effective price 
control mechanism remains problematic, 
however, not least because there are other, 
more efficient, ways of achieving the same 
goal. Under legalisation, governments could 
levy taxes on drugs to push prices up. The 
WHO has noted that raising taxes ‘is the 
most cost-effective measure for reducing 
tobacco use,’ while also increasing revenues 
that can be used for state services, including 
healthcare:19 ‘Raising tobacco taxes so 
that they account for at least 70 percent of 
retail prices would lead to significant price 
increases, induce many current users to quit, 
and deter numerous youth from taking up 
tobacco use, leading to large reductions in 
the death and disease caused by tobacco 
use.’20 
While insisting that prohibition pushes prices 
up, Caulkins acknowledges that it ‘clearly 
fails if it is saddled with the impossible 
aspiration of eliminating all drug use’ and 
has been pursued in the US ‘far beyond the 
point of diminishing returns.’21  Established 
drug markets have proved highly resilient 
in the face of significant seizures and market 
disruptions are mostly due to happenstance 
rather than concerted enforcement efforts: 
there are no clear examples of large-scale 
arrests of dealers disrupting a market and 
it is extremely difficult for enforcement 
agencies to achieve sufficient reductions 
in supply to increase retail price.22 Despite 
massive investment in enforcement efforts 
and substantial increases in the number of 
people imprisoned for drug offences, the 
price of heroin and cocaine has fallen in 
the US over the last 30 years; an apparent 
paradox that led Caulkins and Reuter 
to conclude: ‘Most of the advantages of 
prohibition can be attained with modest 
levels of overall enforcement coupled with 
targeting of dealers whose behaviour poses 
a particular risk to the community (e.g., use 
of juvenile distributors, violence against 
competitors).’  Ultimately then, Caulkins and 
Reuter seem to agree with Dorn and South: 
elimination of the drug market is unrealistic 
and enforcement should concentrate on 
reducing associated harms. A problem 
remains, however, because some of what 
prohibition does to push prices up - even 
with modest levels of enforcement - causes 
or exacerbates harm. Caulkins and Reuter 
themselves have noted ‘in passing’ that 
high prices are responsible for some of 
the violence in drug markets, since they 
provide an incentive for theft and make the 
trade attractive to those with a proclivity to 
violence.23 We might add that prohibition 
also provides near monopoly-profits for 
those willing to break the law, creating 
opportunities for corruption and criminal 
diversification, while pushing dependent 
drug users into acquisitive crime in order to 
fund their drug use.24 
Faced with resilient drug markets and 
the limitations of what enforcement can 
achieve, few national governments have 
been willing to be as openly ‘pragmatic’ 
’
‘ Drug offences pose a particular challenge to 
law enforcement because 
they represent a form of 
‘victimless’ or ‘consensual’ 
crime. The crux of the 
problem here is that if 
‘the victim’ is a willing 
participant then ‘there is 
no party to the act who 
has an interest in  
being the plaintiff.’  
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as the Swiss. A more common response 
has been one of evasion and denial in an 
effort to maintain the foundational ‘myth’ 
of sovereign state control.25 Drug offences, 
perhaps more than any other, have exposed 
the inability of nation states to control 
crime within their territorial borders and 
yet political administrations have routinely 
disregarded evidence that ‘drug use is not 
responsive to criminal penalties and that 
criminalisation brings its own pathologies 
(notably street violence and disrespect 
for authorities).’26  The US ‘war on drugs’ 
provides one of the clearest manifestations 
of the desire to re-impose control and 
has ‘all the hallmarks of a sovereign state 
dealing with its limitations by denying 
they exist.’27 Away from the gaze of the 
mass media and politicians, however, the 
criminal justice state has had to come to 
terms with the realities of widespread 
offending. Various ‘adaptive strategies’ have 
been used to preserve the viability of the 
system and to maintain a sense of efficacy. 
As well as making much greater use of 
cautions and fixed penalties to divert cases 
away from courts, police have scaled down 
expectations, redefined their aims, and 
modified the criteria by which success is 
judged.28 Rather than seeking to eliminate 
the drugs trade, the focus has shifted onto 
managing or containing the problem by 
disrupting the market and settling for 
modest improvements at the margins. 
Success is proclaimed not on the basis of 
prevalence of drug use or even price, but 
on the number of arrests made and the 
amount of drugs seized. The rationale here 
is summarised by Bean: 
‘If low-level policing means moving dealers 
to a different site, displacing them, then 
so be it. This constitutes an advance. It 
means the new site is likely to be second 
best as far as the dealers are concerned, 
otherwise they would have selected it as 
their favoured site, and it also means that 
it will take longer to re-establish contacts. 
Dealing is about creating an atmosphere 
of trust, which means trust regarding the 
security of the deal as well as the quality 
of the drug supplied. Low-level policing 
helps destroy that trust, and makes the 
drug market less secure for those operating 
within it... No-one is suggesting that these 
measures solve the problem, but they offer 
a more coherent approach than chasing 
high-level dealers, busting them and then 
chasing their replacements… A uniformed 
police presence, posted strategically in the 
middle of the drug market, may be all that is 
required and it is likely to act as a reassuring 
sig to the local population that something 
is being done. Whether this will eliminate 
dealing is a moot question.’ 29 
The haRMs of DRug poliCing
 
Harm reduction recognises that policy 
interventions may have adverse 
consequences.30 That attempts to limit the 
availability of controlled substances are 
themselves a source of significant harm 
is not seriously in dispute. In 2008, the 
Executive Director of the UNODC identified 
the following unintended consequences of 
drug control:31
•	 The consequences of a huge 
criminal black market which thrives 
by getting prohibited substances 
from producers to consumers. The 
financial incentives to enter this 
market are enormous and there ‘is 
no shortage of criminals competing 
to claw out a share of a market in 
which hundred fold increases in 
price from production to retail are 
not uncommon.’32
•	 Policy displacement:  the need 
for law enforcement has diverted 
attention away from public health, 
which is ‘clearly the first principle 
of drug control’ but has been 
‘displaced into the background, 
more honoured in lip service and 
rhetoric…[than] in actual practice.’33
•	 Geographical displacement or the 
balloon effect: squeezing drug 
supply in one place through tighter 
control often produces an increase 
in activity in another place.
•	 Substance displacement: if the 
use of one drug is controlled 
by reducing supply or demand, 
suppliers and users move on 
to another drug with similar 
psychoactive effects, but less 
stringent controls.
•	 The way we perceive and deal 
with users of illicit drugs: a system 
appears to have been created in 
which those who are addicted to 
drugs find themselves excluded and 
marginalised, heavily stigmatised, 
and often unable to find treatment 
even when they may be motivated 
to want it.
Policing can cause or exacerbate drug-
related harm in three main ways: firstly, by 
increasing the violence associated with drug 
distribution; secondly, by increasing the 
health harms directly related to drug use; 
and thirdly, by damaging the legitimacy of 
the police.34 Although drug distribution is 
replete with possibilities for violence, its 
actual role is often overstated. Criminal 
organisations do not lie outside the general 
rules of human organisation and drug 
dealing networks adapt to environmental 
factors, particularly the need for security: 
highly flexible networks, often based on 
relationships of trust that are insulated by 
frequent ‘cut-outs’, seem best adapted to this 
context.35 The primary motives are economic 
rather than criminal, moreover, and ‘to a 
large degree, those who participate in drug 
dealing and brokerage are most usefully 
viewed as small business entrepreneurs 
and as rational economic actors.’36  Based 
on their study of middle market drug 
distribution in the UK, Pearson and Hobbs 
note that business principles predominate 
and ‘violence-avoidance’ is the general rule 
because violence attracts attention and 
is ‘bad for business;’ that violence is most 
usefully understood as a consequence of 
market dysfunction and  disorganisation; 
and that, where it does occur, violence is 
essentially instrumental, to secure contract 
compliance or to enforce debt collection.37
Although law enforcement provides 
the default response to violence in drug 
markets, the evidence suggests that 
such responses are likely to be counter-
productive. According to a recent systematic 
review of the literature:
‘…drug law enforcement interventions 
are unlikely to reduce drug market 
violence. Instead, and contrary to the 
conventional wisdom that increasing drug 
law enforcement will reduce violence, the 
existing scientific evidence base suggest 
that drug prohibition likely contributes 
to drug market violence and increasing 
homicide rates and that increasingly 
sophisticated methods of disrupting illicit 
drug distribution networks may in turn 
increase levels of violence.’38
 
Faced with this apparently ‘paradoxical’ 
association, the authors identify several 
‘causative mechanisms’ that explain how 
policing might reshape drug markets in 
ways that increase violence. Research, 
they note, has shown how the removal of 
existing drug distribution networks has 
the perverse effect of creating a lucrative 
vacuum that others will seek to fill. Under 
these circumstances, ‘violence may be an 
inevitable consequence of drug prohibition 
when groups compete for massive profits’ 
without recourse to courts and other means 
of resolving disputes peacefully.39 The 
authors also point to a process of ‘target 
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hardening,’ whereby drug organisations become 
increasingly militarised in the face of enhanced law 
enforcement.  
As well as displacing potential public health 
responses, policing contributes to the ‘risk 
environment’ of drug use by encouraging high-
risk behaviours and undermining harm reduction 
efforts.40 In their ‘seminal’41 ethnographic study 
of Australia’s principal street level heroin market, 
Maher and Dixon describe how users and dealers 
adapt to intense police pressure to avoid detection.42 
Among other things, police crackdowns were found 
to encourage oral and nasal storage and transfer of 
heroin, increasing the risk of transmitting infectious 
diseases and overdose (if heroin is swallowed 
inadvertently or to conceal it from the police). 
Numerous studies have shown how police pressure 
can exacerbate the risks associated with injecting.43 
Access to sterile syringes is one of the main planks 
of harm reduction, but injecting drug users are 
often reluctant to access syringe exchanges or 
carry syringes for fear of being arrested. Under such 
conditions, users are more likely to share syringes 
with others, use discarded syringes or attend 
‘shooting galleries,’ increasing the risk of transmitting 
blood-borne pathogens such as HIV. The threat of 
detection and confiscation creates pressure to inject 
quickly and users may rush the process, further 
increasing the risks of abscesses, bacterial infections 
and overdose. Police crackdowns also increase 
careless disposal of syringes as users may simply 
drop their injecting equipment on the street to avoid 
being stopped or arrested. Having documented this 
kind of heightened risk-behaviour, Maher and Dixon 
show that police pressure resulted in an ‘alarming’ 
increase in Hepatitis C among injecting drug users.44 
A similar link was identified by a US study, which 
found that various indicators of legal repressiveness, 
including the number of ‘hard’ drug arrests and 
police employees, were positively associated with the 
prevalence of HIV among injecting drug users, while 
having no effect on rates of injecting drug use.45
As well as prompting increases in risk-behaviour, 
police activity can disrupt users’ engagement 
with services if it is undertaken in the vicinity of 
needle exchanges or treatment agencies and may 
discourage users from seeking medical assistance 
during or following an overdose out of fear that 
they will be arrested. Finally, physical confrontation 
between drug users and police is ‘a common source 
of health-related harm’ involving physical searches 
as well as use of physical restraints (chokeholds), 
stun guns and pepper spray: perhaps the most 
severe example of such harm comes from Thailand, 
‘where a federally ordered police crackdown resulted 
in reports of thousands of extra-judicial killings of 
suspected drug users and dealers.’46  
Enforcing drug laws runs the risk of significantly 
damaging the legitimacy of the police and criminal 
justice system. The impact of police contact on public 
trust and confidence is famously asymmetrical: 
poor or unsatisfactory contact has a large negative 
effect, while good or satisfactory contact has a much 
smaller positive effect.47  This pattern is particularly 
marked in relation to police initiated encounters and 
is likely to be all the more so when such encounters 
are based on a high degree of discretion. For most 
of the last decade, police in England and Wales 
have conducted close to a million stop-searches 
a year, around half of which have been for drugs.48 
The vast majority of these drug searches were 
targeted at low-level possession offences (mainly 
of cannabis) and fewer than one-in-ten resulted in 
arrest. Ethnographic research suggests that drug 
searches are often based on stereotypes about 
who ‘looks likely,’49 while a recent inspection found 
that more than a quarter of stop-searches lacked 
sufficient grounds to justify the lawful use of the 
power.50 Speculative searches for minor ‘consensual’ 
offences in the absence of objective grounds are 
likely to promote defiance and a sense of alienation, 
undermine respect for the law and co-operation 
with the police, and may even lead to self-help 
violence.51
The policing and prosecution of drug offences is 
not applied equally to all those who use drugs 
and the ‘deliberately inflicted pains of drug control 
have usually fallen most heavily on the poor and 
visible minorities.’52 Drug policing in England and 
Wales weighs heavily on black and minority ethnic 
communities and is a key driver of ethnic disparities 
throughout the criminal justice system.53 Massive 
disparities are also evident in the US, where the 
‘war on drugs’ reproduces historically entrenched 
patterns of racial disadvantage.54 These disparities 
challenge the promise of equality before the 
law and foster a sense of disillusionment that is 
contributing to a crisis of legitimacy: most African 
Americans consider the ‘war on drugs’ to be ‘unfair 
by design’ and this perception negatively affects 
their expectations of the police and the nature of 
their engagement with the criminal justice system.5
Despite massive 
investment in 
enforcement efforts 
and substantial 
increases in the 
number of people 
imprisoned for drug 
offences, the price of 
heroin and cocaine has 
fallen in the US over 
the last 30 years; an 
apparent paradox that 
led Caulkins and Reuter 
to conclude: ‘Most 
of the advantages 
of prohibition can 
be attained with 
modest levels of 
overall enforcement 
coupled with targeting 
of dealers whose 
behaviour poses a 
particular risk to the 
community (e.g., use 
of juvenile distributors, 
violence against 
competitors).’  ’
‘
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The Challenge of haRM ReDuCTion poliCing
 
Harm reduction targets the proximate causes of specific harms 
and demands that the potential costs of an intervention are 
weighed against its potential benefits.56 This requires an analytic 
perspective that, in the context of policing, has an affinity with 
problem oriented approaches. The emphasis here is on developing 
a robust understanding of a particular issue and developing a more 
effective strategy for dealing with the underlying problem rather 
than simply responding to a specific incident.57 Problem oriented 
policing also places considerable value on preventative responses 
that do not depend on the criminal justice system and engage 
other public agencies, the community and the private sector.  It also 
carries a commitment to implementing the new strategy, rigorously 
evaluating its effectiveness, and building a body of knowledge 
that supports further professionalisation. According to a recent 
review of street-level drug law enforcement, problem-oriented 
policing is more effective than community-wide policing or targeted 
enforcement activities in ‘hot spots,’ all of which were found to be a 
marked improvement on ‘standard’ law enforcement tactics (such as 
preventive patrols) that are geographically unfocused.58
The UK Drug Policy Commission advocated a similar ‘problem-
solving’ approach when it called for drug-related law enforcement 
to be refocused on addressing harms. Such an approach ‘requires 
a more explicit consideration and broader understanding of drug 
harms at all stages of the enforcement process.’59 This entails:
1. Defining the problem: both in terms of the harms caused and 
the features of drug markets that produce these harms.
2. Prioritising areas for action: consult with community members 
to understand their concerns and perceptions of how drug 
markets affect their lives.
3.  Considering possible responses and their likely impact: to 
ensure that even when displacement and the potentially 
harmful side effects of enforcement are taken into account, 
there is likely to be a clear ‘net reduction’ in harm to 
communities.
4. Identifying measures of success and impact: these should 
go beyond numbers of arrests and seizures, price or levels of 
purity, to demonstrate real gains in reducing drug problems.
5. Implementing an operation: taking steps to mitigate any likely 
increase in harms caused by enforcement interventions, while 
maximising the potential for reductions in harm.
6. Evaluating to understand the impact of operations on ‘real 
world’ harms: considerably more effort and resources are 
required to demonstrate a sustainable improvement for the 
relevant communities.
Policing can combat drug-related harms in various ways other than 
trying to limit the extent of drug use. It can do so by reducing the 
harm users experience per unit of consumption, by reducing the 
harms users impose on others, and/or by reducing the harms caused 
by production, trafficking and distribution of drugs.60 Most existing 
studies focus on unit-harm to users and identify enforcement 
activities that should be avoided to reduce such harm. To this end, 
it has been recommended that police should not interact with 
 
 
injecting drug users during the injecting process; should not arrest or 
interfere with people for possessing syringes or confiscate injecting 
equipment; and should keep their distance from needle exchanges, 
treatment centres and supervised injecting facilities.61 Caulkins and 
Reuter identify various ways in which police may play a more active 
or ‘positive’ role in promoting harm reduction, noting that they are 
already engaged in some such practices. This more active role might 
involve referring drug users to treatment and/or social services; being 
trained in overdose resuscitation and the use of related medications; 
warning users when there are tainted or particularly dangerous drugs 
on the market; participating in early warning systems designed to 
detect emerging drug trends; cracking down on particularly violent 
dealers; and helping to enforce health, safety, and building codes to 
protect drug users (for example, by ensuring dance venues provide 
free water to reduce the risks associated with club drugs).62 
The positive contribution police can make to reducing harm to users 
is evident from jurisdictions with very different approaches to drug 
control. In Portugal, for example, the emphasis on enforcement has 
been displaced by a general shift toward public health interventions. 
Drug possession was decriminalised in 2001 and police now refer 
users to a ‘dissuasion commission,’ made up of medical experts, social 
workers and legal professionals. While non-dependent first-time 
offenders rarely face any further action, the commission can draw on 
various sanctions to encourage dependent users into treatment.63 
The introduction of this new arrangement was supported by a raft 
of harm reduction measures, including significant expansion of drug 
treatment and methadone maintenance, and has been followed by 
reductions in problematic drug use, HIV infection and drug-related 
deaths.64 The role of enforcement is also being reconsidered in the 
US even though drug possession remains firmly criminalised. Several 
cities have adopted Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion (LEAD) for 
low-level drug and prostitution offences. This innovative programme 
provides officers with specialised harm reduction training and 
enables them to refer drug users directly to housing support, 
treatment and other services without sending them to court.65  If 
an offender agrees to participate in the programme and completes 
the intake process, criminal charges from the arrest are not filed.66 
Early indications suggest that LEAD not only reduces the number of 
people processed by the criminal justice system, but also reduces 
recidivism and improves health and well-being among participants.
The most distinctive contribution policing can make to harm reduction 
is by addressing market related harms.67 While the adaptability of 
drug markets frustrates efforts to eradicate supply, it is this very 
flexibility that enables police to mould distribution practices in ways 
that reduce harm even if the size of the market remains unaltered: 
an open market may be changed into a closed one, for example or 
be pushed into a non-residential area. According to Caulkins and 
Reuter: ‘For enforcement to suppress a particularly noxious part of 
the market, it is not necessary to make that submarket or that selling 
practice uneconomical; it is only necessary to make it uncompetitive 
relative to other, less noxious forms of selling.’68 They go onto 
identify three broad policing strategies for achieving this kind of 
market regulation:
Focused deterrence or ‘pulling levers’ is a problem-oriented 
strategy that targets specific criminal behaviours carried out 
by a small number of chronic offenders who are vulnerable to 
sanctions and punishment. Offenders are directly confronted with 
carefully collected evidence of their involvement and are informed 
that continued offending will result in all potential sanctions, 
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or levers, being applied. This message is reinforced 
through crackdowns on those who continue to offend. 
Desistance among targeted offenders is rewarded 
through positive incentives, including access to social 
services as well as education and job opportunities. 
Focused deterrence was pioneered by The Boston Gun 
Project, which led to a sharp reduction in youth homicide, 
and has been widely replicated in the form of Operation 
Ceasefire. It has also been successfully used to combat 
open drug markets. A recent meta-analysis concluded 
that focussed deterrence is a very promising approach 
that has medium-sized crime reduction effects.69
Place-based enforcement uses police resources to move 
drug markets into areas where they are less harmful. 
This may mean pushing dealing activity away from 
schools, treatment centres, play-grounds and residential 
neighbourhoods into abandoned industrial areas. Where 
the aim is to displace rather than eradicate the market, 
police can use methods that are less expensive than arrest 
and prosecution. Caulkins and Reuter cite the example of a 
particularly problematic crack house in Charleston, South 
Carolina, that was shut down simply by parking a marked 
police car in front of the house for a few days: ‘Customers 
were unwilling to walk past the car to buy drugs, so the 
crack house was soon abandoned. The sellers presumably 
shifted operations elsewhere, but the pressing problem 
was addressed quickly and with minimal resources.’70
Targeting behaviours that are particularly harmful, 
including the use of violence, employment of juveniles 
or selling near schools and treatment centres is a ‘natural 
extension’ of problem-oriented policing, which recognises 
‘there are many important drug-related problems 
above and beyond drug use per se.’71 Concentrating 
enforcement activities on dealers who engage in such 
damaging behaviours may put them at a competitive 
disadvantage compared with those who engage in less 
harmful practices.
Problem oriented strategies may also mitigate the 
reputational damage associated with enforcement-led 
approaches. By promoting preventative responses that do 
not depend on the criminal justice system, such strategies 
are less reliant on the kind of speculative, coercive tactics 
that are so damaging to public trust and confidence. 
The emphasis on working with partners, responding to 
community concerns, and reducing the collateral damage 
associated with drug markets would also be expected 
to enhance police legitimacy. This kind of approach is 
particularly important for communities that are at the 
sharp end of enforcement-led activities. The US based 
LEAD programme emerged out of litigation over racial 
disparities in drug arrests and is attracting considerable 
interest from political leaders and law-enforcement 
officials as a means of improving police/community 
relations in the post-Ferguson era.72  Where coercion 
is deployed, trust and confidence may be protected by 
ensuring officers proceed in ways that are - and are seen to 
be - procedurally and distributively fair.73
ConClusion anD bRief CoMMenTs 
on The ‘MeTRiCs DebaTe’
 
Prohibition sets the police an impossible task, the morality 
of which is weakened when enforcement itself becomes 
a source of harm.74 Reorienting police activity toward 
the goal of harm reduction offers a viable alternative 
that is not only more efficient, but is also more ethical. 
There are, no doubt, significant barriers to such a move, 
not least within police agencies,75 but there are good 
reasons to think that these barriers can be overcome. 
Harm reduction fits comfortably with key developments 
in modern policing, including the rise of intelligence-
led approaches and problem-oriented strategies, as 
well as the emphasis on community engagement and 
partnership-working.76 In other words, harm reduction 
does not represent an alternative to current police 
practices so much as a reorientation of focus. A recent 
survey of police enforcement personnel carried out by the 
UK Drug Policy Commission found widespread support for 
the basic premise of harm reduction: 90 % of respondents 
thought ‘it is very unlikely that the UK drug market will be 
eradicated in the foreseeable future;’ 68 % that the success 
of enforcement activity should be judged by its impact 
on drug harms; and 64 % that it is possible to reduce the 
harms caused by drug-markets without a reduction in use 
or sales.77
Policing should not undermine other aspects of drug 
policy, but should form part of a coherent strategy. 
The prevalence of drug use does not provide a good 
target for drug policy as a whole because it is largely 
unresponsive to prevention and law enforcement efforts, 
while treatment and harm reduction programmes yield 
other benefits, including lower crime, less transmission 
of blood-borne pathogens and fewer drug-related 
deaths. These metrics would make for good police 
performance indicators, alongside drug-related violence. 
The key point here is the same for policing as it is for 
treatment, prevention or any other aspect of drug policy: 
‘The proposition that policy can do little to 
influence prevalence of use may seem nihilistic. 
Far from it. We know that bad policy choices 
can make drug use, drug distribution, and 
production more harmful. All that policy changes 
can in fact do is to reduce the harmfulness of 
these activities…. [and] this proposition has 
enormously liberating effects for policy. At 
present, many laws and interventions are justified 
because they might reduce drug use, even 
though we know with greater confidence that 
they cause harms. If prevalence of use is no longer 
seen as a plausible policy goal, then the harms 
can be avoided.’78 
This is precisely what 30 years on the job had taught 
Bunny Colvin.
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Uncle Sam’s Cocaine Nosedive: 
A Brief Exploration of  
a Dozen Hypotheses
Beau Kilmer
 
SUMMARY
 ■ Heavy consumption of cocaine has created 
a tremendous amount of morbidity and 
mortality, with the US having spent billions of 
dollars domestically and internationally trying 
to reduce its availability. 
 ■ In the late-2000s, there was an unprecedented 
decline in the US cocaine market:  RAND 
estimated that the total consumption of pure 
cocaine decreased by roughly 50% from 2006 
to 2010.  Concurrently, the purity-adjusted 
price increased by more than 40% at the  
retail level.  
 ■ Despite the size and the swiftness of the 
consumption decrease, there is no consensus 
about which policies or factors are responsible 
for the drop. 
 ■ This essay briefly explores twelve hypotheses 
for the decline which are neither exhaustive 
nor mutually exclusive.  It pays special 
attention to the period immediately preceding 
the consumption decrease, noting that there 
was a 40% decline in the purity-adjusted retail 
price from 2000 to 2006.  Whether this price 
decrease was simply part of a larger trend, 
attributable to policy decisions, a random 
fluctuation or  something else, has yet to be 
determined.  
 ■ If further research suggests that much of the 
consumption drop in the US is attributable to 
supply-side polices, this does not mean that 
supply reduction is the optimal approach 
for reducing problem consumption; much 
depends on the particular drug, stage of the 
epidemic, characteristics of the country and 
the perspective of the decision maker.  
It would, however, challenge the  
conventional wisdom that supply-side 
interventions can do little to influence  
mature consumption markets.
Cocaine consumption and trafficking have generated a significant amount of dependence, morbidity, and mortality in the US.1 Of course, calculations of the harms imposed by cocaine must also consider the 
consequences of government efforts to control cocaine. While prohibition 
raises the money price of cocaine, increases search costs and minimises 
marketing (which helps suppress consumption), it is also responsible for 
increasing violence, incarceration and corruption, which has affected cities 
throughout the US as well as production and trafficking countries south of 
the border.
However, beginning in 2006, there was 
an unprecedented decline in cocaine 
consumption in the US.  From 2006 to 
2010, RAND estimated that the total 
amount of pure cocaine consumed in 
the US may have decreased by 50%,2 
leading Caulkins et al.3 to argue that 
‘the downturn competes with the 
2001 Australian heroin drought as the 
greatest ‘success’ in modern recorded 
drug history at the population level. 
Declines associated with the Australian 
heroin drought were proportionately 
larger—closer to 80%—but the US 
cocaine market is vastly larger in 
absolute size.’
Despite the size and the swiftness of 
the decrease, there is no consensus 
about what caused the drop. Indeed, 
the stunning decline has garnered 
surprisingly little analysis in the research 
literature.4  Understanding what caused 
the drop carries with it important policy 
implications considering the US has 
spent billions of dollars domestically 
and internationally trying to reduce 
the availability of cocaine. Much of the 
academic literature suggests that supply 
reduction efforts —at best— can shift 
trafficking patterns or have a short-lived 
impact on the retail market.5  Especially 
with cocaine, few observers believe 
that increasing the intensity of supply-
reduction efforts can have a substantive 
effect on demand. If supply–reduction 
efforts are responsible for the decrease 
in the consumption of cocaine in the 
US, according to conventional wisdom 
this would mean that supply-side 
interventions can do little to influence 
mature consumption markets.
The goal of this essay is to draw attention 
to the large decline in US cocaine 
consumption and stimulate discussions 
and further research in this area.  After 
providing evidence of the decrease, 
it briefly explores twelve potential 
hypotheses that fall into three general 
categories: supply-reduction policies, 
other explanations for a reduction 
in supply, and a shift in demand for 
cocaine in the US.  It then pays attention 
to the period immediately preceding 
the consumption decrease, noting 
that there was a significant drop in 
cocaine prices between 2000 and 2006 
informing the twelfth  hypothesis: mean 
reversion in retail cocaine prices.6  These 
hypotheses are neither exhaustive nor 
mutually exclusive, and some seem 
more plausible than others.
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eViDenCe foR aMeRiCa’s 
CoCaine noseDiVe
For any addictive substance, a minority 
of heavy users account for most of the 
consumption.7  Since household surveys 
do a poor job of capturing heavy users of 
cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine 
in the US (see, e.g., Rhodes et al),8 
information from other sources must be 
combined to generate estimates of the 
users and how much they consume and 
spend.  I worked on a RAND team tasked 
with generating the 2000-2010 estimates 
for White House Office of National Drug 
Control Policy (ONDCP).  Our approach 
differed in important ways from previous 
efforts and there was a special focus on 
displaying the uncertainty surrounding 
these estimates.
Figure 1 presents our annual estimates for 
each of the last 10 years of the number 
of individuals who used powder or crack 
cocaine on four or more days in the 
past month. The ratio of the higher to 
lower estimates is roughly 2.3:1 and the 
uncertainty could be larger.9 Focusing on 
the middle estimates, there was about a 
10% increase from 2002 to 2006 followed 
by a 22% decline between 2006 and 2010. 
The number of those who used cocaine 
on 21 or more days in the previous month 
decreased by 27% from 2006 to 2010 
while the comparable figure for those 
who used on 4 to 10 days decreased 
by 19%.
Since heavy cocaine users tend to use 
more per use day than less frequent 
users (see e.g., Frijns and van Laar),11 
we would expect the change in pure 
cocaine consumed from 2006 to 2010 
to exceed the change in the number of 
users consuming on four or more days in 
the past month.  Multiplying the number 
of users by average annual spending (by 
type of user) generates total expenditures 
and dividing this by the average price paid 
per pure gram purchased generates the 
total amount of pure cocaine consumed 
in the US.  The middle estimate for pure 
metric tonnes of cocaine consumed 
hovered around 325 between 2004 and 
2006 and then plummeted by roughly 
50% (Figure 2).  
While Figure 2 suggests there is a large 
amount of uncertainty surrounding 
these consumption figures, the size 
of the decline is consistent with a 
number of supply-side figures (which 
are used as inputs for neither the user 
nor the consumption estimates).  These 
measures are discussed in more detail 
in Kilmer et al.,13 but highlights include: 
 ■ Colombian cocaine production. 
The US gets most of its cocaine 
from Colombia14 and the US State 
Department15 estimated that pure 
cocaine production in Colombia 
decreased from 510 tonnes in 2006  
to 260 tonnes in 2010.
 ■ Cocaine border seizures.  
Total cocaine seizures fell from about 
160 tonnes in 2006 to about 80 
tonnes in 2010.16
 ■ Interagency Assessment of Cocaine 
Movement (IACM).  Estimates of 
cocaine leaving South America for the 
US were reported to have increased 
from 2006 to 2007, but were then 
followed by nearly a 50% drop from 
2007 to 2010.17 
Figure 1. Estimated number of those who used cocaine four or more times in the past 
month, 2000–2010 (in millions)10
Figure 2. Pure cocaine consumption in the US (metric tonnes)12 
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Obviously, no one knows precisely how 
much pure cocaine is consumed in the US 
or anywhere else. Thus, researchers and 
decision makers are forced to triangulate 
from multiple data points.  While each 
of the aforementioned estimates has its 
idiosyncratic limits and is surrounded with 
uncertainty, the fact that each of them 
suggests the amount of pure cocaine 
available to be consumed in the US could 
have decreased by 50% during the last half 
of the 2000s is noteworthy.
hypoTheses foR The 
us CoCaine DRop 
This section highlights a number of 
potential explanations for the reduction 
in cocaine consumed in the US and/or 
reduction in Colombian cocaine available 
for consumption (building on Caulkins et al. 
and Kilmer et al.).18  These explanations are 
neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive 
and fall into three general categories: supply-
reduction policies, other explanations for a 
reduction in supply, and a shift in demand 
for cocaine in the US.  
suPPly-ReDuction Policies
Hypothesis #1. Coca eradication in 
Colombia. The UNODC attributes much of 
the reduction in Colombian coca available 
over this period to intense spraying and a 
large increase in manual eradication efforts.19 
Figure 3 displays estimates of hectares 
eradicated as well as potential production. 
The aerial eradication figures did increase, 
but the available evidence suggests this 
approach tends to have a small effect,20 
if any.21   
Figure 3 also indicates that hectares of coca 
bush eradicated manually in Colombia 
increased from 6,000 in 2004, and more than 
30,000 in 2005, to a peak of 96,000 hectares 
in 2008. Because it typically takes 18–24 
months before coca cultivated in Colombia 
ends up on US streets,23 the changes in 
manual eradication correlates with the 
large drop in consumption observed after 
2007. Since a hectare of coca can produce 
roughly 3 to 8 pure kilogrammes of cocaine 
hydrochloride (there is a lot of debate about 
this yield figure, see e.g., Washington Office 
on Latin America),24 manual eradication of 
90,000 hectares could be part of the story; 
however, it would require some strong 
assumptions about how growers responded 
to these losses.  Further complicating these 
Figure 3. Coca cultivation, eradication, and potential pure production in Colombia22
While each of the 
aforementioned 
estimates has its 
idiosyncratic limits 
and is surrounded 
with uncertainty, 
the fact that each 
of them suggests 
the amount of pure 
cocaine available 
to be consumed in 
the US could have 
decreased by 50% 
during the last 
half of the 2000s is 
noteworthy... 
explanations are 
neither mutually 
exclusive nor 
exhaustive and fall 
into three general 
categories: supply-
reduction policies, 
other explanations 
for a reduction in 
supply, and a shift in 
demand for cocaine 
in the US.  ’
‘
47
136
530
Aerial Spray
Manual Erad
Cultivation
Potential Pure Prod
84
2
170
700
123
3
144
585
127
4
114
445
132
6
114
410
134
38
144
500
164
42
157
510
148
65
167
470
130
96
119
285
102
61
116
280
98
44
100
260
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Co
ca
 C
ul
tiv
at
io
n 
or
 E
ra
di
ca
tio
n
(1
,0
00
s 
of
 H
a)
Potential production
(pure M
T)
      |   AFTER THE DRUG WARS LSE EXPERT GROUP ON THE ECONOMICS OF DRUG POLICY  |70 71
calculations, the UN also notes that: ‘Since 
2005, probably due to increased counter-
narcotics pressure, the per-hectare yields 
of coca fields went down in many growing 
regions of Colombia.’25
Hypothesis #2.  Reduction in the 
availability of precursor chemicals used 
to produce cocaine hydrochloride.  A 
paper by Cunningham et al.26 suggests 
another explanation.  Their analysis of 
seizure data from the DEA’s System to 
Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence 
(STRIDE) suggests cocaine availability 
dropped in response to US regulations 
on two chemicals produced in the US: 
potassium permanganate in October 1989 
and sodium permanganate, its direct 
substitute, in December 2006.27  Potassium 
permanganate and sodium permanganate 
are interchangeable liquid oxidants used 
to remove impurities from coca base in 
cocaine manufacture.  The authors report 
that the first regulation led to a temporary 
drop in seizure volume, but the authors find 
that after the latter, ‘cocaine seizure amount 
dropped 22%, price rose 100%, and purity 
dropped 35%’ through at least early-2011.  
In a published comment on the paper, 
Caulkins28 argued that ‘Cunningham et al.’s 
analysis of the apparent effectiveness of 
cocaine essential chemical controls is either 
the most important drug policy paper of 
this century or  it is wrong. There is little 
middle ground.’  He then recommended 
that; 1), the analysis should be replicated 
by other authors using the same data and 
2), researchers should conduct similar 
analyses of other countries’ chemical control 
interventions, noting that ‘if chemical 
controls work, then controls implemented 
by any country that supplies chemicals to 
the coca laboratories should affect purity, 
prices and seizures in every country supplied 
by those laboratories.’
Hypothesis #3. Interdiction efforts in 
Colombia and Central America. Another 
plausible explanation offered by Mejia29 is 
the increased focus on interdiction efforts 
in Colombia after 2007, noting that ‘cocaine 
seizures increased from 127 metric tonnes 
in 2006 to 203 in 2009 (an increase of 60%) 
and the number of destroyed laboratories 
increased from 2,300 to 2,900 (an increase of 
26%).’ Mejia argues that this shift reduced the 
net supply of Colombian cocaine by more than 
50%.30
But the increase in cocaine seizures in 
this period was not limited to Colombia: 
UNODC31 reports that beginning in 2006, 
there was a large increase in cocaine seizures 
Central America (Figure 4).  Not all of the 
cocaine seized in Central America is targeted 
for the US (e.g., UNODC notes that Costa Rica 
has been a significant source of cocaine for 
Europe, but this may have declined in recent 
years) and it is important to take these 
data with heaps of salt.  First, there may be 
double-counting as multiple countries may 
take credit for the same seizure.32 Second, 
these seizures are not potency-adjusted, 
so it is unclear how much pure cocaine is 
actually removed from the market. Third, 
seizures do not tell us what is exported, only 
what is detected. Still, the increase from 
about 35 tonnes seized in Central America 
in 2005 to more than 100 tonnes in 2007 
is noteworthy, raising the possibility that 
some of the reduction in US consumption 
may not be entirely attributable to actions in 
Colombia.33
Hypothesis #4.  Fragmentation of criminal 
organisations in Colombia.  Garzón and 
Bailey35 argue that the Colombian cocaine 
chain experienced a ‘double shock’ from 
2006 to 2008. In addition to the increased 
focus on interdiction described in the 
previous hypothesis, the authors reference 
work from Rico36 noting that the cartels ‘were 
weakened by government offensives and 
by internal disputes. The demobilisation of 
paramilitary groups, with more than 30,000 
members, had an important influence on 
the illegal drug chain. Criminal organisations 
Figure 4.  Distribution of cocaine seizures in Central America, 2000-201134
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Figure 4.  Distribution of cocaine seizures in Central America, 2000-201134
entered a phase of adaptation characterised by 
the fragmentation of the large structures and the 
emergence of multiple groups.’ The implication 
is that this changed drug‐trafficking structures 
in Colombia, leading to less coca production and 
fewer exports.
Hypothesis #5.  Improved US-Mexico 
cooperation to reduce drug trafficking. 
Since the mid-1990s, most of the cocaine entering 
the US is believed to enter via the Mexican border.37 
Garzón and Baily38 hypothesize that efforts by US 
enforcement agencies near the Mexican border 
may have had an impact on the cocaine market:
 
‘A budget reauthorization in 2006 for the 
Office of National Drug Control Policy 
(ONDCP) called for a strategic approach to 
drug interdiction on the Southwest border, 
and the first such strategy report appeared 
in 2007. The main goal was to improve 
coordination among the scores of local, 
state, tribal, and federal‐level anti‐drug 
agencies along the border as well as with 
their counterparts in Mexico. For example, 
administrative mechanisms such as Border 
Enforcement Security Task Forces were 
created to improve coordination on the US 
side and Sensitive Investigative Units were 
set up to better work with Mexican agencies.’
 
In addition to these efforts, Garzón and Baily 
suggest that the Merida Initiative — which infused 
more than $2 billion into Mexican efforts to 
disrupt organised crime and support legal reforms 
since late 2007 — led to improved cross-border 
collaboration and intelligence sharing that may 
have had an impact; however, they are quick to 
note the difficulty of assessing the impact of this 
cooperation on efforts to reduce drug trafficking. 
They cautiously conclude, ‘Overall, we consider 
that stepped-up bilateral cooperation must be 
taken into account as a force of change, without 
overestimating the role that the Merida Initiative 
may have played in this dynamic.’39
This hypothesis also raises questions about what 
happened to the markets for other drugs that are 
exported from Mexico to the US. I discuss this next.
 
otheR exPlanations foR a ReDuction 
in cocaine available in the us.
Hypothesis #6.  Increased violence in Mexico 
made it harder to get cocaine to the US.  Given 
the eruption of violence in Mexico following 
President Calderon’s crackdown on drug trafficking 
organisations in late-2006,40 this might have made 
it harder for the DTOs to move cocaine though 
Mexico and into the US. But if this was the case we 
would also expect other drugs that are produced 
in Mexico, such as marijuana and heroin, to be 
more expensive in the US.  
In the 2000s it was estimated that 40% to 67% of the 
marijuana consumed in the US came from Mexico.41 
National retail prices were flat over this period 
while the THC of commercial-grade marijuana 
from Mexico was increasing;42 suggesting that 
the potency-adjusted price for marijuana likely 
decreased.  As for heroin, the purity-adjusted 
retail heroin prices in the US fell from $330 a 
gram in 2000 to $209 in 2005, increased to $304 
in 2006 and $327 by 2008, and then seemed to 
fall below $200 by 2011 (all in 2012 $).  The large 
jump in heroin prices appeared to happen before 
Calderon’s crackdown, but a rigorous evaluation 
of this hypothesis (and Hypothesis #5) should 
look beyond national annual prices.  More could 
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Figure 5. Age Distribution of 
Adult Crack Cocaine Treatment 
Admissions, 1992 and 200854
As Kilmer et al.  argue, 
there may have been 
a ‘perfect storm’ with 
the rapid increase in 
manual eradication, 
increase in 
interdiction, reduced 
availability of sodium 
permanganate, 
instability in Mexico, 
increase in non-
US demand, etc.  
Together, these 
events may have had 
more of an impact on 
cocaine consumption 
in the US than the 
sum of their effects 
had they occurred at 
different times, but 
this is very much an 
open question. ’
‘
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be learned by focusing on both retail and 
wholesale prices in different regions of 
the US, and, if possible, on a quarterly or 
biannual basis.43
Hypothesis #7. Shift away from coca 
production in Colombia. Another 
explanation for the drop in Colombia coca 
production is that there was a shift from coca 
crops to illegal gold mining. Rico and Reuter44 
note that ‘The rapid rise in the international 
prices of gold combined with the reduction 
of the average profit in cocaine smuggling 
for the Colombian [drug trafficking 
organization] DTOs as a consequence of 
the market power of Mexican DTOs (Rico 
2013) created powerful economic incentives 
for a deep and ongoing transformation of 
the landscape in Colombian rural areas.’ In 
addition, one of the authors interviewed 
former coca farmers, who suggested that 
gold mining provided a larger net income, 
lower risk of enforcement interventions, 
greater certainty in payment, and less 
stigma. Rico and Reuter further note that 
some Colombian DTOs actually prohibited 
some farmers from cultivating coca in gold 
mining areas, so as to reduce the prospect of 
government intervention.45
The question here is how much of this shift 
to mining is what caused the reduction in 
pure cocaine available in the US versus being 
a consequence.46    
Hypothesis #8A. Increased demand for 
Colombian cocaine outside of the US. 
Another explanation for the reduction 
in cocaine consumption is that some of 
the cocaine produced in Colombia was 
shipped to other countries instead of the 
US.  Amphetamines are and have always 
been the stimulant of choice in Europe, but 
in the 2000s cocaine became more popular. 
Information about cocaine consumption is 
not tracked on an annual basis, but UNODC 
estimated that between 1998 and 2008 
the amount of pure cocaine exported in 
Europe increased from 63 tonnes to 124 
tonnes.47 After assessing cocaine-related 
deaths in nine European countries, Corkery48 
concluded ‘There is a mixed picture … During 
the 2000s, there was generally an increasing 
upward trend in such cases, followed by a 
decline in most countries. Peaks occurred 
in different years.’ This is consistent with a 
review of annual reports submitted to the 
EMCDDA from 2007 to 2010 by Mena et al..49
Cocaine from multiple countries is exported 
to Europe, and UNODC estimates that from 
2008 to 2010 25% of the cocaine seized in 
Europe came from Colombia. Of course, 
we cannot assume that means 25% of the 
cocaine used in Europe came from Colombia; 
we also do not know how this has changed 
over time. Beyond Europe, there was also a 
reported increase in cocaine consumption in 
Brazil and Argentina in the 2000s.50
Hypothesis #8B. Decline in demand for 
cocaine in the US
A reduction in supply that increases the 
price of cocaine will subsequently reduce 
consumption (see, e.g., Gallet).51 But there 
are other reasons why the demand for 
cocaine may have decreased in the US that 
may be independent of or intertwined with 
the price change.
Hypothesis #9.  Heavy cocaine users were 
aging out of the market.  Researchers 
have noted that the average age of cocaine 
treatment seekers increased throughout 
the 1990s and 2000s (see Figure 5),52 which 
is consistent with a story that some heavy 
cocaine users were aging out of use.53 While 
this could be a partial explanation for the 
reduction in consumption, it is difficult to 
tell a story about why there was such a sharp 
decline for this group after 2006.
Hypothesis #10. Substitution away from 
cocaine to other substances.  Others have 
hypothesized that some cocaine users may 
have shifted to other drugs such as cannabis 
during this period.55 While it is plausible 
that some heavy cocaine users may have 
replaced cocaine for other substances over 
this period, I am not aware of any studies 
which have documented this.
Hypothesis #11. A reduction in 
disposable income due to the ‘great 
recession.’ Another hypothesis is that the 
‘great recession’ accelerated the reduction 
in consumption since users had less money 
available for cocaine.  However, there is 
a bit of timing issue here.  Consumption 
started to decrease around 2006, but the 
great recession did not start until December 
2007, and many did not feel its effects until 
later.56 Yes, some were feeling the pinch 
before the official start, but this could not 
have been the only driver, especially given 
the price increase beginning in 2006 (Figure 
6).  However, one cannot rule out that the 
reduction in income may have intensified 
the price effect for some users.
Figure 6. Retail powder cocaine 
prices in the US (per gram), 
1981-2012 (adjusted to 2012 $)57
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Figure 7. Retail powder and crack cocaine prices in the US (per gram), 1986-2012  
(adjusted to 2012 $)60
whaT happeneD in The 
us befoRe 2006?
The long-standing price decline in 
the purity-adjusted price of cocaine 
in the US before 2006 has been 
well documented, and used by 
some to raise questions about the 
ability of supply-side interventions 
to raise prices (e.g., Pollack and 
Reuter).58  Since the ONDCP price 
series begins in 1981 and there 
was a very large drop in retail 
powder prices in the 1980s, charts 
such as those in Figure 5 (often 
with a measure of a supply side 
intervention such as incarceration 
on the other Y-axis) make it hard 
to see what has happened since 
that drop. Separate prices for crack-
cocaine (which accounted for about 
75% of cocaine consumption in 
the 2000s)59 were not included in 
the ONDCP price series until 1986. 
Figure 6 plots the retail prices for 
both powder and crack cocaine from 
1986 to 2012. After the large drop 
in the 1980s, Figure 7 suggests the 
inflation-adjusted prices stabilised, 
fluctuating around $200 per gram 
for most of the 1990s (in 2012 $). 
After 2000, purity-adjusted prices 
steadily declined, bottoming out in 
2006 at about 40% of the 2000 value. 
We can also get some insight into 
the pre-2006 period by examining 
other indicators. Figures 8 and 9 
display publicly-funded treatment 
admissions involving cocaine and 
cocaine-involved overdose deaths, 
respectively. In both of these series 
there seems to be a steady increase 
from 2001 through 2006, followed 
by a large decline.  While the number 
of total treatment admissions to 
facilities receiving public funding 
over this period increased by 11%, 
the share of admissions mentioning 
cocaine increased 17% from 535,000 
to 624,000.
Figure 8. Treatment admissions mentioning cocaine in TEDS, 1991-201161
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Figure 9.  National Overdose Deaths from Cocaine in the US, 2001-201462
Insights from Figures 7 through 9 could be used 
to tell this story about the 2000 to 2006 period; 
as the price of cocaine plummeted, more people 
experienced problems with cocaine; some died, 
others were more likely to seek treatment.63 Of 
course, one cannot prove this based on a simple 
trend analysis, but it is consistent with the sharp 
reversals in treatment admissions and overdose 
deaths over the 2006-2010 period when retail 
prices increased by 40%.
This reversal suggests another potential 
explanation for some of the post-2006 
price increase (and subsequent decline in 
consumption): ‘mean reversion.’
Hypothesis #12.  Mean reversion in  
cocaine prices
Mean reversion is a statistical concept often 
used in the finance literature to suggest that 
prices and stock returns eventually move back 
to their historic mean.64  Like its statistical cousin 
‘regression to the mean,’ it can cause problems 
for policy analysts, especially when the policy 
change being evaluated was implemented 
when the outcome of the interest was 
particularly high or low.  Going back to Figure 
7, there was a lot of fluctuation in the purity-
adjusted crack prices in the 1990s (around $200 
per gram), with a three-year increase from 1998 
to 2000 before the big decrease; however, the 
price in 1998 was very close to the price in 2003 
(circa $165 per gram). There was a further $30 
decline from 2003 to 2006, followed by the 
historic increase that bought the prices back 
closer to $200 per gram benchmark.
Whether this price decrease was simply part of 
a larger trend, attributable to policy decisions, a 
random fluctuation or  something else has yet 
to be determined; however, Figure 2 suggests 
that there was a large decrease in potential 
pure production in Colombia from 700 tonnes 
in 2001 to 410 tonnes in 2004. Thus, it will be 
hard to tell a story about an increase in cocaine 
supply to the US leading to the 2000 to 2006 
price drop unless it involves storage and/or 
cocaine produced from coca grown outside 
of Colombia.
Even if further 
research suggests 
much of the 
consumption drop 
is attributable to 
supply-side polices, 
this does not mean 
that this is the 
optimal approach for 
reducing problem 
consumption. Much 
depends on the 
particular drug, the 
characteristics of 
the country, and 
the stage of the 
epidemic. ’
‘
Source:  National Center for Health Statistics, CDC wonder
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ConClusion
At this point it is not possible to say how much of the decline in 
US cocaine consumption can be attributable to policy decisions. 
Caulkins et al.65 suspect that some combination of supply-side 
factors likely accounted for the large price increase and subsequent 
consumption decline, but do not make any statements about the 
role of eradication versus other supply-side phenomena.  Garzón 
and Bailey66 conclude that ‘supply reduction through disruption 
and interdiction can reduce and redirect cocaine trafficking but at 
the cost of negative outcomes and collateral damage, at least in the 
short term.’
As Kilmer et al.67 argue, there may have been a ‘perfect storm’ with 
the rapid increase in manual eradication, increase in interdiction, 
reduced availability of sodium permanganate, instability in Mexico, 
increase in non-US demand, etc.  Together, these events may have 
had more of an impact on cocaine consumption in the US than the 
sum of their effects had they occurred at different times, but this is 
very much an open question.  
This essay also pays attention to the period immediately preceding 
the consumption drop and raises the possibility of another potential 
explanation: mean reversion.  While much of the emerging discussion 
about cocaine consumption focuses on the post-2006 period, this 
insight suggests that future research should also attempt to explain 
why the retail purity-adjusted price of both powder and crack cocaine 
decreased nearly 40% from 2000 to 2006.  Since the pre-2006 price 
collapse may also be attributable to policy choices, this suggests that 
existing hypotheses may need to be updated.
Even if further research suggests much of the consumption drop 
is attributable to supply-side polices, this does not mean that this 
is the optimal approach for reducing problem consumption. Much 
depends on the particular drug, the characteristics of the country, 
and the stage of the epidemic. For example, Tragler et al.68 argue that 
the optimal mix of supply- and demand-side reduction policies can 
shift depending on the stage of the drug epidemic, with demand 
reduction generally becoming more attractive as the markets mature. 
In addition, assessments will also depend on one’s perspective: 
what may be optimal from a US perspective may not be optimal 
in other countries. For example, after noting that supply-reduction 
can reduce and redirect cocaine trafficking in the short run, Garzón 
and Bailey69 argue ‘that for Latin American countries the ‘benefits’ of 
maintaining an anti‐drug strategy that emphasises interdiction are 
far outweighed by the costs in terms of instability, insecurity, and 
public health problems.’
Finally, it is important to remember there are a number of different 
policies with varying levels of efficacy that fall under the labels of 
‘supply’ or ‘demand’ reduction.  Policy discussions are more productive 
when debates focus on specific interventions, programmes or 
laws instead of these vague categories—especially since actions 
by criminal justice agencies do not exclusively fall into the ‘supply 
reduction’ category.70 
 
MeTRiCs
The elimination of the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) 
programme in the United States makes it more difficult to understand 
drug problems and drug markets in the Western Hemisphere. Drug 
consumption in the U.S. fuels drug production, drug trafficking, 
and drug problems throughout the Western Hemisphere.  Thus, 
knowledge about consumption in the U.S. as well as data on drug 
expenditures and drug markets is critical for measuring changes 
in revenues to criminal organisations, and also in assessing the 
efficacy of various drug control efforts.  Given the concentration of 
heavy drug users who are arrested and incarcerated in the U.S., the 
ADAM programme — which interviewed arrestees on drug use, drug 
purchases, and conducted drug tests (for validation purposes only) 
— was an invaluable source for informing these metrics.  While the 
National Survey on Drug Use and Health is useful for understanding 
what is happening with alcohol and marijuana, it does a poor job of 
tracking heavy users of cocaine, heroin and methamphetamine.
 
Along with colleagues, the author of this paper used a plethora of 
data sources to generate the 2000-2010 national estimates of drug 
consumption, drug users, and drug expenditures for the White 
House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), but ADAM 
was arguably the most important source for understanding what 
was happening with the markets for the more expensive drugs. 
Unfortunately, ADAM was eliminated in 2004, partially resuscitated 
in 2007, and eliminated again after 2013.  Until the programme is 
re-funded, or a suitable alternative that collects information from 
heavy users (in non-treatment settings) in the U.S. is developed, 
our efforts to understand the dynamics of cocaine, heroin, and 
methamphetamine consumption and trafficking in the Western 
hemisphere will be hampered.
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Even as the administration of Mexico’s President Enrique Peña Nieto has scored important reform successes in the economic sphere, its security and law enforcement policy toward organised crime remains incomplete and ill-defined. Despite the 
early commitments of his administration to focus on reducing drug violence, combatting 
corruption, and redesigning counternarcotics policies, little significant progress has been 
achieved. Major human rights violations related to the drug violence, whether perpetrated 
by organised crime groups or military and police forces, persist – such as at Iguala, Guerrero, 
where 43 students were abducted by a cabal of local government officials, police forces 
and organised crime groups. This has also been seen in Tatlaya and Tanhuato, Michoacán, 
where military forces have likely been engaged in extrajudicial killings of tens of people.2 
Meanwhile, although drug violence has abated in the north of the country, such as in Ciudad 
Juárez, Monterrey and Tijuana, government policies have played only a minor role. Much of 
the violence reduction is the result of the vulnerable and unsatisfactory narcopeace – the 
victory of the Sinaloa or Gulf Cartels. 
Cuidado:  
The Inescapable Necessity of  
Better Law Enforcement in Mexico
Vanda Felbab-Brown
The July 2015 spectacular escape of the 
leader of the Sinaloa Cartel and the world’s 
most notorious drug trafficker – Joaquín 
Guzmán Loera, known as El Chapo – 
from a Mexican high-security prison was 
a massive embarrassment for the Peña 
Nieto government. Yet it serves as another 
reminder of the deep structural deficiencies 
of Mexico’s law enforcement and rule-of-
law system which persists more than a 
decade after Mexico declared its war on the 
drug cartels. 
The Peña Nieto administration often pointed 
to the February 2014 capture of El Chapo as 
the symbol of its effectiveness in fighting 
drug cartels and violent criminal groups 
in Mexico. The Peña Nieto administration’s 
highlighting of Chapo’s capture was both 
ironic and revealing: ironic, because the 
new government came into office criticising 
the anti-crime policy of the previous 
administration of Felipe Calderón of killing 
or capturing top capos to decapitate their 
cartels;  and revealing, because despite the 
limitations and outright counterproductive 
effects of this high-value-targeting policy and 
despite promises of a very different strategy, 
the Peña Nieto administration fell back into 
relying on the pre-existing approach. In 
fact, such high-value-targeting has been at 
the core of Pena Nieto’s anti-crime policy. 
Moreover, Chapo’s escape from Mexico’s 
most secure prison through a sophisticated 
tunnel (a method he had also pioneered 
for smuggling drugs and previously 
used for escapes) showed the laxity and 
perhaps complicity at the prison, and again 
spotlighted the continuing inadequate state 
of Mexico’s corrections system.
In September 2015, in his yearly state-of-
the-nation address, President Peña Nieto 
committed himself to refocusing the 
final three years of his administration on 
deepening the rule of law, strengthening law 
enforcement and justice institutions, and 
combatting organised crime. That is indeed 
what Mexico needs to do. As discussed 
below, policy innovations in Mexico, such as 
legalisation of marijuana and depenalisation 
of drug use, are important and promise 
many benefits. But they are unlikely on 
their own to reduce the power, violence, 
and impunity of Mexico’s organised crime. 
They need to be coupled with extending 
state presence, making socioeconomic 
anti-crime efforts in Mexico smarter and 
sharper, and strengthening the bonds 
between Mexico’s citizens and the state. 
Crucially, they need to be coupled with 
improving law enforcement policies. There 
is no escape for Mexico from figuring out 
how to provide better policing. Some ways 
to start developing better policing as well 
as improving the larger anti-crime strategy, 
including its rule of law and socioeconomic 
components, are suggested below.
SUMMARY
 ■ Major human rights violations 
related to the drug violence, 
whether perpetrated by organised 
crime groups or military and police 
forces, persist in Mexico.
 ■ President Peña Nieto’s 
administration has relied on 
the military and Federal Police: 
with similar lack of planning, 
prepositioning and operational  
design as preceding President 
Calderón’s administration.
 ■ A 2012 CIDE study suggests over 
60% of Mexico’s 250,000 prisoners, 
including 80% of female inmates, 
were jailed for drug crimes; 36% for 
marijuana offenses.
 ■ Civil society has sought to advance 
policy innovation: e.g. influencing 
the Supreme Court decision 
in November 2015 to allow 
individuals the right to grow  
and distribute marijuana for 
personal use. 
 ■ Policy innovations, such as 
decriminalising drug use, are 
important but not sufficient to 
tackle organised crime. 
 ■ These innovations need to be 
coupled with comprehensive 
law enforcement (beyond high-
value targeting), extending 
state presence, developing 
socioeconomic anti-crime efforts 
and strengthening citizen-state 
bonds. 
 ■ Indeed, robust state presence 
and effective law enforcement is 
needed to ensure that organised 
crime is excluded from a legal  
drug trade. 
 ■ Policing and rule of law are 
indispensable elements of 
suppressing violent criminality  
and illegal economies. So is 
regulating the legal economies 
so that they are not socially or 
environmentally destructive.
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fizzleD eneRgy anD saMe 
olD pRobleMs of peña 
nieTo’s anTi-CRiMe sTRaTegy
 
At the outset of his administration, President 
Peña Nieto identified the need to reduce 
violence in Mexico as the most important 
priority for his security policy. That was the 
right decision. Even if criminals are mostly 
killing other criminals (as the previous 
administration of President Felipe Calderón 
pointed to in order to belittle the deaths), 
violence in any form, including violent 
criminality, is highly costly and corrosive 
for society. Yet, according to the Mexican 
government, between 2007 and 2014, a 
staggering 164,000 people were murdered.3
After a year in office, Peña Nieto claimed 
important progress toward his objective 
of reducing violence by half in the first 6 
months in office – with a 30% decrease in 
organised crime-related homicides.4 At the 
beginning of September 2014, the Peña Nieto 
administration released further crime and 
anti-crime policy data, claiming that Mexico’s 
homicide rate for 2013 decreased slightly to 
19 per 100,000, compared to 22 per 100,000 
in 2012, with a total of 22,732 homicides 
in 2013.5 Country-wide violence appeared 
to continue dropping in the first half of 
2014, with the State of Mexico, Guerrero, 
Chihuahua, Michoacán, Tamaulipas, Sinaloa, 
Jalisco, and Baja California registering the 
highest murder rates.6 But the downward 
trend was not sufficiently sustained, and 
levelled off well before reaching the goal of 
a 50% reduction.  Additionally, homicides in 
the first seven months of 2015 were running 
about 3 percent above the 2014 figures.7 
Moreover, the biggest drops in violence were 
experienced in the north of the country – 
Tijuana, Cuidad Juárez, and Monterrey – where 
the violence reduction cannot necessarily 
and solely be attributed to government 
policies. Rather, it has been the outcome of 
new balances of power being established 
among criminal groups in previously highly 
contested hotspots, including the victories 
of the Sinaloa and Gulf Cartels against their 
rivals. Many of these balances of power 
among the drug trafficking organisations 
(DTOs) had already emerged in the last years 
of the Felipe Calderón administration. After 
a decade of carnage that gave rise to new 
DTOs – Los Zetas, La Familia Michoacana, Los 
Templarios – and saw their demise, Chapo’s 
Sinaloa cartel, the largest, most powerful, 
and widespread of Mexico’s drug trafficking 
groups, remains the victor. In these areas 
of newly established criminal control and 
deterrence, even kidnapping and extortion 
might be levelling off and becoming more 
predictable, although they are overall on 
the rise overall in Mexico.8 The outcome has 
been that the Mexican government has for 
the most part averted its eyes from the areas 
where violence declined, even as major law 
enforcement challenges remain there and 
the job is less than half accomplished. 
The Peña Nieto administration has mostly 
focused on putting out immediate security 
fires in areas where fighting among drug 
trafficking groups has newly erupted, such 
as Jalisco, Tamaulipas, and the State of 
Mexico.  Furthermore, the administration 
has often inadvertently triggered many 
of these outbreaks of violence. Despite its 
rhetoric and early ambitions, the Peña Nieto 
administration fell straight back into relying 
on the Mexican military in combination with 
the Federal Police to cope with criminal 
violence.9 Moreover, it did so  with an 
essentially analogous lack of planning and 
and largely unable to deter violence 
escalation and reescalation. In fact, much of 
the security policy reform momentum that 
surrounded the Peña Nieto administration at 
the outset of its six-year term has prematurely 
dissipated. Key pillars of the policy are 
plodding along meekly, including the 
national gendarmerie, the new intelligence 
supercentre, and the mando único. 
Concurrently, deadlines for vetting all police 
units for corruption and links to organised 
crime have been repeatedly missed and 
extended. As with many institutional reforms 
in Mexico, there are large regional variations 
in the quality and even design of the reforms 
being implemented. However, at least the 
Mexican Congress, overall a weak player in 
setting and overseeing anti-crime policy in 
Mexico, approved a new criminal code in 
the spring of 2014. The so-called National 
Code of Penal Procedure (Código Nacional 
de Procedimientos Penales) is critical in 
establishing uniform application of criminal 
law across Mexico’s thirty-one states and 
the Federal District, and standardising 
procedures regarding investigations, trials, 
and punishment.11 
Instead of pushing ahead with institutional 
reforms, the Peña Nieto administration 
has highlighted poor coordination among 
national security agencies and local and 
national government units as a crucial 
cause of the rise of violent crime in Mexico. 
It has thus defined improving coordination 
as a key aspect of its anti-crime approach 
without also focusing on the substance of 
the policies.
New forms of violence – the rise of militias 
in Michoacán and Guerrero and their co-
optation by organised crime – have also 
emerged. In some ways, the willingness of 
the government to act against the militias, 
including to arrest and prosecute some, 
has been more encouraging than its other 
anti-crime policies. After initial neglect and 
back and forth between a tough line and 
embrace of the militias, the ultimate plan of 
folding them into the Rural Defense Corps 
was the least bad option.12 However, the 
government has failed to effectively enforce 
these plans. In Guerrero, the government has 
not even been able to get the militia groups 
to sign onto the deal. In both Michoacán and 
Guerrero, many of the militias have become 
important sources of conflict and abuse, 
hardly acting as a stabilising force.
The militia option might seem seductive 
in the short term at a moment of crisis, but 
it spells long-term problems for security, 
rule of law, and state legitimacy, as much in 
Mexico as it has in Colombia and Afghanistan. 
According to the  
Mexican government, 
between 2007 and 2014, a 
staggering 164,000 people 
were murdered.
‘
’
prepositioning, and essentially the same 
operational design, as the previous Felipe 
Calderón administration. In particular, the 
current administration has adopted the 
same non-strategic high-value targeting that 
defined the previous one’s posture. Perhaps 
with the exception of targeting the Zetas and 
Los Caballeros Templarios, this interdiction 
posture continues to be undertaken mostly 
on a non-strategic basis as opportunistic 
intelligence becomes available, but without 
forethought, planning, and prepositioning 
required to avoid new dangerous cycles 
of violence and renewed contestation 
among local drug trafficking groups. This 
recrudescence of high-value targeting is 
partially the outcome of institutional inertia 
in the absence of an alternative strategy, and 
of the relative operational simplicity of such 
a targeting pattern, compared to a more 
effective, but also more demanding, policy 
of middle-level targeting of the kind that is 
recommend below.10
The overall deterrence capacity of Mexico’s 
military and law enforcement forces and 
justice sector continue to be very limited 
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To the extent that Mexico’s struggle 
against criminality is not merely about 
reshuffling who has control and power in 
the criminal market, but about a broader 
extension and deepening of the rule of law 
and accountability in Mexico, any official 
endorsement of the militias fundamentally 
contradicts that project. 
The Peña Nieto administration’s focus 
on socioeconomic anti-crime policies 
and other crime prevention measures 
is laudable. But its signature anti-crime 
socioeconomic approach – the so-
called polígonos programme – has not 
been well-operationalised and is not 
integrated with law enforcement efforts. 
The discreet efforts remain scattered: the 
theory, implementation, and monitoring 
parameters of the national crime prevention 
strategy are not yet adequately worked 
out. These deficiencies undermine the 
programme’s effectiveness and risk, 
dissipating the relatively small amount of 
resources allocated to the effort. Monitoring 
and evaluation of the effectiveness of 
socioeconomic anti-crime efforts, including 
the polígonos approach, is particularly weak 
and nebulous.13
Importantly, the Peña Nieto administration 
committed itself to paying greater attention 
to human rights issues, such as allowing 
civilian claims of human rights violations 
by Mexico’s military forces to be tried in 
civilian courts and establishing a victims’ 
compensation fund.14 But the efforts 
to increase rule of law, justice, and the 
protection of human rights and to reduce 
impunity and corruption remain very 
much a work in progress, with policies and 
outcomes varying widely among Mexico’s 
states. Moreover, the cover-ups at Iguala 
and Tlatlaya, uninterested investigations of 
extrajudicial killings, and corruption scandals 
involving the president and his wife15 made 
the promise sound utterly hollow.
MoVes TowaRD MaRijuana 
legalisaTion in MeXiCo
 
Although the Peña Nieto administration 
has failed to improve the core elements 
of security, civil society has sought policy 
innovations. As a result of the activism of 
Mexican Society for Responsible and Tolerant 
Consumption (SMART), in November 2015 
the Mexican Supreme Court declared that 
individuals (up to a group of four people) 
have the right to grow and distribute 
marijuana for personal use. The legal 
judgement, not yet reversing existing laws 
but providing the basis for their overhaul, was 
based on the principle of human rights, and 
endorsed recreational activities (including 
recreational marijuana use) that do not 
harm others.16 Following the judgement, 
the Mexican Senate proposed legalising 
medical marijuana. The court ruling also set 
off a national debate on increasing limits 
of personal possession of marijuana and 
other drugs. In 2009, Mexico decriminalised 
possession of up to 5 grams (0.18 ounce) of 
marijuana and small amounts of hard drugs, 
but limits were set at very low levels.
Reducing the number of people arrested and 
imprisoned for nonviolent drug offenses are 
crucial and worthy goals. Mostly imprisoning 
users does not reduce drug use, and under 
some circumstances can even exacerbate it. 
Imprisoning people usually violates human 
rights and can destroy people’s lives and 
social productivity. Crowded prisons are 
financially costly and often, particularly in 
Latin America, schools for criminals. A 2012 
study by the Mexican think tank CIDE argued 
that over 60% of Mexico’s 250,000 prisoners, 
including 80% of female inmates, were jailed 
for drug crimes; 36% of which for marijuana 
offences.17 Stigmatising and punishing users 
undermines efforts to stem the spread of 
HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases. 
For all those reasons, depenalising drug use 
is the right policy.
But proponents of legalisation in Mexico 
also claim that legalisation would reduce the 
violence, power, and impunity of organised 
crime.18 They make at least two arguments: 
Legalisation of marijuana (and possibly 
other drugs) would reduce the income of 
criminal crime groups, which would either 
push them out of crime altogether or make 
them more peaceful. Drug legalisation 
would free Mexico’s law enforcement to 
concentrate on other crimes, including 
murders, kidnappings, and extortions.
However, there are good reasons to doubt 
those arguments, particularly in the case 
of Mexico. First, smuggled marijuana likely 
constitutes not much more than a fifth of the 
revenues generated by the DTOs or  about 
$1.5 billion a year, as a 2010 RAND study 
argued.19 Those are not bankruptcy numbers.
Second, without robust state presence and 
effective law enforcement (both of which are 
elusive in significant parts of Mexico), there 
can be little assurance that organised crime 
groups would be excluded from the legal 
drug trade. In fact, they may have numerous 
advantages over legal companies and 
manage to hold on to the trade, perhaps even 
resorting to violence to do so. Nor does mere 
legalisation mean that the state will suddenly 
become robust and effective. Persistent 
deficiencies in the state explain why there 
is so much illegal logging alongside legal 
logging, for example or  why smuggling in 
legal goods take place. If the state does 
not physically control the territory where 
marijuana is cultivated – which in Mexico it 
often does not –  the DTOs could continue to 
dominate the newly legal marijuana fields, 
still charge taxes and structure the life of the 
growers, and even find it easier to integrate 
into the formal political system. Many oil 
and rubber barons started with shady 
practices and eventually became influential 
(and sometimes responsible) members of 
the legal political space. But there are good 
reasons not to want the very bloody Mexican 
capos to become legitimised. 
In Italy, gambling, including slot machines, 
were legalised precisely on the basis of 
the argument that legalisation would take 
gambling resources away from the mafia. 
In fact, even as the gambling lobby and 
gambling itself, including socially-ruinous 
gambling addiction, rapidly expanded, 
the mafia was able to dominate the legal 
gambling business. It was able to increase its 
profits, use gambling to enter new regions of 
Italy and set up loan-sharking and extortion 
rackets there, and exploit the legal gambling 
for laundering illicit drug money, just as it 
has previously used agriculture, trucking, 
and restaurants.20
Smuggled marijuana  
likely constitutes  
not much more  
than a fifth of the revenues 
generated by the DTOs or  
about $1.5 billion a year, as 
a 2010 RAND study  
argued. Those are not  
bankruptcy numbers.
‘
’
The increase in US demand 
for heroin, spurred by 
prescription opiate abuse 
and dependence, is 
once again stimulating 
expansion of poppy 
cultivation in Mexico and 
in Guatemala.
‘
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Third, a grey marijuana market would likely 
emerge. If marijuana became legal, the state 
would want to tax it – to generate revenues and 
to discourage greater use. The higher the tax, the 
greater the opportunity for the DTOs to undercut 
the state by charging less. The narcos could 
set up their own fields with smaller taxation, 
snatch the market and the profits, and the 
state would be driven back to combating them 
and eradicating their fields. Such grey markets 
exist alongside a host of legal economies, 
from cigarettes, to stolen cars, to logging and 
wildlife trade. As for example in the case of 
illegal logging alongside legal concessions, 
such grey markets can be violent, dominated 
by organised crime, generating corruption, and 
exploitative of society. In Mexico itself, legal and 
illegal logging and violence coexist in the same 
space in Michoacán and Guerrero, for example.21 
Combatting wildlife trafficking in eastern and 
southern Africa has taken on the form of bush 
wars, with heavy firepower and high proclivity 
to use it by poachers, even the illegal trade 
exists alongside a legal one or feeds into legal 
distribution markets in China, such as in ivory.
Fourth and worse yet, Mexican DTOs can hardly 
be expected to take such a change lying down. 
Rather, they may intensify the violent power 
struggle over remaining hard-drug smuggling 
and distribution (notably, the shrinkage of 
the US cocaine market is one of the factors 
that precipitated the current DTO wars22). the 
DTOs could intensify their effort to take over 
other illegal economies in Mexico, such as 
the smuggling of migrants and other illegal 
commodities, prostitution, extortion, and 
kidnapping, and also over Mexico’s informal 
economy – trying to franchise who sells tortillas, 
jewellery, clothes on the zócalo – to mitigate 
their financial losses. They are already doing 
so. If they succeed in franchising the informal 
economy and organising public spaces and 
street life in the informal sector (40% of Mexico’s 
economy), their political power over society will 
be greater than ever. They would also seek to 
extort legal economies, whether restaurants in 
Ciudad Juárez and Tijuana, foreign businesses 
such as Coca Cola and mining in Guerrero or 
avocado and lime farmers and legal logging and 
mining in Michoacán. In fact, they have already 
expanded into such extortion, and indeed, 
some of the bloody escalation of violence has 
been precisely over turf rights to extort legal 
businesses.23
Nor would law enforcement necessarily become 
liberated to focus on other issues or turn less 
corrupt: The state would have to devote some 
resources to regulating the legal economy and 
enforcing the regulatory system. Even in the 
much more peaceful Colorado and Washington, 
the two first US states to legalise marijuana, 
police have to suppress smuggling out of the 
states and devote resources to policing the new 
profitable, taxed, and nonviolent legal marijuana 
trade.24 Corruption could well persist in a legal 
or decriminalised economy. In Brazil, after drug 
possession for personal use was decriminalised, 
the deeply corrupt police did not clean up. 
Instead, they often continue to extort users and 
franchise pushers by threatening to book users 
for greater amounts than personal limits unless 
they pay a bribe or buy from their pushers.25 
Legalisation is not a panacea.26 There are 
no shortcuts to improving Mexico’s law 
enforcement. Rather, legalisation of marijuana in 
Mexico would be more viable if Mexico first got 
the DTOs under control and pulled off effective 
law-enforcement and justice reform. 
 
noT jusT poT, buT 
poppy CulTiVaTion
 
Meanwhile, even if legalisation of marijuana 
cultivation for personal consumption in 
Mexico also reduced industrial-scale marijuana 
plantations for export – or, more likely, if 
expanding commercial cultivation of marijuana 
in the United States priced out illegal cultivation 
in Mexico, another illegal crop is flourishing 
in Mexico. The increase in US demand for 
heroin, spurred by prescription opiate abuse 
and dependence, is once again stimulating 
expansion of poppy cultivation in Mexico and in 
Guatemala.
Poppy cultivation in Mexico is nothing new; in 
fact, it dates back to pre-WWII. Since the 1980s, 
Mexico did not disclose consistent data and 
undertook an uneven effort to monitor the 
levels of poppy cultivation  and marijuana in 
the country. Nonetheless, it is estimated that 
poppy in Mexico cultivation in the 1990s and 
2000s decades hovered between 20,000-25,000 
hectares per year, compared to perhaps 30,000-
40,000 hectares cultivated yearly with marijuana. 
27 This is a rather substantial level of poppy 
cultivation – on par with Burma in the 2000s and 
higher than Thailand at its peak in the 1960s.28 At 
the same time, about 15,000-20,000 hectares of 
opium poppy have been eradicated in Mexico 
during the 1990s and early 2000s, alongside 
some 20,000 to 30,000 ha of marijuana. In the 
first seven months of 2015, over 17,000 hectares 
of poppy were eradicated (and only some 2000 
hectares of illegal marijuana.)29 Eradication of 
illicit crops in Mexico has historically been carried 
out by the Mexican military, often as a result of 
US pressure. 
The cultivation of illicit 
crops employs thousands, 
perhaps tens of thousands, 
of people. In fact, poppy 
cultivation is among the 
most labour-intensive 
illicit economies, enabling 
those who sponsor it – 
whether insurgent groups 
or organised crime groups 
– to obtain extensive 
political capital.
‘
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During the 1970s, the Mexican authorities 
became concerned about a possible 
penetration of the drug trade by leftist 
guerrillas, such as the Popular Revolutionary 
Army (EPR). The result was a trifecta 
of sometimes contradictory policies: 
cooperation between Mexican authorities 
and Mexican drug traffickers to fight against 
the guerrillas; the sponsorship of anti-leftist 
militias by the Mexican state, sometimes 
connected to drug trafficking groups, and, 
paradoxically, also the temporary consent by 
Mexican authorities to an intense eradication 
campaign sponsored by the United States, 
including aerial spraying. Whether as a result 
of the anti-guerrilla policies or the guerrillas’ 
own internal weaknesses, the guerrilla 
groups failed at the time to significantly 
penetrate the drug trade and have not 
managed to robustly participate in it since.
Nonetheless, from 2007 when President 
Calderón decided to deploy the Mexican 
military to fight against drug trafficking 
groups and presumably provide public 
safety, the intensity of eradication in Mexico 
fell off: since fewer soldiers were available 
for this task. At the same time, prime areas 
of poppy cultivation, such as in Guerrero 
and Michoacán, became hotly contested 
among Mexican drug trafficking groups, 
such as La Familia Michoacana, Los Zetas, 
the Sinaloa Cartel, the Acapulco Cartel, 
Jalisco New Generation Cartel, and a myriad 
of splinter groups, such as the Guerreros 
Unidos presumably behind the Iguala 
abduction. Their fighting has tremendously 
increased the fundamental insecurity of local 
populations, even as they depend on poppy 
and illicit crop cultivation for basic economic 
survival. The outcome has been the rise of 
anti-organised-crime militias as well as the 
co-optation of militias by organised crime.
The cultivation of illicit crops employs 
thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of 
people. In fact, poppy cultivation is among 
the most labour-intensive illicit economies, 
enabling those who sponsor it – whether 
insurgent groups or organised crime groups 
– to obtain extensive political capital.30 That 
is very much the case in Mexico where, 
like in other parts of the world, the poppy 
farmers are some of the poorest and most 
marginalised citizens, often also members 
of indigenous groups. And in some areas, 
such as in the state of Michoacán, the drug 
economy – both cultivation and trafficking – 
represents a substantial portion of the local 
economy. 
Yet, Mexico has historically shown little 
interest in developing alternative livelihoods 
strategies toward illicit crop cultivation, 
even rejecting US assistance for such 
programmes.31 Indeed, serious alternative 
livelihoods efforts would require extending 
both state presence, engaging in broader 
and more equitable development and 
sustaining the resources and political 
wherewithal to tackle political and 
economic power distribution in Mexico and 
the social marginalisation of many of its 
communities. It is much easier to occasionally 
simply eradicate the crops and the farmers’ 
livelihoods.
An intense eradication campaign in the 
poppy and marijuana cultivation areas 
will severely complicate the efforts of the 
Mexican military and law enforcement 
forces to pacify the festering Michoacán 
and Guerrero, rid them of the rule of violent 
organised crime, and perhaps for the first 
time bond its residents with the Mexican 
state. Neglecting those areas – despite an 
umpteenth Plan Guerrero (a government 
package of socioeconomic interventions 
mostly amounted to discreet handouts) – is 
cheaper and easier. But it comes at substantial 
and complex costs to the local residents and 
ultimately to rule of law in Mexico.
One of the most dramatic incidents 
involving Guerrero’s self-defence forces 
took place in early May 2015 in the town 
of Chilapa. Although small in size, Chilapa 
is strategically-located on the foothills of 
a major poppy growing area and a major 
logistical hub for the drug trade since it is 
the place with the only gas station in miles. 
Following an assassination of a local political 
candidate in April 2015, 300 civilians armed 
with rifles, machetes, and sticks, followed 
by pickup trucks with men sporting high-
calibre weapons, seized the town. Although 
the Mexican military and federal and 
municipal police were present, they failed 
to act against the self-proclaimed self-
defence group. Whether out of intimidation, 
indifference, complicity or  on orders from 
higher up, the military and police stood by 
while for several days the militias controlled 
the town, set up checkpoints, and detained 
people. At least 11 of those detained (and 
perhaps as many as 30) have not been 
seen since. Townspeople believed that the 
self-defence force, which after several days 
left on its own accord, was actually the 
criminal gang Los Ardillos, fighting over 
the important heroin-turf with another 
gang, Los Rojos.32 Regardless of whether 
the armed invasion was by a self-defence 
force that ran amok or the self-defence label 
was appropriated by an organised crime 
group, its effect on the community was the 
very opposite of increasing security. Yet 
another demonstration that there is no easy 
escape – neither legalisation nor negligence 
– from extending effective and equitable 
state presence and rule of law in Mexico, 
including effective and better-designed 
law enforcement. 
ConClusions anD poliCy 
ReCoMMenDaTions 
 
Despite how tired the Mexican public 
is with the awful criminal violence, and 
with politicians’ unfulfilled promises to 
eradicate it, the Peña Nieto administration 
must not drop the ball in developing 
and implementing a comprehensive law 
enforcement strategy. Without capable 
and accountable police who are responsive 
to the needs of the people from tackling 
street crime to suppressing organised crime 
and who are backed-up by an efficient, 
accessible, and transparent justice system, 
neither legal nor illegal economies will be 
well-managed by the state. 
What is needed is a comprehensive law 
enforcement strategy (beyond high-value 
targeting), to sharpen Mexico’s anti-crime 
socioeconomic policies, and better integrate 
them with policing. Policing and rule of law 
are indispensable elements of suppressing 
violent criminality and illegal economies 
and regulating the legal ones so they are 
not socially or environmentally destructive. 
However, for policing and law enforcement 
to be effective, they require that local 
populations do not fundamentally see 
them as contrary to their human security, an 
attitude that will prevent them from being 
respected and internalised by the citizens. 
Without capable and 
accountable police who 
are responsive to the needs 
of the people from tackling 
street crime to suppressing 
organised crime and 
who are backed-up by an 
efficient, accessible, and 
transparent justice system, 
neither legal nor illegal 
economies will be well-
managed by the state. 
‘
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In Mexico, such a strategy includes:
 ■ Making Interdiction More Strategic 
 
Interdiction must move beyond 
the current nonstrategic, non-
prioritised, opportunistic targeting 
posture. The most dangerous 
groups should be targeted first, 
with an eye toward local stability. 
Targeting plans should be based on 
robust assessments of what kind 
of law enforcement operations will 
trigger violence, and on strategies 
to mitigate and prevent such 
outcomes, such as through force 
prepositioning.  
 ■ Switching from High-Value Targeting 
to Middle-Layer Targeting 
 
Interdiction should shift away 
from predominantly high-
value targeting to middle-layer 
targeting, particularly in a way that 
simultaneously arrests as much 
of a group’s middle operational 
layer as possible. This may seem a 
marginal technical change; in fact, it 
has profound positive implications 
regarding the ability of criminal 
groups to react to interdiction hits 
vis-à-vis law enforcement agencies 
and toward each other, overall 
limiting their capacity for violent 
reaction.33  
 ■ Keeping a Law Enforcement Focus on 
Areas Where Violence Has Declined 
 
The Peña Nieto administration must 
not avert its eyes from areas where 
violence has declined; instead it 
should work with local authorities 
to deepen police reform and 
institutionalise rule of law in those 
areas. It also must analyse why 
violence has not exploded in other 
parts of the country and reinforce 
the stabilisation dynamics there by 
strengthening law enforcement and 
the rule of law. 
 ■ Resurrecting A Momentum on Police 
Reform 
 
In order to strengthen the 
deterrence and response capacity 
of its law enforcement, the Peña 
Nieto administration also needs 
to double up on police reform, by 
enhancing capacity, beefing up 
vetting and reducing corruption, 
adopting proactive and knowledge-
based policing methods, achieving a 
sufficient density of permanent-beat 
deployments, and developing local 
knowledge. 
 ■ Dismantling Militias 
 
The Mexican government needs to 
retain the resolve to monitor the 
militias diligently; prosecute those 
who engage in criminal acts, such as 
extortion and murders; and use any 
opportunity it can to roll them back 
and dismantle them.  
 ■ Doubling Up on Justice and Human 
Rights 
 
In 2016, the new accusatorial justice 
system is supposed to be fully 
functional throughout Mexico. As 
such, the Peña Nieto administration 
must undertake a serious push to 
assist states in switching to the new 
system. This must include increased 
efforts to protect human rights and 
civil liberties and reduce corruption. 
 ■ Making the Polígonos Anti-Crime 
Socioeconomic Interventions More 
Rounded and Integrated 
 
The logic and mechanisms of 
specific polígonos projects should 
be articulated and clarified and 
subjected to careful evaluation and 
monitoring. The projects need to 
be better connected and integrated 
with one another in a particular area, 
not discrete isolated programmes. 
Assessments of cross-boundary 
dynamics and interactive processes 
across polygons and between 
polygon and non-polygon areas 
should be built into the projects’ 
designs. It is also crucial to integrate 
the projects’ designs with local law 
enforcement efforts. 
 ■ Bringing the State and Rural 
Development to Historically-
Neglected Areas 
 
Beyond limited handouts and 
politically-motivated buyoffs, 34 
Mexico needs to extend the state, 
including its role in socioeconomic 
development, to the neglected 
underdeveloped areas. Alternative 
livelihoods and socioeconomic anti-
crime measures need to be a part of 
the package. But for these measures 
to be effective in reducing such 
undesirable economies in a lasting 
way, effective security needs to be 
established in the rural regions. 
Moreover, alternative livelihoods 
programmes cannot be construed 
as merely crop substitution 
or temporary cash-for-work 
programmes. They must address 
all the structural drivers of illicit 
economies. 35 They must encompass 
the generation of sufficient 
employment opportunities, such as 
through the promotion of high-
value, labour-intensive crops as 
well as through off-farm income, 
infrastructure building, distribution 
of new technologies, marketing help 
and the development of value-
added chains, facilitation of local 
microcredit, and establishment of 
access to land without the need to 
participate in the illicit economy, to 
name a few of the most prominent 
components. Incorporating broader 
human development aspects, 
including improving access to 
health and education, and reducing 
social and ethnic marginalisation, is 
crucial.  
 
Alternative livelihoods also need 
to be integrated into overall 
development strategies, with 
attention paid to whether overall 
economic growth leads to job 
creation or capital accumulation 
while exacerbating inequality.  
 ■ Decriminalising Drug Use, But Also 
Focusing on Drug Use Reduction and 
Prevention 
 
Mexico should move away from 
incarcerating users and toward 
depenalising drug use and reducing 
penalties for low-level dealers.36 
Public health approaches to drug 
treatment should be emphasised, 
acknowledging addiction as an 
illness requiring medical treatment. 
They should adopt harm reduction 
measures which produce far better 
policy outcomes, such as needle-
exchanges, safe-injection sites, and 
distribution of life-saving anti-
overdose medications. However, 
casual users under community 
supervision can be effectively 
dealt with through mild, short, 
swift, and reliable penalties, such 
as demonstrated in US Project 
Hope.37 Drug prevention measures 
– not very effective overall, but 
nonetheless cost-effective, should 
focus on early-age interventions and 
confidence-building, including peer 
pressure resistance.38
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MeTRiCs/inDiCaToRs:
To monitor the success of such strategies and in drug 
policies overall, the following metics and indicators 
are proposed:
1. Number of homicides (geographically 
disaggregated), changes in levels 
of violent crime (such as murders, 
assaults, armed robberies, and 
extortion), including the level of 
discrimination across these crimes 
(e.g. amount of innocent bystanders 
getting caught in the crossfire),
2. Number and intensity of violent fights 
among or within criminal groups 
following arrests of major criminals,
3. Efficiency in the level of prosecution 
(i.e. the percentage of arrests leading 
to imprisonment),
4. Public satisfaction with police-
performance, including public self-
identification on how likely they are 
to report a crime, disaggregated by 
prosperous versus poor areas,
5. Survey breakdown of which authority 
citizens would seek for dispute 
resolution, such as formal courts, 
militias or  criminal groups,
6. Efficiency of police internal affairs 
units: reflected in convictions and/or 
employment contract termination of 
law enforcement officials,
7. Arrestee and prisoner surveys 
measuring their fear or respect 
for the justice system; including 
disaggregated data for the police, 
prosecutors, and judges,
8. Number of people living in slums 
and poor rural areas, and the levels of 
violent crime in these areas,
9. Number of people working in the 
informal or criminal economies,
10. Prevalence of militias,
11. Number of extrajudicial killings  
by security forces as well as  
‘citizens militias’,
12. Effective prosecution and roll-back of 
militia members and units that violate 
government-specified terms  
of operation. 
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The debate around what is generally termed ‘harm reduction’ – treating drug abuse as a health policy issue rather than a law enforcement one – has been a central feature of discussions around drug policy for at least the last decade. It is 
now gathering significant momentum as countries, most notably in Latin America and 
Europe, have embraced its core tenants. Coverage of the run-up to the Special Session 
of the United Nations General Assembly on the World Drug Problem (UNGASS) in April 
2016 has centred on the concept of ‘harm reduction’ and how it is interpreted. As has 
been widely noted, what is remarkable in the current discussion is the degree to which 
the health policy aspects can be openly discussed in a way that was simply not possible 
even a few years ago. That is a feature of how rapidly the debate is now evolving. While, 
in the medium term, this may not lead to a change in the overall drug control framework 
itself, it has and will continue to, stretch the boundaries of the possible within the current 
international drug control regime. 
UNGASS 2016:  
The focus on ‘harm reduction’  
is making us blind to reducing  
the broader harms of organised crime 
Mark Shaw
One concern, however, is whether that 
widening space for debate could come at 
a cost: by shifting the discussion of health 
policy approaches at the front-end where 
drugs are consumed, but returning to a set 
of established law enforcement practices 
further down the supply chain. Indeed, that 
may be part of a subtle concession to the 
‘hard liners’: more talk of health approaches 
balanced by harder law enforcement 
responses. While the latter may not 
necessarily be wrong in its entirety, it harks 
back to a language of the past at a time 
when there is an urgent need to consider 
a wider set of alternatives.  Evidence and 
experience has shown that a broader set of 
harms that are resulting from the growth of 
criminal networks, including prolific violence 
in certain states, are only exacerbated by 
hard line criminal justice and militarised 
approaches.  If the full harms of drug 
trafficking and use are to be addressed, then 
a broader understanding of harm reduction 
must be introduced.
In short, in the space provided by the rapidly 
developing discussion around development 
and security, symbolised most clearly by the 
UN Agenda for Sustainable Development 
2030 (ASD2030), we are missing an 
opportunity if a multi-dimensional harm 
framework is not also applied to the issue 
of organised crime. This argument considers 
the possibility of widening the scope of the 
harm reduction concept to the drugs supply 
chain in its entirety, and to organised crime 
itself, and considers the policy implications 
of doing so. Just as in the case of the drug 
use debate, this does not mean a ‘softer’ 
approach on organised crime, but only that 
a wider set of policy alternatives beyond 
narrow law enforcement are required if we 
are to succeed. 
 
fRoM ‘haRM ReDuCTion’ 
To ReDuCing haRM 
Language and labelling has always been 
an important feature of the drug policy 
discussion, even though the terms used, 
including ‘harm reduction’ itself, may have 
widely different meanings in different 
contexts. However, it is seldom noted that 
in the context of the current debate, and no 
matter which side of the aisle you are on, to 
talk about ‘harm reduction’ almost always 
means discussing policy options where 
drugs are bought and used at what could 
be called the ‘front-end’ of the market. The 
term has become exclusively associated with 
healthcare policy interventions. Yet, the term 
‘harm reduction’ or  perhaps better stated 
‘the reduction of harm,’ is far from a unique 
concern, and one that occurs in a wider set of 
public policy debates.1
SUMMARY 
 ■ The dangers of widening 
the space for health policy 
approaches to consumption 
strategies are associated with 
a return to traditional law 
enforcement practices further 
down the supply chain – perhaps 
as concession to ‘hard liners.’
 ■ Evidence demonstrates that a 
broader set of harms from the 
growth of criminal networks and 
violence in certain states are 
only exacerbated by hard line 
criminal justice and militarised 
approaches.  
 ■ There is a need to widen the 
scope of harm reduction to the 
supply chain of illicit drugs in its 
entirety, and to organised  
crime itself.
 ■ This does not mean a ‘softer’ 
approach on drugs, but only that 
a wider set of policy alternatives 
beyond narrow law enforcement 
are required if we are to succeed 
in sustainably limiting the harms 
of these illicit markets  (and  
the policies employed to  
tackle them).
 ■ There is a need to make a 
linkage between security and 
development issues, not in order 
to ‘securitise’ development, but 
in order to protect development 
interventions from criminal 
exploitation – and to deliver 
services where they are  
needed most.  
 ■ As political momentum focuses 
around UNGASS 2016 and 
the implementation of the 
Sustainable Development 
Goals, there is a potentially 
unprecedented opportunity to 
push this debate further.
      |   AFTER THE DRUG WARS LSE EXPERT GROUP ON THE ECONOMICS OF DRUG POLICY  |90 91
Development and humanitarian practitioners for 
example often refer to the ‘do no harm’ principle, 
meaning that their actions should not exacerbate 
any situation where they intervene.2 While it is not 
often stated in that way, the arguments around 
‘harm reduction’ in the drug policy field, and the 
response to the war on drugs itself, revolves around 
a similar premise: policy interventions should be 
people centric, should aim to reduce harm, and 
should not create a greater set of harms in their 
implementation than are already present. 
Despite this focus on ‘harm reduction,’ and its 
alignment with medical and health interventions 
in the drugs debate, the orientation of the current 
discussion has led to cutting off harm reduction 
principles as soon as the upper reaches of illicit 
economies are discussed: that is, essentially along 
the supply chains which move the drugs, and in 
countering the organised criminal groups who 
control these. This is regrettable, partly because 
the development donor community is increasingly 
broadening their capacity to address organised 
crime, and the ASD2030 offers new opportunities 
here, as it recognises organised criminal networks and 
markets as a cross-cutting, multidimensional threat 
to the achievement of sustainable development 
objectives. Of its 169 targets, more than 13 per cent 
(23 targets in total) stand at risk if criminal markets 
are not addressed.3  The 2015 OECD States of Fragility 
report recognised the need to move toward a more 
multi-dimensional understanding of what is needed 
to achieve sustainable development, redefining the 
concept of the ‘fragile state’ and bringing several 
middle-income countries with disproportionately 
high levels of crime-related violence, sub-national 
conflict or  poor access to justice, into focus.4 The 
explicit linkage between these development 
objectives and safety is unprecedented in terms of 
the objectives of the UN, and provides a mandate to 
make such concerns central to debates.
In fact the failure to extend the principle of ‘harm 
reduction’ up the trafficking chain is leading to 
an unexpected anomaly; while ‘harm reduction’ 
principles must apply at the front-end of drug 
markets, where substances are sold and used, 
further up the chain, we need to renew our efforts 
on ‘supply reduction,’ hunting down traffickers 
and tackling organised crime. And, taking such an 
approach is curious coming from those who have 
long argued against the war on drugs, but now 
with advances being made on front-end harm 
reduction are tone deaf to a wider set of harms. 
Arguably, a new set of standard terminology is 
needed, that can span analysis and responses 
across illicit drug markets from beginning to end, 
and particularly in responses to organised crime. 
Timing is crucial too: responding to contemporary 
challenges of organised crime is a critical public 
policy issue for global policy makers and is likely to 
remain so. 
iT’s noT all abouT The Money 
 
As indicated, accompanying the call to reduce 
harm has been a renewed focus on organised 
crime and its role in facilitating the drug trade. 
This was the conclusion of the two regional 
Commissions on Drugs for Latin America and 
West Africa.5  Criminal justice driven strategies 
along the supply chain – at source and in transit – 
have broadly failed to have the desired impact at 
reducing supply or the potency of criminal groups. 
Though the criminal justice approach may have 
served as a mechanism to get more conservative 
forces on board in the front-end ‘harm reduction’ 
debate, the way the debate has been framed has 
largely side-stepped an important opportunity 
to consider a wider set of solutions to organised 
crime and illicit trafficking. 
Instead, now the area of experimentation comes 
in trying to alter market conditions to bring down 
the prices of illicit drugs, thereby shifting the risk-
return equation for criminal groups, and reducing 
their profits.  Reducing criminal profits, particularly 
from drug trafficking, is not a new discussion at all. 
It has become the mantra of the sophisticated law 
enforcement official encapsulated in the much 
(over?)used phrase ‘follow the money.’
Efforts and innovations in alternative livelihoods 
and other ‘supply reduction’ strategies both in the 
Americas and in the opiate producing countries 
of Central and West Asia have failed to provide 
consistent returns on investment, and have 
largely ignored the versatility and legitimacy that 
trafficking groups can gain with local populations 
when they provide and control the major 
livelihood generator of the region.  Subsequently, 
the remaining parameter for policymakers appears 
to be to decriminalise the sale and use of drugs 
and introducing regulated legal channels, thereby 
reducing its profitability in the illicit market and 
commensurately the strength of criminal groups.
While distinguishing the profits made from drug 
trafficking from those in other illicit markets can be 
complicated, given that criminal groups engage 
in multiple illicit activities, the trafficking of illicit 
narcotics remains an important contributor to 
their business. Profits from drugs remain on most 
estimates, both those globally and for different 
regions, to be the mainstay of organised crime. 
At a global level, the scale of criminal proceeds 
from transnational organised crime is equal to 
approximately 1.5 % of global GDP.  Of this, about 
half relate to trafficking in drugs.6  There are some 
exceptions to this, for example the smuggling of 
oil or illicit mining in West Africa,7 but for the most 
part and at a global scale this assertion holds true. 
What is remarkable 
in the current 
discussion is the 
degree to which the 
health policy aspects 
can be openly 
discussed in a way 
that was simply 
not possible even a 
few years ago. That 
is a feature of how 
rapidly the debate 
is now evolving. 
While this may not 
lead in the medium 
term to a change 
in the overall drug 
control framework 
itself, it has and will 
continue to, stretch 
the boundaries 
of the possible 
within the current 
international drug  
control regime. 
’
‘
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The enD of oRganiseD CRiMe? 
 
A broader point is worth making as a preface 
to this discussion: using ‘harm reduction’ policy 
alternatives around drug use should be supported 
on the grounds that the evidence suggests that it 
is viable, genuinely reduces harm to the individuals 
involved, and is cost effective in the longer term. 
That is, that ‘harm reduction’ mechanisms should 
be supported in their own right, rather than for any 
savings that they might bring for law enforcement. 
The discussion on profits is important however 
when considering the impact of front-end 
decriminalisation as it is now widely advocated. 
While claims have been made that the 
decriminalisation (or legalisation) of use will 
reduce the profits made by organised crime, the 
evidence suggesting that this may be the case is 
decidedly mixed. Perhaps most pertinently, an 
examination of other markets where front-end use 
is or has been legal suggests that organised crime 
remains active along the supply chain, and makes 
good money in doing so. 
Two illustrative examples can be found comparing 
the smuggling of cigarettes, including counterfeit 
ones, and the trafficking of a variety of products 
harvested from endangered species such as 
elephant ivory or rhino horn. While the sale of rhino 
horn has not been illegal in many jurisdictions, 
the profits made by organised crime in poaching 
and supplying the product has nonetheless 
been immense.8  Unless illicit commodities 
are universally legalised, with uniform levels 
of taxation and regulation, criminal networks 
will still maximise the opportunity to arbitrage 
between markets, as the illicit cigarette industry 
has highlighted most effectively. Even in the cases 
where complete legalisation is possible, as seems 
possible in the case of cannabis, commercial 
opportunities generated by legal sale may provide 
criminal opportunities to launder large quantities 
of illicitly produced product, much the same way 
as in several regions (the Balkans and in parts of 
Africa) as occurs with the market for smuggled 
cigarettes. 9  All of these arguments suggest that 
we should be suspicious of claims that legalising 
products at point of sale reduces organised 
criminal profits. 
As the variety of forms of criminal enterprises 
have globalised and proliferated, the focus of 
governments globally – though in Europe most 
notably – have been divided amongst competing 
threats. While priorities may have shifted, the 
weight of years of policy and bureaucratic emphasis 
remains, and most police agencies, certainly in 
the developed world and in many places in the 
developing world too, retain a strong focus on 
finding and seizing illicit narcotics.10 Whether 
they have been successful is another debate, 
but the fact remains that policing drugs markets 
is still a primary priority for law enforcement. 
Proponents of front-end harm reduction policies 
suggest that one cost saving that may result from 
legalisation or de-penalisation may be reducing 
law enforcement attention to street level drug use 
and by doing so save resources or  at least allow 
them to be redistributed elsewhere.
There is some merit in these arguments. However, 
in most police bureaucracies what appears easy 
from an external perspective – that funds are 
shifted from front-end policing to sophisticated 
organised crime investigations – will be easier said 
than done.   Firstly, these require different styles 
of police capacity, resources and disciplines.  So, 
yes, there may be savings, but it is questionable 
whether they will find their way into supporting 
high-end or externally focused investigations. 
In fact, in most cases where savings accrue, they 
are likely to free up policing for greater visibility 
and more crime prevention focused work – 
an objective that is laudable in its own right. 
Secondly, it should not be forgotten that front-
end harm reduction requires much more effective 
cooperation between police and other authorities, 
notably those in the health sector, which in itself 
may be costly both in terms of time and money. 
MeasuRing haRMs along 
The illiCiT supply Chain 
 
Nevertheless, the renewed focus on harm is 
useful, not only because it is the best response to 
drug use, but because it could change our overall 
analytical paradigm. The question is, do we simply 
do more of what we have done – enormous 
expenditure on law enforcement, with mixed 
or at least uneven results – or do we think more 
creatively at the back-end too? 
One approach is to extend the harm reduction 
analysis to illicit trafficking chains themselves, 
at least in terms of how we prioritise actions to 
respond. For a start, as stated, it would make our 
language and approach more consistent. The 
harms at the market end of the supply chain have 
been broadly agreed are mainly health ones, but 
what about further up the supply chain?
Illicit trafficking causes multiple harms around 
which a growing body of analysis has been 
written.11 However that discussion is generally a 
motivation for why we should tackle organised 
crime as a whole rather than a strategy, based 
on limited resources, of how we should prioritise 
some aspects or harms in particular. This is 
however the purpose of public policy: organised 
crime must be managed, and we need to begin by 
focusing (and that means prioritising) where harm 
is considered the greatest. 
‘ In the context of the current 
debate, and no 
matter which 
side of the aisle 
you are on, to 
talk about ‘harm 
reduction’ almost 
always means 
discussing policy 
options where 
drugs are bought 
and used at what 
could be called 
the ‘front-end’ of 
the market. The 
term has become 
exclusively 
associated with 
healthcare policy 
interventions. 
Yet, the term 
‘harm reduction,’ 
or perhaps 
better stated 
‘the reduction of 
harm,’ is far from 
a unique concern, 
and one that 
occurs in a wider 
set of public  
policy debates. ’
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An important body of literature has also 
cautioned that organised criminal activity 
may also bring, at least in the short term, 
some significant benefits, particularly for 
communities who may receive few services 
from the state. Therefore, resources from 
illicit activities are essential for survival, 
and the abrupt breaking down of criminal 
markets where no legitimate livelihood 
alternatives are provided may cause critical 
harms to local communities’ economic and 
social development prospects.12  The ‘do no 
harm’ principle may well apply in such cases. 
Broadly, however, there is consensus that 
organised crime is in fact causing significant 
and escalating levels of harm.  The nature of 
those harms is diverse, and in places where 
states have relatively limited institutional 
authority and capacity, these may have 
significant long-term consequences. 
Identifying the harm caused by organised 
crime does vary by market of course. So 
the trafficking of illicit environmental 
products may have particular consequences 
for ecosystems or sustainable tourism for 
example. But three broad and particularly 
powerful harms characterise most organised 
crime supply chains. These are primary 
or significant harms, and while there are 
undoubtedly others, these are the most 
important. They are:
 ■ The harm caused by violence 
associated with illicit drug markets. 
 ■ The harm caused by the distorting 
impact of illicit funds on politics and 
political processes. 
 ■ The harm caused by long-standing 
impunity and damage to the rule 
of law. 
In none of these cases will an exclusively law 
enforcement or security based response be 
adequate to addressing the scope of the 
challenge – and law enforcement officials 
are the first to recognise this reality.13  None 
of the responses implemented in these 
three areas should solely be based on a 
law enforcement approach. And, indeed, 
to conceive of the responses too narrowly 
will mean that a focus on developing 
more comprehensive and sophisticated 
alternatives would have been lost from the 
outset. These three issues are not in and of 
themselves new, but they have not been 
as directly connected to the discussion on 
global policy responses to organised crime 
as is warranted by a more coherent and 
strategic approach. 
Each of the three areas is discussed briefly 
in turn. 
 
enDing ViolenCe
 
Violence, and homicide in particular, causes 
great human and financial costs. The 2011 
World Development Report calculated that 
areas exposed to prolonged violence 
and conflict experienced a 20 % loss in 
development performance in comparison 
to more stable and peaceful peers.14  Yet 
pervasive violence is, although not always, 
associated with competition around drug 
markets. Such violence, particularly when 
the homicide rate is extremely high, is the 
result of street or gang violence around low-
level drug markets. Take the case of Cape 
Town, where the 2014 homicide rate is some 
65 murders per 100,000 people. That rate, 
which has increased exponentially over the 
last couple of years, is a direct result of gang 
conflicts fuelled by efforts to control local 
drug markets. 
A number of the governments in Central 
America have noted that the war on drugs 
is just as potent and violent as any intra-
state conflict or insurgency.15 The increasing 
power of criminal groups in Latin America 
has created a violent threat to children and 
youngsters who cannot achieve a decent 
lifestyle in their home states, triggering 
large scale displacement of populations 
both inside and outside their countries, with 
significant humanitarian and protection 
consequences.16 Central American cities, 
many of which have homicide rates above 
100 victims per 100,000 people, suffer from 
the problem in an extreme form.  In Central 
America and Mexico, an estimated 30% of 
murders are directly attributed to organised 
crime or gang violence.17 
Regrettably, despite extensive efforts, we 
have surprisingly little to show for our 
efforts to reduce street level gang related 
drug violence in the cities of the developing 
world.  Efforts that have focused on the 
manifestations of violence and conflict 
without assessing the role of illicit flows and 
criminal networks as causal factors have 
similarly been unsuccessful.  For example, 
analysis of experimentation with gang 
truces, including those most recently in 
the Americas between 2012-14, showed 
that the most successful of these achieved 
their primary objective to reduce the rate 
of violent homicides in the short term, but 
in the medium- to long-term they were 
challenged to achieve sustainability whilst 
trafficking activities continued.18
This debate is not a new one, but the challenge 
is now of great urgency, with the growth of 
mega-cities and the intersection between 
drugs, criminal networks and terrorism in 
several of them.19  However, violence is not 
associated with all criminal markets, and is 
often locally contained, amongst the most 
marginalised, in major urban complexes. 
This necessitates that we need to rethink 
urban security, redoubling our efforts to 
seek better solutions for the urban poor, 
and a concerted effort to make a linkage 
between security and development issues, 
not in order to ‘securitise’ development, 
but in order to protect development 
interventions from criminal exploitation 
– and to deliver services where they are 
needed the most.  That in its own way is the 
route to undercutting criminalised violence. 
As political momentum focuses around 
the UNGASS and the implementation 
of the ASD2030, there is a potentially 
unprecedented opportunity to push this 
debate further forward.
pRoTeCTing poliTiCal 
pRoCesses
A second and related question is the harm 
related to illicit trafficking and its impact on 
political processes, most pertinently illegal 
money entering into politics or funding 
political interests. This is of increasing 
concern in many developing countries 
where drug trafficking is prevalent. For 
example,  a study in Kenya showed significant 
cross-over between political and criminal 
interests linked to drug trafficking.20  The 
same applies in many countries, particularly 
as the emphasis on reducing the levels of 
violence around political campaigning has 
required more insidious and covert levels of 
political manipulation.21  
Given the absence of electoral transparency, 
legislation in the majority of jurisdictions 
is lacking – and even where the legislation 
exists, the capacity to oversee, regulate 
and enforce that legislation is inadequate 
– understanding the influence of key 
criminal figures on political and electoral 
process is thus a significant challenge. 
Nevertheless, closer examination of the 
realities in several places suggests that 
the issue is one of considerable urgency. 
The modus operandi of important criminal 
figures is to ensure that they have political 
protection to safeguard their businesses 
and ensure that they are not prosecuted. 
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One of the most effective ways of doing 
so is to provide much needed funding 
to political parties, securing the political 
endorsement of those in a position to create 
and enforce the law.  In many jurisdictions, 
therefore, this has created a degree of 
complicity between criminal enterprises 
and politics.22 
In such cases there is little that law 
enforcement agencies can do. In one 
prominent African country, a senior police 
investigator informed the author that his unit 
was entitled to go after most cases, but it was 
clear from the messages that they received 
that some people and cases were to be left 
alone. The common link between these 
cases was people who provided funds for 
political activities and in some cases personal 
benefit.23
 The point here is that a set of policy solutions 
beyond simple support to law enforcement 
agencies is required. These must focus on 
raising the costs of blurring the distinctions 
between crime and politics: what one recent 
Indian delegate to a conference in Mexico 
called the ‘criminalisation of politics and the 
politicisation of crime.’24 There are no easy 
solutions here but we need to start with:
 ■ A much greater focus in many 
countries on the issue of political 
party funding, and from where it is 
drawn.
 ■ Sustained support for civil society 
and free media in countries where 
criminal funding plays a significant 
role in shaping political choices. 
 
an enD To iMpuniTy
As this association and criminalisation of the 
state continues and strengthens, the result 
is the creation of widespread impunity for 
criminal acts.  Impunity causes harm because 
it generally means high-level traffickers 
(often with political connections) operate 
unimpeded, while lower level people are 
targeted: people who are almost always from 
excluded and marginalised communities. In 
many contexts, those involved in protecting 
drug trafficking accumulate enormous 
influence and are untouchable. This is 
particularly the case in states where justice 
institutions have been compromised or 
weakened, such as in periods of conflict or 
post-conflict.
In many, although not all, such instances 
there is little chance of justice being served. In 
Guinea-Bissau or in several Central American 
states the police, prosecutors and judges 
are often too scared or too compromised to 
challenge the powerful. Those who engage 
in drug trafficking and those who protect 
them are highly unlikely to be prosecuted. 
That level of impunity causes severe damage 
to states, undercutting their long-term 
ability to deliver services and compromising 
key institutions. 
How to end impunity in such cases is and will 
be a key challenge for future policy making. 
So, what options are available? 
The standard international response in such 
cases has been to provide training and 
institutional support for law enforcement 
agencies. But such efforts are largely wasted 
when there is little protection for those 
officials who will have to conduct high-level 
investigations, arrests and prosecutions. No 
matter how willing or well trained the police 
were in Guinea-Bissau for example, there was 
little chance of making real headway. Where 
arrests were made and drugs or money 
seized, ‘high-level’ interventions quickly 
ensured that the good work was undone.25 
What is required are responses that partner 
across borders, to provide alternatives to 
compromised institutions. In many cases this 
is only possible when states have become 
so weak that international intervention is 
mandated by the Security Council or  at 
least when an intervention can no longer be 
resisted by corrupt elites. Notwithstanding, 
doing so creates important precedents and 
lessons that can be applied in future cases.26 
Though the  
criminal justice approach 
may have served a 
mechanism to get more 
conservative forces on 
board in the front-end ‘harm 
reduction’ debate, the way 
the debate has been framed 
has largely side-stepped 
an important opportunity 
to consider a wider set of 
solutions to organised crime 
and illicit trafficking. ’
‘
That is essentially what occurred in the 
case of maritime piracy where courts in 
external states tried suspects from a state 
(Somalia) where justice infrastructure was 
weak or compromised.  Although admittedly 
this did not lead to the arrest and trial of 
high-level people, it was a unique partnership 
between the North and South.  While it 
presented a range of political challenges 
for both sides, it was largely successful in 
bringing to trial low-level pirates, sending 
an important and widespread message 
about the need for respecting the rule of law. 
Over a longer period, a UN Commission has 
acted to investigate high-level government 
officials in Guatemala on organised crime 
and corruption charges, and while the 
results have arguably been mixed,27 the 
Commission has played a key recent role in a 
major corruption scandal that brought down 
the government. 
While important, high-level targeting and 
prosecutions are not by themselves sufficient 
to prop up a weak justice sector and support 
it in a fight against organised crime.  In order 
for actions that reduce impunity to have a 
long-lasting effect, they must be coupled 
with measures to increase the exposure of 
criminals and other drivers of illicit activities 
and organised crime in general.  Such 
programmes complement the high-level 
interventions to reduce impunity by making 
it more difficult to achieve impunity in the 
first place. 
In future then, the question should be less 
about how assistance can be delivered to 
law enforcement agencies, but how a set 
of institutions can be created that build a 
partnership between different interests and 
seek to isolate corrupt or criminal elites. Could 
a regional court to try drug trafficking cases 
be agreed in West Africa for example? Can 
we push forward more cases (such as in 
Guatemala) where internal and external 
partners work together in new hybrid 
institutions, protected from local corrupting 
influences, to bring high-level traffickers, 
within the framework of the rule of law, to 
book? Developing such arrangements must 
be the focus of global public policy responses 
to organised crime. 
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fiRsT, ReDuCe haRM…
In all of these three issues – impunity and 
compromised institutions, criminalised 
politics and violence reduction – the 
ASD2030 looms large. Security and 
development issues are closely intertwined 
and the SDGs provide perhaps the most 
significant foundation for advancing the 
discussion in a generation. We must seek 
to address these issues more creatively 
than we have in the past and from a policy 
perspective that is complementary to law 
enforcement – but not the same.
While we recognise the difference in 
approach, we must resist the call to simply 
apply only harm reduction principles to drug 
use and not to illicit trafficking and organised 
crime. While it is clear that combating 
organised crime and drug trafficking at 
high levels will still be a necessary priority, 
there is a growing consensus that harm 
reduction-based approaches at lower levels 
is a more appropriate response.  But policies 
are moving forwards at different speeds, 
with some states experimenting more than 
others, and a variety of new experiments 
emerging as to how organised crime can 
be tackled, so it is crucial that we start 
identifying and learning lessons in a context 
in which the policy framework is visibly being 
stretched.   What occurs at UNGASS 2016 
has the potential to begin a reorientation 
of the worldwide response to illicit drugs, 
including how they are trafficked. 
In short, the same set of public policy 
questions apply both to the organised crime 
response as they have to the demand side 
approaches: how can we reduce the harms 
being caused, in order to manage the 
challenges we face?  If the UNGASS cannot 
break free of the polarised silos that have 
dominated the war on drugs era, then it will 
be a significant opportunity missed by the 
multilateral system to bring forward new 
approaches. 
This also raises a connected set of questions 
as to whether, in the long-run, the current 
international multilateral infrastructure is 
adequate for the division that we need to 
make between dealing with drugs as a health 
issue – and dealing with all forms of trafficking 
and the associated harm as a justice and 
development issue.  If that separation is taken 
to its logical conclusion, drug consumption 
issues should be dealt with by the UN agency 
responsible for health issues (the WHO) and 
justice and by implication illicit trafficking 
issues, coordinated within the framework of 
a development agenda, should be dealt with 
by a separate UN entity dedicated to dealing 
with criminal justice aspects of cross-border 
crimes, such as trafficking.28
As indicated at the beginning of the article, 
two recent regional Commissions that 
highlighted the requirement for harm 
reduction measures also drew attention to 
the need to tackle organised crime – but 
what they suggested (albeit not in much 
detail) is more of the same.  In context of 
the progress made on harm reduction, the 
fear is that we simply draw the conclusion 
that ‘we must now target organised crime; 
implying the same set of solutions we have 
already tried, which is largely an exclusively 
law enforcement based approach. Shifting 
the harms discussion further up the supply 
chain allows us to reconceptualise how 
we define the nature of what we face – to 
prioritise what we should tackle, and rethink 
our approach in these areas. That is the new 
challenge for ‘harm reduction.’ 
Efforts and innovations  
in alternative livelihoods 
and other ‘supply reduction’ 
strategies both in the 
Americas and in the opiate 
producing countries of 
Central and West Asia have 
failed to provide consistent 
returns on investment, and 
have largely ignored the 
versatility and legitimacy that 
trafficking groups can gain 
with local populations when 
they provide and control the 
major livelihood generator  
of the region.  ’
‘
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MeasuRing The iMpaCT 
of oRganiseD CRiMe29
A key challenge of expanding the definition of 
what constitutes ‘harm’ under the framework 
of organised crime comes from the debate 
surrounding what should be the metrics by 
which to measure a ‘successful’ response to 
organised crime.  This debate is important 
because the way that success is measured 
tends to drive the ‘toolbox’ of approaches 
that are employed in response to organised 
crime.  For example, regarding seizures as 
the primary metric of success has arguably 
led to an over-emphasis on interdiction and 
disruption strategies, rather than genuine 
investigations into the networks perpetrating 
those flows. Furthermore, seizure rates (along 
with measuring some related crimes, such 
as arrests for drug offences) have proven 
to be a better measure of the effectiveness 
of government and law enforcement 
agencies in interdiction activities, rather 
than providing any indication of changes 
and success in curbing organised crime. 
Moreover, such measures provide little or 
no indication of the impact that criminal 
networks are having on the security and 
development of local communities.
With discussions around the establishment 
of the ASD2030 framework30 and subsequent 
indicators to measure progress, employing 
‘illicit financial flows’ (IFFs) as a proxy 
measure of organised crime has been 
proposed.31 Ground breaking work by 
Global Financial Integrity (GFI) has created 
widespread acceptance of the use of the 
International Monetary Fund’s balance of 
payments and residual trade statistics as 
an acceptable measure of IFFs, and thus for 
organised crime as a whole.32 Yet, GFI’s work 
focuses on the reporting of licit trade; this 
by definition excludes the actual volume 
of criminal activity that occurs outside the 
legitimate economy. Data on activities such 
as drug trafficking, the wildlife trade or 
human trafficking is precisely what we would 
seek to accumulate in order to formulate 
an appropriate response to organised 
crime.  Similarly, as with seizures, the GFI 
metric focuses on volume of IFFs, and does 
not demonstrate the impact of such flows. 
Therefore, it provides little assistance to 
policymakers and practitioners who are 
seeking to understand the implications 
for development responses and how to 
prioritise their assistance.
Moving toward a harm reduction approach 
means seeking a more responsive and multi-
dimensional set of metrics, and it is clear that 
one single indicator is unlikely to fit the bill. 
There is a need for a basket of indicators that 
will provide data across two categories, 1) the 
scale of organised crime, and 2) its impact. 
Measurements of scale would analyse the 
depth and forms that organised crime has 
assumed, and measurements of impact 
would look at the ways that organised 
crime is engaging with communities, states 
and the natural environment, including 
through violent means. It is worth noting 
the juxtaposition between scale and impact 
as the two outputs do not necessarily rise 
and fall with each other. In fact, a decrease 
in the scale of organised crime can result 
in a greater impact on communities.  For 
example, in Honduras, a decrease in cocaine 
trafficking resulted in greater competition 
between criminal actors and higher levels of 
violence and homicide.33 
Criminal justice data does remain 
important, but it must be analysed as part 
of a wider context allowing a more nuanced 
combination of crime data, seizure data, 
law enforcement indictments on typical 
organised crimes, as well as homicides 
and other forms of crime. Examining a 
combination of crimes may have value: 
targeted assassinations or ‘hits,’ kidnappings, 
disappearances, unexplained arsons, and 
sharp changes in crime trends may be 
important indicators of organised crime 
when local contexts are taken into account. 
The extent of unsolved crime, particular 
targeted killings and the murder of 
witnesses or criminal justice officials, shows 
the degree of power or threat (including 
corruption) which criminal groups may 
have.34 One important measure that could 
be used is that of ‘protection:’ how much 
does it cost for criminal groups to obtain 
local or political protection to move goods or 
conduct their activities? There is a surprising 
amount of data available on ‘protection fees’ 
and qualitative interviews often provide an 
indication of these amounts. Increases in 
protection fees may signal greater difficulty 
in moving goods, whereas decreasing fees 
may suggest a greater diversity of ‘protectors’ 
in the market. At the local level, the extent of 
‘protection fees,’ for example in an extortion 
market, may provide a useful indication of 
the changing strength of organised crime, as 
well as the degree of competition between 
criminal groups. Using the phenomenon of 
protection in conflict zones may also provide 
a set of typologies against which to measure 
the development of organised crime and its 
links to the state, the latter generally being 
the most important protection network 
in town.35 
A critical element of moving toward 
people-centric and human security 
focused responses will be the greater use 
of public perceptions data.  In the first 
place, public perceptions of the presence of 
organised crime is essential to supplement 
and interpret criminal data, as there is a 
tendency for organised crime actions to go 
unreported, particularly in environments 
where corruption is a concern.  Surveys, such 
as the International Crime Victims Survey, 
which measures crimes that affect ordinary 
citizens on a large scale, found that the less 
confidence individuals had in the police the 
less likely they were to report ‘conventional’ 
or not as serious crimes. Thus, in regions 
such as Latin America and Africa – regions 
where observers are witnessing high levels 
of organised crime – there are very low crime 
reporting rates.36   
Perhaps more important, however, is 
the value of public perceptions data in 
measuring and understanding the impact 
of organised crime.  This is arguably the 
more challenging and complex category to 
measure, as it focuses more on the intangible 
effects of organised crime in areas such 
as on increased levels of insecurity and 
diminishing public service delivery.  There 
are a number of sources already available 
and systematically collected that could 
contribute to such a composite public 
perceptions indicator, including the ‘Ease 
Of-‘ and ‘Cost Of Doing Business’ surveys 
and indexes compiled annually by the World 
Bank.37 Moreover, Gallup Analytics collects 
global data on issues such as confidence in 
leadership, confidence in the military and the 
police, corruption, entrepreneurial energy 
and emotions. Surveys on public perceptions 
of safety can reflect increased levels of 
violence and fear in communities as a result 
of organised crime, while surveys of local 
businesses can uncover extortion rates and 
reflect the impact organised crime is having 
on local economies.  At the same time, they 
may also reveal the level of dependency 
and concern that illicit markets and actors 
present for the community, which in turn 
can nuance the direction of international 
investment. 
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of Drug Policy1
Javier Sagredo, Rebecca Schleifer and Tenu Avafia 
However, in many countries, drug control 
policies and related enforcement activities 
focused on reducing supply and demand 
have had little effect in eradicating 
production or problematic drug use. Various 
UN organisations have also described 
the harmful collateral consequences of 
these efforts: creating a criminal black 
market; fueling corruption, violence, and 
instability; threatening public health and 
safety; generating large-scale human rights 
abuses, including abusive and inhumane 
punishments; and discrimination and 
marginalisation of people who use drugs, 
indigenous peoples, women, and youth.2 
Evidence shows that in many parts of the 
world, law enforcement responses to drug-
related crime have created or exacerbated 
poverty, impeded sustainable development, 
and threatened the health and human rights 
of the most marginalised people. 
Drug control agencies and development 
institutions have tended to operate in 
isolation from each other and in some cases 
at cross-purposes. Drug control policies 
and accompanying enforcement practices 
have emphasised the role of organised 
crime and corruption in impeding human 
development and focused on criminal justice 
solutions. Otherwise, the potential impacts 
of drug control policies on development 
outcomes have mostly been factored into 
development planning at the margins and 
often limited to ‘alternative development’ in 
areas where illicit crops are grown.3 The root 
causes that sustain the cultivation of illicit 
crops, their trafficking and use, including 
poverty, food insecurity, lack of land tenure 
or access to markets, have not received 
sufficient attention.
The international drug control system 
recognises the ‘health and welfare of 
mankind’ as its overarching concern. 
To succeed in meeting Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) as well as drug 
control objectives, UN entities and Member 
States must align drug control efforts with 
this goal. They must commit to community 
development and support the provision of 
viable and sustainable livelihoods for the 
poor. They must ensure that drug control 
measures protect human rights and do 
not impede access to HIV and other health 
services.
In April 2016 the UN General Assembly 
Special Session on drugs (UNGASS 2016) will 
assess and debate the successes and failures 
of international drug control policies. There 
is increasing recognition of the collateral 
harms of current drug policies, and that new 
approaches are both urgent and necessary. 
The UNODC has stated that the UN drug 
conventions do not require penalisation 
of drug use or possession for personal use 
and acknowledged the role of human rights 
abuses against people who use drugs in 
fuelling HIV.4 UNODC Executive Director Yuri 
Fedotov has encouraged UN Member States 
to use the upcoming UNGASS on drugs and 
other high-level meetings as opportunities 
to discuss ways to rebalance international 
drug control policy responses to focus on 
health and respect for human rights, and 
address stigma and discrimination that 
limits access to services by people who 
use drugs.5
SUMMARY
 ■ Repressive and prohibitionist drug 
policies have frequently been 
implemented irrespective of wider 
development goals.
 ■ These policies have had little 
effect in eradicating production 
or problematic drug use, while 
producing their own harmful 
collateral consequences, in 
particular exacerbating poverty, 
impeded sustainable development 
and threatened the health 
and human rights of the most 
marginalised people. 
 ■ The vast majority of poor farmers 
grow illicit drugs to meet basic 
needs. Crop eradication eliminates 
their principal source of income, 
driving them further into poverty 
and insecurity.
 ■ In 2014, WHO´s technical 
guidance on HIV prevention, 
diagnosis, treatment and care for 
key populations recommended 
decriminalising drug use to 
facilitate conditions conducive to 
providing health and social services 
among people who use drugs.
 ■ Drug control agencies and 
development institutions have 
tended to operate in isolation and 
in some cases at cross-purposes. 
 ■ To succeed in meeting the 
Sustainable Development Goals 
as well as drug control objectives, 
UN entities and Member States 
must commit to a sustainable 
development approach to drugs.
 ■ UNDP is uniquely positioned  
within the UN to leverage its 
knowledge of the similarities and 
differences between countries at 
different stages of development, 
and to translate that into evidence-
based insights for effective, 
adaptable development solutions, 
responding effectively to country 
and local demand.
The relationship between drug control policy and human development is complex and multifaceted. Yet, policies aimed at prohibiting and punishing the cultivation, sale and use of certain drugs have played a disproportionate role in shaping the 
international approach to drug control and country responses, irrespective of countries’ 
development goals. Drug control policies have been justified by the real and potential 
harms associated with illicit drug use and markets, such as threats to safety and security, 
health problems, crime, decreased productivity, unemployment and poverty.
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Drug control policy affects many areas 
of UNDP’s work. UNDP is committed to 
providing input on the impact of drug 
control policies on sustainable human 
development that can contribute to a 
more comprehensive and coherent UN 
system-wide approach to these issues at 
policy and programme levels. This paper 
discusses UNDP’s position on addressing the 
development dimensions of drug policy.6 
DRug poliCy anD  
huMan DeVelopMenT
 
Each year, the UN General Assembly 
(UNGA) reasserts that ‘countering the world 
drug problem’ requires an ‘integrated and 
balanced approach’ that must be carried 
out in full conformity with the purposes and 
principles of the UN Charter and ‘in particular’ 
fundamental human rights norms.7 Yet 
the control system has traditionally and 
systematically paid less attention to human 
rights and development consequences than 
to enforcement and interdiction.
Drug control policies often leave an 
indelible footprint on sustainable human 
development processes and outcomes. Yet, 
drug control agencies typically have not 
considered the human development context 
of their responses. Many policies have 
fuelled the marginalisation of people linked 
with illicit drug use or markets. As a result, 
people who use drugs are often among the 
most marginalised and stigmatised people 
in society, vulnerable to a wide array of 
human rights violations. Local communities 
in drug-producing countries also regularly 
face systematic human rights violations 
as a result of campaigns to eradicate illicit 
crops, including environmental devastation, 
attacks on indigenous cultures and damage 
to health from chemical spraying.8
Whereas the SDGs are intended to guide 
global development efforts for the 
next fifteen years, there are potential 
contradictions between the proposed SDGs 
and many current drug policies. For example, 
the SDGs aim to end poverty and hunger, 
protect the environment, and promote 
sustainable livelihoods as well as health and 
well-being for all.  But global drug policies 
and their collateral consequences have 
fuelled and escalated violence; diverted 
limited funds and political attention from 
public health to law enforcement; and 
impeded access to lifesaving harm reduction 
interventions as well as medications essential 
to treat pain and drug dependence. Drug 
production and trafficking, and related 
law enforcement activities, degrade the 
environment, contaminating water and soil, 
and harming protected forests. 
Guided by its Strategic Plan 2014-2017, 
which states that ‘the challenge is to rethink 
development,’ UNDP could play an important 
role in several ways: for example, first, by 
highlighting the linkages between drug 
policy, public health and sustainable human 
development; and second, by bringing to 
the discussion UNDP’s knowledge, empirical 
experience and capacity on human 
development issues, thereby helping to 
frame the development dimensions of 
drug control policies and in turn providing 
an evidence base for development-sensitive 
drug control policy.
The iMpaCT of DRug 
ConTRol poliCy on 
huMan DeVelopMenT
 
Evidence shows that supply and demand 
reduction activities have had little marginal 
meaningful effect in eradicating production 
or  on problematic drug use.9 Further, 
increasing evidence demonstrates harmful 
impacts of drug control policies and law 
enforcement practices on development 
outcomes, particularly poverty and 
sustainable livelihoods; governance and the 
rule of law; human rights; gender equality; 
the environment; and on indigenous peoples 
and traditional and religious practices.
PoveRty anD sustainable 
livelihooDs
The cultivation of illicit drug crops is 
strongly linked to poverty, and driven by 
socioeconomic, security-related, agricultural 
and environmental factors. As UNODC 
Executive Director Yuri Fedotov states, ‘Let 
us not forget that behind the policies, we 
have hundreds of thousands of farmers 
affected by poverty, food insecurity, lack 
of land, instability who [as] a result engage 
in illicit drug cultivation. It is our common 
responsibility to continue addressing the 
livelihood of these people. . .’10
For many people living in conditions of 
poverty and insecurity, cultivating illicit 
crops is often considered to be their best 
livelihood option. Coca, opium poppy and 
cannabis are non-perishable, high-value-
to-weight commodities that can be grown 
in marginal terrain, poor soil, with limited 
irrigation, and can provide income for those 
who are land-, food-, and cash-poor.11  But 
illicit drug economies do not address the 
structural drivers of illicit crop cultivation or 
promote improvements in access to food, 
housing, education and land distribution. 
In addition, cultivators may face violence at 
the hands of state eradication campaigns 
and criminal, insurgent, and non-state actors 
involved in production and trafficking.
The vast majority of poor farmers grow illicit 
drugs to meet basic needs. Crop eradication 
eliminates the principal source of income, 
driving them further into poverty. Evidence 
suggests that destruction of coca plants as 
well as traditional crops has affected food 
security, contaminated water supplies, 
and degraded land, forcibly displacing 
populations dependent on coca, as well as 
those who are not.12
Political instability, weak governance systems, 
poverty, loss of livelihoods, inequality, and 
social exclusion, as well as conditions of 
insecurity and proliferation of small arms in 
post-conflict environments, also exacerbate 
the vulnerability of countries, territories and 
communities used as transit routes and for 
trafficking activities.13 In Mexico, for example, 
because of underlying poverty more than 
25,000 children left school in 2013 to join 
drug trafficking organisations, and as a result 
UNODC Executive 
Director Yuri Fedotov 
has encouraged UN 
Member States to use 
the upcoming UNGASS 
on drugs and other 
high-level meetings as 
opportunities to discuss 
ways to rebalance 
international drug 
control policy responses 
to focus on health and 
respect for human rights, 
and address stigma and 
discrimination that limits 
access to services by 
people who  
use drugs.
’
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faced substantial danger of serious violence 
and human rights abuses.14
UNODC and the World Bank have identified 
multidimensional poverty, food insecurity, 
lack of land tenure, and insecurity in the face 
of armed conflict as key drivers of illicit crop 
production.15 As the European Union has 
observed:
‘[N]o single project or program 
can address the multiple factors 
that drive illicit drug production 
. . . Evidence points to the fact that 
it is a combination of improved 
governance, security and economic 
growth that will deliver the 
development impact required to 
improve the life and livelihood of 
primary stakeholders and reduce 
illicit drug [crop] cultivation. . . . 
[D]evelopment assistance in illicit 
crop producing areas should be 
undertaken in full compliance with 
the overall aims of human rights 
protection, poverty alleviation, 
conflict prevention and resolution, 
peace building and human security.’16
‘Alternative development’ programmes have 
been promoted as a way to wean farmers 
from drug crop production to legal crops or 
other non-agricultural activities. However, 
these programmes have traditionally 
produced questionable demonstrable 
efficacy in terms of supply reduction or 
development outcomes.17 The European 
Union, the Organization of American States 
(OAS) and UNODC have all argued that efforts 
to address illicit drug cultivation should 
be mainstreamed into national poverty 
reduction strategies, conflict prevention 
efforts and development programmes.18 
Successful development depends on many 
factors including:
 ■ long-term investments by 
governments and international 
donors;
 ■ integration of sustainable livelihood 
strategies in local, regional, and 
national development plans;
 ■ coordination of drug control and 
development experts and agencies;
 ■ existence of sound monitoring and 
evaluation mechanisms;
 ■ local ownership;
 ■ development markets and 
infrastructure for crops or products 
that replace them;
 ■ meaningful involvement of farmers 
as citizens with rights and partners in 
development.19
iMpaCT on publiC healTh20
 
A UNODC report published in 2014 estimates 
that approximately 243 million people or 
5.2 percent of the world’s population, used 
illicit drugs in the past year. Of these, about 
10 percent are classified as ‘problem drug 
users:’ i.e. people who engage in high-risk 
consumption of drugs, such as injecting drug 
use, and people who are drug-dependent. 
Worldwide, an estimated 12.7 million people 
inject drugs.21
Some of the most severe drug-related harms 
are associated with injection drug use. 
Outside of sub-Saharan Africa, up to 30% of 
all new HIV infections occur among people 
who inject drugs. Unsafe injecting practices 
put people who inject drugs at high risk 
of blood-borne infections such as HIV and 
viral hepatitis, in particular hepatitis B and 
hepatitis C.22 
A substantial body of evidence shows 
the  effectiveness  of  harm reduction 
interventions in preventing HIV and viral 
hepatitis, and preventing and reversing 
overdose – thereby saving lives and 
significant amounts of often scarce monetary 
resources.23 In light of this evidence, UNODC, 
WHO, and UNAIDS all recommend that a 
comprehensive package of harm reduction 
services be integrated into national AIDS 
programmes, both as a HIV prevention 
measure and to support adherence to 
antiretroviral therapy and medical follow-up 
for people who use drugs.24
However, evidence shows that criminal 
laws and related enforcement policies 
and practice have impeded access to 
these lifesaving health services in many 
countries. These include laws and policies 
that criminalise possession or distribution of 
sterile syringes and other drug paraphernalia, 
Opioid-Substitution-Therapy (OST), and 
peer outreach to people who use drugs; 
government registration of people who 
use drugs on registries accessible to police; 
and abusive policing practices. This has put 
people who use drugs at increased risk of 
HIV, viral hepatitis, and premature death 
from overdose.25
In 2014, WHO´s technical guidance on 
HIV prevention, diagnosis, treatment and 
care for key populations recommended 
decriminalising drug use because that 
measure would serve as a ‘critical enabler’ 
to create conditions conducive to providing 
health and social services, and preventing 
HIV, among people who use drugs.26
The drug conventions require governments 
to take steps to reduce supply and demand 
for controlled drugs. These efforts must 
be balanced with States’ obligations to 
ensure an adequate supply of narcotic and 
psychotropic drugs for medical and scientific 
purposes and consistent with their human 
rights obligations. The obligation to provide 
access to essential medicines is a core 
component of the right to health.27
Several drugs subject to control under the 
international drug control conventions 
are also on the WHO ‘Model List of 
Essential Medicines,’ including morphine 
for pain treatment, and methadone and 
buprenorphine for OST.28 Yet, only a fraction 
of people who inject drugs have access 
to OST.29 Three quarters of the world’s 
population has no or insufficient access 
to treatment for moderate to severe pain, 
and each year tens of millions of people 
suffer untreated moderate to severe pain. 
Unnecessarily restrictive drug control 
regulations and practices are a significant 
barrier to access to effective pain treatment.30
iMpaCT on The 
foRMal eConoMy
Current drug control efforts have fuelled 
the creation of a huge criminal black market 
with an estimated turnover of more than 
$332 billion annually.31 Illicit drug markets 
are robust due to their high value, driven by 
a sustained demand. While the illegal drug 
market may generate economic growth, 
economic inclusion and employment, 
thus improving the lives of some who are 
involved, it also poses a threat to long-term 
development objectives and outcomes.32 
Illegal businesses, often associated with 
money laundering schemes, affect formal 
economies in many ways including the 
distortion of markets, exacerbating income 
inequality, undermining the rule of law and 
fuelling corruption.
Drug markets can also undermine 
economic development by eroding social 
cohesion, degrading quality of life and 
forcing skilled workers to leave, while 
the direct impacts of victimisation, as 
well as fear of crime, may impede the 
development of those that remain. Violence 
and insecurity associated with illicit drug 
markets also drive up the costs of legitimate 
trade and commercial activities, and in turn 
discourage investment in affected regions.33 
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iMpaCT on goVeRnanCe, 
ConfliCT anD The Rule of law
 
Illicit drug markets undermine democracy and 
confidence in the criminal justice system. Weak 
state institutions, absence of basic infrastructure 
and lack of economic opportunities create 
enabling conditions for the drug trade to flourish. 
Criminal drug organisations operate and expand 
their business by paying off private individuals 
and police, judiciary and political officials at all 
levels. Organised crime has the potential to usurp 
the rule of law where the state is not present. The 
more the state is permeated with the influence of 
the drug trade, the more difficult transparency and 
accountability becomes. At the same time, the more 
public institutions and procedures are weakened, 
the more they are susceptible to being permeated 
by the illegal drug economy, in some contexts on 
a massive scale. The illicit drug trade can also affect 
income inequality which may then disturb power 
structures within communities, erode traditional 
social structures, and encourage more people to 
enter the illicit drug industry.34
UNDP has recognised that in Latin America for 
example, policies focusing predominantly on 
repression, increased penalties and use of force have 
increased lethal violence and police abuse, fuelled 
belligerent responses from criminal organisations 
and provoked their fracture and geographic 
dispersion.  Successful interdiction efforts, arrest or 
extradition of drug cartel leaders and destruction of 
drug cartels, have led to increased levels of violence, 
as the remaining players compete to control 
market share.35 
Enforcement pressure on one production 
area or transit route displaces production or 
trafficking routes, and related crime, violence 
and destabilisation, to new geographic areas 
and communities. Transit countries often also 
experience an increase in drug consumption, which 
in turn can lead to an increased burden on the health 
system.36
The excessive use of criminal justice mechanisms, 
the disproportionality of incarceration penalties 
for drug-related offences and the enforcement 
of mandatory sentencing laws have contributed 
to overloading the judicial and prison systems, 
undermining their capacity to deliver justice and 
support rehabilitation. The lack of alternatives to 
incarceration and re-entry mechanisms and the 
excessive use of pretrial detention have contributed 
to serious prison overcrowding, facilitating human 
rights abuses, as well as connections to organised 
crime networks within prison.37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
human Rights imPlications of DRug 
Policy
‘Placing human rights at the centre of 
drug control, crime prevention and 
criminal justice provides an organizing 
set of principles that dissolves boundaries 
between the fields and promotes a single 
coherent response. Effective drug control 
cannot exist without fair criminal justice 
and successful crime prevention..  ...Such 
an approach represents more than 
“added value”; it is a legal obligation.’38 
-Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director, 
UNODC (2010)
In many countries around the world, drug control 
efforts result in serious human rights abuses: torture 
and ill treatment by police, mass incarceration, 
extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention, denial of 
essential medicines and basic health services. Local 
communities in drug-producing countries regularly 
face violations of their human rights as a result 
of campaigns to eradicate illicit crops, including 
environmental damage, attacks on indigenous 
cultures, and displacement and damage to health 
from chemical spraying. Communities also face 
serious human rights abuses by large-scale drug 
trafficking organisations including massacres, 
killings, forced displacement, sexual and physical 
violence and extortion.39
More than 235,000 people are arbitrarily detained, 
often without their consent and or any form 
of due process, in over 1000 compulsory drug 
detention centres in East and South East Asia, 
under the guise of ‘treatment’ or ‘rehabilitation.’41 
UN guidance recognises that drug dependence 
is a chronic, relapsing condition and that several 
episodes or types of treatment may be required to 
overcome it.42 Yet in some countries, ‘drug courts’ 
have obliged many people with drug dependence 
to follow abstinence-based treatment and 
subjected them to additional penal measures if they 
fail ‘treatment.’43
The death penalty for drug-related crimes is a 
violation of international law. Yet 33 countries retain 
this penalty and up to 1,000 people are executed 
annually for drug offenses.44  Drug enforcement 
efforts have led to extrajudicial killings by police 
and military. Some 2,800 people were extra-
judicially executed in the first three months of 
Thailand’s 2003 ‘war on drugs’ campaign, at least 
half of whom had no connection whatsoever to 
drugs. According to a 2007 investigation, of 2,819 
people killed between February and April 2003, 
more than 1,400 were unrelated to drug dealing 
or had no apparent reason for their killings.45 
Targeted killings of drug traffickers have also been 
justified as a military intervention, in violation 
of international humanitarian as well as human 
rights law. 46
A substantial body 
of evidence shows 
the effectiveness 
of harm reduction 
interventions in 
preventing HIV and 
viral hepatitis, and 
preventing and 
reversing overdose 
– thereby saving 
lives and significant 
amounts of often 
scarce monetary 
resources. In light 
of this evidence, 
UNODC, WHO, 
and UNAIDS all 
recommend that 
a comprehensive 
package of harm 
reduction services 
be integrated into 
national AIDS 
programmes, both 
as a HIV prevention 
measure and to 
support adherence 
to antiretroviral 
therapy and medical 
follow-up for people 
who use drugs.’
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iMpaCT of DRug ConTRol poliCies  
on The enViRonMenT  
The 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs requires state parties to ‘take 
appropriate measures to prevent illicit cultivation 
of and to eradicate plants containing narcotic or 
psychotropic substances.’ These measures must 
‘respect fundamental human rights and shall take 
due account of traditional licit uses, where there is 
historic evidence of such use, as well as protection 
of the environment.’47 
In practice, however, eradication campaigns have 
had devastating consequences for the environment. 
Drug cultivation, production and related trafficking 
and enforcement activities can also cause serious 
harm to the environment including: deforestation, 
soil erosion and degradation, loss of endemic 
species, contamination of soil, groundwater, and 
waterways and the release of climate change 
fuelling gases including methane, carbon dioxide, 
carbon monoxide and nitrogen oxides, to name 
a few.48
Meanwhile eradication campaigns have widely 
been shown as ineffective, leading Richard 
Holbrooke, US Special Envoy to Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, to comment in 2009, ‘Spraying the crops 
just penalises the farmer and they grow the crops 
somewhere else ... This is the least effective program 
ever.’49 Glyphosate, a herbicide used in aerial 
fumigation of illicit coca crops, has been associated 
with serious harm to physical and mental health, 
food security, family income and the environment. 
The International Agency for Research on Cancer, a 
specialised agency of the WHO, recently reclassified 
glyphosate as a probable carcinogen.50 
iMpaCT of DRug ConTRol 
poliCies on inDigenous 
people, TRaDiTional, anD 
Religious pRaCTiCes
The criminalisation of indigenous, traditional 
practices done without consultation with 
indigenous communities raises a number of human 
rights and development concerns.  The ban on 
traditional uses of coca, opium and cannabis in the 
1961 Convention was passed at a time when scant 
attention was given to cultural and indigenous 
rights and before the adoption of key international 
instruments and relevant jurisprudence protecting 
the right of all indigenous peoples to free and prior 
informed consent relating to issues that affect them, 
and to maintain traditional, religious and medical 
practices, and to own, develop, control and use of 
their real property and resources.51 Criminalisation 
of drugs used for traditional and religious purposes 
likewise contradicts human rights protections for 
the traditional and religious uses of controlled 
drugs.52 
 
unDp suppoRT foR susTainable 
DeVelopMenT appRoaChes 
To DRug poliCy
 
UNDP’s mandate provides it with a unique 
opportunity to support countries in adopting 
evidence-based and development-sensitive 
drug policies that address the harms caused by 
illicit drug production, trafficking and abuse, as 
well as the harm caused by drug control efforts. 
Country Number of  
death sentences/ 
executions in 
2011
Number of  
death sentences/ 
executions for 
drug- related 
offenses in 2011
% of death sentences/ 
executions for drug 
offenses
Islamic Republic  
of Iran
676 540 80%
Kuwait 17 3 18%
Malaysia 108 83 77%
Singapore 4 2 50%
United Arab Emirates 31 7 23%
Vietnam 69 27 39%
Yemen 29 10 34%
Figure 1. Sample of countries with mandatory death penalty for drug offences40
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However, this requires, among other things, 
focusing not only on illicit cultivation and 
use but also on their root causes: poverty, 
social exclusion, inequality, government 
instability and weak of rule of law. Figure 
2 provides a snapshot of how drug policy 
intersects with various aspects of UNDP’s 
work as articulated in the 2014-2017 
Strategic Plan.
DeveloPment-sensitive 
PRogRamming in suPPoRt of un 
membeR states
Many aspects of UNDP’s policy work and 
programme delivery in countries could 
support initiatives already being undertaken 
by UN Member States to implement 
development-sensitive drug control policies.
sustainable DeveloPment 
PathWays
A substantial body of evidence has shown 
that drug policies anchored in economic and 
social development plans are more likely to 
result in positive development outcomes. 
An important opportunity exists for UNDP 
to support Member States’ programmes to 
tackle poverty, inequality and exclusion in a 
way that empowers vulnerable populations 
who depend on illicit drug economies or 
those who experience exclusion because of 
problematic drug use.
 
 
inclusive anD effective 
DemocRatic goveRnance
UNDP’s work assisting countries to maintain 
or secure peaceful and democratic 
governance, helping institutions to adapt 
to changing public expectations and deliver 
clear benefits to citizens, whether in terms of 
better services, improved access to resources 
needed for employment and livelihoods 
or  greater security, could also provide an 
important pathway into the development of 
evidence informed drug policies anchored in 
human rights principles. Promoting a culture 
of accountability, inclusive governance and 
participation reduces space for corruption 
and infiltration of organised crime within 
government institutions.
UNDP’s experience in the design and 
implementation of evidence-based, 
sustainable human development-oriented 
public policy and in the construction of more 
effective governance has strong potential 
for helping drug policy frameworks bring 
greater development benefits to citizens 
and increased confidence and trust in public 
institutions, both at national and, most 
intensively, at sub-national level. UNDP’s 
work in reinforcing the rule of law and citizen 
security should promote greater respect 
for citizen rights, facilitate stronger civilian 
oversight, help to counter drug-related 
discrimination and allow for faster progress 
in reducing drug-related gender-based 
violence. Moreover, UNDP’s promotion of 
civil, political, economic, cultural and social 
rights should help reduce discrimination 
and violence experienced by women, youth, 
indigenous people and other minorities with 
linkages to drug use or drug markets.
UNDP could build on its experience working 
with Member States to review and shape 
laws and legal practices to create legal and 
human rights environments supportive of 
effective responses to HIV for people who use 
drugs and other marginalised populations. 
This work could provide a model for 
meaningful engagement with civil society 
and in particular with those most affected by 
drug-related problems to address drug laws, 
policies and practices that affect their lives 
and the communities in which they live.53 
UNDP could support longer-term efforts 
to strengthen democratic governance 
wherever it has been challenged by illicit 
actors of drug-markets. For example, on 
issues like legislative oversight, transparency 
of public accounts, improvements in public 
administration, reinforcement of local 
governments to deliver basic services and 
working with the non-governmental and 
private sectors. Furthermore, complementary 
support can be given to address justice and 
security sector institutions focusing on 
rapid restoration of access to justice and 
the rule of law, transitional justice measures, 
longer-term recovery of justice and security 
sector institutions and the implementation 
of preventive strategies to confront drug-
related crime and violence, including 
gender-based violence.
Resilience builDing
All areas of work proposed in UNDP’s 2014-
2017 Strategic Plan can help build resilience 
to reduce the harmful impact of drug-related 
problems.  Initiatives that result in higher 
levels of employment, more equitable 
access to resources, better protection 
against economic and environmental 
shocks, peaceful settlement of disputes, 
progress toward democratic governance 
and comprehensive HIV and health 
responses that include harm reduction can 
all mitigate the negative impacts of drug 
production, drug trafficking and problematic 
drug use.
Averting major development setbacks 
and promoting human security in areas 
and communities strongly affected by 
violence and other threats caused by illicit 
drug production and trafficking or  by 
the negative consequences of repressive 
drug policies, is another aspect of people-
centred human development. UNDP has 
experience and capacity to induce effective 
recovery from conflict-induced crises in 
those cases where prevention has fallen 
short, through early economic recovery 
and focus on employment and livelihoods 
stabilisation and creation, reintegration of 
displaced persons and restoration of basic 
infrastructure at local level. Additionally, 
peaceful resolution of disputes and 
mediation in order to stabilise volatile 
conditions could be of great help in areas 
with drug market related conflicts. In these 
contexts, interventions on illegal economies 
must be centred on the protection of citizens 
and the reduction of risks, harms and 
negative impacts.
UNDP has  
recognised that 
in Latin America 
for example, 
policies focusing 
predominantly on 
repression, increased 
penalties, and use of 
force have increased 
lethal violence 
and police abuse, 
fuelled belligerent 
responses from 
criminal organisations, 
and provoked 
their fracture 
and geographic 
dispersion.  Successful 
interdiction efforts, 
arrest or extradition 
of drug cartel leaders, 
and destruction of 
drug cartels have led 
to increased levels 
of violence, as the 
remaining players 
compete to control 
market share.’
‘
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UNDP STRATEGIC PLAN 
OUTCOMES
ExAMPLES OF DRUG POLICY RELATED ISSUES THAT NEGATIVELY  
AFFECT ACHIEVEMENT OF UNDP’S STRATEGIC PLAN OUTCOMES
1 Growth and development 
are inclusive and 
sustainable, incorporating 
productive capacities that 
create employment and 
livelihoods for the poor and 
excluded
1.  Inhibition of legitimate social and economic activity and lack of formal and legal economic alternatives for the 
poor, youth, women, indigenous populations and other excluded groups, because of illegal market dynamics. 
2.  Forced eradication campaigns precede development of alternative livelihood options, undermining food 
security and exacerbating poverty. 
3.  Greater exposure to risks in poverty environments due to a mix of social determinants such as higher availability 
of drugs and arms, higher urbanisation levels, higher crime rates, presence of trafficking organisations, repressive 
law enforcement strategies and presence of violence.
2 Citizen expectations 
for voice, development, 
the rule of law and 
accountability are met 
by stronger systems of 
democratic governance
4.  Excessive use of criminal justice mechanisms, the disproportionality of penalties for drug offenses, including 
death penalty and long-term incarceration, abuse of pretrial detention and the enforcement of mandatory 
sentencing laws contribute to overload the judicial and prison systems, making them even more inefficient and 
undermining people’s confidence in them.  
5.  Impunity for human right abuses and major crimes due to corruption of and major threats to justice system 
officials and other decision makers and administrative authorities.  
6.  Erosion of democratic governance, rule of law and people’s adherence to social norms and institutions by illegal 
actors or by means of the ‘normalisation’ of illegal activities, political and economic influence or lack of protection 
from law enforcement and justice.
3 Countries have 
strengthened institutions 
to progressively deliver 
universal access to basic 
services 
7.  Laws criminalising drug use/possession of small amounts of drugs for personal use, discrimination and lack of 
investment in health and social welfare, impede people who use drugs’ access to basic services such as housing, 
education, healthcare, employment, social protection and treatment.  
8.  Lack of social (re)integration processes along with significant percentages of relapses and readmissions limit the 
chances of addressing drug dependence and substantially reduce the efficiency of investments in treatment and 
recovery systems.  
9.  Absence of comprehensive harm reduction and effective prevention, treatment and care services and policies for 
people who use drugs contributes to increased prevalence of HIV and other infectious diseases. 
4 Faster progress is achieved 
in reducing gender 
inequality and promoting 
women’s empowerment
10.  Involvement of women in drug trading due to economic and gender-inequality, such as single mothers needing 
a means by which to support their family.  
11.  Disproportionate incarceration of women for their participation in the lowest levels of drug production or 
trafficking. Women feel consequences of criminal punishment differently, often with greater impact on their 
children and families. Lack of drug-related services for women who use drugs in prison or pretrial detention.  
12.  Higher prevalence of gender-based violence affecting women who use drugs, with double vulnerability and 
stigma and the lack of specialised services.
5 Countries are able to reduce 
the likelihood of conflict, 
and lower the risk of natural 
disasters, including from 
climate change
13.  Weak states create environments conducive to illicit activity, thereby allowing armed groups to use illicit drug 
economies to finance their activities thus threatening citizen security and fuelling conflict.  
14.  Implementation of repressive drug control policy causes loss of livelihoods, displacement, migration and 
criminalisation of rural communities, fuelling conflict.  
15.  Deforestation, land degradation, loss of endemic species and pollution of aquifers from illegal production of 
drugs or the fumigation, eradication and destruction of drug laboratories.
6 Early recovery and rapid 
return to sustainable 
development pathways are 
achieved in post-conflict 
and post-disaster settings
16.  Violent conflicts cause considerable damage to infrastructure, destroy livestock and farming land, result in 
the mass displacement of populations, lead to social instability, loss of household members, human rights 
violations, and undermine human development. Participation in the illicit drugs economy becomes a viable 
source of income. 
17.  Loss of income, unemployment and food insecurity resulting from supply control programmes may lead to 
frustration, antipathy toward authorities, and social instability. Experiencing hardship and with no other options 
on hand, households often resume cultivation of drug crops and farmers disperse fields more widely or move to 
more remote locations. 
 18.  Economic turbulence, along with poverty and social inequality, can also exacerbate existing obstacles in access 
to health, education and social services.
7 Development debates 
and actions at all levels 
prioritise poverty, inequality 
and exclusion, consistent 
with UNDP’s engagement 
principles
19.  Pre-eminence of prohibition and abstinence-based policies fuel exclusion and do not allow for debate on the 
effects of drugs and drug policy on poor and excluded populations.  
20.  High sensitivity of drug issues along electoral processes, generating political problems for the promotion and 
approval of alternative policies and interventions.  
21.   Metrics and indicators for drug policy success are based in the specific and narrow traditional objectives of drug 
demand and supply reduction without any other consideration of its impact on human rights, social inclusion or 
on any other elements of sustainable human development.
Figure 2.   How drug policy intersects with various aspects of UNDP’s work as articulated in the 2014-2017 Strategic Plan
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DRug poliCy anD The posT-2015 agenDa
Topics and principles at the core of the post-2015 agenda that should also be considered in relation to drug 
policy include:
1. Poverty eradication, sustainable consumption and production, and protecting the natural 
resource base of economic and social development.
2. People centred approaches: just, equitable and inclusive, with inclusive economic growth, social 
development and environmental protection.
3. Freedom, peace and security, the rule of law, good governance, gender equality, women’s 
empowerment and commitment to just and democratic societies for development.
4. Respect for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
5. Importance of international cooperation and of common but differentiated responsibilities.
6. Need for different approaches depending on national or local circumstances and priorities.
7. Need for additional resources for sustainable development.
8. Improvement of the quality, coverage and availability of disaggregated data to ensure that no one 
is left behind.
The potential 
impacts of drug 
control policies 
on development 
outcomes have 
mostly been 
factored into 
development 
planning at the 
margins and 
often limited 
to ‘alternative 
development’ in 
areas where illicit 
crops are grown. 
The root causes 
that sustain the 
cultivation of 
illicit crops, their 
trafficking and use, 
including poverty, 
food insecurity, lack 
of land tenure or 
access to markets,  
have not received 
sufficient attention.’
‘
RESILIENCE BUILDING INCLUSIVE AND EFFECTIVE 
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
PATHWAYS
Address mass incarceration and 
disproportionate sentencing, 
by for instance, increasing 
access to legal services and 
alternatives to incarceration
Address abuses that interfere 
with access to comprehensive 
harm reduction services, 
including laws criminalising 
drug use and possession 
of small amounts of drugs 
for personal use and drug 
paraphernalia laws
Support the provision of viable 
and sustainable livelihoods 
for small farmer-producers 
of illegal drug crops and 
ensure that alternative 
development programmes 
are non- discriminatory and 
based on economically realistic 
alternatives
Focus on reducing the power of 
criminal organisations as well as 
the violence and insecurity that 
result from their competition 
with both one another and the 
state
Address legal, regulatory and 
policy barriers to access to 
narcotic drugs for pain relief 
(e.g., morphine) and drug 
treatment (e.g., methadone 
and buprenorphine for opioid 
dependence)
Advocate that illicit crop 
eradication not be undertaken 
until small-farmer households 
have been supported to 
adopt viable and sustainable 
livelihoods
Promote the meaningful 
participation of communities 
including people who use drugs 
and indigenous communities 
affected by drug control 
policies in the development and 
implementation of policies that 
affect them
Encourage countries to take 
advantage of room within 
the drug conventions on 
penalisation of possession and 
use of controlled substances, 
including decriminalisation of 
drug use and possession of  
small amounts of drugs for 
personal use
Support local development, 
while considering interactions 
with factors such as human 
security, governance, violence, 
human rights, development and 
food security
Figure 3. A snapshot of how UN Member States, with support from UNDP, could promote development-
sensitive policies and programmes on drug policy and control.
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There are contradictions between the targets 
established in the SDGs and the drug policies 
emanating from the three drug conventions. The SDGs 
aim to promote sustainable development, including 
health and well-being for all.  But as described 
above, global drug policies and their ‘unintended 
consequences’ have fuelled and escalated violence; 
diverted limited funds and political attention from 
public health to law enforcement; and impeded 
access to lifesaving harm reduction interventions 
as well as medications essential to treat pain and 
drug dependence. Several SDGs aim to end poverty 
and hunger, protect the environment, and promote 
sustainable livelihoods, but drug production and 
trafficking, and related law enforcement activities, 
degrade the environment, contaminating water 
and soil and harming protected forests.  A number 
of SDGs aim to promote human rights by combating 
discrimination, promoting gender equality and 
strengthening access to justice and government 
accountability at all levels.  However, the illicit drug 
trade, and efforts to control it, have devastating 
impacts on indigenous people and on women and 
girls, have undermined democratic governance and 
the rule of law, and threatened the human rights of 
people who live in communities where drugs are 
produced, through which they are trafficked, and 
where they are sold. These contradictions need to 
be clearly presented and debated in the process 
of defining the new global agenda for sustainable 
development and, more intensely, during the 
evaluation of the international drug control system 
and its implementation at UNGASS 2016.
The post-2015 development agenda provides an 
opportunity to establish different measures of 
success for drug policy, with a clear articulation of 
metrics related to the impact of drug policies on 
peace, development and human rights.
ConClusion
UNDP’s sustainable human development mandate 
affords it the opportunity to develop unique 
approaches and solutions, including as it relates to 
the intersection of drug policy and development. 
UNDP is uniquely positioned within the UN system to 
leverage its extensive knowledge of the similarities 
and differences between countries at different stages 
of development, and to translate that into evidence-
based insights for effective, adaptable development 
solutions, responding effectively to country and local 
demand. The almost universal reach of UNDP, its 
‘lead in development thinking,’ its operational focus 
and its relationships of trust with national partners, 
are strong assets to address complexity, to deliver 
development results and to become a force for 
development-sensitive reform.
UNDP’s greater involvement in drug policy 
discussions could also spur constructive engagement 
of other UN agencies and entities, while deepening 
strategic thinking and responses by the UN system, 
developing consistency in results formulation 
and monitoring, forging closer links between 
programmes and agencies and strengthening 
links with non-UN partners. UNDP’s focus on 
country-level coordination and on delivery and 
development results could strengthen UN Country 
Team capacity to support Member State’s priorities, 
providing assistance through its technical work and 
expertise on cross-sectoral issues, and drawing on 
non-resident agencies with relevant knowledge 
and skills.
Additionally, UNDP’s coordination with the 
UN Secretariat could contribute to enhancing 
the achievement of development results, 
as it relates to development-sensitive drug policy 
and programming. UNDP’s strong engagement 
with key UN system actors like the Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs (ECOSOC), the Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and 
the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) can support 
UN system coherence in this and other development 
issues.
UNDP’s commitment to South-South and 
Triangular cooperation, capacity building 
and facilitation of lessons learned exchanges, 
are important assets that could be mobilised toward 
supporting development-sensitive drug control 
policy, as for other sustainable human development 
issues. UNDP could help across a range of settings to 
disseminate knowledge on what has worked in the 
development context and what has not, work with 
partners to support the harmonisation of policies 
and regulations that allow for better exchanges, 
mobilise strategic funding and technical cooperation 
and connect relevant actors to develop effective 
development solutions, while benefiting from its 
wide network of development partners.
Finally, UNDP’s additional assets include its capacity 
to support multi-sectoral approaches to complex 
development challenges, its ability to influence policy 
and its mobilisation capacity to tackle important 
issues or specific crises and its long-standing role 
as a trusted partner working across sectors and 
with multiple stakeholders, even on sensitive issues. 
Adding UNDP’s engagement to multilateral support 
to governments addressing drug-related challenges 
would almost certainly make a difference in ensuring 
drug policy and control are more fully coherent with 
development policies and goals.
In 2014, WHO´s 
technical guidance 
on HIV prevention, 
diagnosis, treatment 
and care for key 
populations 
recommended 
decriminalising 
drug use because 
that measure 
would serve as a 
‘critical enabler’ to 
create conditions 
conducive to 
providing health 
and social services, 
and preventing HIV, 
among people who 
use drugs.’
‘
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new MeTRiCs To eValuaTe 
DRug ConTRol poliCies
 
Success in drug control efforts has mainly been measured by supply 
and demand reduction: hectares of illicit crops eradicated, volumes 
of drugs seized and numbers of people arrested, convicted and 
incarcerated for drug law violations.  These are process measures that 
reflect the scale of enforcement efforts but tell us very little about the 
impact of drug use or policies on people’s lives. Measuring success by 
arrests and seizures creates perverse incentives for law enforcement, 
and may encourage law enforcement to engage in violence or other 
abuse to achieve these goals. It also encourages police to seek out 
small offenders, such as people who use drugs or  commit minor 
drug-related offenses, as they are easy targets for arrest.
 
Metrics and indicators for drug policy success are based in the 
specific and narrow traditional objectives of drug demand and 
supply reduction without any other consideration of its impact on 
human rights, social inclusion or on any other elements of sustainable 
human development.
The development of a comprehensive set of metrics to measure 
the full spectrum of drug-related health issues, as well as the 
broader impact of drug control policies on human rights, security 
and development would be an important contribution. UNDP’s 
experience with Human Development indices, its mandate 
to promote human development and its role within the UN 
system make it well suited to play a role in the development of 
such metrics. 
 
Possible metrics to consider include:
1. Goals that address root causes that contribute to 
supply and demand for drugs including poverty, 
food insecurity, lack of access to markets, health 
and education, lack of land tenure, lack of security, 
presence of armed conflict; 
2. Targets that address progress toward ensuring the 
‘health and welfare of mankind,’ including a decrease 
in the number of overdose deaths and infection rates 
for HIV, hepatitis B and C and other communicable 
diseases among people who use drugs; an increase 
in access to harm reduction, treatment demand 
and treatment access; an increase in investments in 
health and social welfare benefits, and in the number 
of people receiving such assistance; a reduction in 
excessive and disproportionate punishments;
3. Indicators that measure access to health care 
information and services in consultation with and 
participation of affected communities; harms to 
individuals and communities, such as the number of 
victims of drug-related violence; levels of social and 
economic development in communities where drug 
production, consumption, or sale is concentrated; 
and underlying conditions of poverty, inequality, 
and insecurity that sustain cultivation of drug crops  
and exacerbate vulnerability to trafficking and  
organised crime.
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In the public mind, the ‘war on drugs’ usually conjures up a male image. In most countries, official statistics would show that men, indeed, are the majority of people who use drugs recreationally, who have problematic use and who sell drugs. But punitive drug 
laws and policies pose a heavy burden on women and, in turn, on the children for whom 
women are often the principal caregivers.
Measuring the Impacts of  
Repressive Drug Policies  
on Women
Kasia Malinowska-Sempruch and Olga Rychkova
SUMMARY
 ■ Punitive drug laws and policies 
pose a heavy burden on women 
and, in turn, on the children for 
whom women are often the 
principal caregivers. 
 ■ In Latin America, between 2006 
and 2011, the female prison 
population increased from 40,000 
to more than 74,000, some 
facing sentences as high as 30 
years, largely because of drug 
convictions.
 ■ Punitive drug laws result in children 
being taken from their mothers, 
a reduced access to essential 
health and treatment services and 
stigmatise vulnerable populations 
placing them at a much higher risk 
of HIV and HCV infection and other 
health-related issues. 
 ■ Women who inject drugs have 
a far higher HIV prevalence than 
men; as well as face a higher risk of 
violence, incarceration and a host 
of other human rights issues. 
 ■ Where drug-related health services 
exist, they are rarely tailored to 
the needs of women. Moreover, 
despite being critically needed, 
anti-violence services remain 
largely unavailable to women who 
use drugs.
 ■ Less punitive laws for minor and 
non-violent drug infractions are 
the best single means of reducing 
incarceration of women and thus 
incarceration-related abuse. The 
authors suggest a comprehensive 
set of new policies, targets, metrics 
and indicators to reverse or at least 
mitigate these impacts.
Men and boys are indeed put at risk of HIV 
and hepatitis C by prohibitionist policies that 
impede access to and use of prevention and 
care services, but women and girls virtually 
always face a higher risk of transmission of 
these infections. Men suffer from unjust 
incarceration for minor drug offences, but 
in some places women are more likely 
than men to face harsh sentences for 
minor infractions. 
Treatment for drug dependence is of poor 
quality in many places, but women are 
at an especially high risk of undergoing 
inappropriate treatment or not receiving 
any treatment at all. All people who use 
drugs face stigma and discrimination, but 
women are often more likely than men to be 
severely vilified as unfit parents and ‘fallen’ 
members of society.
As other papers in this report highlight, 
criminalisation and stigmatisation of 
those at greatest risk of HIV infection fuels 
the epidemic. People who inject drugs 
experience all of this and, consequently, 
they account for 30% of new HIV infections 
outside of sub-Saharan Africa.1 In China, 
Malaysia, the Russian Federation, Ukraine 
and Vietnam, they account for 67% of all 
HIV cases.2
This paper elaborates on the gender 
dimension of drug policy and law with 
attention to the burdens that ill-conceived 
policies and inadequate services place on 
women and girls.
 
whaT The un anD oTheR 
inTeRnaTional boDies say
In a resolution in 2005, the UN Commission 
on Narcotic Drugs (CND) formally recognised 
the ‘adverse impact of drug use on women’s 
health, including the effects of fetal exposure’ 
and urged member states to implement 
‘broad-based prevention and treatment 
programmes for young girls and women’ and 
to ‘consider giving priority to the provision of 
treatment for pregnant women who use illicit 
drugs.’3 It also asked the UNODC to include 
more gender-disaggregated information in 
its drug reports. A 2012 CND resolution noted 
that ‘women with substance abuse problems 
are oft deprived of or limited in their access 
to effective treatment that takes into account 
their specific needs and circumstances.’ It 
urged member states to ‘integrate essential 
female-specific services in the overall design, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation 
of policies and programmes addressing 
drug abuse and dependence,’ including 
the integration of ‘childcare and parental 
education’ in treatment services. It further 
encouraged members states to ‘take into 
account the needs of women who have 
experienced sexual and other violent trauma 
related to drug abuse’ in their programmes.4
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The UN Special Rapporteur on Violence 
Against Women, Rashida Manjoo, reported 
to the   General   Assembly in 2013 that 
drug laws and policies ‘are a leading cause 
of rising rates of incarceration of women 
around the world’ and expressed concern 
that in some countries ‘women who 
commit relatively low-level drug crimes’ 
are more likely to be handed long prison 
sentences than men who commit major 
trafficking offences. She highlighted that 
‘[w]omen who commit relatively low-level 
drug crimes find themselves serving prison 
time while more serious offenders often 
escape imprisonment by entering into plea-
bargaining deals.’5
In its 2014  report on Brazil, the Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW) highlighted the 
large increase in the number of women 
in prison and pretrial detention in the 
country, ‘a large proportion of them…
imprisoned for committing drug trafficking-
related offences, in particular for having 
transported drugs (mules) at the request 
of their partners.’ CEDAW urged Brazil to 
help women avoid drug-related activities 
and incarceration and also to improve the 
conditions of those incarcerated, including 
ensuring housing in facilities separate from 
men and providing appropriate services 
for pregnant women.6 In a 2014 policy 
briefing UN Women emphasised that 
‘women’s involvement in drug use and the 
drug trade reflects the decreased economic 
opportunities and lower political status that 
women face in everyday life.’10 The agency 
stresses that women who participate in the 
drug trade, usually in low-level positions, 
often do so because they ‘lack education 
[and] economic opportunity or have been 
victims of abuse.’11 UN Women also cites 
gross inequality in access to health services 
for women who use drugs. Meanwhile, in 
2015, the UNDP noted that the ‘corruption, 
violence and instability’ fuelled by the war 
on drugs generates ‘large-scale human 
rights abuses’ and ‘discrimination and 
marginalisation of people who use drugs, 
indigenous peoples, women and youth.’ It 
also highlights the high rate of drug-related 
incarceration of women and its impact on 
children and families as a problem of human 
development.12 
 
issues ReleVanT To woMen
 
Women anD DRug-RelateD 
cRiminal justice
Avoid and reduce drug-related 
incarceration for women:  
In the supply chain of illicit drugs, women 
and girls are usually minor links, but 
they suffer a disproportionate burden in 
application of criminal law. Globally, women 
are incarcerated more for drug offences, 
mostly non-violent, than for any other 
crime.13
In Latin America, between 2006 and 2011, 
the female prison population increased 
from 40,000 to more than 74,000, some 
facing sentences as high as 30 years, largely 
because of drug convictions.14  As shown in 
Figure 1 (below), from 1977 to 2013 in the 
US, the incarceration of women rose nine-
fold, due in great part to harsh drug laws. 
The burden of this mass incarceration fell on 
women of colour, though they did not have 
higher rates of drug use than white women.15 
In many countries, a higher percentage of 
women than men are imprisoned for drug-
related offences (though the number of 
women is smaller).16 Among the national 
figures cited by the UN Special Rapporteur 
on violence against women are the following: 
about 50% of women in state custody in 
Spain and Estonia were convicted of drug 
offences, almost 70% in Tajikistan, 68% in 
Latvia, about 40% in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan 
and 37% in Italy. In Ecuador, 77% of the 
women in state custody were convicted of 
drug offences, compared to 35% of the male 
prison population.17 
 
Reduce the disproportionate impact of 
mandatory minimum sentences  
on women:
The Special Rapporteur on violence against 
women noted that the relative harshness 
of drug sentences handed down to women 
is likely because they often do not have the 
insider information that enables accused men 
to plea-bargain or make deals with prosecutors 
in exchange for lighter sentences.18 In some 
countries, conspiracy laws, which may have 
been designed to ensnare collaborators of 
traffickers and organised crime networks, 
are often applied to women who had no 
role in major trafficking but lived with or 
drove the car of someone involved with 
 
petty drug sales.19 Mandatory minimum 
sentences exacerbate the vulnerable position 
of women, particularly when they have no 
leverage in plea-bargaining.20 Women are at 
the lowest rung of the trafficking hierarchy, 
and imprisoning them has little impact on the 
larger drug trade; as long as there are poor 
and vulnerable women, there will be couriers.
There is some progress being made on this 
front in Latin America, specifically Bolivia, 
Costa Rica and Ecuador, which have passed 
laws that take into consideration the 
precarious and often low-level position of 
women involved in the drug trade.21
Understand the socioeconomic drivers of 
engagement with the drug trade:
Prosecution of women for drug-related 
offences also rarely takes into account the 
reasons why women may be involved with 
drugs in the first place, which may include 
pressure from a sexual partner, histories of 
domestic violence or other abuse, lack of 
mainstream livelihood opportunities, and 
lack of accessible treatment programmes 
and related social support.22 Prison sentences 
are likely to exacerbate most of these factors.
In many countries, women who are 
convicted for drug offences tend to be socio- 
economically marginalised and are often 
single parents.24 They often share a similar 
socioeconomic profile; poor, low levels of 
education and frequently belong to ethnic 
minorities, and ‘many of them have been 
deceived, threatened or intimidated into 
transporting drugs.’25 A recent report by The 
Research Consortium on Drugs and the Law 
(CEDD) underscores the fact that drug law 
implementation is selective and ‘generally 
it is those who are the poorest and weakest 
who are punished, and women in situations 
of social exclusion and/or vulnerability are 
disproportionately affected.’26
Quantify, understand and reduce  
the impact on the children of  
incarcerated women: 
The impact on children of the mass 
incarceration of women is profound. Large-
scale incarceration of women in the US in 
recent decades, for example, is responsible 
for a sharp increase in placement of low-
income children in foster care in many US 
states as extended family members are 
unable to cope.27 Children may be impeded 
from visiting their mothers in prison because 
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women’s penal institutions are few and 
far between in many countries. Policies 
differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction as to 
whether women who give birth in prison are 
permitted to keep their infants with them,28 
but it is likely that women judged to be unfit 
mothers because of past involvement with 
drugs will have difficulties making the case 
to keep their infants. Women incarcerated 
for drug offences are often single mothers 
and heads of household, with responsibility 
for caring for children and other family 
members, so ‘their incarceration has a bigger 
impact on the destruction of family ties 
and greater implications for children’s best 
interests’29 than the incarceration of men. 
Provide effective treatment and 
complementary social services to women 
with drug dependence:
Women who need suitable treatment for 
drug dependence rarely have access  to 
it in prison or pretrial detention (see next 
section). Incarcerated women, especially 
marginalised and socioeconomically 
disadvantaged women, are highly vulnerable 
to violence and sexual abuse in detention, 
as has been documented in many places, 
but incarcerated women who are drug-
dependent (and unable to obtain treatment) 
may be more likely to face violent extortion 
and abuse than other imprisoned women.30
Improve community reintegration post-
incarceration, including employment 
opportunities:
After release, the ex-convict status of 
women may limit their opportunities for 
employment and social engagement and 
in some cases their families’ access to social 
or economic support programmes. For 
example, a number of US states require drug 
testing of people as a condition of receiving 
housing or welfare benefits, a policy that has 
been considered in other countries and has 
been criticised (and in some cases opposed 
in US courts) for stigmatising the poor, 
not identifying people with problematic 
drug use, unjustifiably invading privacy, 
and exacerbating discrimination based on 
race and ethnicity.31 Women may also have 
difficulty regaining custody of their children 
if they have been placed in foster care, 
particularly if women also face barriers to 
employment.
Women, DRug DePenDence anD 
DRug tReatment
Remove barriers to treatment - particularly 
the fear of losing custody of children:
When women do figure into drug policy 
decision-making, it is often around 
policymakers’ stated concern about drug 
use in pregnancy and its impact on the 
new-born. Some countries give pregnant 
women priority in treatment services for 
drug dependence, as recommended by 
UNODC.32 Unfortunately, as UNODC also 
notes, women, including pregnant women, 
in much of the world ‘encounter significant 
systemic, structural, social, cultural and 
personal barriers’ to obtaining good-quality 
drug treatment, including ‘lack of childcare 
[in treatment programmes] and punitive 
attitude toward parenting and pregnant 
women, which makes them fear losing 
custody of their children and prevents them 
from seeking treatment early enough.’33
In a number of countries in Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia, for example, being in 
treatment for a drug problem means being 
registered as a drug user, which in turn may 
be automatic grounds for losing custody 
of a child.34 In Russia, pregnant women 
registered as or otherwise judged to be drug 
users reported having their children taken 
away from them in the maternity ward soon 
after birth.35 UNODC notes that in a number 
of countries, drug use during pregnancy 
can result in automatic criminal charges 
and incarceration for the duration of the 
pregnancy and sometimes beyond.36
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Figure 1. Number of Women in US State and Federal Prisons, 1977-201323 
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Recognise that poverty, social exclusion, 
malnutrition, and violence frequently 
have much greater impacts on prenatal 
and neonatal health than maternal drug 
consumption patterns:
Unfortunately, concern for pregnant women 
with respect to drugs is often based on ill-
informed ideas about drug dependence 
and pregnancy. The notion of babies ‘born 
addicted’ has been popularised in mass 
media with no grounding in science. It has 
been known for over 20 years, for example, 
that the extensive portrayal in the US of a 
generation of ‘crack babies’ who would be 
mentally handicapped for life was a vilifying 
construction by media and political leaders 
with no basis in reality.37 A large body of 
research indicates that the effects of cocaine 
exposure in utero are not associated with 
long-term intellectual or behavioural 
deficits.38  Rather, it is the circumstances of 
poverty, social exclusion, malnutrition, and 
violence in which many drug using women 
are trapped, partly as a result of the ‘war on 
drugs,’ that affect their children’s opportunity 
to have access to health and education 
services on par with other children.39 Still, 
erroneous ideas about neonatal ‘addiction’ 
circulate and gain a foothold in the popular 
mind, even to the point of calling into 
question decades of research and WHO 
endorsement of the effectiveness of 
opiate substitution therapy in pregnancy.40 
These ideas also reinforce stigma and the 
demonisation of women who use drugs.
Strive toward providing destigmatised, 
affordable, scientifically sound, 
gender-appropriate treatment for drug 
dependence:
Even if women have the courage to seek 
treatment, in many countries affordable, 
scientifically sound, gender-appropriate 
treatment for drug dependence is a 
distant dream. Treatment services are 
rarely designed specifically for women, 
even though women differ greatly from 
men in their more rapid progression to 
dependence, their responses to treatment 
and the physical and psychological 
comorbidities they experience.41 An 
international review of literature—though 
research unfortunately remains sparse 
from many parts of the world—found that 
compared to men, women who seek drug 
treatment are younger and less educated 
and are more likely to be unemployed, have 
dependent children, and/or suffering from 
anxiety, depression and suicidal thoughts.42 
Programmes that seek to instil guilt about 
drug use are ill-suited for women already 
burdened with guilt and shame. For women, 
a treatment facility that lacks child care or 
does not allow them to bring their children 
may be a serious barrier to seeking or 
staying in treatment. Women may also be 
less likely than men to have the disposable 
income for costly treatment services or for 
transportation to far-away services.
While research indicates that pregnancy 
can be a powerful motivator to seek drug 
treatment, in places where drug use is 
criminalised or where drug use can lead to loss 
of child custody, as noted above, pregnancy 
perversely can be an impediment to seeking 
care.43 Perhaps most importantly, services 
designed for women need to address the 
profound stigma and demonisation faced by 
women who use drugs, since they are often 
quickly branded by society as immoral and 
unfit mothers.
Women, hePatitis c anD haRm 
ReDuction
Harm Reduction, endorsed by the WHO, 
UNODC, and UNAIDS, effectively reduces HIV 
transmission among people who inject drugs 
and provides other measurable benefits to 
their health and communities. Though an 
increasing number of countries are including 
harm reduction in their national policies and 
strategic plans, there remains a significant 
gap between what we know works and what 
is actually being done.44 For example, in 
2012, of the 158 countries with documented 
injecting drug use, only 86 had implemented 
needle and syringe exchange programmes. 
And of these, only a handful were distributing 
the recommended 200 needles/syringes per 
drug user per year.45 The reasons that HIV is 
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so prevalent among injecting drug users, 
according to UNAIDS, are criminalisation 
and punitive laws, absent or inadequate 
prevention services, widespread societal 
stigma and lack of investment.46
In many countries, there is a higher 
incidence and prevalence of HIV among 
female injecting drug users (IDUs) than male. 
Studies in nine European Union countries 
showed that the average HIV prevalence 
was more than 50% higher among women 
IDUs than their male counterparts.47 
In Yunnan Province, China, HIV prevalence was 
significantly higher among women IDUs than 
among male IDUs,48 and in Mombasa, Kenya, 
the prevalence of HIV infection was 50% among 
all IDUs, but 85% among women IDUs.49
Many countries do not report HIV prevalence 
for women who inject drugs, but in UNAIDS’ 
2014 compilation of available data, the 
pooled HIV prevalence among women 
who inject drugs was 13% compared to 
9% among men from the same countries.50 
Some of the highest HIV prevalence rates 
are among women sex workers who inject 
drugs.51 The lack of investment in harm 
reduction services in many parts of the world 
affects both women and men, but women 
face HIV risks and barriers to seeking and 
using services that are specific to them.
The time of initiation to injection is the 
highest-risk period for transmission of HIV 
and hepatitis B and C.52 Evidence from 
some parts of the world indicates that when 
women are new to injecting drugs, they may 
rely on a sexual partner or other person to 
prepare the drug and actually inject them. 
This scenario may mean that women are 
more likely to be injected by used and 
potentially contaminated equipment or  with 
contaminated solutions.53
Where violence or trauma is also part of 
the picture, the risk may be even greater. 
Research from some countries suggests that 
women who use drugs are at very high risk 
of sexual and physical violence, especially 
from sexual partners, and particularly when 
they require assistance from partners in 
injecting or obtaining drugs.54 In general, the 
intertwining of drug-related and sex-related 
HIV risk is frequently prominent in the lives 
of women who inject drugs but infrequently 
addressed in programmes.
As suggested by UNAIDS’ figures, women 
who use drugs and engage in sex work are 
at very high risk for HIV contraction, as well 
as magnified stigma and criminalisation, 
which are powerful barriers to seeking and 
using health services. There is significant 
overlap between sex work and drug use in 
many countries. Recognising that stigma 
makes data on this subject somewhat 
incomplete, the UN Reference Group on 
HIV and Drug Use cites estimates that 15%–
66% of women who inject drugs in the US 
have engaged in sex work at some time, 
20%–50% in Eastern Europe, 49%–94% in 
Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia and Azerbaijan 
and 21%–57% in China.55 The Reference 
Group, which reviewed a large number of 
studies, suggests that the risk from sex, 
particularly where sex workers are unable 
to demand condom use, and injection use 
together make for very high rates of risk of 
HIV contraction that is further, and too often, 
compounded by violence, including sexual 
violence (see also next section).56 It is also 
the case that women who use drugs may 
not identify themselves as sex workers even 
if they trade sex for drugs or money when 
they need to.
Underinvestment in proven harm reduction 
services is a central challenge in national 
and global responses to HIV and hepatitis C. 
Where services exist, they are rarely tailored 
to the needs of women who use drugs. For 
example, they rarely take into account child 
care and other demands on women’s time, 
do not take measures to address violence 
that women might face at home, from 
police or other men using the services or 
help  women  to  overcome deep stigma 
and social vilification.57 A study in Ukraine, 
Russia and Georgia found that women who 
injected drugs frequently relied on their 
boyfriends or spouses to go to the needle 
exchange, largely because women’s drug 
use is so deeply stigmatised and needs to 
be kept secret, thus depriving women of the 
counselling and support they could have 
received.58 The study also demonstrated 
that when harm reduction services helped 
women with child-care, supplies, advice, 
and made sure that welcoming women 
counsellors were present, women used the 
services more.59
Whatever the accessibility and quality of harm 
reduction (and drug treatment) services that 
may be available to women, these services 
are rarely integrated with reproductive 
health services. Women who use drugs may 
be in particular need of reproductive health 
information and care. UNODC notes that 
cocaine and many opiates may interfere with 
the menstrual cycle such that women may 
be at risk of unplanned pregnancy or may 
be unaware of being pregnant and thus may 
delay seeking prenatal care or drug-related 
health services.60 Integrated reproductive 
and drug-related services—or easy referral 
between the two by health professionals 
aware of the links—are needed but are often 
lacking.
Given the high rate of arrest and detention 
of women for drug-related offences in many 
places, it is especially important that harm 
reduction services be available to women 
who are in state custody, which is always 
a high-risk environment for HIV. A WHO 
review of data from numerous countries 
found that women in prison had consistently 
higher prevalence of both HIV and hepatitis 
C than incarcerated men.61 From needle 
exchange and opiate substitution to 
peer-led information and support 
programmes for people who use or used 
drugs, harm reduction programmes are 
less available in women’s than in men’s 
detention facilities.62 In Kyrgyzstan, for 
example, where methadone and sterile 
injection equipment are both available 
in some men’s prisons and in Georgia, 
where methadone is available to male 
prisoners, these services are not available 
to incarcerated women.63
In Russia,  
pregnant women  
registered as or otherwise 
judged to be drug users 
reported having their 
children taken away from 
them in the maternity 
ward soon after birth.’
‘
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Policy Goals: Empowering Women in Harm 
Reduction Services: 
 ■ Programmes that offer low-threshold 
access to services such as centres 
that are only for women or that have 
women-only hours. Operational 
hours should be set at times that 
suit the needs of their clients who 
may be working or responsible for 
childcare. Centres located in areas/
neighbourhoods that are convenient 
to women as well as to particular 
minorities  
and migrants.
 ■ Programmes that are welcoming  
to mothers by offering safe, clean, 
age-appropriate spaces where 
children can stay while their 
mothers receive care. Women do 
not want their children to know 
they are drug users so they require 
programmes that provide services 
that do not interfere with their family 
responsibilities.
 ■ Centres that support rather than 
interfere with their client’s other 
commitments will increase their 
chance of success. To that end, mobile 
dosing services and take-home 
dosing are important features of such 
treatment and should be made widely 
available.64 Also, creating services and 
policies that allow women flexibility 
in the frequency of their visits, such 
as increasing the number of needles/
syringes that can be exchanged per 
visit.
 ■ Integrated services that incorporate 
sexual and reproductive health 
education and services and that 
network with women’s shelters, 
domestic violence and rape 
prevention, and drug treatment.65
 ■ Programmes that address the unique 
needs of specific sub-populations 
such as drug-using sex workers, 
women in prison, transgender 
women, and women who have sex  
with women.  
Overall, efficient and effectively delivered 
services depend on the availability and 
analysis of gender and age disaggregated 
data specifically on addiction, drug use, 
and service access among women and girls. 
They also depend on drug laws that facilitate 
rather than deter provision of and access to 
services for women. Institutionalised stigma 
and discrimination must be addressed. Legal 
literacy and services can be offered that 
empower people who inject drugs and law 
enforcement and healthcare personnel can 
be sensitised to challenge discrimination 
and abuse. People who inject drugs know 
better than any of us their experience and 
we can empower them to support their 
peers and be active in the HIV response in 
their communities.66
violence anD abuse
Studies show that women who use drugs are 
more likely than men to have experienced 
physical and/or sexual abuse.67 In a recent 
survey in Kyrgyzstan, 81% of women in 
harm reduction programmes reported 
surviving sexual, physical or other injurious 
violence at the hands of their partner, family 
or police.68 In the US, surveys have reported 
that 25%–57% of women in drug treatment 
programmes experienced intimate partner 
violence in the previous year compared 
to 1.5%–16% in the general population.69 
Exposure to gender-based violence has 
a profound effect on women’s health: 
it intensifies the risk of HIV by limiting 
women’s ability to negotiate safer sex and 
injection practices, and women’s attempts 
to seek and use drug treatment, HIV 
prevention programmes or other services 
are often sabotaged or discouraged when 
they are in abusive relationships. Despite 
the critical need, anti-violence services 
remain largely unavailable to women who 
use drugs. Providers at services responding 
to the needs of people who use drugs or 
sex workers often lack necessary knowledge 
and skills to address gender-based violence, 
while anti-violence shelters often explicitly 
ban women with criminal records, resulting 
in a service gap. In her 2011 report, the UN 
Special Rapporteur on violence against 
women asserted that unpreparedness of 
domestic violence shelters to serve women 
who use drugs constitutes a human rights 
violation.70
Women who use drugs are also deterred 
from seeking help due to their criminalised 
status. Criminalisation of women who use 
drugs — whether by law or just by treating 
women who use drugs as criminals 
without formal legal grounding— makes 
it extremely difficult for women to report 
violence to police and to seek safety, 
justice and essential health services. 
Some 60% of women who participated 
in the study in Kyrgyzstan had sustained 
injuries as a result of abuse but did not 
seek medical care out of fear of arrest 
and even greater violence.71 In some 
countries, such as Georgia, in order to be 
placed in a shelter, women are required 
to report violence to police and thus 
face the risk of arrest for drug use. In 
Russia and the US, being identified as a 
drug user might trigger child protection 
agencies to remove children from their 
parents, which further discourages 
women from seeking help in situations 
of violence. The existing service gap 
in combination with repressive drug 
policies leaves women entrenched in 
situations of abuse, without access to 
healthcare, safety or justice.
Criminal networks controlling drug 
markets may effectively be more 
powerful than police and may engage 
in abuse of women and girls with 
impunity. In Colombia, for example, 
the leader of the Urabeños, a criminal 
network judged to be the largest drug 
trafficking organisation in the country, 
has been reported to capture young 
girls into sexual slavery, often luring 
girls from impoverished communities 
with luxury items.72 High-level drug 
traffickers in Mexico, including the 
notorious Zeta cartel, have been 
implicated in kidnapping of women 
and girls and using them as sex slaves, 
as well as engaging in international sex 
trafficking.73
Women anD cRoP eRaDication
Eradication of drug crops — poppy, 
coca leaf and cannabis — is pursued 
as a central element of drug control in 
a number of countries. Aerial spraying 
of coca fields in the Andes usually with 
the herbicide glyphosate, although 
recently halted in Colombia, has been 
widely condemned as ineffective in 
reducing overall production of coca 
and toxic to the environment and the 
people in it.74 There is some evidence 
that exposure to glyphosate — which is 
unavoidable for communities subjected 
to aerial spraying — is associated with 
miscarriage or premature delivery 
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among pregnant women.75 The insecurity 
associated with displacement caused by 
crop eradication as well as the presence of 
military and paramilitary eradication teams 
in communities is likely to affect women 
disproportionately.
ConClusions anD 
ReCoMMenDaTions 
foR MeTRiCs
 
The widespread recognition of the failure 
of the war on drugs has come at an 
enormous cost to women. By compounding 
and perpetuating women’s existing 
vulnerabilities and the discrimination they 
face, punitive drug policy regimes function 
as a tool of further oppression. For all the 
terrible impact that criminalisation and 
incarceration of women involved with drugs 
has had on their lives and their families, there 
is no evidence that it has deterred drug use 
or marketing.
But the story does not need to end there. In 
drug policy reform debates and movements 
happening around the world, the rights of 
women should be a central concern. As noted 
by UNODC, The International Network of 
People who Use Drugs (INPUD), UN Women, 
and the WHO, drug policy reform must 
recognise that the vast majority of women 
arrested and incarcerated for drug offences 
have not committed a violent crime or are 
first-time offenders, and harsh punishments 
in these cases are disproportionate and 
unjust, both to them and to their families.76 
Less punitive laws for minor and non-
violent drug infractions are the best single 
means of reducing incarceration of women 
and thus incarceration-related abuse. Such 
measures will also reduce stigma and enable 
women to have better access to services in 
the community.
In addition to law and policy reform along 
these lines, policies and programmes should 
incorporate and pursue the following goals 
and practices:
 ■ Collect and use gender-
disaggregated data on drug use 
and drug-related health and social 
services, but without invading 
women’s privacy or contributing to 
stigma.
 ■ Ensure access to affordable, gender-
appropriate and non-judgmental 
drug dependence treatment, harm 
reduction and other drug-related 
healthcare for women, and integrate 
these services with reproductive 
healthcare, and other services 
sought by women to maximise 
convenience, accessibility, and 
coherence of care. Services should 
be accessible to women caring for 
children and should incorporate 
supportive child-care services and 
counselling as much as possible.
 ■ Ensure availability and accessibility 
of appropriate, good quality, non-
discriminatory anti-violence services 
for all women in need, regardless of 
their drug use status and without 
involving the police or other 
criminal justice system actors.
 ■ Ensure that treatment for drug 
dependence and harm reduction 
services are available to women in 
the custody of the state (prison or 
pretrial) on a level equal to those 
offered to men and women in the 
community and that services are 
non-stigmatising and independently 
monitored.
 ■ Ensure integration of respectful 
and good quality harm reduction, 
drug treatment, and reproductive 
health services — or ready referral 
mechanisms among the three — to 
enable pregnant women with opiate 
dependence to have easy access 
to opiate substitution therapy, for 
example, and women living with 
HIV or HCV to prevent vertical 
transmission of these infections.
 ■ Institute measures to reduce 
violence and abuse against 
incarcerated women, including 
functioning mechanisms of 
complaint and redress.
 ■ Train police on supportive and non-
judgmental approaches to dealing 
with women involved with drugs, 
including referral to appropriate 
services, and establish means of 
police oversight and complaint and 
redress mechanisms for persons 
claiming police abuse.
 ■ Develop humane policies for 
protecting families against arbitrary 
removal of children from the 
custody of their mother (or father), 
with meaningful participation of 
women who use drugs, respecting 
the fact that drug use alone is not 
evidence of child neglect or harm.
 ■ Ensure meaningful participation 
of women who use drugs in 
policy and programme planning, 
implementation and evaluation.
UN agencies have produced numerous 
technical documents on women and drugs, 
particularly on improving health services, 
including HIV prevention, for women who 
use drugs and women in prison settings.7 
Together they suggest specific metrics, 
indicators and targets, including:
1.     Reducing incarceration.
a. Women in prison suffer a higher 
prevalence of HIV; are vulnerable 
to gender-based sexual violence; 
may engage in risky practices such 
as tattooing and injecting drug 
use.
b. Women in prison tend to be 
young and many are mothers, with 
children living with them in prison 
or in care outside.
c. Many women in prison are 
pregnant and give birth in 
prison with minimal access to 
reproductive care or post-natal 
services. Meanwhile, an absence 
of HIV treatment services increases 
mother-to-child transmission.8
2.     Reducing legal barriers to accessing 
services, including the criminalisation 
of people who use drugs.
3.     Making all services gender-sensitive 
and integrating close evaluation with 
service user input. 
4.      Improving data collection and 
programme planning, implementation 
and evaluation in line with international 
best practices. 
5.      Focusing on expanding comprehensive 
health and HIV services to  ensure 
they reach all women who need them, 
with a particular focus  on those who 
are incarcerated and women who use 
drugs. 
 
a.     For example: UNAIDS 2014   
        Guidance Note suggests targets of:
         i.     ‘more than 60% of people who 
inject drugs regularly reached     
 by NSPs [or greater than 200 
syringes distributed per person    
 per year].
ii.    more than 40% of people who 
inject opiates reached by OST
iii.   more than 75% of people who 
inject drugs who do not know  
their status and who are HIV 
positive having received an HIV 
test in the past 12 months and 
know their results.’9
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Public Health Research  
in a Time of Changing Drug Policy: 
Possibilities for Recovery?
Joanne Csete
Some of the ways in which the pursuit of drug prohibition has undermined the health of individuals have been well researched and reported in the academic literature.  For example, it is well documented that there is a more pronounced 
risk of HIV linked to drug injection where aggressive policing of people who use drugs 
impedes access to HIV services, and where incarceration for minor drug offenses 
puts large numbers of people at high-risk of HIV, hepatitis C and tuberculosis. 
Documentation of the negative health impacts in the pursuit of drug prohibition 
may be one small factor behind the shift of drug policy in somewhat less repressive 
directions in recent years.  In some cases, fast-growing injection-linked HIV epidemics 
opened a space for public health officials to attend the drug policy round table in 
ways that may not have happened otherwise.
The purpose of this paper is to look 
beyond the impact of drug policy on 
the health of the individual to discuss 
ways in which drug policy and drug 
policy thinking have distorted and 
limited public health science and 
undermining the use of public health 
research and practice as tools to address 
drug problems.  
Public health as a progressive policy 
discipline has long had a focus on equity, 
especially equity in access to health 
services.  In recent years, energised by 
the work of Sir Michael Marmot with 
the World Health Organization (WHO),1 
social determinants of health has 
become a more codified and central 
approach to thinking about disparities 
in public health services and outcomes. 
Research on the social determinants 
of health outcomes is very pertinent 
to drug problems and the social and 
policy responses to these.  It will be 
argued here, however, that some period 
of recovery and rehabilitation – to 
borrow terms from addiction medicine 
– is likely to be in order to overcome 
the misdirection and undermining of 
public health research that is the result, 
at least in part, of ideologically driven 
drug policies. 
publiC healTh anD 
pReVenTion of DRug  
DepenDenCe anD 
pRobleMaTiC use
 
PReventing What?   
constRuction of the natuRe  
of DRug DePenDence
Prevention of health problems is the 
essence of public health.  Public health 
efforts to prevent drug dependence and 
other problematic drug use, often through 
education programmes aimed at young 
people, are inevitably shaped by dominant 
understandings of the etiology and nature 
of drug dependence.  Considering that 
drug dependence is not a new problem in 
human history, there is a remarkable lack 
of consensus in the medical community 
about the causes and manifestations of drug 
dependence and the most effective ways to 
address and prevent it.  A 2015 exchange 
amongst prominent experts in the field in a 
special issue of Lancet Psychiatry illustrated 
some of the continuing debates on the 
physiological and psychological basis for 
assessing the presence and degree of drug 
dependence in an individual.2  In particular, 
SUMMARY
 ■ Aggressive policing and incarceration 
results in higher HIV, hepatitis C and 
tuberculosis risks. 
 ■ Repressive drug policies have distorted 
and limited public health science and 
undermined the use of public health 
research and practice as tools to address 
drug problems. 
 ■ There is a remarkable lack of consensus 
in the medical community about the 
the causes and manifestations of drug 
dependence, and the most effective ways 
to address and prevent it.
 ■ The ‘brain disease’ model reinforces a 
construction of drug use as pathology.  
This pathologising of drug use reinforces 
prohibitionist drug policy by selling 
aggressive drug supply interdiction and 
policing as the most effective means of 
protecting young people’s vulnerable 
brains from the addiction disease.
 ■ There has been a shift in broader public 
health spheres toward using social 
determinants as a ‘central approach to 
understanding disparities in public health 
outcomes.’ However, this has been lacking 
in drug policy because of the ideological 
focus on abstinence. 
 ■ Drug education should aim to help young 
people know how to reduce the harms of 
drug use or how to prevent problematic 
use, rather than pursuing the elusive goal 
of preventing all drug use
 ■ There is a need for greater scepticism 
about the supposed effectiveness of 
drug courts, given lack of rigorous 
evaluation and many concerns about 
implementation.
 ■ Ultimately, UN agencies and treaty bodies, 
‘which should promote evidence-based 
best practices in research and programs, 
have too often been silent or complicit 
with questionable research (and program) 
directions.’
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this exchange centered on the question of 
the scientific justification for understanding 
drug dependence as a ‘brain disease.’
The question is pertinent partly because the 
‘brain disease’ model is so heavily espoused 
by officials of the US government and 
especially the leadership of the US National 
Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), which is 
the dominant funder of drug-related health 
research in the world.3  Since the 1990s 
NIDA, an agency of the US National Institutes 
for Health, has strongly promoted this 
model, citing neuroimaging data indicating 
changes in brain structure and function 
linked to persistent drug use, as well as more 
recent evidence from genetic research. 4  In 
principle, the idea that people’s drug use 
is driven by a clinical brain disease should 
reduce the tendency to stigmatise and 
demonise ‘addicts’ as deviant and morally 
weak.  In addition, as NIDA has emphasised 
in public statements, the model should lead 
to breakthroughs in effective treatment and 
prevention of drug dependence.  
The extensive scientific critiques of this 
model5 are beyond the scope of this paper; 
in brief, neither the stigma reduction nor 
the many new therapies promised by the 
model have materialised. 6 The ‘brain disease’ 
model reinforces a construction of drug 
use as pathology.  Courtwright, amongst 
others, argues that this pathologising of 
drug use is consistent with and explicitly 
reinforces prohibitionist drug policy, through 
facilitating selling aggressive drug supply 
interdiction and policing to the public as the 
most effective means of protecting young 
people’s vulnerable brains from the addiction 
disease.7  Satel and Lilienfeld note that the US 
Congress has readily latched on to the ‘brain 
disease’ idea, a help in generating funding 
for drug control and research.  They conclude 
that in this sense the idea has been a tactical 
victory but a scientific regression.8  
PRevention PRogRammes: 
extenDing the logic of the 
Pathology of DRug use
It is a virtually universal public policy and 
public health goal to prevent initiation 
of use of psychoactive drugs, especially 
amongst young people.  Drug dependence 
as ‘brain disease’ has helped to energise 
classroom education programmes and mass 
media campaigns that depict all drug use as 
deleterious to cognition and brain function. 
In the US, the story of drug education 
programmes meant to prevent initiation of 
drug use amongst young people is one of 
clinging to the non-science that envelops 
the pursuit of a ‘drug-free’ world to the 
tune of billions of taxpayer dollars.  It is also 
a tale of misdirection of drug education 
and prevention programmes and related 
research from which recovery is difficult.  
The academic literature on drug prevention 
programmes is dominated by evaluations 
from the US, in part the result of a 2002 
federal law requiring drug prevention 
programmes to be demonstrably ‘evidence-
based’ as a condition of receiving financial 
support from the government.9  This 
policy resulted from the government’s 
heavy investment in a school-based drug 
prevention programme called DARE (Drug 
Abuse Resistance Education) that turned out 
to be anything but evidence-based. 
DARE was developed in 1983 at the initiative 
of the Los Angeles Police Department to be 
taught in schools by police officers to pre-
teen students.10  Its abstinence-oriented 
curriculum was centered on teaching 
children to ‘say no’ to drugs with lessons 
on the harms of drugs, the model of ‘good 
students’ who refuse drugs and assertiveness 
training for sticking to ‘saying no’ in the face 
of various pressures.  It had a strong focus 
on marijuana and also included lessons on 
the harms of alcohol and tobacco use.  DARE 
was generally very well received by parents, 
politicians and the public, and by the late 
1990s, the programme was implemented in 
about 75% of public school districts in the 
US11 It was backed by hundreds of millions 
of federal dollars and was imitated in other 
countries.12 
A 1994  evaluation of DARE by the US 
Department of Justice found no discernable 
effect on students’ decision-making on 
marijuana or alcohol and only a modest 
short-term effect on initiation of tobacco 
use.13  Over time, more than 30 published 
evaluations of DARE found similarly null 
impacts on initiation of drug use.14  Some 
studies, in fact, found that the programme 
raised the curiosity of children about 
drugs and may have motivated them to 
experiment with drugs or  that exaggerated 
messages about the dangers of drugs, 
compared to the observed experience of 
children, undermined the credibility of 
the programme.15  
Adoption of the policy that federal funds 
would support only ‘evidence-based’ 
prevention programmes for young people 
should have generated a body of excellent 
evaluations.  But many public health experts 
have criticised the quality of the evaluations 
undertaken in response to this policy and 
thus to the funding of programmes that were 
not rigorously ‘evidence-based.’16  Amongst 
the criticisms were the following: 
 ■ Some of the programmes accepted 
as evidence-based were evaluated 
only once or very few times, 
alternatively positive results were 
‘cherry-picked’ and negative 
results were not presented in the 
evaluations or  with no peer review; 
 ■ Some programmes had inherent 
conflicts of interest where, for 
example, evaluations were 
conducted by the creators of the 
programme, including cases where 
the programme creators stood 
to profit financially from positive 
evaluations; and, 
 ■ Perhaps most importantly, 
programmes were chosen more 
because they accorded with  
the abstinence-only orientation of 
US policy than because of  
their effectiveness.
Top-rated academic journals such as 
Addiction have hosted frank discussions on 
how to deal with a US-centered prevention 
literature plagued by ‘pseudoscience’ and 
flawed, ideologically driven research.17  This 
is all in addition to the obvious criticism that 
drug education should aim to help young 
people know how to reduce the harms of 
drug use or  how to prevent problematic 
use, rather than pursuing the elusive goal 
of preventing all drug use. 18 As Skager 
noted, the complete abstinence goal may be 
unrealistic since young people are likely to 
try drugs at some point, but  ‘debate about 
whether this is a realistic goal is off the table’ 
in the political environment of the US,19 
and research on that question is equally off  
the table.  
Treatment of addiction 
can run the gamut from 
quackery to practices that 
include beating, unjustified 
involuntary detention, 
humiliation and torture.
‘
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UN bodies should help to counter the 
influence of politics with guidance based 
on the best science from around the world. 
In the case of drug prevention, the UNODC 
came relatively late onto the scene with 
international drug prevention guidelines 
published in 2013.20  The guidelines 
reflect some consideration of DARE-type 
experiences, suggesting, amongst other 
things, that ‘fear arousal’ about the dangers 
of drugs is unlikely to be effective as a central 
strategy of prevention and that having the 
police deliver drug education may not be 
the best idea.  UNODC stresses that many 
‘powerful risk factors’ for initiating drug 
use – biological processes, mental health 
disorders, family neglect and abuse, poor 
attachment to school and community, for 
example – are  ‘largely out of the control of the 
individual’ so that no amount of preaching 
about behaviour change without addressing 
risk factors is likely to be successful to 
prevent drug use.21  Thus, formative research 
to understand the reality of young people’s 
lives and their motivations and perceptions 
about drugs is needed to inform the design 
of prevention programmes.  Public health 
experts would ideally be situated to conduct 
such research, but funding for research to 
inform reality-based rather than abstinence-
based programmes is scarce.
DRug CouRTs as a Response 
To pRobleMaTiC DRug use
While there may have been quantum leaps 
in the neuro-science of addiction, in recent 
years, as van der Stal notes, ‘evidence-based 
guidelines [for treatment] derived from the 
results of clinical trials are still very limited.’22 
He concludes, like some critics of the ‘brain 
disease’ model, that addiction medicine 
may be too focused on biological aspects of 
dependence and too little on social, cultural 
and juridical factors.23  Moreover, in his view, 
practices reflecting the best evidence are 
not frequently implemented in most places. 
In the worst cases, as noted by human rights 
observers, treatment of addiction can run 
the gamut from quackery to practices that 
include beating, unjustified involuntary 
detention, humiliation and torture.24  
 
 
DRug tReatment couRts
An approach to treatment of drug dependence 
that has political support in many countries 
is the drug treatment court (or just ‘drug 
court’).  This approach was pioneered in the 
US in the late 1980s as incarcerations of minor 
drug offenders were increasing dramatically. 
Drug courts offer court-supervised treatment 
of drug dependence as an alternative to 
incarceration to persons accused of certain 
non-violent drug infractions where drug 
dependence may be at the root of the offence. 
Drug courts have become prominent in 
international drug policy debates because the 
US, the Organization of American States (OAS) 
and UNODC portray them as an important 
option for diverting some drug offenders from 
custodial sentences without decriminalisation 
of those offenses.25 Drug courts are portrayed 
by US officials as key to approaching drug 
dependence as a public health problem 
rather than as a crime. 
About 3,000 drug courts are found in the 
US, 26 and they exist in nine Latin American 
countries, 27 at least four European countries, 
in addition to Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand. 28 In over 90% of the drug courts 
in the US, accused persons are required to 
plead guilty to the charge before them as 
a condition of participation in the court-
supervised treatment,29 raising obvious due 
process questions as well as a barrier to the 
right to health services.
The US government subsidises the 
operations of many county-level drug courts 
and has also funded numerous evaluations 
of drug courts, usually focusing on the 
courts’ impact on recidivism.  The largest was 
a 2011 evaluation covering 23 courts in six 
Academic researchers have identified fundamental problems with the  
claims of the success of the drug courts, including the following:
 ■ As suggested by the CRS review, drug courts have 
‘cherry-picked’ the participants most likely to 
complete treatment programmes successfully so 
they can show good results, and qualify for federal 
support.33  One study found that about one third of 
the ‘patients’ in one drug court jurisdiction did not 
meet clinical criteria for drug dependence.34
 ■ The courts in some jurisdictions punish people who 
‘fail’ treatment by putting them in jail or sending 
them back to the normal adversarial court with 
a guilty plea on their record, which may mean 
a longer sentence than if they had been able to 
argue their case with an attorney.  A 2013 meta-
analysis of 19 studies in the US showed that long 
sentences imposed on people who ‘failed’ treatment 
offset the reduction in prison time represented 
by the ‘successful’ participants.35  Noteworthy is 
that the WHO underscores that treatment of drug 
dependence often needs to be offered more than 
once; relapse is a common outcome.36
 ■ In the US, many drug courts simply forbid 
medication-assisted therapy (MAT) using methadone 
or buprenorphine for opioid dependence as an 
option for court-supervised treatment, often 
because of a judge’s belief that all treatment 
must be abstinence-based.37  As one treatment 
provider noted, this prejudice essentially forces 
people to go to the streets for heroin or diverted 
prescription opioids at a time when use of both is 
on the rise in the US38  A number of cases have been 
reported of deaths from overdose amongst people 
denied MAT by drug courts.39 In 2015, US federal 
authorities said that they would not allocate funds 
to drug courts that refuse to offer MAT at least with 
buprenorphine.40  It remains to be seen whether this 
leverage will be effective.   
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sites, which reported significantly lower self-
reported crime rates in the drug court group 
(24-month follow-up) vs. a comparison group 
and lower official rearrest rates, though the 
latter was not statistically significant.30  Many 
smaller studies by sub-national authorities 
also reported some degree of reduction 
in recidivism.
In 2011, the non-partisan US Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) reviewed 260 drug 
court evaluations, including the government’s 
multi-site evaluation, in its oversight of drug 
court spending.  Of the 260 studies, GAO 
found that less than 20% used sound social 
science principles.31  A particular deficiency 
was the lack of appropriate comparison 
groups.  The Congressional Research Service 
(CRS), a non-partisan research body of the 
Library of Congress, in its review of drug 
court evaluations noted that a much smaller 
number of people were coming through drug 
courts than the number who could benefit 
in theory, suggesting some kind of unstated 
selection process. 32  
A drug treatment court model could 
probably be devised that would be worthy 
of being called a public health intervention. 
Public health research could have helped to 
illuminate good practices and would have 
been beneficial before the rapid expansion 
of these courts around the world.  But, as with 
prevention programmes in the US, there was 
no major effort to ensure that independent 
public health research or expertise was 
informing decision-making.  
 
social seRvices as PaRt of 
ResPonDing to DRug DePenDence
While there is ready recognition, even from 
proponents of the ‘brain disease’ model, 
that both biological and social factors 
are important in the etiology of drug 
dependence, it is striking that there is not 
a larger and more robust body of research 
to guide action on addressing social factors 
in drug treatment activities.  WHO has 
offered guidance for psychological and 
social support only with respect to the best 
researched drug dependence treatment 
– that is, MAT for opioid dependence – 
noting that there is some evidence that 
‘assistance with social needs such as 
housing, employment, education welfare 
and legal problems’ are useful adjuncts to 
treatment programmes, but also notes that 
the research base for this recommendation 
is thin.41
The work of Rhodes on conceptualising 
a multi-level ‘risk environment’ for drug 
use42 is a breakthrough that should guide 
the kind of research WHO calls for in its 
guidelines.  Building on Rhodes’ work, 
public health researchers have begun to pull 
together elements of a social epidemiology 
of drug use and drug dependence.43  This 
conceptual work explicitly highlights the 
limitations of over-reliance on reductionist 
medical approaches to drug dependence. 
Some studies have demonstrated statistical 
relationships between social or community-
level factors and drug use and dependence 
outcomes,44 but, as suggested by van der 
Slat, these do not seem to have added up 
to practical frameworks to guide health 
and social services as part of responses to 
drug dependence. 
A body of evidence that begins to inform 
practical interventions has to do with 
so-called ‘housing first’ approaches to 
drug dependence and mental illness in 
North America.  While many government 
programmes in the past have recognised that 
homelessness or unstable housing is often 
part of the risk environment of drug use, 
proof of abstinence from drug use has often 
been required as a condition of receiving 
public housing assistance.45  The premise of 
‘housing first’ is that stable housing may be a 
pre-condition to enabling drug-dependent 
persons to engage with treatment 
programmes and may thus improve health 
outcomes and reduce health service costs.46 
‘Housing first’ received a major boost in 2012 
when the US Department of Veteran Affairs 
adopted it in responding to homelessness 
amongst military veterans and initiated a 
three-year study of its impact.47  
The literature on housing first approaches 
is thin and fraught with fundamental 
disagreements about methods.  The paucity 
of randomised designs is one criticism;48 
some studies have had very small sample 
sizes;49  others have been criticised for 
making conclusions about drug treatment 
adherence when the studies were not 
designed only to evaluate outcomes related 
to homelessness:50  and some of the research 
may have been compromised by the lack of 
availability of readily accessible treatment 
options, even if stable housing contributed 
to the readiness to seek treatment.51
 Adequately researching housing assistance 
and other possible social support services to 
accompany drug treatment is likely to require 
considerable funding for independent, 
multi-sectoral, large-sample, multi-year 
studies.  It also requires an openness to what 
is essentially a harm reduction approach – 
not insisting on proof of abstinence or proof 
of adherence to treatment programmes, in 
the US in any case, is a break from both the 
abstinence ideal that underpins drug policy 
and from the spirit of long-standing laws 
and policies that deny social benefits to 
people who use drugs or who are convicted 
of even minor drug offenses.52  Although the 
Department of Veteran Affairs is funding a 
major study of ‘housing first’ that will include 
looking at the outcomes of drug treatment, 
it is unlikely that this kind of research will be 
encouraged by NIDA, the government’s drug 
research funding body.
DisToRTing anD DisMissing 
publiC healTh: ReDuCTionisM 
anD esChewing 
haRM ReDuCTion
 
Harm reduction is a central idea of much 
of the pursuit of public health as it relates 
to risky or potentially risky behaviours and 
exposures.  For example, driving motor 
vehicles is a potentially lethal undertaking, 
but rather than banning it, measures are 
instituted to reduce harm.  The link between 
obesity and sugary carbonated drinks and 
the particular harms of this link in low-income 
populations has spawned a body of public 
health research on possible harm reduction 
measures such as taxation, limiting portion 
sizes at the point of sale and disallowing 
soda from food assistance vouchers.53  
But health research on harm reduction related 
to drug production, sale, consumption, 
prevention and care has been limited with 
the exception of research on MAT for opioid 
dependence and on HIV and drug injection, 
though at times both of those have also been 
caught up in drug politics.  It is not correct 
to lay barriers to harm reduction-oriented 
More than 30  
published evaluations of DARE 
found similarly null impacts 
on initiation of drug use. Some 
studies, in fact, found that the 
programme raised the curiosity 
of children about drugs and 
may have motivated them to 
experiment with drugs or  that 
exaggerated messages about the 
dangers of drugs compared to the 
observed experience of children 
undermined the credibility  
of the programme.
‘
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research only at the feet of US policies, but 
the strident anti-harm reduction bent of US 
drug policy and drug-related health research 
funding is influential to some degree and 
not only in the US.  The US objection to 
drug-related harm reduction in arenas such 
as school-based prevention programmes 
and allowing drug court prejudices to 
favor abstinence-based treatment in 
defiance of clinical indication is not always 
clearly explained by policy-makers.  Gil 
Kerlikowske, the US ‘drug czar’ from 2009 to 
2014, said that the term ‘harm reduction’ is 
not used by the government because it is 
associated with the legalisation of drugs.54 
 
It is also not correct to attribute all trends in 
health-related drug policy research to the 
priorities of NIDA, but, again, those priorities 
undoubtedly have had an influence.  NIDA 
has funded some research, including on 
MAT and more recently on effective pain 
management, which has helped move some 
drug-related health programmes in a useful 
direction.  But its public statements about 
priorities for health research at this time 
of shifting drug policy debates generally 
reflect a limited and medicalised view of 
the field.  NIDA’s priorities, as stated in the 
budget request to the US Congress for fiscal 
year 2015, highlighted the agency’s pride 
in being at the center of the 'explosion in 
genetic knowledge,’ 'the advent of precise 
technologies to probe neuronal circuits' 
and other knowledge 'that can be used to 
reduce drug use.’55  Similarly, for FY 2016, 
NIDA proposed spending about half its 
billion-dollar budget on neurological and 
genetic/epigenetic foundations of drug 
'abuse' that 'will revolutionise our ability 
to mitigate or even reverse the deleterious 
effects of addiction.’56 To its credit, NIDA 
is funding work on the long neglected 
area of medication-assisted therapies for 
stimulant dependence.  It also proposes to 
look at the effect of programmes authorised 
by the 2010 Affordable Care Act (known 
informally as ‘Obamacare’), on access to drug 
dependence treatment, on which there is very 
little research.57
NIDA’s priorities for FY2015 and  FY2016 
related to changing state-level marijuana 
policy in the US include longitudinal studies 
to follow the impact of marijuana use on 
the 'developing brain' of adolescents and 
intensification of information programmes 
on the harms of marijuana to counter the 
'dangerous and growing misperception that 
marijuana use is harmless.’58  Though the 
states that have legalised cannabis may fund 
policy-relevant research with their newly 
generated tax revenues, it seems unlikely 
from these statements that NIDA will be 
keen to respond to long-standing calls for 
more funding – and more access to research 
supplies of cannabis – to study, for example, 
medical uses of cannabis,59 or the interesting 
research suggesting that access to medical 
cannabis may be associated with less use of 
prescription opiates.60  As Pardo notes, the 
current policy environment begs for research 
to elucidate lessons of decriminalisation 
and partial decriminalisation experiences of 
Europe with respect to both cannabis and 
other drugs.61  But, he concludes, 'so far, with a 
few exceptions, the literature comparing the 
details of actual and theoretical regulatory 
models is scarce.'62  As jurisdictions seek to 
weigh health measures, taxation and pricing, 
regulation of commercialisation and many 
other factors in this changing environment, 
sustained funding for policy research, 
including in the health sector, would be 
welcome.
It is a badge of honour – though very troubling 
– for the UBC research group that they have 
been attacked in many ways, including the 
impugning of their professional credentials, 
by proponents of drug prohibition.  After 
trying and failing to force a retraction of a 
Lancet article on supervised injection by 
these researchers, a group of organisations 
espousing a ‘drug-free’ society created an 
online publication with the trappings of 
an academic journal of which the raison 
d’etre seemed to be to discredit the UBC 
researchers.65  These organisations went on 
to lodge a formal complaint to UBC alleging 
academic misconduct by some of these 
researchers, charges that were investigated 
and dismissed.66  
At this time of shifting drug policy debates 
and, one hopes, a continued shift to less 
repressive drug policy, public health research 
should ideally be informing new directions 
in drug control policy and programmes.  As 
noted above, in an ideal world, building on 
strides made in research methods to study 
social determinants of health, public health 
research would inform a new generation of 
prevention activities based on the reality 
of risk environments for problematic drug 
use.  It would explore ways in which young 
people can be armed with information to 
protect themselves from the harms of drug 
use without lies or exaggerations.  There 
could be rigorous studies of varied modes of 
community-based care and socioeconomic 
support for people who use drugs and are 
accused of minor drug offences as policies 
evolve away from incarceration in these cases. 
But it may take the courage of the UBC 
researchers and access to large amounts 
of ideologically untied funding for truly 
independent policy-relevant investigations 
to get drug-related public health research 
out of its hunkered-down state.  Drug 
policy researchers in public health, if they 
are not fending off ideologically motivated 
attacks, have found themselves struggling 
for funding to investigate hugely expensive 
government programmes that are 
supported by large, shoddy and blatantly 
politicised bodies of research.  UN agencies, 
which should promote evidence-based 
best practices in research and programmes, 
have too often been silent or complicit with 
questionable research (and programme) 
directions.  New directions in drug policy 
thinking, whether or not they are reflected 
in upcoming UN debates in 2016, should 
mean a new platform, new openness, and 
new funding for cutting-edge drug policy-
relevant public health research not designed 
to serve a prohibitionist agenda.  
Drug courts  
have become prominent in 
international drug policy debates 
because the US, the Organization 
of American States (OAS) and 
UNODC portray them as an 
important option for diverting 
some drug offenders from 
custodial sentences without 
decriminalisation of  
those offenses.
‘
’ 
ConClusions
 
A remarkable body of drug-related health 
research has been generated around policy 
and programme change in the Canadian city 
of Vancouver, largely by researchers at the 
University of British Columbia (UBC).  This 
research includes the most important body 
of peer-reviewed reports about supervised 
injection sites in the world, as well as 
longitudinal studies of housing, employment, 
access to psychological services and 
other social determinants of patterns of 
problematic drug use.63  Some of this work 
was funded by NIDA, particularly in the early 
years of the HIV epidemic in Vancouver.  This 
body of public health research has figured 
prominently in Canadian (and to some 
degree international) drug policy discussions 
and importantly informed judicial decisions 
that protected the supervised injection 
site from closure by the Conservative-led 
government.64
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MeTRiCs
 
Some of the published discussions on metrics for a new drug 
policy66 seem a bit overly optimistic about the possibilities of getting 
governments to turn toward a new set of indicators for judging 
drug policy.  There is no question that governments have too often 
represented their drug policy successes by indicators such as arrests, 
tonnes seized and hectares of drug crops eradicated, but it may be 
too much to presume that numerical targets with respect to those 
indicators are what drives drug policy decision-making.  If that were 
the case, governments would have long ago abandoned their efforts 
and gone back to the drawing board because very few could have 
shown sustained progress through these measures.  It seems unlikely 
that these governments will be easily inspired to adopt indicators of 
public health and welfare, for example, to ‘drive’ the fundamental 
directions of their drug policies.  Indeed, the value of some of the 
preferred indicators in policing-heavy drug policies is that the 
numbers are easy to cook.  The value of ‘metrics’ is probably in many 
cases more based on projecting a certain image than on any rigorous 
reflection of reality.
Muggah and colleagues report that Colombia, for example, is 
interested in new metrics as it is currently rethinking their drug 
policies.67 Colombia, with high-level political leadership and in the 
aftermath of a war of insurgency with enormous implications for 
drug policy, has undergone more reflection on national drug policy 
than most countries.  It will be interesting to see how much of 
such reflection was inspired by concern about whether or not the 
government had employed the wrong indicators to measure the 
impact of policy.  
 
 
With respect to metrics, a first step might be to engage in some harm 
reduction.  Overall, drug policy may not be driven by the rise and fall 
in arrest figures, but if at a human resource management level the 
performance of police is rigorously judged by the number of drug 
arrests, that practice should be stopped, even if larger drug policy 
directions will take time to change.  There is good evidence from a 
number of countries that arrest quotas or targets for the individual 
police officer, especially when linked to salaries or bonuses, will result 
in an unduly large number of arrests of low-level offenders: as those 
individuals are often the easiest to catch.  Resolving bad practices 
such as this should not have to wait for a major upheaval of the 
philosophy of metrics on which drug policy is based.
Another area in which both governments and international agencies 
and experts can do better with regard to metrics is so-called 
alternative development or alternative livelihood programmes 
that UNODC and many international donors have supported. 
Development programmes that are meant to help people cultivating 
drug crops to find other sources of livelihood have been notoriously 
free of evaluation in the way that other development programmes 
have come to be judged.  There have been very few independent 
evaluations of UNODC-supported alternative development 
programmes, for example.68  The impact of these programmes on 
the health and well-being of poor rural households has not been 
evaluated with anything like the standards that have come to be 
routinely brought to bear in most development programmes.  It 
would not require a major overhauling of drug policy to have an 
approach to alternative development programmes for drug crop 
producers that embodies some of the standards of participatory 
development and monitoring and evaluation built in from the 
beginning that have become more common in socioeconomic 
development work. 
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(Mis)understanding the Intersection  
Between Development Policies  
and Data Collection:  
Case Study, Afghanistan1
David Mansfield
Development organisations are often ill at ease when engaging with the challenges of illicit drug production in the global south. Even in countries like Afghanistan, Colombia and Burma where the illicit drugs economy dominates large parts of the 
rural landscape and has a significant impact on both the political economy and macro-
economic indicators, development donors have been reluctant to integrate an analysis 
of the causes and effects of illicit drug production into their programmes and country 
level assessments. 
Their discomfort has multiple causes. For 
one, for those development donors tied 
to the ‘Washington consensus’ and its 
emphasis on ‘market based solutions,’ it is 
perhaps counterintuitive to intervene and 
actively seek to undermine one of the few 
value chains that appears to work in the 
kind of conflict affected environments that 
illegal drug crops are concentrated. Rather, 
donors like the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and the 
Department for International Development 
(DFID) look to work with markets, intervening 
in order to make them ‘work for the poor.’ 
They do not look to destroy a market entirely 
as is the intent of the current international 
control system and would no doubt question 
whether such an aim is achievable.  
A second cause of discomfort has been 
the problem of identifying an appropriate 
development response to illicit drugs 
production, particularly given the benefits 
opium and coca cultivation have delivered to 
the rural households and communities that 
produce them. For example, in Afghanistan 
illegal opium is the largest export; it has 
created an estimated 400,000 direct jobs 
(Full Time Equivalent);2 boosted the legal 
economy, providing livelihoods for farmers 
and those providing agricultural inputs and 
consumer goods; and helped bring 265,000 
hectares of former desert land under 
agriculture.3 Policy makers and practitioners 
are hard pressed to offer examples of 
development assistance that has delivered 
such dramatic outcomes.  
Yet at the same time, in Afghanistan the illicit 
opium economy has led to growing levels 
of corruption; offered a revenue stream for 
private state actors and insurgent groups 
who seek to undermine the legitimacy of 
the central state; and ‘crowded out’ licit 
economic enterprise, a trend that is likely 
to increase in the wake of dwindling levels 
of aid. Furthermore, the concentration of 
opium poppy cultivation in the former 
desert areas of southern and south western 
Afghanistan has led to the intensification of 
agricultural production, including the use of 
harmful pesticides, increased salination and 
ultimately leading to the collapse of rural 
livelihoods for the land-poor and increasing 
rates of outmigration.       
As a dual edged sword, generating both 
benefits and costs for producer countries, 
illicit drug production has typically left the 
development community unaware of how 
to best respond. While in the past there 
was some sympathy for the argument 
that a possible development response 
to illicit drug production in a country like 
Afghanistan was to legalise or regulate 
drug crop production, there is now a 
recognition that this option leads to its own 
development challenges.4 Not least the fact 
that the comparative advantage of a major 
drug producing country like Afghanistan lies 
with illicit, not licit, drug crop production 
and therefore many of the economic 
benefits that opium production has brought 
would be lost to more efficient producers in 
the global north, such as Australia, France 
SUMMARY
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with a host of examples where it has 
been focused to provide largesse and 
political favour to elites, so that they 
will in turn coerce the rural population 
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 ■ The kind of pro-poor development 
outcomes that donors like DFID or the 
World Bank might support are lost or  
merely an externality of a programme 
primarily designed to leverage 
reductions in levels of opium poppy 
cultivation, much of which is only 
short lived.
 ■ Many of the statistics used as both 
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those individuals and communities 
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and Spain. These countries have not only made 
the necessary advances in agricultural inputs 
and techniques but also have the large farms 
necessary for the economies of scale required to 
sell opiates competitively on the international 
market, along with the institutional capacity and 
security regimes required for effective regulation. 
In the absence of the option of shifting to legal or 
regulated production, for both practical and legal 
reasons, many development organisations have 
been left not knowing which way to turn.        
Those advocating for drug control, such as 
organisations like UNODC, have offered a limited 
menu of responses for development donors, 
many of which run contrary to donors’ current 
thinking and practice.  For example, area based 
rural development programmes with the primary 
objective of reducing illicit drug crop production 
- so called ‘Alternative Development’ - have 
long been considered problematic by many 
development organisations.5 Limited in geographic 
scope and often perceived as little more than crop-
substitution, alternative development finds little 
financial support from the main development 
donors within the OECD.6 In Afghanistan, there has 
been the added challenge that this kind of area 
based programme tasked with delivering a wide 
range of services, including physical and social 
infrastructure within a contained geographic 
territory, has been out of line with a development 
architecture and funding that is more sectoral-
based and tied to national programmes.   
The change model that underpins alternative 
development is also far from clear with many 
development donors perceiving it intimately 
tied to coercive measures such as eradication 
and efforts to make development assistance 
contingent on reductions in drug crop cultivation, 
so called ‘conditionality.’ There are many examples 
of alternative development, particularly in 
Afghanistan, where the strategic focus of the 
programme has been to provide largesse and 
political favour to elites so that they will in turn 
coerce the rural population to abandon or reduce 
opium poppy cultivation. The kind of pro-poor 
development outcomes that donors like DFID or 
the World Bank might support are lost or merely 
an externality of a programme primarily designed 
to leverage reductions in levels of opium poppy 
cultivation, much of which is only short lived.                      
In the absence of a change model aligned with 
current development theory and practice, the 
most common response of the development 
community has been to ignore the illicit economy 
altogether and to carry on with its conventional 
development programmes. In Afghanistan it 
has not been unusual to hear the argument that 
any support to legal on-farm, off-farm and non-
farm income will lead to a contraction of the 
illegal economy or at least provide an increased 
portfolio of legal options that farmers can pursue. 
In practice, both illicit drug crop cultivation and 
the legal economy can grow in parallel and it 
is not uncommon for investments in physical 
infrastructure such as irrigation and agricultural 
inputs such as fertilisers, are used to increase the 
amount of land under opium poppy and its yields.7 
Other interventions, some of them ostensibly 
designed to deliver development outcomes, 
such as the increased production of staples or 
high-value horticulture, have marginalised the 
land-poor, leading to changes in land tenure 
arrangements, the migration of vulnerable groups 
and the concentration of drug production in more 
remote and insecure regions.  
In this situation, development donors have 
often argued that it is the responsibility of 
law enforcement to respond to the diversion 
of development investments into illicit drugs 
production or  the relocation of cultivation and 
that these kind of unintended consequences 
should not interfere with the business of delivering 
development assistance. The high price of opium 
poppy, and the alleged insurmountable profit 
of opium production, is cited as justification 
for abrogating responsibility to eradication 
and interdiction teams even if ill-considered 
development interventions may have played a 
role in making matters worse.  The relatively high 
income of those farming opium poppies is also 
used to justify targeting development assistance 
in areas where drug crops are not grown; on the 
basis that those growing illicit drug crops are not 
the ‘poorest of the poor,’ and therefore not part of 
the mandate of the development donors.  
It is the contention of this paper that this 
fundamental misalignment between a 
development community focused on improving 
the welfare of the Afghan population and the 
challenges of addressing widespread illicit drug 
crop production is in large part a function of the 
way that opium poppy and the illicit economy 
is currently perceived and understood - not just 
by policy makers and practitioners but also by 
scholars.  Much of the problem lies with the 
various statistics used to describe and quantify 
opium production in Afghanistan, many of them 
produced by UNODC and cited repeatedly in 
media coverage and the academic literature. These 
statistics shape how we have come to understand 
the scale and nature of the drugs problem and 
thereby have informed policy responses.   
The rest of this paper focuses on a number of 
drug-related statistics, including levels of opium 
poppy cultivation, the number of farmers involved 
in opium poppy cultivation, the reasons why 
farmers grow opium and the economic returns 
to opium poppy cultivation. While it is recognised 
that collecting data on illicit drug crop cultivation 
is fraught with problems, it is critical that policy 
makers and scholars fully understand the veracity 
of this data —its methodological and conceptual 
Area based rural 
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crop production - so 
called ‘Alternative 
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in geographic scope 
and often perceived 
as little more than 
crop-substitution, 
alternative 
development finds 
little financial support 
from the main 
development donors 
within the OECD’
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limitations - before using it as the foundations 
for development programmes or policy 
responses. Indeed, this paper argues that 
many of these statistics have presented a 
simplified and ‘profit maximising’ model of 
the factors influencing farmers’ livelihoods 
choices, which has proven deeply misleading 
and further alienated the development 
community from engaging constructively 
with the challenges of illicit drug production 
in developing countries.   
esTiMaTing opiuM 
poppy CulTiVaTion 
 
Levels of opium poppy cultivation are often 
used as an important metric for judging 
counternarcotics efforts. However, in 
Afghanistan the rise and fall in the hectarage 
of opium poppy has also been used as a 
benchmark for judging the progress of the 
wider statebuilding project; and not just 
at the national level but also tied to the 
performance of individual donor countries 
and their development and security 
investments in specific provinces - most 
notably the US in Nangarhar, the UK in 
Helmand and the Canadians in Kandahar.
While there are obvious problems 
associated with linking the performance 
of counternarcotics efforts  - let alone 
statebuilding - with annual fluctuations in 
opium poppy cultivation, there is the added 
challenge of deciding which figures to use, 
how to account for significant changes 
in methodology over time, as well as the 
problems associated with the disaggregation 
of cultivation data, particularly in what is the 
diverse and dynamic socioeconomic and 
political terrain of rural Afghanistan.   
There are in fact two sources of data on 
the extent of opium poppy cultivation in 
Afghanistan, the UNODC and the United 
States Government (USG). In the past, there 
were wide discrepancies between the 
estimates of opium poppy cultivation by 
UNODC and USG, with a difference of over 
80,000 hectares between the two surveys in 
2004 (see Figure 1). 
Prior to 2002, the UNODC survey was entirely 
formed on a ground-based ‘census’ and while 
pioneering at the time, it had limitations. 
Based on an assessment of reports of where 
cultivation was located, surveyors were 
required to travel to what could be remote 
and insecure villages and visually estimate 
the amount of land under opium poppy 
cultivation.  Incomplete information on the 
whereabouts of opium poppy, insecurity, 
wide scope for human error, inability to 
verify data, and the challenges of supervision 
in the field, were just some of the problems 
associated with the ground survey at the 
time.8
In the 2001/2002 growing season, UNODC 
introduced commercial satellite imagery for 
the major opium producing provinces of the 
south and east, combining it with a ground-
based survey in many of the provinces in the 
center and north where cultivation was not 
as extensive. With support from Cranfield 
University following the results of the 
2004 survey and with closer collaboration 
with USG, the UNODC and USG figures 
subsequently aligned more closely. In 2015, 
further changes in the UNODC methodology 
were made – making comparisons over time 
particularly problematic.9    
While national data had become more 
aligned between UNODC and USG, there 
remain discrepancies at the provincial 
level rendering explanations for shifting 
levels of cultivation at the regional and 
provincial level rather challenging. Part of 
the explanation for these discrepancies is 
the different methodological approaches 
adopted by the two surveys and how they 
calculate the full extent of the agricultural 
areas – the agricultural ‘mask,’ how samples 
are selected and the number of images 
collected. 
These limitations make assessing changes 
in levels of cultivation at the district level 
problematic and severely limit the value 
of using district-level figures for assessing 
progress against opium poppy cultivation, 
as in the case of ‘conditionality’ – where 
development assistance is made contingent 
on reductions in opium poppy cultivation. 
To properly assess changes in cultivation at 
the district or community level, it is necessary 
to conduct a comprehensive review of the 
area being assessed and establish what 
crops are being cultivated. While resource 
intensive, this approach provides detailed 
data on the different crops cultivated in an 
area of interest, can support an assessment 
Figure 1. A comparison of National data on opium poppy cultivation 
 in Afghanistan, 1994-2013 (hectares)
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of the uptake of different legal crops (including 
orchards, wheat and annual horticultural crops) 
and can thereby offer both an assessment of how 
resilient any reduction in opium poppy cultivation 
might be and the impact of efforts to expand the 
cultivation of high-value horticultural crops.  This 
kind of data, produced by USG and analysed by 
Alcis Ltd, has been used as part of the assessment 
of the Helmand Food Zone and has provided 
invaluable data on changing cropping patterns 
over a five year period.10  
This data, combined with detailed fieldwork 
examining the changing socioeconomic and 
political environment and patterns of non-farm 
income has developed an understanding as to why 
changes in cultivation have taken place. It has also 
provided a prognosis as to whether these factors 
would be sustained, and offered insights into the 
unintended consequences of drug control and 
development efforts – not least the likelihood of 
relocation of production to neighbouring areas. 
Unfortunately, it is the emphasis on estimates of 
cultivation at the provincial and district level – many 
of which are of questionable provenance – that has 
become the focus of drug control agencies such as 
UNODC and which has left many policy makers and 
practitioners within the drugs and development 
communities speculating over causality and 
disagreeing over appropriate programmatic 
responses.11
600,000
500,000
400,000
300,000
200,000
100,000
0
2003        2004        2005        2006        2007       2008         2009       2010        2011        2012     
The nuMbeR of faRMeRs 
gRowing opiuM poppy
A further statistic that became a benchmark for 
the scale of the drug problem in Afghanistan and 
was often cited in scholarly and policy papers 
along with the media, was the number of farmers 
growing opium poppy in Afghanistan. This data 
was produced by UNODC between 2003 and 2010, 
with estimates ranging from a low of 245,000 in 
2009 to a high of 509,000 in 2007 (see Figure 2). 
At the time, this was seen as an important metric 
by which to assess the importance of opium 
production to the Afghan economy and how it was 
changing over time. With an average of between 
6.2 to 6.5 people per household, the number of 
people involved in opium poppy cultivation was 
reported to be as many as 3.3 million people or 
14.3% of the total population, in 2007,12 falling to 
6% in 2010.
There are, however, some major challenges 
with this particular metric. The most obvious 
is establishing a meaningful estimate of the 
number of households involved. Here the most 
serious issue is whether farmers are actually in 
a position to answer questions regarding the 
households in the village and their activities to 
the degree of integrity required. This problem is 
Figure 2: Number of households involved in opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan  
reported by UNODC, 2003-2012
There are many 
examples of 
alternative 
development, 
particularly in 
Afghanistan, where 
the strategic focus 
of the programme 
has been to provide 
largesse and political 
favour to elites so 
that they will in 
turn coerce the 
rural population 
to abandon or 
reduce opium 
poppy cultivation. 
The kind of pro-
poor development 
outcomes that 
donors like DFID 
or the World Bank 
might support are 
lost or  merely an 
externality of a 
programme primarily 
designed to leverage 
reductions in levels 
of opium poppy 
cultivation, much of 
which is only  
short lived.                      ’
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compounded when researchers are enquiring about 
sensitive or illegal subjects, phenomena that change 
markedly over time or  practices that are somehow 
concealed or  which take place in private rather than 
public spaces.
Evidence over the last few decades suggests that 
there are significant challenges with regards to the 
knowledge of village members and the veracity of 
their responses about the farming practices of other 
households in the same village. There are further 
concerns regarding the nature of the questions 
asked and whether phenomena are adequately 
defined or understood in the same way by all those 
interviewed. A critical issue is when asked about 
‘the number of households involved in opium poppy 
cultivation in this village,’ do all respondents have the 
same understanding of who should be included? For 
example, where there is a landowner that cultivates 
opium poppy but employs a sharecropper to work 
the land, would this be reported as one household 
or two?  In some cases, particularly in the south 
and east, even if sharecroppers have worked in the 
village for many years, they would not be considered 
as being of ‘this village’ if they did not own land and 
hence would not be included in the response.13 
Further, labourers residing outside the village of 
enquiry but working there during the opium poppy 
harvest as itinerant labourers would not be included 
by those that actually live in the village as being of 
‘this village.’ Nor would these labourers be counted 
elsewhere if they came from a village that had no 
history of opium poppy cultivation, since they would 
not be covered by UNODC’s village survey.   
Meanwhile, UNODC reports that 1.5 million people 
were involved in opium poppy cultivation in 2010, 
a fall of 1.8 million from 2007 when it estimated 
that 3.3 million people were involved. These figures 
were calculated on the basis of an assumed average 
household size of 6.5 people.  However, the National 
Risk and Vulnerability Assessment – which serves 
as Afghanistan’s National Household Survey,14 
suggests a national average of 7.3 persons per 
household, which would result in a markedly higher 
number for the estimated total number of people 
involved in opium poppy cultivation.15 Other data 
collected in the rural areas in which opium poppy 
is grown consistently suggest significantly larger 
household sizes than the national average. For 
instance, the NRVA reported an average household 
size in Helmand province of 9 persons in 2005,16 
while other surveys have consistently reported even 
higher figures of almost 13 household members.17 
Indeed, there are questions about how 
representative national data is of the areas in which 
opium poppy is actually cultivated. The level of 
insecurity tends to limit access for formal surveys 
in the parts of the country where opium poppy has 
become concentrated. There is the added challenge 
that some of these hard-to-reach areas, such as the 
former desert areas in the south, have experienced 
such a dramatic transformation over the last few 
years that many official data collection tools have 
found it hard to keep up. For example, remote 
sensing imagery shows that between 2003 and 2013 
the amount of land under agriculture in the former 
desert areas of south and south-west Afghanistan 
increased by as much as 265,000 hectares, much 
of which was cultivated with opium poppy.18 
Official statistics barely recognise this growth 
or the estimated population of up to 1.2 million 
people that resides there.  At best, the data on the 
number of farmers involved in poppy cultivation in 
Afghanistan was incomplete, while at worst it was 
highly inaccurate and misleading.   
 
The Reasons why faRMeRs 
gRow opiuM
 
Integral to how policy makers and scholars perceive 
illicit drug crop cultivation and those that grow it 
is the data produced on why the crop is grown.19 
Each year since 2006, UNODC has asked a sample 
of farmers the reasons why they cultivate opium 
poppy.20  The high price of opium has typically 
been recorded as the most popular response to this 
question, cited by 41% of respondents in 2006:21 
25% in 2007;22 74% in 2008;23 61% in 2009;24 41% in 
2010;25 59% in 2011;26 44% in 2012;27 72% in 2013;28 
and 44% of those interviewed in 2014.29 In fact, 
‘high price’ has been the most frequent response 
every year of the survey with the exception of 2007 
and 2008, when ‘poverty alleviation’ was the most 
popular response by farmers, cited by 29% and 92% 
of respondents respectively in those two years.30  
In fact, 2008 seems anomalous given the huge 
proportion of farmers citing ‘poverty alleviation’ as 
their reason for cultivating poppy compared with 
other years, where typically no more than 15 per 
cent of those interviewed gave this response.  On the 
surface, the high frequency of this response could 
be a function of negative economic circumstances in 
2008. However, closer analysis suggests it could be a 
methodological issue - 2008 apparently being the 
only year when UNODC reported against multiple 
responses for cultivating opium poppy rather than 
just one. In 2009, the annual opium poppy survey 
reverted back to reporting only a single response 
from farmers. From then until 2014, almost none 
of the other reasons for cultivating opium poppy, 
mentioned so frequently by respondents in the 
2008 survey and recorded in 2007, are cited by more 
than 15% of those interviewed each year,31 and 
the ‘high price of opium’ became by far the most 
frequent response reported each year, irrespective 
of whether opium prices had in fact risen or fallen.      
The difference between what is reported in the 
2007 and 2008 surveys and the responses in the 
It is quite possible for 
a land-poor farmer to 
cultivate opium poppy 
as a means of accessing 
both land – and thereby 
water – as well as credit, 
to achieve the outcome 
of food security, while at 
the same time wishing to 
produce opium to pay for 
his son’s wedding. ’
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2008 report, highlight the conceptual 
and methodological weaknesses of an 
approach that attempts to distil the 
complex and interconnected factors 
that inform household decision-making 
into a single answer.32  At its most basic, 
recording and reporting only one response 
denies the multifunctional role that opium 
poppy plays in rural livelihood strategies. 
Moreover, none of the responses listed and 
tabulated by UNODC are actually mutually 
exclusive. The recording of only one answer, 
without any contextual background on 
those responding, also fails to recognise 
the fact that farmers with different assets 
may weigh the multiple reasons why they 
cultivate opium poppy in quite different 
ways.   
For example, it is quite possible for a land-
poor farmer to cultivate opium poppy as a 
means of accessing both land – and thereby 
water – as well as credit, to achieve the 
outcome of food security, while at the same 
time wishing to produce opium to pay for 
his son’s wedding. Such a marriage would 
achieve a range of other outcomes, which 
might include fulfilling his son’s wishes, 
securing lineage and possibly establishing 
familial bonds with a relatively wealthy 
and influential family in the community. 
Marriage to a more prosperous family 
may in turn secure access to other assets 
in the future, including land, non-interest 
bearing credit (known as qarze hasana) 
or  perhaps to gain the kind of patronage 
that might support another son getting a 
job or even ensure the family’s protection 
from an ongoing or potential conflict with 
a neighbour.  
For this individual farmer, the high price of 
opium is almost irrelevant. He may have 
sold most of his share of the opium crop in 
advance the previous year so that he could 
meet the bride price and secure his son’s 
future wife. He might have also sold what 
little residual opium he had, in the spring 
prior to this year’s harvest, so that he could 
cover his wheat deficit and feed his family. 
The result of these advance sales might well 
be that once the crop was finally harvested, 
he would have little or no opium to actually 
sell on the open market. 
Therefore, for this farmer, the relatively 
high price of opium at the beginning of 
the season would only be important in that 
there might be more land available under 
sharecropping arrangements that year, 
particularly from the influential landowners 
in the village who had established good 
relations with the local security commander 
and possibly anti-government elements, as 
a way of insuring themselves against crop 
destruction. The farmer’s familiarity with 
how to cultivate opium poppy would mean 
that he had an increased probability of 
getting this land and due to the landlord’s 
relationship with local powerbrokers, a 
greater probability of obtaining a yield 
than other farmers who had not built these 
kind of alliances. In this context, ‘high price’ 
may have featured as a response by this 
farmer as shorthand for ‘it works,’ but it is 
importance was rather minor compared to 
the other assets that opium ensured access 
to, some of which the farmer might not 
have even given to the enumerator during 
a short discussion, in his desire to avoid 
disclosing sensitive information on both 
opium production and the household’s 
financial circumstances.
This points to a further problem beyond 
the conceptual problems associated 
with recording and reporting only a 
single answer to a direct question on the 
reasons for opium poppy cultivation: the 
clear challenges of asking farmers direct 
questions about an illegal activity in the 
complex political landscape in which 
opium poppy is grown in Afghanistan.  This 
more direct line of enquiry raises concerns 
over how security issues and the presence 
of armed actors (state, insurgents and 
others) not only impacts on the selection 
of respondents, but also how it affects 
respondents’ answers. There is great potential 
for a bias in favour of more secure, peri-
urban areas on the part of those conducting 
the survey and also the likelihood of social 
desirability bias by respondents.33 However, if 
contextual data is gathered about what shapes 
the decisions of farmers, it could provide a 
basis for recasting the conversation to make 
it less threatening, as well as information to 
support verification of findings.        
In conclusion, both the methods and the 
findings reported are problematic. Reducing 
the myriad of factors that inform poppy 
cultivation to a single response is simplistic 
and potentially very distortionary. It ignores 
how the decision to cultivate is shaped by 
individual, household and community assets, 
values and behaviour. It overlooks the rules 
that govern how households access the 
factors of production and neglects both the 
complex political environment in which opium 
poppy cultivation takes place and the multiple 
and often competing institutional interests at 
play. Finally, it ignores the multifunctional role 
that opium poppy plays in rural livelihoods 
and how these roles vary across different 
socioeconomic groups and locations.
The eConoMiC ReTuRns 
To opiuM poppy
 
The economic returns to opium are typically 
presented in the UNODC annual survey and 
cited by others, as gross returns and compared 
with the gross returns on wheat. This is 
calculated by multiplying the price of opium/
wheat by the average yield. The focus on gross 
returns presents a number of problems: 
 ■ Both estimates ignore the by-products 
of each crop;
 ■ There are considerable differences in 
input costs between opium poppy 
(an input-intensive crop) and wheat 
(typically grown using only family 
labour);
 ■ Opium and wheat are presented as 
the only alternatives to each other and 
mutually exclusive, whereas there are 
a number of other cropping options 
and opium poppy and wheat are often 
grown on the same land over time as 
part of sensible crop rotation practices 
aimed at achieving food security 
through a combination of direct and 
exchange entitlement.        
To properly assess changes in cultivation at the district or 
community level, it is necessary to conduct a comprehensive 
review of the area being assessed and establish what crops 
are being cultivated. While resource intensive, this approach 
provides detailed data on the different crops cultivated in an 
area of interest, can support an assessment of the uptake of 
different legal crops (including orchards, wheat and annual 
horticultural crops), and thereby can offer both an assessment of 
how resilient any reduction in opium poppy cultivation might be 
and the impact of efforts to expand the cultivation of high-value 
horticultural crops ’
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by-pRoDuCTs 
Both opium and wheat have by-products that can 
be either sold or used by the household. Opium 
has two by-products, poppy straw and seed. 
Neither are included in UNODC’s calculations of 
gross returns.  
Poppy straw is typically used as fuel for 
households, saving on the purchase or gathering 
of firewood or alternative fuels. It is estimated 
that a jerib (1/5 of a hectare) of opium poppy 
can provide fuel for a household for around six 
weeks, saving around $1.00 per day.34 The straw 
can also be sold on the open market. 
Poppy seed  can also either be used or sold.35 It can 
be processed into cooking oil by small household 
presses, with the resultant waste, known as 
khunjara, fed to livestock.  An alternative is 
to sell to local traders who sell it on to larger 
traders who transport the seed to Pakistan36 for 
production into edible oils.37 Given the amount 
of poppy seed produced each year and the small 
amount of seeds required for planting, there 
is a significant amount of seeds available for 
sale or use. In the south, one hectare of poppy 
produces an estimated 60 to 75 man of seed 
(the equivalent of 270 to 337.5 kg) which in 2009 
sold for 300 PR/man. Farmers estimate around 
2.5 to 5 man (the equivalent of 11.25 kg to 22.5 
kg) of seed is required to cultivate one hectare 
of opium. This leaves 55 to 72.5 man per hectare 
cultivated (the equivalent of 247.5 kg to 326.25 
kg). If this is applied to the 209,000 hectares of 
opium poppy cultivated in 2013 – and assuming 
the same level of cultivation in 2013/14 – there 
would be a potential surplus of 51,727 to 68,186 
metric tonnes of poppy seed available for sale. As 
late as 2005, poppy seed was still a legal export 
and listed in official statistics.  
With regard to the by-products of wheat 
cultivation, Maletta38 stated that ‘any attempt to 
analyze the wheat crop as an activity conducive 
only to the production of grain would be 
deeply flawed.’ In practice, wheat straw plays an 
important role in the household economy. In 
particular, it serves as feed for livestock during 
the winter months, allowing households to 
retain their animals and sell them in the spring 
at higher prices than if they had to sell them in 
the previous fall. 
As such, wheat straw is an important input 
into livestock and its by-products such as ghee 
(clarified butter), krut (dried cream) and wool. In 
turn, livestock manure is used as a fertiliser and 
mixed with wheat straw for use as household 
fuel.  Wheat straw is also used in the production 
of mud bricks and in house construction.39 The 
yield of wheat straw is high and there is the 
potential for a unit of land to yield up to twice 
the weight of wheat straw as of wheat.40  The straw 
can also be sold on the open market.  Prices vary 
depending on availability and season, but in the 
north during the winter, wheat straw can sell at a 
price that is commensurate with the value of wheat 
grain.41 Consequently, the failure to include the 
value of wheat straw can result in the gross returns 
on wheat being significantly undervalued. 
inpuTs
UNODC’s comparison of economic returns to wheat 
and opium poppy does not reflect the significant 
differences in input costs, despite the input-
intensive nature of opium production. For opium, 
farmers incur higher costs for land preparation; use 
more fertiliser per unit of land; spend money on 
diesel for a tube well or  hire the use of a pump when 
there is insufficient irrigation water. Furthermore, 
while all crops are subject to an agricultural tithe 
payable to the local mullah, opium production 
incurs additional costs in the form of payments to 
corrupt government officials to avoid eradication or 
payments to insurgents.  
Most important is the large difference in labour 
requirements. Opium requires an estimated 360 
person-days per hectare,42 compared to an average 
of only 31 person-days days for rain-fed wheat and 
64 days for irrigated wheat.43 While wheat can be 
largely managed by household labour,44 opium 
usually requires costly labour during the harvest 
season,45 with daily wage rates on occasions 
reaching $2 per person-day in 2013 in areas such as 
Bakwa in Farah and Khaniishin in Helmand.46 
To minimise the need for hired labour, farmers have 
pursued a number of strategies including staggered 
planting, cultivating different varieties of opium 
poppy with different maturation periods, engaging 
in reciprocal labour arrangements, and maximising 
the use of household labour, including women and 
children. Wealthier households have been found 
to prefer to recruit labour under sharecropping 
arrangements, as well as offering advance payments 
on the future opium crop as a way of increasing 
their returns at the expense of farmers with limited 
land and capital. As Figure 3 shows, such is the 
value of the by-products of wheat and the costs of 
inputs for opium production, that the net returns on 
wheat can be comparable with those of cultivating 
opium poppy, for example in 2008.47  Prior to 2008, 
wheat was estimated to have generated higher net 
returns than opium poppy cultivation in a number 
of districts in the southern region of Afghanistan 
in 1994, 1997 and 1999.48  However, it should be 
kept in mind that opium prices in the 1990s were 
considerably lower than they have been over the 
past decade and than they are currently.
When asked about  
‘the number of 
households involved 
in opium poppy 
cultivation in 
this village,’ do all 
respondents have the 
same understanding 
of who should 
be included? For 
example, where there 
is a landowner that 
cultivates opium 
poppy but employs a 
sharecropper to work 
the land, would this 
be reported as one 
household or two? ’
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Table A2.  Estimated net returns on opium poppy and wheat in Helmand Province  
in 2007/2008 growing season (Afs/Jerib)
OPIUM POPPY WHEAT
Amount Unit Cost Total Amount Unit Cost Total
 
Inputs
Seed 4 Kg 0 0 Seed 30 Kg 0 0
Farmpower 2 Hours 500 1,000 Farmpower 1 Hour 500 500
Fertiliser (DAP) 2 Bag 
(50kg)
1,500 3,000 Fertiliser (DAP) 0.5 Bag 
(50kg)
1,500 750
Fertiliser (Urea) 2 Bag 
(50kg)
1,200 2,400 Fertiliser (Urea) 1.5 Bag 
(50kg)
1,200 1,800
Hired Labour during 
harvest
% of 
final 
yield
2.5 kg 3,150 7,875 Hired Labour 0 Person 
days
0 0
Food 20 Person 
days
50 1,000
0 0
Sub Total 15,275 3,050
 
Other costs
Payment to mullah 10% 
of final 
yield
1 Kg 3,150 3,150 Ushr 10% 
of final 
yield
50kg 33.3 1,665
Payment to avoid 
eradication
1 Payment 6,000 6,000
Sub Total 9,150 1,665
Outputs
Opium gum 10 Kg 3,150 31,500 Wheat Grain 500 33.3 16,650
Seed 490 Kg 10 4,900 Wheat Straw 1,000 10 10,000
Fuel (stalks) 42 Days 50 2,100
Sub Total 38,500 26,650
Net returns (family 
labour)
28,950 21,935
Net returns (hired labour) 20,075
Net returns (family labour 
and bribe)
22,950
Net returns (hired labour 
and bribe)
14,075
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soCioeConoMiC DiffeRenTiaTion
 
A further issue is the uneven return to different 
socioeconomic groups involved in opium poppy 
cultivation.   UNODC typically reports gross 
returns per hectare, derived by multiplying the 
average yield by the average farm-gate price at 
harvest time.  The costs of production, as reported 
by farmers, are then subtracted from this gross 
figure to derive a net return per hectare. It is not 
clear whether the production costs reported by 
farmers are actual costs or a percentage of the 
gross.49  In 2013, UNODC reported a gross return 
of $4,500 per hectare and a net return of $3,600 
per hectare,50 the equivalent of $900 and $720 
per jerib, respectively. 
Net returns will vary depending on both the 
inputs and the outputs (including the by-
products) of the final crop. Data highlighted 
elsewhere show how much gross returns 
varied over a relatively short distance in central 
Helmand during the 2013 growing season, 
ranging from $900 to $1,424 per hectare – a 
function of the different yields obtained in the 
former desert areas north of the Boghra canal 
compared to those in the canal command 
area itself. Most importantly, these data offer 
a calculation of the contrasting net returns to 
different socioeconomic groups. It notes the 
different land tenure arrangements, how these 
differ between the canal command area and 
the former desert areas north of the Boghra and 
what this means in terms of the net returns on 
cultivation. It shows how markedly different 
net returns are, depending on whether farmers 
own their own land, whether they use family or 
hired labour, including during the harvest period 
and according to the different sharecropping 
arrangements under which farmers gain access 
to land. At the extreme the net returns in 2013 
to a landowner - who used no hired labour at all 
- varied from $167 per jerib in the former desert 
area to $997 in the canal command area. If hired 
labour was used during the harvest, both saw a 
fall in net returns; however, the landowner in the 
former desert area actually incurred a loss of $34 
for each jerib of opium poppy cultivated.  
The losses are even more significant for 
landowners who met all the costs of production 
but employed a sharecropper who was given 
three quarters of the final crop. Under this 
arrangement, the landowner made a net loss of 
$251 per jerib whereas the sharecropper actually 
made a net gain of $224 per jerib.             
As indicated in another report, not only do 
estimates of the gross (or even net) returns 
fail to capture the on-farm income different 
socioeconomic groups actually derive from its 
sale, but they also ignore the different functions 
opium plays in the wider household economy. For 
instance, for the sharecropper in a former desert 
area, opium not only provides an on-farm income 
with which to purchase food, but it also provides a 
place to live - something he had lost access to when 
opium was banned in the canal command area and 
landowners moved to less labour-intensive crops 
that they could manage with their own family labour. 
As the only crop valuable enough to cover the costs 
of establishing a tube well, as well as the running 
costs, opium production also cross-subsidises the 
production of food crops, such as wheat and a small 
amount of summer vegetable production, as well as 
providing drinking water for the household and their 
livestock. None of these in-kind benefits are included 
in any calculations of the returns on opium poppy, 
but they can be just as important in determining 
levels of cultivation as the on-farm income that 
farmers expect to earn from opium production. 
sTaples VeRsus Cash CRops 
 
It is also important to recognise the different roles 
these crops play in the household economy and how 
this impacts on the allocation of both labour and land. 
Maletta51 has outlined how small landholdings, low 
yields and high population densities in Afghanistan 
preclude the majority of farmers from achieving 
(let alone surpassing) self-sufficiency in wheat and 
deriving any monetary value from its production. 
The result is that for the vast majority of farmers in 
Afghanistan, wheat is a staple and not a cash crop 
and as such, the presentation of the gross returns (or 
even the net returns) on the two crops is misleading. 
For most farmers, an increase in the price of wheat 
does not result in a shift to commercial wheat 
production, even if the net returns on wheat 
production surpass those of opium. Instead, high 
wheat prices are seen by farmers as bringing about 
an increase in the cost of food that needs to be 
managed by the household. This is especially the 
case where there are concerns over wheat imports 
from neighbouring countries such as Pakistan and 
where violence and conflict make it difficult to travel 
and purchase wheat at the local market.52 
For farmers who own sufficient land, an increase 
in wheat prices may result in an increase in wheat 
production. However, this will largely be at the 
margin, where households may forego some of the 
land that they had cultivated with cash crops the 
previous year (including opium poppy) to produce 
extra wheat for family consumption.53  It should be 
emphasised that this shift to wheat is not driven by 
the pursuit of profit and commercial production, but 
rather by the need to hold down financial outlays for 
a staple food and to secure wheat supply.54  
It remains unclear 
why we are still only 
presented with a 
comparison between 
the gross returns 
on wheat, a crop 
grown primarily for 
consumption, and 
opium, an input-
intensive and labour-
intensive cash crop. 
In addition to being 
misleading, such 
comparisons may 
further distort policy 
thinking, not least by 
giving an impression 
that the primary 
alternative to opium 
poppy is wheat, which 
could not be farther 
from the truth.’
‘
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However, for the vast majority of Afghan farmers, 
small landholdings and the large number of 
household members mean that they cannot meet 
their household food requirements even if they 
allocate all of their land to wheat. For these farmers 
there will always be a need for cash income to 
make up any food deficit and to manage the risk 
of crop failure. Therefore, in response to increasing 
wheat prices, these farmers will persist with cash 
crop production and where possible pursue 
wage labour opportunities so that they can meet 
the rising cost of wheat flour on the market. For 
farmers that do not own any land at all and gain 
access to land through sharecropping or tenancy 
arrangements, an increase in the wheat price may 
force them off the land altogether, if landowners 
look to ensure food security by substituting 
wheat for opium poppy and no longer require 
sharecroppers or tenant farmers to manage the 
land due to the lower labour inputs required 
for wheat production. Moreover, if sizeable 
landowners are prevented from opium cultivation 
(i.e. by an effective ban), they will make ends meet 
cultivating wheat, but will eject sharecroppers 
who had been on their land cultivating opium 
poppy and instead engage in wheat cultivation 
entirely or largely with household labour.
The varying responses to an increase in the 
price of wheat from farmers with quite different 
landholdings reflects the inadequacy of the 
current comparison of the economic returns on 
opium and wheat. Not only does it portray a far too 
simplified model of farmers as economic actors 
having solely income maximising objectives, 
choosing between two crops grown with quite 
different functions and inputs, but it also presents 
an image of farmers as homogenous, landed, 
shaped by the same aspirations and preferences 
and in a position to respond to shifts in prices 
by simply reallocating inputs from one activity 
to another.  This is clearly not the case in rural 
Afghanistan and it distorts our understanding of 
those who are engaged in drug crop cultivation 
and how they respond to efforts to encourage 
them to abandon it.  
Of course, a range of other crops are cultivated 
in the winter alongside opium poppy and 
wheat, including onion, spring onion, garlic, 
clover, spinach and squash, which rarely figure 
in comparisons with opium poppy. There are 
also crops that are planted in the spring, such as 
watermelon, melon, cotton, eggplant, cucumber, 
tomato, pea, green bean and okra, all of which 
compete with opium poppy for both household 
land and labour, but only between February/
March and May when opium is harvested and not 
for the entire winter growing season.  
Estimates have shown that the potential net 
returns on these cash crops have often been 
favourable.  For example, research in Nangarhar 
in 2006 showed higher net returns for gandana 
(a type of leek), onion, okra, potato, squash and 
tomato than for opium poppy.55  In Badakhshan, 
Johnson and Polovny56 reported higher net 
returns from tomato, eggplant, onion, cucumber, 
carrot, turnip, cauliflower and okra than for opium 
in 2007. Moreover, unlike opium poppy, many 
of these crops can be intercropped and farmers 
have been found to have as many as five crops 
cultivated on the same unit of land at the same 
time. 
Given the multitude of crops that compete with 
opium poppy for the factors of production in 
Afghanistan and the fact that many can be grown 
alongside each other as a way of managing pests, 
labour inputs and risks of crop failure, it remains 
unclear why we are still only presented with a 
comparison between the gross returns on wheat, 
a crop grown primarily for consumption and 
opium, an input-intensive and labour-intensive 
cash crop. In addition to being misleading, such 
comparisons may further distort policy thinking, 
not least by giving an impression that the primary 
alternative to opium poppy is wheat, which could 
not be farther from the truth.
Many of the 
statistics used as 
both descriptors 
of illicit drug crop 
production and 
metrics for assessing 
the performance of 
drug control measures 
are conceptually and 
methodologically 
weak. Guilty of drugs 
fetishism - viewing the 
world solely through 
the prism of drug 
production and drug 
control measures 
- these statistics 
give little or no 
consideration to the 
wider socioeconomic, 
political and 
environmental 
context inhabited by 
those individuals and 
communities that 
cultivate opium poppy 
and coca. ’
‘
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ConClusion
Statistics shape how we view the world, 
particularly when they describe activities 
or population groups that few have direct 
experience of such as is the case with illicit 
drug crop production.  As this paper has 
shown, many of the statistics used as both 
descriptors of illicit drug crop production 
and metrics for assessing the performance 
of drug control measures are conceptually 
and methodologically weak. Guilty of drugs 
fetishism - viewing the world solely through 
the prism of drug production and drug control 
measures - these statistics give little or no 
consideration to the wider socioeconomic, 
political and environmental context inhabited 
by those individuals and communities that 
cultivate opium poppy and coca. 
Indicative of this fetishism is the reductionism 
with which the communities that cultivate drug 
crops are described. In the case of Afghanistan, 
drug control agencies such as UNODC depict 
rural households in binary terms, as either 
‘poppy farmers’ or ‘non poppy farmers.’ Their 
livelihood activities are circumscribed by a 
comparison of the gross returns on opium and 
wheat57 and by statistics which assert that it 
is simply ‘high price’ that motivates farmers 
to cultivate opium poppy: a caricature that is 
frequently perpetuated in the media and in 
some of the scholarly literature.58 
These statistics fail to capture the diversity 
of drugs cultivating contexts and the 
varied patterns of opium poppy and coca 
cultivation within a single source country. 
They simplistically portray those who cultivate 
drug crops as homogenous economic actors 
driven by the desire to maximise income;59 
either for the purpose of conspicuous 
consumption - ‘the greedy’60 - or as a means of 
escaping poverty - ‘the needy.’   Risk is largely 
considered in the context of the state acting to 
destroy the crop.61 How different households 
and communities living under different 
circumstances and political orders experience 
and manage the risk of the imposition of a 
ban or crop destruction is largely neglected, 
as is the diverse risks and opportunities that 
households and communities associate with 
engaging in activities related to ‘the legal 
economy.’ As the critique of these statistics has 
shown, there is much in the current portrayal 
of drug crop-producing households that, 
to quote Durrenberger62 in his discussion 
of Chayanov’s seminal work on the peasant 
economy, ‘do not match the realities observed.’ 
 
This process of abstraction, methodologically 
by asking specific drug-related questions, and 
conceptually by producing data describing 
those that cultivate drug crops, that is distinct 
from the assets, institutions, organisations, 
policies and legislation that shapes their 
livelihoods, offers little of analytical value 
to those practitioners actively engaged in 
development in rural areas where opium 
poppy and coca are grown.  Confronted with 
real examples of households and communities 
transitioning out of illicit drug crop production 
through the diversification of on-farm, off-farm 
and non-farm income and the provision of 
public goods, development practitioners are 
confounded by the drug control community’s 
reaction to a rise in aggregate levels of 
cultivation - even though the increases may 
have occurred in a more remote and less 
well endowed part of the province.  They 
are further undermined by explanations of 
cultivation that are reduced to price, profit and 
high income and abstinence to the activities of 
the state and its campaigns of eradication and 
law enforcement.  
Although these explanations for shifting 
levels of cultivation often have little empirical 
basis, they have provided development policy 
makers in western capitals, already nervous 
about engaging in what is undoubtedly a 
complex and highly politicised issue, the 
reason to abrogate responsibility to a drug 
control community that lacks expertise in 
rural livelihoods and the political economy of 
conflict affected states.  The result is the kind 
of simplistic models of rural development 
that have been so common in Afghanistan 
and other drug producing countries, where 
development assistance is a means to leverage 
reductions in drug crop cultivation from rural 
elites and power brokers - the oft cited ‘carrot 
and stick’ - while development outcomes and 
how they are distributed go largely unnoticed. 
It is clear that development organisations 
need greater support in developing a better 
understanding not only of the diverse 
circumstances and motives that influence 
drug crop cultivation but also of the different 
pathways that households follow when they 
transition out of opium and coca production. 
Greater academic research in this area will help, 
supported by a much more discerning review 
of current drug-related statistics by scholars 
and development policy makers alike.
.
Explanations for shifting 
levels of cultivation often 
have little empirical 
basis.  Yet, they have 
provided development 
policy makers in western 
capitals, already nervous 
about engaging in what 
is undoubtedly a complex 
and highly politicised issue, 
the reason to abrogate 
responsibility to a drug 
control community that 
lacks expertise in rural 
livelihoods and the 
political economy of 
conflict affected states.  
The result is the kind 
of simplistic models of 
rural development that 
have been so common 
in Afghanistan and other 
drug producing countries, 
where development 
assistance is a means to 
leverage reductions in drug 
crop cultivation from rural 
elites and power brokers 
- the oft cited ‘carrot and 
stick’ - while development 
outcomes and how they 
are distributed go  
largely unnoticed.           ’
‘
      |   AFTER THE DRUG WARS LSE EXPERT GROUP ON THE ECONOMICS OF DRUG POLICY  |138 139
1 Editors note: this represents a policy 
overview of extensive statistical data to 
be found in W. A. Byrd and D. Mansfield, 
‘Afghanistan’s Opium Economy: An 
Agricultural, Livelihoods, and Governance 
Perspective’, Prepared for the World 
Bank Afghanistan Agriculture Sector 
Review, Revised Version: 23 June 2014.
2 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 
Reconstruction, ‘Quarterly Report to 
the United States Congress’, 30 July 
2014, https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/
quarterlyreports/2014-07-30qr.pdf, p.82.
3 D. Mansfield, ‘Helmand on the Move: 
Migration as a Response to Crop Failure’, 
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Brief 
(Kabul: AREU, 2015), http://www.areu.
org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1521E-%20
Helmand%20on%20the%20Move-%20
Migration%20as%20a%20Response%20
to%20Crop%20Failure.pdf.
4 W. Byrd and D. Mansfield, ‘Licensing 
Afghan Opium for Medicinal Use: 
Why It Won’t Work’, Peacebrief 179 
(Washington, D.C.: USIP, 2014).
5 ‘UNDCP’s development projects appear no 
different from the numerous other small-
scale inputs (schools, irrigation, health 
centres etc) being made by the NGO’s and 
other development orientated UN agencies.  
The latter agencies at least have experience 
and some comparative advantage in 
development.  It would not appear to 
be cost effective to fund UNDCP as an 
intermediary to build schools etc. when 
they simply contract out to others to do the 
work.  We are also concerned that excessive 
UNDCP attention to a myriad of projects 
distracts attention away from the area of 
comparative advantage which relate to 
their mandate as a specialist drugs agency’. 
From M. Kapila, G. Templar, and E. Winter, 
‘Review of British Aid to Afghanistan’ 
(Emergency Aid Department/Western 
Asia Department: Overseas Development 
Administration, 1995), p.52.   
6 UNODC report that commitments 
to alternative development account 
for ‘just 0.2% of overall development 
assistance’ and only ‘3% of all 
development assistance in the four 
main coca-producing and opium-
producing countries’ between 2009 
and 2013. UNODC, ‘World Drug Report 
2015’ (Vienna: UNODC, 2015), https://
www.unodc.org/documents/wdr2015/
World_Drug_Report_2015.pdf, pp.84,88.  
7 D. Mansfield, ‘Examining the Impact 
of IDEA-NEW on Opium Production: 
Nangarhar: A Case Study’, 2015, http://
pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00KCPT.pdf.
8 Between June 1997 and December 
2000, David Mansfield managed 
the UNDCP Afghan Opium Poppy 
Survey in Afghanistan.       
9 UNODC, ‘Afghanistan Opium Poppy 
Survey 2014: Cultivation and Production’ 
(Vienna: UNODC, 2015), p.6 
10 For more detail see D. Mansfield, Alcis 
Ltd, and OSDR, Managing Concurrent 
and Repeated Risks: Explaining the 
Reductions in Opium Production in 
Central Helmand between 2008 and 
2011 (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and 
Evaluation Unit, 2011), http://www.areu.
org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1122E%20
Managing%20Concurrent%20and%20
Repeated%20Risks%202011.pdf ;  and 
Mansfield, ‘Examining the Impact of 
IDEA-NEW on Opium Production’. 
11 For example see the Ministry of Counter 
Narcotics assessment of the Helmand 
Food Zone and its push to replicate 
the programme in Kandahar, Uruzgan 
and Badakhshan, at http://mcn.gov.af/
en/page/5138/5141, as well as Senator 
Dianne Feinstein’s letter to Hillary 
Clinton calling for the same thing  (D. 
Feinstein, ‘Feinstein: Support Afghan 
Farmers, Cut Off Taliban’s Drug Funding’, 
7 February 2012, http://www.feinstein.
senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2012/2/
feinstein-support-afghan-farmers-cut-
off-taliban-s-drug-funding) and contrast 
this with J. Havfenstein’s critique (‘The 
Helmand Food Zone Fiasco’, 26 August 
2010, http://registan.net/2010/08/26/
helmand-food-zone-fiasco/) or that of V. 
Felbab-Brown (‘Afghanistan Trip Report VI: 
Counternarcotics Policy in Afghanistan:  
A Good Strategy Poorly  
Implemented ‘, 10 May 2012, 
http://www.brookings.edu/
research/opinions/2012/05/10-
counternarcotics-felbabbrown).
12 UNODC and the Ministry of Counter 
Narcotics (MCN), Afghanistan Opium 
Survey (Kabul: UNODC/MCN, 2007), p.7.
13 David Mansfield’s own 
experience in the 1990s.
14 Central Statistics Organisation (CSO), 
Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook 2007/08, 
(Kabul: CSO, 2008), downloaded from 
http://www.cso.gov.af/, p.xviii.
15 The 2011/2012 NRVA takes an ‘implied’ 
average household size of 7.4 persons 
CSO, Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook 
2013/14, (Kabul: CSO, 2014), downloaded 
from http://www.cso.gov.af/, p.12).
16 CSO, Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook 
2004/05, (Kabul: CSO, 2005), downloaded 
from http://www.cso.gov.af/, p.88.
17 For example, UNHABITAT, UNDP, and 
the Helmand Planning Group, ‘Helmand 
Initiative Socio-Economic Survey: 
Prepared by Agency Coordinating 
Body for Afghan Relief Survey Unit 
(Peshawar)’, 2000, http://www.
scottshelmandvalleyarchives.org/docs/
fes-00-04.pdf, p.1,  reported an average 
household size of 12.7 ; the Swedish 
Committee for Afghanistan, ‘Farming 
systems of Nad Ali District, Helmand 
Province’, Afghanistan Agricultural 
Survey, Fifteenth Report, part VI, 1992, 
estimated an average household size 
of 13 ; and Mansfield’s own work in 
Helmand over an extended period.
18 Alcis, ‘Where have all the flowers 
gone? The real reasons for the drop 
in the poppy crop in Afghanistan in 
2015’, 10 October 2015, https://stories.
alcis.org/where-have-all-the-flowers-
gone-7de7b34e8478#.5w9yl9u2h.
19 UNODC, ‘World Drug Report 2015’, p.94; 
UNODC, ‘Afghanistan Opium Poppy 
Survey 2014: Cultivation and Production’ 
(Vienna: UNODC, 2015), pp.7-8.
20 The 2005 survey also reported the reasons 
farmers were cultivating opium poppy 
that year, but the question was originally 
one that asked ‘the reasons for increasing 
cultivation of opium poppy’ (UNODC 
and MCN), United Nations Afghanistan 
Opium Survey (Kabul: UNODC/MCN, 
2005), p. 62) rather than the reasons 
for cultivation per se. Since 2006 the 
question has remained unchanged.  
21 UNODC and MCN, Afghanistan Opium 
Survey (Kabul: UNODC/MCN, 2006), p.73.
22 UNODC and MCN, Afghanistan 
Opium Survey, 2007, p.99.
23 UNODC and MCN, Afghanistan Opium 
Survey (Kabul: UNODC/MCN, 2008), p.105.
24 UNODC and MCN,  Afghanistan Opium  
Survey (Kabul: UNODC/MCN, 2009), p.79.
25 UNODC and MCN, Afghanistan Opium 
Survey (Kabul: UNODC/MCN, 2010), p.62.
26 UNODC and MCN, Afghanistan Opium 
Survey (Kabul: UNODC/MCN, 2011), p.60.
27 UNODC and the Ministry of Counter 
Narcotics (MCN), Afghanistan Opium 
Survey (Kabul: UNODC/MCN, 2012), p.54.
28 UNODC and MCN, Afghanistan Opium 
Survey (Kabul: UNODC/MCN, 2013), p.51.
29 UNODC and MCN,  Afghanistan Opium 
Poppy Survey 2014: Socio Economic 
Analysis (Vienna: UNODC, 2015), p.33. 
30 UNODC and MCN, United Nations 
Afghanistan opium Survey, 2006, p.99; 
UNODC and MCN, United Nations 
Afghanistan Opium Survey, 2008, p.105.
31 With the exception of ‘high 
income for little land’ in 2012 and 
poverty in 2014 which were both 
cited by 20% of respondents. 
32 D. Mansfield, Alcis Ltd., and OSDR, 
‘Managing Concurrent and Repeated 
Risks: Explaining the reductions in opium 
production in central Helmand between 
2008 and 2011’ (Kabul: Afghanistan 
Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), p.8.
noTes
      |   AFTER THE DRUG WARS LSE EXPERT GROUP ON THE ECONOMICS OF DRUG POLICY  |138 139
33  A. Pinney, ‘DFID Afghanistan Data Quality 
Assessment of the Asia Foundation 
Surveys of the Afghan People 2006-2009’, 
Unpublished Report, September 2010.
34  D. Mansfield, ‘‘Economical with 
the truth’: The limits of price and 
profitability in both explaining opium 
poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and 
in designing effective responses’, In A. 
Pain and J. Sutton (Eds.), Reconstructing 
Agriculture in Afghanistan (Rugby: 
Practical Action Publishing, 2007), p.20.
35  In the south opium poppy seed sells 
for around 300 PR/man.  A man is a 
unit of weight typically used in the 
south and is the equivalent of 4.5 kg.  
36  In 2005, 976 metric tonnes of poppy seed 
were exported, down from 3,198 metric 
tonnes in 2003/04 (CSO, Afghanistan 
Statistical Year Book (2009-09: 205).
37  Dawn, ‘Reducing edible oil imports’, 
Dawn, 24 November 2008, http://
www.dawn.com/news/430194/
reducing-edible-oil-imports. 
38  H. Maletta, ‘The Grain and the Chaff: Crop 
residues and the cost of production of 
wheat in Afghanistan in a framing system 
perspective’, Unpublished Paper, 2004, p.2. 
39  Maletta, ‘The Grain and the Chaff’.
40  D. Mansfield, Poppy Free Provinces: 
Measure or a Target? Report for AREU’s 
Applied Thematic Research into Water 
Management, Livestock and the Opium 
Economy (Kabul: AREU, 2009), p.48 ; 
Maletta, ‘The Grain and the Chaff’, p.13.
41  G. M. Johnston and J. J. Povolny, 
‘Alternative Development Program for 
Northeast Afghanistan (ADP/N): Economic 
Analysis of Net Returns to Opium Poppy, 
Wheat and Vegetables, Badakhshan, 
2007’ (United States: USAID, 2008), p.21.
42  D. Mansfield and A. Pain, Counter 
Narcotics in Afghanistan: The 
Failure of Success? (Kabul: AREU 
Briefing Paper, 2008), p.16.
43  Maletta, ‘The Grain and the Chaff’, p.24.
44  Maletta, ‘The Grain and the Chaff’.
45  D. Mansfield, ‘Coping Strategies, 
Accumulated Wealth and Shifting 
Markets: The Story of Opium Poppy 
Cultivation in Badakhshan 2000-
2003’, A Report for the Aga Khan 
Development Network, 2004, p.8.
46  See ‘Diversity and Dilemma: 
Understanding Rural Livelihoods and 
Addressing the Causes of Opium Poppy 
Cultivation in Nangarhar and Laghman, 
Eastern Afghanistan’ (PAL – Internal 
Document No. 2, December 2005, p.8).
47  Mansfield, Poppy Free Provinces, p.48.
48  See UNDCP, Afghanistan: Assessment 
Strategy and Programming Mission 
to Afghanistan (Kabul: UNDCP, May-
July 1995) ; and UNDCP, Afghanistan 
Annual Opium Poppy Survey 1997, 
(Islamabad: UNDCP, 1997), p.11,  cited in 
D. Mansfield, ‘The Economic Superiority 
of Illicit Drug Production: Myth and 
Reality - Opium Poppy Cultivation in 
Afghanistan’, Paper prepared for the 
International Conference on Alternative 
Development in Drug Control and 
Cooperation, Feldafing, 7-12 January 2012.
49  UNODC and MCN, Afghanistan 
Opium Poppy Survey, April 2013 
(Kabul: UNODC/MCN), p.62
50  UNODC and MCN, Afghanistan 
Opium Poppy Survey, December 
2013 (Kabul: UNODC/MCN), p.10.  
51  Maletta, ‘The Grain and the Chaff’, p.4.
52  Mansfield, Poppy Free Provinces 
; Mansfield et al., Managing 
concurrent and repeated risks.
53  Mansfield et al., Managing 
concurrent and repeated risks.
54  W. A. Phillips, G. W. Horn, and M. E. Smith, 
‘Effect of protein supplementation on 
forage intake and nitrogen balance 
of lambs fed freshly harvested 
wheat forage’, Journal of Animal 
Sciences 73 (1995): 2687-2693.
55  D. Mansfield, ‘Exploring the ‘Shades 
of Grey’: An Assessment of the Factors 
Influencing Decisions to Cultivate 
Opium Poppy in 2005/06’, A Report for 
the Afghan Drugs Inter-Departmental 
Unit of the UK Government, http://www.
davidmansfield.org/data/Field_Work/
UK/Final2005Drivers.pdf, p.22. 
56  Johnston and Povolny, ‘Alternative 
Development Program for 
Northeast Afghanistan (ADP/N)’.
57  UNODC and MCN, Afghanistan Opium 
Poppy Survey, December 2013, pp.63-64
58  J. P. Caulkins, J.D. Kulick, and M. A. R. 
Kleiman, ‘Drug Production and trafficking, 
Counterdrug Policies and Security and 
Governance in Afghanistan’, (New York 
City, Center on International Cooperation, 
New York University) ; P. Keefer and N. 
Loayza, ‘Innocent Bystanders: Developing 
Countries and the War on Drugs’ (World 
Bank Publications, 2010), pp.95-134.
59  UNODC and MCN, Afghanistan Opium 
Poppy Survey, December 2013, pp.63-
64 ; Caulkins et al., ‘Drug Production 
and trafficking, Counterdrug Policies 
and Security and Governance in 
Afghanistan’, p.23 ; M. Naim, Illicit: how 
smugglers, traffickers and copycats 
are hijacking the global economy 
(London: Arrow Books, 2005), p.69.
60  Chouvy (P. A. Chouvy, Opium: Uncovering 
the Politics of Poppy (London: I.B.Tauris, 
2009), p.158) cites a counternarcotics 
official in the British Embassy in reference 
to Helmand Province, saying ‘My feeling 
is that a lot of the poppy is grown here 
by people who are greedy, not needy; 
not by people who have to grow 
poppy. They are growing it for profit. 
They are not being forced to grow it, 
they choose to grow it, and they do it 
because they can get away with it’.    
61  F. E. Thoumi, Illegal drugs, Economy, and 
Society in the Andes (Washington DC: 
Woodrow Center Press, 2003) ; D. Mejia, 
‘Evaluating Plan Colombia’ in P. Keefer 
and N. Loayza (ed.) Innocent Bystanders: 
developing Countries and the war on 
drugs (World Bank Publications, 2010).
62  P. E. Durrenberger, ‘Chayanov’s 
Economic Analysis in Anthropology’, 
Journal of Anthropological Research 
36, no.2 (1980): 133-148, p.134.
Editor 
Dr John Collins
Managing Editor 
Alexander Soderholm
Project Assistant
Jay Pan
Creative Director
Indira Endaya
Cover photography 
Adrianna Zajaczkowska
LSE IDEAS is an IGA Centre that acts as the 
School’s foreign policy think tank.  
Through sustained engagement with  
policymakers and opinion-formers,  
IDEAS provides a forum that informs  
policy debate and connects academic  
research with the practice of diplomacy  
and strategy.
IDEAS hosts interdisciplinary research  
projects, produces working papers and 
reports, holds public and off-the-record 
events, and delivers cutting-edge executive 
training programmes for government,  
business and third-sector organisations.
Supported by grants from:
